NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.
NYSED # 539461 / NYC # 196182
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number: 196182
Student’s Name: REDACTED
School District: N.Y.C. Dept. of Ed., District # REDACTED Impartial Hearing Officer: Harry A. Christodoulou
Date of Filing: 06/30/2021
Hearing Requested by: REDACTED (“Parent”)
Date of Hearing: 05/31/2022
Record Close Date: 05/31/2022
Date of Decision: 06/13/2022
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON MAY 31, 2022
For the Student:
REDACTED (hereinafter referred to as “Parent’s representative”)
REDACTED (hereinafter referred to as “Parent”)
For the Department of Education (“DOE”):
REDACTED (hereinafter referred to as “District’s representative”)
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Student was a REDACTED-year-old child classified as a student with a disability under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) during the 2019-2020 school year (“SY”). The Student’s eligibility for special education supports and services at that time was not in dispute.
On July 07, 2020, the Parent, through the Parent’s representative firm, filed a due process complaint (“DPC”) against the DOE pursuant to the IDEA. I was appointed on December 30, 2020, to preside over the claims in the DPC in terms of New York State regulations, and to conduct an impartial hearing (“IH”) pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) and New York State Education Law § 4404(1) to determine the claims in the DPC, concerning the special education program of the Student.
The parties sought, and were afforded time, to try resolve the matter without the need for an IH. At a status conference (“SC”) held on April 5, 2022 a date for the IH was agreed for May 25, 2022, so that the matter could proceed to IH if the settlement negotiations did not lead to a resolution. The hearing date was moved out by agreement to May 31, 2022.
JURISDICTION
A decision in this matter is being rendered, pursuant to the IDEA[1], and its implementing regulations[2], and the New York State Education Law[3], and its implementing regulations[4].
PARTIES’ POSITIONS AND CASES PRESENTED
DOE:
At the IH held on May 31, 2022, the District’s representative confirmed that the DOE was not putting on a case in the sense that it would not be calling witnesses or submitting any documentation in support of the District’s case. I enquired from District’s representative whether the DOE was conceding that the DOE failed to provide the Student a Free and Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), and it was confirmed by District’s representative that the DOE was conceding Prong I.
In an opening statement at the IH, District representative: confirmed that the DOE conceded its Prong I case for the Student; stated that the only concern that was expressed related to the 44% portion of the tuition relating to the non-secular (religious) part of the program; and that once this issue was address, the DOE did not have any issues or concerns with any of the Parent’s witnesses and would not be cross-examining them.
Parent:
Parent, through the Parent’s representative, submitted 12 documents in support of the Parent’s case. The proposed exhibits were admitted to the record (and are listed below) after confirming with the District’s representative that there were no objections from the DOE to those documents being admitted into evidence.
The deponents to the affidavits (Exhibits P-E, P-F, P-J, and P-K) were not required for cross-examination or clarifying questions.
In an opening statement at the IH, Parent’s representative, inter alia: provided background and asserted that based upon the evidence submitted to the record the Parent had met her Prong II burden, raising the progress that the Student made even during the COVID-19 pandemic; confirmed that Parent was seeking tuition funding, based upon need which had been established by the evidence, for direct funding to the Attending School for the secular portion (56%) of the program and the services (100%); and asserted that they did not believe that any equitable factors would warrant a denial or reduction and that the Parent fully cooperated with the DOE.
PREVAILING PARTY
The Parent is the prevailing party, and an award or Order is granted in her favor.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The claims in the DPC relate to the Student’s special education program and placement for the 2019-2020 SY, asserting that based on numerous procedural and substantive grounds, the DOE failed to offer the Student a FAPE. Parent is seeking, inter alia, tuition funding for the cost of the Student’s placement at the Attending School for the 2019-2020 SY and relates services costs (Exhibit P-A-2).
A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its Committee on Special Education (“CSE”) through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits[5].
If a procedural violation is alleged, an impartial hearing officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student’s right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits[6].
The IDEA directs that, in general, an impartial hearing officer’s decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE[7], and default judgments are disfavored by the federal courts[8]. A school district offers a FAPE “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction”[9].
School districts are not required to “maximize” the potential of students with disabilities[10], but must provide “an IEP that is ‘likely to produce progress, not regression,’ and... affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial advancement’”[11]. The IEP must be “reasonably calculated to provide some ‘meaningful’ benefit”[12].
School districts have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in IDEA due process hearings, except that a parent or person in parental relationship seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement has the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement, which exception applies in this case[13].
The DOE may be required to pay for educational services obtained for a student by the student’s parent, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parent were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim[14].
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Prong I - Denial of a FAPE:
The DOE did not present any testimony to substantiate a case that it offered the Student a FAPE for the 2019-2020 SY. The Supreme Court has found that “[a] reviewing court may fairly expect those authorities [school district staff] to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”[15] There was no explanation offered, let alone a cogent and responsive one.
Given the DOE’s decision to concede Prong I, it has not discharged its burden in these proceedings to establish that it provided the Student a FAPE for the 2019-2020 SY. Parent has accordingly met the first criterion of the test set out in the Burlington/Carter case for tuition reimbursement/funding.
Prong II - Appropriateness of the Parent’s Placement:
Parent has the burden of proving that the unilateral placement was appropriate. To meet this burden, parents must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the unilateral placement provides “educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the student”[16].
The private school placement however “need not meet the IDEA definition of a free and appropriate public education” or “state education standards or requirements”[17].
The private school placement must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits, and must be likely to produce progress, not regression. The standard to apply is whether “[the] unilateral private placement... provides educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child”[18].
The Judges in the Gagliardo case wrote that “no one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents’ unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child’s individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child’s potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction”[19] (my emphases).
In both instances highlighted above, the focus is on the needs of the child, which are individual and unique, and that the placement must reasonably serve those needs to an extent that permits the child to benefit from the instruction.
Parental placements are not subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school district placement. The private placement need not provide certified special education teachers or an IEP.
Evidence on record:
Parent’s representative presented detailed testimony by Parent’s Witness and the Parent by affidavit and submitted documentary evidence in support of the Parent’s position that the Attending School placement was appropriate.
Parent’s Witness testified (Exhibit P-J): As to her credentials, experience and her duties and responsibilities (par. 1-3); the special education program offered at the Attending School, including class size, the students served, as well as their IEP classifications (par. 4-7); professional development for staff (par. 8); the related services offered by the program, as well as the certification of the service providers (par. 9); the specific classroom that the Student attended during the SY in question, including the commonalty of needs of all the students in the classroom in question (par. 10-12); as to her familiarity with the Student, including her academic and language delays (par. 10; 13-15); what the Student required due to her significant language delays, which included a lot of 1:1 support, and how the Attending School addressed the Student’s needs (par. 16-17); the significant progress the Student made over the SY in question (par. 17); how the Attending School’s program was departmentalized (par. 18); how the Attending School assessed the Student’s progress (par. 19); the name and qualification and experience of the Student’s classroom teacher, including the credentials of the teacher’s assistant (par. 20); specific details regarding the Attending School’s ELA program and how the Student’s gaps in her reading skills where addressed (par. 21-22); the considerable progress made in writing by the Student over the course of the SY (par. 24); the need for the Student’s speech-language therapist to push into the classroom, given the Student’s needs (par. 25); the modified algebra class that the Student participated in, as well as the name and experience of the teacher (par. 26); the level of the Student’s math class, which was taken over two years instead of the traditional one year to provide the Student with additional time to learn and process the materials (par. 27); and how the extended schedule provided a clear indication that the Student had mastered the materials taught to her (par. 28); the name and certification of the Student’s earth science and global studies teachers, including the additional supports required in the latter class (par. 29-31); details of the once-weekly REDACTED class (par. 32); the speech and counseling services that the Student received during the SY and how both providers were intricately involved in the Student’s program, providing details for each and also how the Student’s confidence and self-esteem significantly improved (par. 33-35); the various ways in which the Attending School collaborated amongst their teachers and the providers (par. 36); the opportunities that the Student had to interact with students in the mainstream host school; the percentage of the program that was secular versus non-secular and how that was calculated, as well as the related services being 100% secular (par. 38); details of the program when the school switched to remote learning during the SY (par. 39); confirming the significant progress that the Student made in all areas and providing color to this assertion, and specifically how the attending school appropriately addressed the Student’s needs (par. 40-42).
Parent testified (Exhibit P-K): As to the Student’s classification on her IEP (par. 2); the struggles that the Student experienced and how it had impacted her self-confidence (par. 3); how, based upon discussion with the Student’s school, it became clear that the Student could no longer remain in a mainstream setting (par. 5); that she requested an emergency IEP meeting in writing to request a new IEP and program for the Student for the 2019-2020 SY and would begin at the Attending School, pending an appropriate IEP and placement for the Student (par. 6-7); despite following up, an IEP meeting was not held until March 2020, approximately six months after she had started requesting an IEP for the Student (par. 8); the CSE recommended an ICT program for the Student and how she expressed clear concern that an ICT class would be too large for the Student, especially for her core academic subjects, and would not provide the level of adult support that the Student required (par. 9); given the Student’s needs, she did not believe that the Student could handle an ICT class setting (par. 9); that the CSE failed to provide a placement offer for the Student at any point during the SY in question (par.10); the Student therefore remained at the Attending School during the SY (par. 11); the Student made strong progress at the Attending School (par. 12); the small classes and individualized attention greatly supported the Student’s needs (par. 12); had the DOE offered an appropriate program, she would certainly have considered it for the Student (par. 13); the tuition for the SY for the Attending School was $50,600.00, which included tuition and related services (par. 14); as indicated in the Attending School’s tuition contract, she and her husband are fully liable for the contract costs (par. 15); based upon their income, they were unable to directly pay the tuition and are therefore seeking tuition to be awarded for the secular cost (56%) of the tuition and related costs (100%) for the SY to be paid directly to the Attending School (par. 16).
I find that the Student’s program is specifically designed to cater to a class or category of students, namely those whose learning disabilities require special education programming to be offered in a small self-contained setting, covering student’s whose classification is Learning Disabled or Speech Impairment. The program, including the learning methodologies and the supports provided are all designed to meet the needs of this class or category of student. The Student falls in this class or category, and as Parent’s Witness testified “[Student] struggled for many years in a mainstream setting before joining [Attending School] where she was finally able to learn in our small self-contained setting” (Exhibit P-J-2, par. 15).
Additionally, there is detailed uncontested evidence presented by Parent’s Witness substantiating how the Student’s teachers specifically tailor/ed the already specialized program – for the class or category of student – even further for this Student’s unique and individual needs.
The testimony of the Parent and Parent’s Witness, and the Parent’s documentary evidence (Exhibits P-D through G, P-I through P-L) establishes that the Attending School was appropriate and provided the Student with educational instruction that was specifically designed to meet her unique special education needs, supported by such services that were necessary to permit her to benefit from instruction, for the 2019-2020 SY. This evidence was not disputed through any testimony or other evidence by the DOE.
I find that, based on the Student’s attendance at the Attending School for the SY in question, as testified to by the Parent and Parent’s Witness, the Student made progress during the 2019-2020 SY. Parent has therefore met the second criterion of the test set out in the Burlington/Carter case for tuition reimbursement/funding.
Prong III - Equitable Factors:
Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA[20]. The IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to challenge the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents[21].
The IDEA allows that reimbursement may be reduced or denied if parents do not provide notice of the unilateral placement either at the most recent CSE meeting prior to removing the student from public school, or by written notice 10 business days before such removal, “that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense”[22].
This statutory provision “serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise an appropriate plan, and determine whether a [FAPE] can be provided in the public schools”[23]. Although a reduction in reimbursement is discretionary, courts have upheld the denial of reimbursement in cases where it was shown that parents failed to comply with this statutory provision[24].
The hearing record reflects that the Parent notified the CSE by letter dated September 10, 2019 (Exhibit P-B-1), faxed on September 16, 2019 (Exhibit P-B-2), of her intention to immediately place the Student at the Attending School for the 2019-2020 SY. Parent sent a follow up letter dated October 31, 2019 (Exhibit P-C-1), faxed on November 04, 2019 (Exhibit P-C-2), essentially restating the contents of her earlier letter.
I find that in the first letter the Parent indicated that current level of services was insufficient, that the Student required a self-contained setting where she could receive full time special education, that the Student’s IESP was insufficient, that she required an IEP, and sought a FAPE.
I also find that while the Parent offered sufficient information to put the DOE on notice about the Parent’s concern regarding the current offering and informed of the Parent’s intention to place the Student at the Attending School for the 2019-2020 SY, the letter did not afford the District an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, which is the intent underlying the 10-day notice requirement[25]. The letter did not afford 10-days of notice.
It is also apparent from the record that the Parent signed a contract enrolling the Student in the Attending School for the 2019-2020 SY on September 10, 2019 (Exhibit P-D-1) and the Addendum thereto on September 16, 2019 (Exhibit P-D-2), being the same date as the letter and the date it was faxed, respectively (Exhibit P-C).
The Second Circuit has explained that, so long as parents cooperate with the CSE, “their pursuit of a private placement [i]s not a basis for denying their [request for] tuition reimbursement, even assuming... that the parents never intended to keep [the student] in public school”[26]. This however does not absolve the Parent of the duty to comply with the 10-day notice requirement.
In a recent case[27] that addressed a statute of limitations issue, the parent had relied upon the following failures by the DOE (the “Failures”): to hold an annual review for the student for the relevant SY; to provide the parent with prior written notice of a change, or lack thereof, to the student's IEP; to send a school location letter with a placement for the student for the relevant SY; and to produce an annual IEP by the first day of the relevant SY.
In that case, it was conceded by the DOE that the Failures had constituted the denial of a FAPE and, like this case, the DOE did not contest that it had denied the student a FAPE (in this case Prong I is being conceded by the DOE). The IHO Decision, which was the decision being appealed, did not probe whether the denial of a FAPE was procedural, substantive, or both, but found that "the DOE's failure to present a case at the hearing is a concession that it denied the student FAPE....". The U.S. District Judge wrote, about the Failures, that in “any case, there were clearly both procedural and substantive violations of IDEA that amounted to the denial of a FAPE”.
In addressing the nature of the violation for failing to have a written IEP in effect by the first day of the school year (i.e., whether it is procedural or substantive), the U.S. District Judge wrote:
“Substantive violations of IDEA may include the failure to propose an IEP or deficiencies in the IEP itself. Id.; Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238-39, 129 S. Ct. 2484, 174 L. Ed. 2d 168 (2009). School districts are required to have a written IEP in effect for each child with a disability by the beginning of the school year, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A), and, in New York State, the school year begins annually on the first day of July. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2(15). Thus, failure to provide a written IEP by July 1 constitutes a substantive denial of FAPE. C.W.L. and E.L. v. Pelham Union Free Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 3d 451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)” (my emphases).
Parent only communicated the Parent’s request to have an IEP, as opposed to an IESP, and a FAPE, on the very same date Parent had signed the enrolment agreement and addendum thereto, thereby not affording 10-day notice, and an opportunity to address the issues that the Parent asserted. Additionally, the letter does not expressly bring to the DOE’s attention that the Parent would be seeking tuition funding, although it does request a FAPE.
Parent’s reminder letter during October 2019 would have however been unnecessary if the DOE had held an IEP meeting and offered a FAPE in response to the Parent’s letter. The DOE has conceded a denial of a FAPE for the 2019-2020 SY.
Accordingly, whilst courts have upheld the denial of reimbursement in cases where it was shown that parents failed to comply with this statutory provision[28], there was not a complete failure to provide notice, just late/inadequate notice given. Whilst the circumstances do not warrant a denial of funding, it does however warrant a reduction in tuition funding, as part of my discretion, which I address below.
Other than the deficiency with the Parent’s “10-day notice” detailed above, I do not find any other factors that would warrant a denial or reduction of the Parent’s claim.
Parent has therefore met the third criterion of the test set out in the Burlington/Carter case for tuition funding. Having met all three criteria of the Burlington/Carter test, the Parent is entitled to funding for the cost of the Student’s placement at the Attending School for the 2019-2020 SY.
Amounts Claimed:
Parent confirmed the total annual tuition rate of $47,000.00 (100%) owing to the Attending School for the 2019-2020 tuition for the Student’s enrolment. Additionally, there are costs associated with the related services (speech and counseling) provided to the Student, totaling $3,600.00 (Exhibits P-D-2; P-F-1 & -2; P-K-2, par. 14).
According to the Attending School’s tuition affidavit (Exhibit P-E-1, par. 4), no monies have been received from the Parent.
I do not find that the aforesaid tuition rate excessive or unreasonable, given what is offered by the Attending School as part of the program[29].
Parent is seeking tuition funding in the form of direct funding, and therefore a case for direct funding based upon need must be supported by the record. Based on the Parent’s testimony and tax records (Exhibit P-H-1 & -2; P-K-2, par. 15 & 16), this has been established.
In my discretion an equitable deduction of 50% for the tuition claim is warranted in the circumstances of this case. I acknowledge that the Parent had been amendable to reducing the claim by 44% due to the non-secular portion of instruction.
In the circumstances, an award of $23,500.00 for tuition (i.e., 50%), plus the full cost (100%) of the related services (speech and counseling) is being awarded.
Other than the relief set out in my Order below, I find that no basis and/or evidence in the record supports any additional relief.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, it is hereby:
- • ORDERED that, the DOE shall directly fund 50% of the Student’s tuition owing to the Attending School for the Student’s attendance at the Attending School for the 2019-2020 school year in the sum of $23,500.00 (Twenty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars).
- • ORDERED that, the DOE shall directly fund 100% of the Student’s related services costs owing to the Attending School for the related services provided to the Student by the Attending School during the 2019-2020 school year in the sum of $3,600.00 (Three Thousand, Six Hundred Dollars).
SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 13, 2022
__H.A.C._(Signed Electronically)___
Impartial Hearing Officer
Harry A. Christodoulou
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.
An appealing party's request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.
DISTRICT EVIDENCE
Exhibit
Title
Date
Pages
-
-
-
-
PARENT EVIDENCE
Exhibit
Title
Date
Pages
A.
DPC
07/07/2020
3
B.
Parent letter with receipt
11/04/2019
2
C.
Parent letter with receipt
10/26/2020
2
D.
Tuition Contract
2020-2021
2
E.
Payment affidavit
05/23/2022
1
F.
Provider affidavits
2019-2020
G.
Daily class schedule
2019-2020
1
H.
Parent W-2 forms
2019
2
I.
Remote learning plan
2020
3
J.
School testimony affidavit
05/16/2022
4
K.
Parent testimony affidavit
05/22/2022
3
L.
Program description
2020
1
IHO EVIDENCE
Exhibit
Title
Date
Pages
-
-
-
-
APPENDIX
REDACTED
Footnotes
[1] U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
[2] C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
[3] Educ. Law Art. 89 § 4404 et seq.
[4] NYCRR § Part 200.
[5] Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005].
[6] U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.513[a][2]; Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 [S.D.N.Y. 2007].
[7] U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i].
[8] See Branham v. Govt. of the Dist. of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 11-12 [D.C. Cir. 2005]; G.M. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 F. App'x 698, 699 [9th Cir. 2014]; Jalloh v. Dist. of Columbia, 535 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19-20 [D.D.C. 2008]; and Sykes v. Dist. of Columbia, 518 F. Supp. 2d 261, 267 [D.D.C. 2007], as well as Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal Nos. 20-167; 20-203 and 21-032.
[9] Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
[10] Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 [2d Cir. 1998], at 132.
[11] Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130.
[12] Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
[13] NYS Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c).
[14] School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]; Florence County School District Four et al. v. Carter by Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; See also Frank G. and Dianne G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356 [2d Cir. 2006], cert denied, and Board of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. School Dist. v. Frank G., 2007 WL 2982269 [Oct. 15, 2007].
[15] Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 137 S. Ct. at 1002 (2017).
[16] Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 [2d. Cir. 2007].
[17] Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 [2d. Cr. 2006].
[18] Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115.
[19] Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112 (quoting Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).
[20] Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; R.E., 694 F.3d at 185, 194; C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826 [2d Cir., 2014]; M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable"].
[21] U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii]; 34 CFR 300.148[d]; see S.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 362-64 [S.D.N.Y. 2009]; Thies v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 344728 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2008]; M.V. v. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 53181, at *5 [N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2008]; Bettinger v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2007 WL 4208560, at *4 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007]; Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417-18 [S.D.N.Y. 2005], aff'd, 192 Fed. App'x 62, 2006 WL 2335140 [2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2006]; Werner v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660-61 [S.D.N.Y. 2005]; see also Voluntown, 226 F.3d at 69 n.9; Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001].
[22] U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii][I]; see 34 CFR 300.148[d][1].
[23] Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 [1st Cir. 2004].
[24] Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160; Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 [1st Cir. 2004]; Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 523-24 [6th Cir. 2003]; Rafferty v. Cranston Public Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 27 [1st Cir. 2002]); see Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 376 [2d Cir. 2006]; Voluntown, 226 F.3d at 68; Lauren V. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 3085854, at * 13 [E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2007].
[25] Greenland Sch. Dist., 358 F.3d at 160.
[26] C.L., 744 F.3d at 840.
[27] In L.B., ex rel. E.B., v. New York City Dep’t of Educ. (122 LRP 8348) (U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York) (21-CV-1033 (VEC)) (03/08/22).
[28] Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160; Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 [1st Cir. 2004]; Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 523-24 [6th Cir. 2003]; Rafferty v. Cranston Public Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 27 [1st Cir. 2002]); see Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 376 [2d Cir. 2006]; Voluntown, 226 F.3d at 68; Lauren V. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 3085854, at * 13 [E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2007].
[29] Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 20 IDELR 532 (U.S. 1993).