New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

Case Number:

Student’s Name:

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Date of Hearing: October 30, 2013

March 4, 2014

June 19, 2014

August 8, 2014

September 8, 2014

Actual Record Closed Date: December 4, 2014

Hearing Officer: , Esq.

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Name Title For Date Attorney PARENT 10/30/13 Attorney DISTRICT 10/30/13 Attorney PARENT 03/04/14 Attorney DISTRICT 03/04/14 Attorney PARENT 06/19/14 Parent PARENT 06/19/14 Attorney DISTRICT 06/19/14

Teacher DISTRICT 06/19/14 Special Teacher DISTRICT 06/19/14 Placement Officer DISTRICT 06/19/14 Attorney PARENT 08/08/14 Parent PARENT 08/08/14

Director of School PARENT 08/08/14 Class Room Teacher PARENT 08/08/14

CSE Rep. DISTRICT 08/08/14

Attorney PARENT 09/08/14

Parent PARENT 09/08/14

CSE Rep. DISTRICT 09/08/14

On October 18, 2013, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law and Parts 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education, concerning a dispute between the Parents of an old student attending a private school and the New York City - Department of Education (“DOE”) - District: , regarding the student’s special education program. I was appointed after the recusal of at least one other IHO. After adjournments were granted on consent of the parties or for cause, the impartial hearing was held on October 30, 2013, March 4, 2014, June 19, 2014 and August 8, 2014. The Parent’s request to submit a written closing statement was granted. (T-259) The parties written closing statement were made due on October 7, 2014. An extension of that date was requested by the Parent and her closing statement was received on or about November 3, 2014. (P-AA) The DOE did not submit a closing statement. A list of the witnesses who appeared and the documents taken into evidence is annexed to this decision.

BACKGROUND

The student in this case attended a private school for the 2013-2014 school year. (See Parent’s Due Process Complaint - “DPC” - P-A) This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint (“DPC”) made by the student’s Parents through their attorney(s), the and received at the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (“DOE-IHO”) on or about September 8, 2013. (Id.) The DPC is carried under New York City (“NYC”) Case No. . The Parent’s DPC alleges that the student is diagnosed with a “ ”, a “ ”, a “ ” and a “ .” (Id.) The DPC further alleges that for the student’s 2013-2014 school year, the DOE “failed to convene an Individualized Education Program (IEP) meeting, recommend an appropriate special education public school program, or provide an offer of placement for an appropriate public school site.” The Parent then alleges that on August 8, 2013, she served the DOE with “notice” that the student would continue at her private school placement for the 2013-2014 school year.

The Parent filed an amended DPC on January 7, 2014 that included a request for an Order on Pendency. (P-C) The amended DPC also alleges that several weeks after the filing of the Parent’s initial DPC on September 8, 2013, the DOE informed Parent’s counsel that it was making a school recommendation for the 2013-2014 school year. (Id.) The Parent amended DPC request the following relief at the impartial hearing:

(a) a determination that the Doe failed to provide the student with a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2013-2014 school year; and

(b) a determination that the student’s private school was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit and meet the student’s needs; and

(c) a determination that the Parent has cooperated throughout the special education process and that the equities do not bar an award of funding for the private school for the 2013-2014 school year; and

(d) an order that the DOE must provide tuition reimbursement for any amounts paid to the private school, and direct and/or prospective funding for any amounts owed to the private school, including tuition and any other related costs or fees for the 2013-2014 school year; and

(e) an order that the DOE must provide appropriate transportation to the private school for as long as may be necessary until such time as the DOE offers an appropriate program or placement; and

(f) an order that the DOE must provide reimbursement and/or prospective funding for any private transportation expenses incurred as a result of the DOE’s failure to set up appropriate public transportation in a timely manner prior to the start of the school year; and

(g) an award of such other, further, and different relief as the IHO determines to be fair and just under the circumstances of this case.

A motion for an Order on Pendency was subsequently made by the Parents’ attorney(s) and a hearing was held on the same on October 30, 2013. On that date, the hearing was completed and the following Order on Pendency was issued on November 6, 2013 on consent of the parties:

ORDERED on CONSENT and pursuant to the pendency provisions under the IDEA, the student shall immediately continue to receive the services provided under the decision of IHO , Esq. dated February 22, 2013 and carried under New York City Case No. (P-B), the costs of which are to be paid by the DOE upon the agency’s receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of said services having been rendered; and it is further

ORDERED on CONSENT that a copy of IHO , Esq., dated February 22, 2013 and carried under New York City Case No. (P-B)

shall accompany this order for reference.

The decision of IHO dated February 22, 2013 awarded the Parent the following relief:

Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the Department of Education provide tuition reimbursement in the amount of for the 2012-2013 school year upon proof of attendance and payment (the evidence of such payment must be acceptable to the Department of Education). The Dept. of Education is directed to fund the cost of the for the 2012-2013 school year at the contract rate minus the parent already paid.

Department of Education is further ordered to provide special education transportation and funding for the IEE from Dr. in the amount of

.

THE DOE’S CASE

The DOE argues that there was an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) in effect before the start of the student’s 2013-2014 school year and a Final Notice of Recommendation (“FNR”) was sent to the Parent via certified mail. (T-33) The DOE further argues that the IEP was created by a duly constituted team under law and the recommended DOE placement was appropriate for the student. (T-33-4)

The DOE called (2) witness and submitted (7) documents in evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testimony and documentary evidence for and against the DOE’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

THE PARENT’S CASE

The Parent argues that the program recommended in the IEP was not supportive enough for the student. (T-35) There is a specific way of instructing students that have and to enable them to learn. (Id.) Even if the FNR had been sent to the Parent in a timely manner, the school still would have not been able to meet the student’s needs. (Id.)

The Parent called (3) witness and submitted (26) documents in evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testimony and documentary evidence for and against the Parent’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION

IDEA ensures that students with disabilities are afforded a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1400 & Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528 (2005)) A FAPE includes special education and related services designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written IEP. (20 U.S.C. 1401(8) & 141(d) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.13) The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. (Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537)

The DOE may be required to reimburse Parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the parent’s claim. (Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2nd Cir. 2005))

The first step is to determine whether the DOE offered to provide the student a FAPE. (Mrs. C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 66 (2nd Cir. 2000)) A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with procedural requirements set forth in IDEA and (b) the IEP developed by the CSE through the procedures set forth in IDEA, is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (Bd. Of Educ. V. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-7 (1982)) The student’s recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b), 8 NYCRR §200.6(a)(1))

The Parent bears the burden of showing that the private school placement selected is appropriate. (SRO Nos.: 95-57, 94-29 & 93-34) The Parents must show that the private school placement offers an educational program that meets the student’s special education needs. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 & SRO No. 94-20) The private school need not be approved by the state educational agency to provide instruction to children with disabilities. (Florence County School District Four et. al. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993)) It is also not required that the private school employ certified special education teachers, or have its own IEP for the student. (SRO No. 94-20)

Finally, the IHO must consider whether equitable considerations favor the Parents' request for tuition reimbursement. State Review Officer (“SRO”) Decision 06-004 holds:

Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]). Such considerations "include the parties' compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties' positions, and like matters" (Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). With respect to equitable considerations, a parent may be denied tuition reimbursement upon a finding of a failure to cooperate with the CSE in the development of an IEP or if the parent's conduct precluded the CSE's ability to develop an appropriate IEP (Warren G. v. Cumberland Co. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 [3rd Cir. 1999]; see Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-

102; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-026). In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of tuition reimbursement. (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-

049).

As stated above, the DOE may be required to reimburse Parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the Parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the Parents' claim. (Carter and Burlington, supra) In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to Parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 at 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) “Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance” had it offered the student a FAPE. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148)

Initially, I note that in this case the Parent has now received under pendency all of the relief she sought at the impartial hearing and that the 2013-2014 school year at issue has expired, which raises the question of whether the instant matter has been rendered moot by the passage of time. Upon consideration of the evidence in the hearing record I find that regardless of the merits of a decision concerning whether the DOE offered the student a FAPE for the 2013-2014 school year, no further meaningful relief may be granted to the Parents because they have received all of the relief sought pursuant to “pendency”, and thus, the Parent’s case has now been rendered moot. In addition, a review of the District Court's decision rendered in V.S., 2011 WL 3273922, as discussed further below, does not compel a different result.

The dispute between the parties must at all stages be “real and live,” and not “academic,” or it risks becoming moot. (See Lillbask v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84-85 (2nd Cir. 2005), Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008), J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008), see also, Chenier v. Richard W., 82 N.Y.2d 830, 832 (1993), Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714 (1980) and SRO No. 07-139)

In general, cases dealing with issues such as desired changes in IEPs, specific placements, and implementation disputes may become moot at the end of the school year because no meaningful relief can be granted. (See, e.g., SRO Nos. 06-044, 05-058, 04027, 00-037, 00-016 & 96-37) Administrative decisions rendered in cases concerning such issues arising out of school years that have since expired may no longer appropriately address the current needs of the student. (See Daniel R.R. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1989) and SRO Nos. 07-139, 07-028, 06-070 & 04-007)

An exception provides that a claim may not be moot despite the end of a school year for which the student’s IEP was written, if the conduct complained of is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” (See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 (1988), Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 84-85, Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040 and SRO No. 04-038) The exception applies only in limited situations (see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) and is severely circumscribed. (See Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2nd Cir. 1998) First, it must be apparent that “the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” (See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) see Knaust, 157 F.3d at 88 and SRO No. 07-139) Second, controversies are “capable of repetition” when there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. (See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975), Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d at 714-15 and SRO No. 07-139) To create a reasonable expectation of recurrence, repetition must be more than theoretically possible. (See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482, Russman v. Bd. Of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 120 (2nd Cir. 2001) and SRO No. 07-139) Mere speculation that the parties will be involved in a dispute over the same issue does not rise to the level of a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability of recurrence. (See Russman, 260 F.3d at 120 and SRO No. 07-139) What’s more, “mootness” may be raised at any stage of litigation. (In re Kurtzman, 194 F.3d 54, 58 (2nd Cir. 1999) and SRO No. 07-139)

In this case, there is no longer any live controversy relating to the parties’ dispute over the placement or program offered by the DOE for the 2013-2014 school year. Here, even if a determination on the merits demonstrated that the DOE did not offer the student a FAPE for the 2013-2014 school year, in this instance, it would have no actual effect on the parties because the 2013-2014 school year expired on June 30, 2014, and the student remained entitled to her pendency placement funded by the DOE through the conclusion of the administrative due process. Accordingly, the Parents’ claims for the 2013-2014 school year need not be further addressed here. An IHO is not required to make a determination that is academic or will have no actual impact upon the parties. (See SRO Nos. 11-085, 09-077, 09-065, 08-104, 08-044, 07-077, 06-044, 04-006, 02-086, 02-011 & 97-64)

Concerning the District Court’s decision in V.S. (2011 WL 3273922), the court in that case held that in SRO No. 10-041, the SRO correctly determined that the Parents’ request for funding for the school year that was the subject of that appeal was no longer at issue where the student was educated at public expense at a private school chosen by the Parents for the duration of the school year pursuant to a pendency order. (See V.S., 2011 WL 3273922, at *9) Noting that a decision in favor of the district in that matter would not affect its obligation to pay the costs of the student’s private school tuition, the Court nevertheless determined that the district sought redress regarding the collateral issue of the student’s ongoing pendency placement for future proceedings and that had a decision been rendered by a SRO on the merits, it would have affected the student's placement. (Id.) After careful consideration and for several reasons discussed below, I respectfully decline to adopt the reasoning as set forth in V.S..

First, the sole reason that the District Court in V.S. held that SRO No. 10-041, was not moot was because the parties required resolution of the merits of their dispute to establish the student’s pendency placement in future proceedings. (See V.S., 2011 WL 3273922, at *10) However, this rationale regarding future pendency may be read so broadly as to apply to virtually any and all IDEA proceedings involving the educational placement or services to be provided to a student, and other courts in New York have not adopted this broad approach. (See Bd. of Educ. v. O'Shea, 353 F.Supp.2d 449, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(determining the matter was moot and declining to resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute when the pendency provision provided an independent basis for doing so) see also Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 2002)(ruling that the pendency provision formed a basis for awarding relief without addressing the merits of the parties’ dispute), Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 484 (2nd Cir. 2002)(rejecting the district's argument that a dispute must be resolved on the merits rather than on the basis of the pendency provision), Patskin, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29 (holding that the matter was moot where the school year at issue had passed, and stating that the relevant controversy was whether the IEP that the student was provided with was an appropriate placement and that there was no reasonable expectation that the student would be subjected to that particular IEP again), M.S. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273, 278-80 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2010)(dismissing the case as moot and noting that the parents were receiving full compensation for their private school expenditures and that the proceeding was brought to obtain legal fees), J.N., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 (upholding a SRO’s determination that the case was moot), Bd. of Educ. v. Steven L., 89 F.3d 464, 468-69 (7th Cir 1996)(holding that it was not necessary to determine which party would prevail on the merits when the stay put provision controlled for the duration of the dispute and the proposed public school IEP was no longer applicable to the student), see also New York City Dep't of Educ. v. S.S., 2010 WL 983719 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010))

The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected this rationale, holding that the stay put provision cannot be relied upon as the basis for a live controversy when the issue of liability on the substantive issues has been rendered moot. (See Marcus I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 2011 WL 1979502, at *1 (9th Cir. May 23, 2011)(explaining that stay put provision 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) is designed to allow a student to remain in an educational institution pending litigation, but does not guarantee a student the right to remain in any particular institution because the right to a stay put placement that stems from a given adjudicatory proceeding lapses once the proceeding has concluded).

Second, we must be concerned with adjudicating rights unnecessarily, particularly when it will not affect the claims that a party alleged at the outset of the due process proceeding and especially under a statutory scheme like the IDEA, which envisions that Parents and Districts will continue to convene on at least an annual basis to review a student's current IEP or educational placement, share their concerns with one another, and cooperatively and affirmatively engage in efforts to develop a new appropriate plan designed to offer the student a FAPE in the public schools. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][4][A], 34 C.F.R. § 300.324[b][1][i], see also Educ. Law § 4402[2] and 8 NYCRR 200.4[f]) This process usually works best when it is as free as possible from acrimonious relationships that often develop after continued litigation.

Third, the automatic nature of the pendency provision set forth in the IDEA (see Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2nd Cir. 1982), Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 335 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2003), Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3rd Cir. 1996), and if necessary, the speed with which parties may obtain State-level pendency placement reviews on an interlocutory basis under New York's regulatory scheme (see 8 NYCRR 279.10[d]) strongly diminishes the need to establish future pendency placements for future school years. Such determinations are better left until the proceedings under which the right arises are commenced and the issue of the student's pendency placement is actually in dispute.

Fourth, the Court's comment that a decision on the merits in V.S. would be useful (2011 WL 3273922, at *10), raises a concern that the decision has the effect of removing the much needed discretion of administrative hearing officers to focus on both fairly and efficiently resolving disputes while retaining the discretion of how best to allocate their adjudicative resources to address ever growing dockets.

Lastly, the Second Circuit has proffered three possible definitions of "then current educational placement": (1) the placement described in the student's most recently implemented IEP; (2) the operative placement actually functioning at the time when the pendency provision of the IDEA was invoked; and (3) the placement at the time of the previously implemented IEP. (See Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163, citing Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625 [6th Cir. 1990] [emphasis added], see also SRO No. 05-

006) Thus, there is no barrier to an IHO deciding “pendency” in a future matter between the parties were a decision on the merits has not been rendered in a previous controversy between them.

For the forgoing reasons, I decline to find that the Parent’s claim for tuition reimbursement and transportation services for the 2013-2014 school year continues to be a live controversy. I find that the matter has been rendered moot by the passage of time. The exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply in this case because the matter is not capable of repetition and would not evade review. While the Parents may elect to challenge the IEP developed for the 2014-2015 school year and seek tuition reimbursement for the student at her private school for the 2014-2015 school year in a subsequent due process proceeding, the issues presented in such a claim could be different as the placement recommended for the 2013-2014 school year. What’s more, each year the elements of a tuition reimbursement claim must be analyzed separately. (See Mrs. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 67 (2nd Cir. 2000)(examining the prongs of the Burlington/Carter test separately for each school year at issue), Snyder v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 2009 WL 3246579, *9-*10 (D.Md. Sept. 29, 2009), Omidian v. Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 904077, at *21-*26 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31 2009)(analyzing each year of a multi-year tuition reimbursement claim separately), Student X v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) and SRO Nos. 09-071 & 09-055) Accordingly, the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here as I do not find this matter to be capable of repetition yet evading review. (See Honig, 484 U.S. at 318-23, Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 84-85, Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040 and SRO 04-038)

Additionally, the Mayor’s new policy announced on June 24, 2014, was implemented September 1, 2014 and includes the following changes in New York City: • Expedite Decisions: Where settlement is appropriate, DOE will seek settlement within (15) days of receiving notice of parent intent to unilaterally place their child in a school. • Reduce Extended Legal Battles: The DOE will refrain from re-litigating settled or decided cases, unless there is a change in the IEP placement recommendation.

The DOE will avoid unnecessary litigation in cases where the agency is unable to offer a placement, or when a child is about to enter the final grade of a school. • Reduce Paperwork: Instead of requiring parents to submit full documentation every year, the DOE will only require that paperwork every three years, allowing for income eligibility updates to be made each year, as needed. • Expedite Payments: DOE will make tuition payments on a monthly basis when required by a program, and it will provide a payment schedule to parents following any settlement. Once parents win a claim for tuition reimbursement, the DOE will pay the tuition while the DOE appeals that decision to a higher level of review.

These changes make it even more less than likely that this matter is capable of repetition that may evade review. (Supra) It is also important to note that there is case law that prohibits the DOE from recouping payments made pursuant to pendency. (See New York City Dep’t of Educ. v. S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *11 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010])

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that in light of the determinations herein, I find that this matter is rendered “moot”, and as such, that it is unnecessary to address the merits of the parties’ contentions herein. Accordingly, the matter is DISMISSED. Dated: December 22, 2014

, ESQ.

Impartial Hearing Officer

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period.”

(8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.

Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For # of Pages

A Due Process Complaint 09/08/13 PARENT 08

B /22/13 PARENT 24

C Amended Due Process 01/05/14 PARENT 11

D 10-11/10 PARENT 14

Evaluation E Classroom Observation 03/05/12 PARENT 11 F Parent Letter to CSE 08/09/13 PARENT 04 G Parent Letter to CSE 11/12/13 PARENT 02 H Parent Letter to CSE 12/16/13 PARENT 05 I Parent Letter to CSE 08/20/12 PARENT 02 J Parent Letter to CSE 06/02/09 PARENT 01 K Program Description Undated PARENT 01 L Affidavit of Payment 04/23/14 PARENT 01 M Contract 09/09/13 PARENT 02 N Class Schedule 2013/2014 PARENT 01 O Attendance Page 2013/2014 PARENT 01 P Needs Undated PARENT 01 Q Report Card 03/2014 PARENT 02 R Report 03/20/14 PARENT 02 S Progress Report 2013/2014 PARENT 04 T Progress Report 03/2014 PARENT 04 U Undated PARENT 06

Progress Report V Report 04/2014 PARENT 03 W Undated PARENT 09

X Info. Undated PARENT 10 Y CV of Undated PARENT 03 Z CV of Dr. Undated PARENT 10 AA Closing Statement 11/03/14 PARENT 25

1 WITHDRAWN N/A DISTRICT 00

2 Final Notice of 06/25/13 DISTRICT 01

Recommendation

3 IEP 05/06/13 DISTRICT 13

4 Classroom Observation 02/06/13 DISTRICT 01 5 Addendum Progress 04/15/13 DISTRICT 04

Report 6 Progress Report 04/2013 DISTRICT 03 7 Report Card 2013 DISTRICT 24

8 WITHDRAWN N/A DISTRICT 00

9 WITHDRAWN N/A DISTRICT 00

10 Proof of Mailing 06/25/13 DISTRICT 01