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CASE NUMBER: 553105 - NYC: 209209
FINDINGS OF FACT & DECISION
Case Number: 209209
Student Name: [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "Student")
Date of Birth: [REDACTED]
School District: [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as "School District")
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Actual Record Close Date: June 12, 2023
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey J. Schiro, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
For the Student:
[REDACTED], ESQ., Attorney
For the District:
[REDACTED], PH.D., District Representative
I. JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. This hearing was requested by the attorneys for student and the parent in a due process complaint dated June 30, 2021. The primary issue to be determined at this hearing is whether the School District offered the student a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") for the 2021/22 school year (Exs. P-A, P-B). [1]
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program ("IEP"), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (the "CSE") that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student." See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1).
An impartial hearing officer ("IHO") typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(A), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii).
The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration of the resolution session period. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer ("SRO"). See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(k).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 30, 2021, the School District appointed the undersigned to serve as the IHO in this matter. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(3)(i). On August 26, 2021, the parent files an amended due process complaint. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(7). On September 17, 2021, the parties entered into a pendency agreement, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(m), in which the School District agreed to fund the student's placement at the [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as the "Private School"), i.e., tuition, related service and transportation costs, for the twelve (12) month 2021/22 school year for the duration of these proceedings (Ex. IHO-II). Conferences with the parties were thereafter held on April 24, 2023, May 24, 2023 and June 13, 2023 to discuss the status of the litigation and determine if the parties' pendency agreement had been fully implemented (R. 1-37).[2] Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the August 26, 2021 amended due process complaint, the student was [REDACTED] years old and has been diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD"), REDACTED Syndrome and severe global developmental delays among other significant health concerns. For the 2021/22 school year, the student was enrolled for instruction at the Private School. The Commissioner of Education has not approved the Private School as a nonpublic school with which public school districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities. See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(d), 200.7. The student's eligibility for special education and related services as a student with multiple disabilities is not in dispute in this hearing (Exs. P-A, P-B).[3] See 34
The CSE convened on September 15, 2020 to develop an IEP for the student. On or about January 26, 2021, the parent received a copy of CSE's IEP for the student from the September 15, 2020 meeting. The CSE reportedly recommended that the student be educated in a 6:1+1 special class program at a specialized school. In a letter dated May 28, 2021, School District advised the parent that the student's recommended program for the 2021/22 school year would be implemented at [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as the "Public School"). In her due process complaint, the parent objects to the CSE's IEP for the student on a number of procedural and substantive grounds and seeks an Order directing the School District to fund the student's unilateral placement at the Private School for the 2021/22 school year (Exs. P-A, P-B). This hearing ensued.
IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The School District
As this case has been addressed through pendency, the case should be withdrawn with prejudice if the school has been paid or kept open until the pendency agreement is fully implemented (R. 5, 32). The School District opposes holding a hearing on the merits (R. 19).
B. The Parent
The School District has failed to fully implement the parties' pendency agreement. Although the School District has reimbursed the parent $500 that she paid toward the student's tuition, the Private School has not received any payments from the School District; there remains an outstanding tuition balance of $135,149 (R. 13-16). The parent cannot withdraw the case until include deaf-blindness. 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(8). the School District fully implements the parties' pendency agreement and pays the outstanding tuition balance to the Private School (R. 20-21). The parent is prepared to have a hearing on the merits if the School District will not fund the placement via pendency, but requests an Order directing the School District to implement the parties' pendency agreement (R. 20, 30-31).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Applicable Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). [4]
A FAPE is offered to a student when: (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2014); H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3155869 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013); R.E. v. New York City Dep't. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied 2013 WL 1418840 (U.S. June 10, 2013); M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 (2d Cir. 2012); Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005).
"'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.'" Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement." Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 2017). While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and has indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not," see R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91, the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA, M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003); Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007); R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.H. v. Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3242234, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010); E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008), aff'd, 2009 WL 3326627 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009); Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. The "IDEA, [however,] does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Grim, 346 F.3d at 379.
Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement.'" See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130); see also T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2008); Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15. The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" See Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment ("LRE"). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114(a)(2)(i), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); see also Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 4946429 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Patskin v. Board of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(i); Tarlowe v. Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320(a)(2)(i), (2)(i)(A); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(v). [5] A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). The remedy of tuition reimbursement has been extended to authorize direct payments to a private school for educational services rendered where Burlington/Carter factors are satisfied. Mr. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Connors v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010). B. Mootness It is well settled that the dispute between the parties must at all stages be "real and live," and not "academic," or it risks becoming moot. See Lillbask v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008); see also Chenier v. Richard W., 82 N.Y.2d 830, 832 (1993); Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714 (1980). Mootness may be raised at any stage of litigation. See In re Kurtzman, 194 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1999). Administrative decisions rendered in cases that concern such issues that arise out of school years since expired may no longer appropriately address the current needs of the student. See Daniel R.R. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1989); M.S. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280-81 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). In general, cases dealing with issues such as desired changes in IEPs, specific placements, and implementation disputes may become moot at the end of the school year because no meaningful relief can be granted. See V.M. v. No. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3187069, at *13-*15 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2013); Application of a Student with a Disability (New York City Dep't of Educ.), Appeal No. 12-205 at 8 (SRO July 31, 2014).
In this case, there is no longer any live controversy relating to the parent's claim for tuition reimbursement and/or direct payment for the student's unilateral private placement for the 2021/22 school year. The school year that is the subject of this hearing has expired and the parties' September 17, 2021 pendency agreement granted the parent all the relief requested in her due process complaint. Other than the implementation issue identified by the parent, this matter is now moot.
Alternatively, an exception to the mootness doctrine provides that a claim may not be moot despite the end of a school year for which the student's IEP was written, if the conduct complained of is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 (1988); Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 84-85; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040. The exception applies only in limited situations, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983), and is severely circumscribed, Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1998). First, it must be apparent that "the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982); see Knaust, 157 F.3d at 88. Second, controversies are "capable of repetition" when there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d at 714-15. To create a reasonable expectation of recurrence, repetition must be more than theoretically possible. See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482; Russman v. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2001). Mere speculation that the parties will be involved in a dispute over the same issue does not rise to the level of a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability of recurrence. See Russman, 260 F.3d at 120.
I find that the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here, as the CSE should have convened to revise the student's program and develop new IEPs for the student for the 2022/23 and 2023/24 school years. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(f). As noted during the April 24, 2023 conference, the parent has filed a separate due process complaint concerning the 2022/23 school year (i.e., Case No. 227638).
C. Enforcement of Pendency Agreement
It is well settled that neither IHOs nor SROs have authority to enforce prior decisions rendered by administrative hearing officers. See N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 4404(1)(a), (2); A.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 76, 78 n.13 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that IHOs do not retain jurisdiction to enforce their orders and that a party who receives a favorable administrative determination may enforce it in court); A.T. v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 1998 WL 765371, at *7, *9-*10 & n.16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998) (noting that SROs have no independent enforcement power and granting an injunction requiring the district to implement a final SRO decision).
In the event that a parent experiences difficulty with a school district in implementing a final decision of an IHO or SRO reached through the impartial due process hearing process, such parent may file a State complaint against the district through the State complaint process for failure to implement an IHO or SRO's due process decision or may seek enforcement through the judicial system. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c)(3); SJB v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2004 WL 1586500, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (finding that parties need not initiate additional administrative proceedings to enforce prior administrative orders); see also A.R., 407 F.3d at 76, 78 n.13.
At the April 24, 2023 conference, I directed counsel for the student and parent to confirm whether full payment had been made by the School District for the student's tuition, related service and transportation costs at the Private School for the 2021/22 school year, in compliance with the parties' September 17, 2021 pendency agreement. At the May 24, 2023 conference, counsel informed me that for the 2021/22 school year, there remains an outstanding tuition balance of $135,149. The School District requested additional time for its Implementation Unit to comply with the parties' pendency agreement. See L.V. v. [REDACTED], No. 03–CV–9917 (LAP), 2021 WL 663718, at *3–4, *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2021) (Preska, Senior D.J.) (discussing the School District's long history of failing to timely implement IHO orders, along with the School District's attempts to excuse those failures).
In light of the implementation issue, I cannot simply dismiss this matter as moot. Nor, however, am I permitted to retain jurisdiction over this matter solely to enforce the parties' pendency agreement. See A.R., 407 F.3d at 76, 78 n.13. Instead, I now determine that, by virtue of the parties' pendency agreement in this matter, the student is entitled to full reimbursement and/or direct payment for tuition, related service and specialized transportation costs associated with the student's unilateral placement at the Private School for the 2021/22 school year. See Araujo v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 20 Civ. 7032 (LGS), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, 2020 WL 5701828, 77 IDELR 127 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020). If the parent experiences difficulty with the School District in implementing this final decision, she may file a State complaint against the School District, see 8 NYCRR § 200.5(l), or seek enforcement through the judicial system, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c)(3); A.R., 407 F.3d at 76, 78 n.13.
VI. ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, the School District shall reimburse the parent, and/or directly pay, all tuition, related service, and transportation costs associated with the student's unilateral placement at the Private School during the 2021/22 school year.
Dated: June 26, 2023
/s/ Jeffrey J. Schiro
Jeffrey J. Schiro, Esq.
Impartial Hearing Officer
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the public school district has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer ("SRO") of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
If either party plan to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.
An appealing party's request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENT
A. Due Process Complaint/Impartial Hearing Request, 6/30/21, 16 pgs.
B. Amended Due Process Complaint/Impartial Hearing Request, 8/26/21, 16 pgs.
SCHOOL DISTRICT
None
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
I. Order
on Consolidation (Case Nos. 209209 & 194965), 8/22/21, 5 pgs.
II. Pendency Agreement, 9/17/21, 2 pgs.
III. Extension Order, 11/9/21, 1 pg.
IV. Extension Order, 12/9/21, 1 pg.
V. Extension Order, 1/8/22, 1 pg.
VI. Extension Order, 2/7/22, 1 pg.
VII. Extension Order, 3/9/22, 1 pg.
VIII. Extension Order, 4/8/22, 1 pg.
IX. Extension Order, 5/8/22, 1 pg.
X. Extension Order, 6/7/22, 1 pg.
XI. Extension Order, 7/7/22, 1 pg.
XII. Extension Order, 8/6/22, 1 pg.
XIII. Extension Order, 9/5/22, 1 pg.
XIV. Extension Order, 10/5/22, 1 pg.
XV. Extension Order, 11/4/22, 1 pg.
XVI. Extension Order, 12/4/22, 1 pg.
XVII. Extension Order, 1/3/23, 1 pg. XVIII. Extension Order, 2/2/23, 1 pg.
XIX. Extension Order, 3/4/23, 1 pg.
XX. Extension Order, 4/3/23, 1 pg.
XXI. Extension Order, 5/3/23, 1 pg.
XXII. Extension Order, 6/2/23, 1 pg.
Footnotes
[1] References to the hearing transcript are noted as "R." References to exhibits admitted into evidence are noted as "Ex."
[2] Following my appointment to this case, the parties moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter several times. In considering those requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that the stated reasons justified the delay in the resolution of the matter and were in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, requests for extensions of the case compliance date were granted (R. 7-8, 24-25; Exs. IHO-III – IHO-XXII).
[3] Multiple disabilities means concomitant impairments (such as intellectual disability-blindness, intellectual disability-orthopedic impairment, etc.), the combination of which cause such severe educational needs that they cannot be accommodated in a special education program solely for one of the impairments. The term does not C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(8); 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(8).
[4] The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.
[5] The Supreme Court has stated that even if it is unreasonable to expect a student to attend a regular education setting and achieve on grade level, the educational program set forth in the student's IEP "must be appropriately ambitious in light of his [or her] circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives." See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.