COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Dedham Public Schools v. Chamberlain International School BSEA # 2609435
DECISION
This decision is issued pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 USC 1400 et seq.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC 794), the state special education law (MGL c. 71B), the state Administrative Procedure Act (MGL c. 30A), and the regulations promulgated under these statutes.
On February 25, 2026, Dedham Public Schools (Dedham or the District) filed an accelerated Request for Hearing, asserting that on February 10, 2026, Chamberlain International School (Chamberlain or School) improperly attempted to terminate the enrollment of Student who had been attending Chamberlain’s residential program through an accepted Individualized Education Program (IEP). Dedham sought an order of "stay-put" placement at Chamberlain as well as a due process hearing on whether Chamberlain properly complied with all state and federal regulations pertaining to a unilateral change in placement, including those relating to a manifestation determination review. Accelerated status was found to be appropriate and a Notice of Accelerated Hearing was issued by the BSEA on the same day.
On March 6, 2026, Chamberlain responded that the standard for emergency termination had been met and that it had complied with all relevant laws and regulations; that manifestation determinations were not required in the termination context; that, in the emergency termination context, where there existed a clear and present threat to the health and safety of Student, Student’s stay-put rights were not location-specific, and instead apply to the array of services contained in his last signed IEP, which could be provided outside of Chamberlain; that Chamberlain could not be forced to maintain Student’s enrollment over its objection, but that Chamberlain could continue to provide Student with an interim array of virtual services while a successor placement was being sought.
On March 13, 2026, the parties jointly requested that the matter be taken off the accelerated track and be postponed until April 16, 2026, as, at that time, Student was in the custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS), and the parties wanted to explore informal resolution. The request for postponement was granted for good cause.
On April 3, 2026, pursuant to Rule XI of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules), the parties agreed to submit this matter for decision based upon written documents.
On April 8, 2026, the parties submitted their respective exhibits. The official record of the hearing consists of documents submitted by Dedham Public Schools and marked as D-1 through D-20; one document submitted by Chamberlain International School and marked as Exhibit C-1; and written closing arguments submitted on April 16, 2026. The record closed on that day.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The following issues are in dispute:
1. Whether Chamberlain followed proper emergency termination procedures when it terminated Student’s placement without conducting a “due process hearing;” and
2. Whether Student is entitled to a “stay-put” placement at Chamberlain.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
1. Student is a seventeen-year-old resident of Dedham, Massachusetts. He is classified as a ninth-grade student who is eligible for special education and related services pursuant to the Emotional Impairment (Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD))[1] and Health Impairment (Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)) disability categories. Student’s emotional and behavioral challenges manifest as sensitivity to and easy annoyance by others, argumentativeness with adults, deliberate antagonism toward others, blaming others for his mistakes, and being spiteful/vindictive. Historically, Student’s self-regulation challenges have impacted his academic progress and ability to complete academic tasks because, in an emotionally heightened state, he has difficulty following directions and accessing coping strategies. Student requires adult supervision to monitor peer interactions. (D-2, D-6) Student is also vulnerable to symptoms of depression and possible hypomania. (D-3, D-6)
2. Student has a longstanding need for a highly structured educational setting due to significant academic, behavioral, and emotional challenges. He has a history of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations related to unsafe behaviors, including aggression, property destruction, threats, elopement, lying, and stealing. He also struggles with executive functioning, impulsivity, inattention, and difficulty regulating emotions, particularly when faced with minor frustrations, transitions away from preferred activities, or increased demands. Despite receiving extensive community-based supports, such as therapy, in-home services, and medication management, he has continued to exhibit unsafe behaviors across settings, necessitating ongoing psychiatric intervention. (D-3, D-6)
3. Prior to attending Chamberlain, Student attended Manville School in Boston, Massachusetts, a day program that provided Student with intensive academic and therapeutic services. (D-3, D-6)
4. In January of 2023, Student transitioned from Manville School to the CALO Program, an intensive residential program located in Missouri. (D-4, D-6)
5. The Team convened on March 10, 2023 to develop an IEP for the period 3/10/2023 to 3/9/2024. Parents requested a residential placement for Student “where he won’t have to be in a hospitalization cycle.” However, the Team proposed a private day program at Manville School. (D-4)
6. Student was repeatedly hospitalized during the 2023-2024 school year. (D-2)
7. In February 2024, Student participated in a three-year re-evaluation. Testing reflected a full scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) in the low average range. The evaluation recommended that Student continue to receive therapeutic services in a small, highly staffed therapeutic setting to help him learn strategies to regulate his emotional state. Individual psychotherapy was also recommended. (D-5, D-6)
8. On April 2, 2024, the Team reconvened following the three-year reevaluation to re-determine eligibility and propose a new IEP for the period 4/02/2024 to 4/01/2025. The Team found Student to continue to be eligible under the Emotional and Health Disability Categories and proposed goals and services in the areas of Self-Regulation, Social Interactions, Executive Functioning, Written Language, and Mathematics. According to the N1, dated April 8, 2024, the Team agreed it would “need to review the additional information from CALO in combination with the re-evaluation results to determine whether a day or residential placement is needed to meet [Student’s] educational needs in the least restrictive environment.”(D-3)
9. On May 14, 2024, the Team reconvened and proposed a residential placement at an approved special education program for Student, to which Parents consented. (D-3, D-20)
10. On July 25, 2024, Parents consented to placement at Chamberlain’s residential program. (D-20)
11. From August through December 2024, Student struggled with challenging behaviors at Chamberlain. He made statements about drug use and access to a firearm, was involved in repeated verbal and physical peer conflicts, tampered with food, engaged in self-injurious behavior, refused to return to his dorm, broke school property, eloped, refused staff directives, discharged a fire extinguisher, and ran from campus with a shard of glass, which resulted in police involvement leading to psychiatric evaluation. In January 2025, Student demonstrated ongoing school refusal, medication refusal, and unsafe behaviors such as climbing onto a roof, discharging a fire extinguisher, and eloping, again requiring police involvement. He also made repeated statements about possessing a firearm, prompting police response. (D-15)
12. The Team convened on April 1, 2025 and developed an IEP for Student for the period 04/01/2025 to 03/31/2026 (April 2025 IEP). At that time, Parents were concerned about Student’s overall emotional dysregulation. Goals and services were proposed in the areas of Self-Regulation, Social Interactions, Executive Functioning, Written Language, and Mathematics. Placement was proposed at Chamberlain, an approved private residential program. (D-2)
13. Although Parents accepted the April 2025 IEP in full, they rejected the placement on May 15, 2025, advocating for a new placement. Because the student refused to return to Chamberlain, Parents placed him at the Second Nature Wilderness Program in Utah. However, he was terminated there when he was unable to ensure his own or others’ safety. Parents then placed him at TELOS, also in Utah. (D-2, D-20) During this time, Dedham continued to fund Chamberlain. (D-11)
14. In July 2025, Parents informed the District that, while at TELOS, Student had decompensated to the point that the program could no longer meet his needs. He was placed in a 1:1 Safe House after engaging in self-harm and threatening others. Student also faced pending criminal charges in both Massachusetts and Utah. Parents reported that a consultant was seeking a new placement and requested the District’s assistance in locating a program for Student. Dedham responded that it had maintained Student’s placement at Chamberlain and offered to send referrals to other Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE)-approved residential programs using updated information from TELOS. (D-13)
15. In early August 2025, Parents informed Dedham that Student’s situation in Utah had become urgent, and he could not remain at the Safe House much longer. They reported limited placement options and multiple program denials. Parents’ “backup plan” was to transport Student back to Chamberlain and continue to search for alternatives. (D-13)
16. During the summer of 2025, Parents sent Student to Passage Alaska, a program in Alaska “for a 30-day outdoor behavioral therapy intervention, where he [could] hopefully have a reset and recommitment to a safer and healthier path for his final 1.5 years of childhood.” Parents hoped “this [would] also set him up for a more successful academic experience.” (D-13)
17. Student’s discharge summary from Passage Alaska describes a pattern of generally calm and engaging behavior in the absence of demands, contrasted with rapid escalation into defensiveness, argumentativeness, and refusal when expectations were introduced, at times presenting as angry and threatening. He frequently adopted an antisocial “gang” persona in group settings. Student eloped from the program, triggering a search. During this period, he misused stolen medication and later ingested multiple pills in front of staff, requiring emergency medical intervention. Given the seriousness of his elopement, substance misuse, and self-harm behaviors, the program determined that a field-based setting was no longer appropriate and that Student required a higher level of care. (D-14)
18. In August 2025, Dedham informed Parents that Student could return to Chamberlain. (D-13)
19. In September 2025, in anticipation of Student’s return to Massachusetts, Parents reached out to the District, indicating their concerns that at Chamberlain, Student could “access substances and take off from there pretty easily again and get into trouble.” They inquired about a secure, assessment-based program to observe and stabilize Student prior to school reentry, emphasizing that Student needed stability as well as a highly supervised, relational program with minimal use of restraint. (D-13)
20. In September 2025, Student returned to Massachusetts prepared to resume placement at Chamberlain School. Parents reported that he had recently restarted medication after previously discontinuing all medications while in Alaska, and that his then current regimen differed significantly from prior prescriptions. (D-13)
21. In September 2025, Student appeared in Court for misdemeanor charges for property destruction and assault. (D-15)
22. During the first semester of the 2025-2026 school year, while attending Chamberlain, Student engaged in multiple unsafe behaviors, including standing on the roof of a school passenger van, threatening to hit a teacher with a metal bar, eloping into a wooded area, punching a student (who then required stitches), pouring canola oil and soap into the coffee machine, breaking a cabinet, kicking staff, attempting to “give himself a tattoo,” and breaking his headphones. (D-15) During the first term of this school year, Student earned two Bs, one C+, one D, and 2 “Pass” grades. (D-7)
23. In December 2025, Student became involved with DYS.[2] Parents noted that “[s]ince [Student’s] return to Chamberlain, some staff members [had] expressed concern, informally, about the level of support he needs, relative to what they could give. There hasn't been any formal communication to us that the school wishes to have him placed elsewhere. They also [did] not seem to engage in re-entry planning with him/us each time he returned to campus from hospital stays, etc. So [Parents] [were] not getting a clear signal from them.” Parents requested “further guidance on how [Student could] be placed to ensure his safety — especially to limit his future actions that continue to result in criminal charges, at the very least.” Dedham indicated it would look into other programs, including the Brandon School and Residential Treatment Center (Brandon). (D-11)
24. In January 2026, as Student was transitioning with staff, he walked onto the koi pond that was frozen over and began to stomp on it. Staff redirected Student several times and attempted to physically redirect him off of the pond, but he was able to break through the ice, and he went into the water. He also made several suicidal statements. (D-15)
25. Via an email dated February 10, 2026, Chamberlain informed Dedham that
“[Student] ha[d] been refusing to attend his partial hospitalization and [would] be subsequently terminated from the program. [On February 9, 2026, Student] engaged in property damage and [was] [] refusing to attend school and remain[] in the dorm. While being supervised, he exited a window and went on the balcony roof. Staff were able to have him return inside the dorm. At [that] point, Chamberlain [could] not provide the level of structure needed for [Student]. Chamberlain [was] issuing an emergency termination letter for [Student] effective immediately.”
The termination letter was attached to the email. It stated that Chamberlain intended
“to seek the Emergency Termination of placement for [Student] due to immediate health and safety concerns. Chamberlain School [was] no longer an appropriate placement due to [Chamberlain’s] concerns for [Student’s] current safety needs and another placement should be found. This termination [was] effective immediately. This notice of termination [was] pursuant to 603 CMR 18.05(7)(d) and follow[ed] the conditions under CMR 28.09(12)(b). Chamberlain School [would] be available to assist Dedham Public Schools in identifying a more appropriate setting for [Student].” (D-9)
26. Following the incident on February 9, 2026, Student was hospitalized, and, when discharged on February 12, 2026, Chamberlain refused to pick him up from the emergency room. (D-10)
27. On February 18, 2026, Dedham formally requested that Chamberlain readmit Student under his last accepted IEP, noting that it had been unable to secure an alternative residential placement. Dedham asserted that it had not yet “assumed responsibility” under 603 CMR 28.09(12)(b), and therefore Chamberlain could not terminate Student’s enrollment. The District objected to the emergency termination and change in placement, arguing that Chamberlain had not demonstrated that Student could not be safely educated there. Dedham further maintained that Student was entitled to stay-put protections until an appropriate alternative placement is found, and that any exclusion from the program must comply with formal disciplinary procedures under 603 CMR 53.00, including required due process hearings and a manifestation determination. (D-1)
28. In February and March 2026, Dedham sent referral packets to twelve programs, eleven of which declined to accept Student. Brandon had yet to respond as of the date of this proceeding. (D-11, D-12, D-18)
29. On March 24, 2025, Dedham contacted DESE, informing it that the District had “referred Student to and he was rejected from [nine named DESE-approved residential programs],” Dedham inquired whether DESE had “any other suggestions...approved or unapproved[.]” (D-16) The record did not include DESE’s response to this inquiry.
30. On March 30, 2026, Parents informed Dedham that Student was found “not to meet criteria for Department of Mental Health (DMH) services” as “the ‘ODD’ diagnosis was felt to be driving his issues more than the mood issues.” (D-17)
31. On April 2, 2026, the District sent out five additional referrals for Student. (D-19) The record is unclear as to how many are pending at this time.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
1. Free Appropriate Public Education in the Least Restrictive Environment
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was enacted "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE]".[3] To provide a student with a FAPE, a school district must follow identification, evaluation, program design, and implementation practices that ensure that each student with a disability receives an Individualized Education Program (IEP) that is: custom tailored to the student's unique learning needs; "reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit"; and ensures access to and participation in the general education setting and curriculum as appropriate for that student so as "to enable the student to progress effectively in the content areas of the general curriculum.”[4] Under state and federal special education law, a school district has an obligation to provide the services that comprise FAPE in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE).[5] FAPE does not require a school district to provide special education and related services that will maximize a student’s educational potential,[6] and appropriate progress will look different depending on the student.[7] An individual analysis of a student’s progress in his/her areas of need is key.[8] The educational services provided to a student, therefore, need not be, "the only appropriate choice, or the choice of certain selected experts, or the child's parents' first choice, or even the best choice."[9]
1. Stay-Put[10]
The IDEA’s “stay-put” provision requires that unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, during the time that a parent and school district are engaged in an IDEA dispute resolution process, “… the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, …..”[11] Preservation of the “status quo” assures that the student “stays-put” in the last placement the parents and the school district agreed was appropriate for him.[12] In addition, the stay-put provision reflects “the preference of Congress for maintaining the stability of a disabled child’s placement and minimizing disruption to the child while the parents and school are resolving disputes.”[13] Generally, the last accepted IEP is the stay-put IEP.[14]
Massachusetts extends "stay-put" protections to eligible students whenever the parents and responsible school districts disagree, even where no formal due process proceedings have been initiated. 603 CMR 28.08(7) provides that “[i]n accordance with state and federal law, during the pendency of any dispute regarding placement or services the eligible student shall remain in his or her then current education program and placement unless the Parents and the School district agree otherwise.”[15] Hence, in Massachusetts, stay-put may attach even in the absence of a formally filed due process complaint[16], so long as there is a live dispute regarding placement or services. Moreover, a BSEA stay-put decision establishes a student’s legally protected placement, and that placement remains in effect beyond the BSEA proceeding for as long as the underlying dispute continues.
To determine a child’s “stay-put,” courts often look for the “operative placement,” or the IEP that is “actually functioning at the time the dispute first arises.”[17] Some circuits have also examined the impact of the proposed change on the student.[18] Recent BSEA decisions and rulings have similarly applied these principles to identify the “operative placement” and examine the impact on the student of the proposed change.[19]
2. Stay-Put and Private Placements.
603 CMR 18.05(7) reinforces the stay-put entitlement by obligating the private program to “make a commitment to the public school district or appropriate human service agency that it will try every available means to maintain the student's placement until the local Administrator of Special Education or officials of the appropriate human service agency have had sufficient time to search for an alternative placement.”[20] This regulation applies either to “termination or discharge of the student.”[21] BSEA rulings[22] have consistently found with respect to private school termination or discharge that
“[u]nder both federal and state special education law an eligible student who challenges any aspect of her special education program through a due process proceeding is entitled to remain in the program in which s/he is then currently enrolled until the dispute is resolved by an administrative or judicial officer, or by an agreement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (j); 34 CFR § 300.514; 603 CMR 28.08 (7). The regulatory language according this right is unequivocal. There are no qualifiers.”[23]
Specifically, in In Re: Lolani, Hearing Officer Lindsay Byrne explained that
“the Massachusetts regulations must be read to effect the purpose of both the IDEA and M.G.L. c. 71B to provide a free, appropriate public education to all students with disabilities. As stated in the first section of the regulations governing private special education schools, the provisions of 603 CMR 18.00 relate back to the general special education regulations found at 603 CMR 28.00. These two sets of regulations must be read to complement, not to exclude, each other. Reading the regulatory language of 603 CMR 18.05(7) in this context I find that the termination provisions applicable to publicly funded private school students set out explicit procedures that acknowledge the special characteristics of private school placements, but do not exempt those placements from adherence to the fundamental set of special education rights that attach to and travel with the student. One of those fundamental rights is the right to ‘stay[-]put’. Had the drafters intended to strip private school students of a right accorded to public school students[,] they would have said so.”[24]
This does not mean that “parental assertion of stay[-] put rights to a particular private school bar[s] any publicly funded student from termination, [because, otherwise,] the regulation covering that specific topic – termination of publicly funded students from a private school – would serve no purpose.”[25] There are situations when the term "current educational placement" referenced in 34 CFR 300.518 includes the setting in which the IEP is implemented but not considered to be location specific.[26] However, where the school district has yet to identify any alternative placements for the student, the Hearing Officer must “look to the specifics [of a] case, with an eye for ensuring [the student’s] continued education and for providing her with a FAPE as soon as possible.”[27]
4. Terminations from Private School Placements
603 CMR 18.02(8) states that emergency termination "shall mean removal of a student from a program due to an unplanned circumstance, including a student endangering his/her physical health or safety or endangering the physical health or safety of others." 603 CMR 18.05(7) addresses termination of students in private school placements:
“(a) … The school shall keep [the District special education administrator] informed of the progress of the student and shall notify that person immediately if termination or discharge of the student is being discussed.
(b) The school shall, at the time of admission, make a commitment to the public school district or appropriate human service agency that it will try every available means to maintain the student's placement until the local Administrator of Special Education or officials of the appropriate human service agency have had sufficient time to search for an alternative placement.
…(d) In case of an emergency termination, which shall be defined as circumstances in which the student presents a clear and present threat to the health and safety of him/herself or others, the school shall follow the procedures required under 603 CMR 28.09(12).”
603 CMR 28.09(12)(b) states as follows:
“Emergency termination of enrollment. The special education school shall not terminate the enrollment of any student, even in emergency circumstances, until the enrolling public school district is informed and assumes responsibility for the student. At the request of the public school district, the special education school shall delay termination of the student for up to two calendar weeks to allow the public school district the opportunity to convene an emergency Team meeting or to conduct other appropriate planning discussions prior to the student's termination from the special education school program. With the mutual agreement of the approved special education school and the public school district, termination of enrollment may be delayed for longer than two calendar weeks.”
5. Burden of Persuasion
In a due process proceeding, the burden of proof is on the moving party.[28] If the evidence is closely balanced, the moving party will not prevail.[29] In the instant case, as the moving party, Dedham bears this burden.
B. Application of Legal Standards[30]
It is not disputed that Student is a student with a disability who is entitled to special education services under state and federal law. The fundamental issues in dispute are set out under ISSUES IN DISPUTE, supra.
Based upon the extensive exhibits introduced into evidence, thoughtful arguments of Counsel, and a review of the applicable law, I conclude that Dedham has met its burden to show that Chamberlain failed to follow proper procedure in its emergency termination of Student and that Chamberlain is Student’s stay-put placement.
I note, first, that Chamberlain is correct in its argument that it was not required, as suggested by Dedham, to conduct a manifestation determination hearing. There is no requirement in the state regulations to conduct a manifestation determination review prior to an emergency termination pursuant to 603 CMR 28.09(12)(b), and Chamberlain did not initiate disciplinary proceedings that would result in a change in placement for 10 days or more. Rather, as evidenced by Chamberlain’s February 10, 2026 communication to the District and to Parents, Chamberlain at all times intended to terminate Student’s enrollment at the School pursuant to the state’s emergency termination regulations, not for any disciplinary reasons. As such, the District’s argument relative to the need for a manifestation determination review is unpersuasive and without merit.
Chamberlain argues that in the emergency termination context, where, as here, there exists a clear and present threat to the health and safety of the student, Student’s stay-put rights are not location-specific, and instead apply to the array of services contained in his last signed IEP, which can be provided by Dedham outside of the Chamberlain setting. Dedham, however, disputes that Student’s emergency termination was appropriate or that the circumstances surrounding said termination were such that Student presented a clear and present threat to the health and safety of himself or others pursuant to 603 CMR 18.05(7)(d).” I find Dedham’s argument convincing.
I do not disagree with Chamberlain’s argument that it “needs to be allowed to terminate when it sees a health and safety issue that is beyond the scope of its approved program and putting the student’s health and safety at risk”, nor with its contention that “[i]f it is possible for the District to provide the student with the array of services laid out in his IEP in some other setting, that should be the default, rather than forcing the continuation of an unsafe placement.” However, the evidence before me does not support Chamberlain’s contention that Student’s behavior posed a clear and present threat to the health and safety of himself or others in accordance with 603 CMR 18.05(7)(d). Rather, the evidence reflects a long history of behavioral dysregulation, including for a substantial period of the time that Student had been attending Chamberlain, that is materially indistinguishable from the conduct cited by Chamberlain as the basis for Student’s emergency termination.
Student’s profile is characterized by a persistent, historical pattern of unpredictable, aggressive, and unsafe behavior that could be described as consistently posing a clear and present threat to his own safety and that of others. This pattern of maladaptive and unsafe behaviors predated Student’s initial admission to Chamberlain in July 2024, continued throughout his enrollment, was evident in other highly structured therapeutic programs (i.e., in Utah and Alaska) prior to Student’s readmission to Chamberlain in September 2025, and continued after such readmission through the February 10, 2026 notification of emergency termination. It is precisely these behavioral challenges that necessitated Student’s placement in a therapeutic, highly structured, residential school, such as Chamberlain. Hence, it is difficult to reconcile Chamberlain’s decision to invoke emergency termination procedures where Chamberlain accepted Student into its program with full knowledge of the nature, severity, and chronicity of his behavioral challenges; developed and implemented an IEP specifically designed to address those challenges through goals in the areas of Self-Regulation and Social Interactions; and continued to serve Student despite repeated incidents of similar frequency and magnitude. Moreover, Chamberlain readmitted Student following reports from other therapeutic and structured placements where Student exhibited highly comparable behaviors. At no point prior to termination did Chamberlain inform Dedham that Student’s behaviors were escalating such that termination was being considered[31], or that Student’s behaviors had substantively changed from his prior presentation while attending Chamberlain. Neither did Chamberlain request to convene the Team to formally reassess Student’s program, consider whether his behaviors had escalated beyond what could be safely managed within the placement, or determine whether additional supports, programmatic modifications, or an alternative placement was warranted.
As such, I am unconvinced that the application of the emergency regulation was appropriate. The record reflects that, as recently as January 2026, Student engaged in multiple serious incidents, including physical altercations with peers, one resulting in hospitalization, and in highly unsafe conduct such as stomping on a frozen body of water and falling through the ice. These incidents, like many before them, posed significant safety risks to Student and to others. The behavior ultimately cited by Chamberlain in its Emergency Termination notification as constituting a “clear and present threat to the health and safety” of the Student or others within the meaning of 603 CMR 18.05(7)(d), does not appear to be distinguishable from prior events of comparable severity that did not prompt emergency termination. This is particularly so, given that during the February 9, 2026, incident in question, Student was able to be verbally redirected back into the dorm.
If I were to adopt Chamberlain’s argument as applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, then this would enable the emergency termination regulation to be used as a mechanism to discharge a student for exhibiting the very behaviors that the placement is designed to address. Rather, I conclude that the regulation’s reference to an “emergency” contemplates its use only in truly exceptional circumstances, that is, those that are qualitatively different from his presentation upon acceptance at the private school program and are so acute and extraordinary that they cannot be safely addressed within the program, even with the implementation of reasonable modifications, additional supports, or short-term interventions.[32] Here, although Parents reported to Dedham that “[s]ince [Student’s] return to Chamberlain, some staff members [had] expressed concern, informally, about the level of support he needs, relative to what they could give,” Chamberlain did not indicate that it “wishe[d] to have [Student] placed elsewhere,” and there is no evidence that Chamberlain attempted additional modifications, interventions, or supports in an attempt to maintain Student at Chamberlain. Based on the extensive record of behavioral challenges at Chamberlain, it is unclear why an emergency termination was initiated at the time it was.
I also note that Chamberlain is only compliant with the procedural requirements governing emergency terminations at such time that the District “assumes responsibility for the student”. The plain language of 603 CMR 28.09(12)(b) is unclear as to whether “assumes responsibility” is interpreted to mean that the District’s responsibility is assumed when it initiates the referral and planning search process for another program or when it actually identifies and secures a new placement. Although the regulation contemplates a relatively prompt transition (as suggested by the “two weeks” delay referenced therein), this timeline presumes the ready availability of appropriate placements, which, unfortunately, does not reflect the current program availability crisis in Massachusetts, where the number of students with severe emotional and behavioral needs far exceeds the available spots in both approved and unapproved programs. As such, I suggest that a more reasonable interpretation (and one that is consistent with the purpose of special education law, which is to provide students with disabilities with a free appropriate education) is that a district “assumes responsibility” once it has, at the very least, identified an available placement.[33] Any other interpretation would mean that Student could be effectively left without any educational placement for unknown and extensive periods of time. In any event, here, Chamberlain did not even allow the District the additional two weeks referenced in the regulation, as it refused to allow Student to return on February 12, 2026, only three days following its termination letter. Despite an active, extensive, and ongoing search process by Dedham throughout February, March, and early April, the District has been unable to locate an alternative program for Student. As such, I find that Dedham has not yet “assumed responsibility for” Student, rendering the final step of the termination procedures outlined in the regulation effectively unfulfilled.
Even if I were to have concluded that Chamberlain followed correct emergency termination procedures, I would nonetheless find that Chamberlain is Student’s stay-put placement. Here, there is no other setting in which Student’s IEP services, which include therapeutic and residential programming, can be implemented such that I could entertain a stay-put placement at a different location.[34] BSEA Hearing Officers have consistently concluded that if, at the time of the hearing, no appropriate placement is available,[35] the stay-put placement remains the private school placement, because, “[a]s a matter of public policy, and if the IDEA’s stay[-]put provisions are to have any meaning, the BSEA cannot issue a decision finding that [the] [s]tudent does not have any placement in which to remain during the pendency of this matter, and the removal of the private school as the stay-put placement would [leave] the student without any educational placement.”[36] The same rationale applies also to stay-put during the pendency, not only of the BSEA proceeding, but also of the underlying dispute.[37] The purpose of the stay-put provision is continuity and preservation of the “status quo.”[38] In the absence of a new location where Student’s IEP can be implemented, Chamberlain, the last educational placement which Student attended prior to the instant dispute, and the placement delineated in the “last implemented IEP,”[39] is the only program and placement capable of implementing Student’s last accepted IEP, and thus is Student’s stay-put placement during the pendency of the underlying dispute.
If, moving forward, Chamberlain believes that it cannot appropriately and safely maintain Student’s placement, it may seek a Honig injunction from a court with pertinent jurisdiction. (Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. at 325).
ORDER
Dedham has met its burden to show that Chamberlain failed to follow proper procedure in its termination of Student and that Chamberlain is Student’s stay-put placement.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: April 21, 2026
Footnotes
[1] In 2020, Student had also been diagnosed with Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder. (D-6)
[2] In December 2025, Student’s father observed that Student had “continued to engage in activities that result in misdemeanor charges since returning in-state, and more recently 2 felony charges as well. He has 6 cases pending in Massachusetts now. (2 additional cases in Utah.) He does not seem to be able to keep himself out of serious trouble.” (D-11)
[3] 20 U.S.C. §1400 (d)(1)(A).
[4] See 20 U.S.C. §1401(9), (26), (29); 603 CMR 28.05(4)(b); C.D. by and through M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 621, 629 (1st Cir. 2019); Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg'l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 84, 84 (1st Cir. 2012); Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Cooperative Sch. Dist., 518 F. 3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008); C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Comty. Sch. Dist., 513 F. 3d 279 (1st Cir. 2008).
[5] 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A); 34 CFR 300.114(a)(2)(i); M.G.L. c. 71 B, §§2, 3; 603 CMR 28.06(2)(c).
[6] Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197, n.21 (1982) (“Whatever Congress meant by an “appropriate” education, it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education”).
[7] See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 400-401 (2017); see also 603 CMR 28.02(17).
[8] Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 388 (“The nature of the IEP process, from the initial consultation through state administrative proceedings, ensures that parents and school representatives will fully air their respective opinions on the degree of progress a child's IEP should pursue”); see K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795, 809 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the court would not compare the student to her nondisabled peers since the key question was whether the student made gains in her areas of need).
[9] G.D. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942, 948-949 (1st Cir. 1991).
[10] An exception to the stay-put provision should be noted. Hearing officers have the authority to order the temporary removal of a child to an Interim Alternative Educational Setting (IAES) for up to 45 days when maintaining the child's placement is substantially likely to result in injury.
[11] 20 U.S.C. §1415(j); see 34 CFR §300.514; ; M.G.L. c. 71B; 603 CMR 28.08(7); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988); Verhoven v. Brunswick Sch. Comm., 207 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999); M.R. and J.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014); In Re: Framingham Pub. Schs. and Quin, BSEA #1605247 (Reichbach, 2016); In Re: Abington Pub. Schs., BSEA # 1407763 (Figueroa, 2014).
[12] See limiting language, Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 918 (1st Cir. 1983) (“We therefore join the Seventh Circuit in its view that (e)(3) establishes a strong preference, but not a statutory duty, for maintenance of the status quo .… We do not believe Congress intended to freeze an arguably inappropriate placement and program for the three to five years of review proceedings. To construe (e)(3) in this manner would thwart the express central goal of the Act: provision of a free appropriate education to disabled children”) (internal citations omitted); see also In re: Hampshire Regl. Sch. Dist. (Ruling on Parents’ Motion to Enforce Stay[-]Put), BSEA # 2103975 (Kantor Nir, 2020) (finding no stay-put rights attached to an erroneous increase in reading services to which there was “no meeting of the minds” as the increase “was never discussed at the Team meeting” ); In Re: Nathan F., BSEA # 96-1706 (Byrne, 1996) (finding that it there was no “meeting of the minds” on modified speech-language services for Student as a result of the Team meeting, and therefore the district had no obligation to provide services other than those set out in the last accepted IEP).
[13] Student & Concord & Natick Pub. Schs. (Corrected Ruling on Mother’s Request for “Stay[-] Put” Order), BSEA # 18-00182 (Berman, 2017)
[14] See 20 U.S.C. §1415(j); 34 CFR §300.514.
[15] Emphasis added.
[16] In Re: Tahlia H. & Taunton Public Schools (Order), BSEA # 16-06007 (Byrne, 2016) (“parental rejection of any proposal to initiate, continue, supplement, change or withdraw a special education service or setting is an indication of a parent's ‘disagreement’ sufficient to trigger ‘stay[-]put’”).
[17] Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 859, 867 (3rd Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F. 2d 618. 626 (6th Cir. 1990).
[18] See A.W. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 681–83 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that educational placement referred to an “instructional setting” rather than to the “precise location of that setting” or the “precise physical location where the disabled student is educated).
[19] See In Re: Agawam Pub. Schs. and Melmark-New England, BSEA #1504488 (Berman, 2015).
[20] 603 CMR 18.05(7)(b).
[21] 603 CMR 18.05(7)(a).
[22] See, e.g., In re: Student v. Belmont Pub. Schs. and Devereux Advanced Behavioral Health, BSEA # 2103476 and BSEA # 2104694 (Figueroa, 2021) (finding Devereaux to be student’s stay-put where no other program had yet to be identified for him); In re: Chelmsford Pub. Schs. v. Swansea Wood School, BSEA # 22-03132 (Kantor Nir, 2021) (finding that where at the time of the filing for Hearing, the student “did not have any program available to him in the immediate future,” the private program was his stay-put placement).
[23] In Re: Lolani, BSEA # 04-0359 (Byrne, 2003).
[24] Id.
[25] Student v. Georgetown Pub. Schs. and Landmark Sch. (Rulings on Parents’ Motion for Summary Decision, Parents’ Motion for Stay[-]Put and Landmark School’s Motion for Summary Judgment), BSEA # 14-08733 (Oliver, 2014).
[26] See A.W., 372 F.3d at 676 (“the term “educational placement” as used in the stay-put provision refers to the overall educational environment rather than the precise location in which the disabled student is educated”); see also Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 199 n.5 and 206 (5th Cir. 1992) (“educational placement” not a place but a program of services); Weil v. Bd. of Elem. and Secondary Educ., 931 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1991) (change of schools under the circumstances presented in this case was not a change in “educational placement”).
[27] In re: Susan S. and the Cotting Sch. and Falmouth Pub. Sch., BSEA # 05-1581 (Sherwood, 2004); see also In Re: Student v. Agawam Pub. Schs. & Melmark New England, BSEA # 15-04488 (Berman, 2015) (the “fundamental purpose of ‘stay[-]put’ … is to ensure stability for the student regardless of conflicts between and among the adults”).
[28] Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2008).
[29] Id. (places the burden of proof in an administrative hearing on the party seeking relief).
[30] In making my determinations, I rely on the facts I have found as set forth in the Findings of Facts, above, and incorporate them by reference to avoid restating them except where necessary.
[31] See 603 CMR 18.05(7)(a).
[32] See 603 CMR 18.02(8) (emergency termination means “removal of a student from a program due to an unplanned circumstance, including a student endangering his/her physical health or safety or endangering the physical health or safety of others”) (emphasis added); see also In re: Student and Quincy Pub. Schs. and League School of Greater Boston, BSEA # 22-02940 (Mitchell 2021) (finding that there were no emergency grounds for termination where the incident was not “dissimilar to behavioral dysregulations Student has had throughout [the student’s] attendance at League. ... In all situations, Student ultimately returned to a calm state through the use of various strategies including administration of his Ativan PRN, playing basketball, and going on a van ride”); In re: Chelmsford Pub. Schs. v. Swansea Wood Sch., BSEA # 2203132 (Kantor Nir 2021) ("There is no evidence that Student's aggressive, sexualized and elopement behaviors at Swansea Wood were not consistent with... descriptions available to the special education school prior to his acceptance. . . . [A] DESE-approved special education program cannot, on the one hand, fail both … to reconvene the IEP Team to assess whether additional assessments, supports and/or services are needed, and, on the other hand argue that Student's circumstances deteriorated in a period of 11 months to the point that an emergency termination was indicated or that additional supports beyond those provided for in his IEP will not be sufficient").
[33] See Student v. Melmark New England & Bourne Pub. Schs., BSEA # 25-08471 (Putney-Yaceshyn, 2025) (“The regulation does not define what is meant by ‘assumes responsibility for the student’. However, in order to avoid conflicting with the stay[-]put provision of federal and state law, it must be inferred to mean that assuming responsibility connotes the ability to provide a placement. … Until Bourne is able to identify a successor placement for Student, it will not have fully fulfilled the ‘assume responsibility’ language of the Regulation”); see also In Re: Steve and Worcester Pub. Schs. and Cent. Mass. Collab., BSEA # 1808823 (Reichbach, 2018) ("Absent ‘insurmountable safety concerns’ that cannot be overcome through modifications, a special education school cannot terminate a student until a new placement is located"); In Re: Lolani, BSEA # 04-0359 (Byrne, 2003).
[34] See In re: Student v. Georgetown Pub. Schs. and Landmark School, BSEA # 1408733 (Oliver, 2014); see also In Re: Dracut Pub. Schs. and Melmark New England, BSEA # 09-1566 (Crane, 2008) (citing to Hale v. Poplar Bluff R-1 Sch. Dist., 280 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2002) (determination of whether there has been a change in student's "then-current educational placement" is a "fact-specific" inquiry that considers the impact of a change of placement on student's education)).
[35] See Framingham Pub. Schs. and Student v. Guild for Human Services, Inc. and the Dep’t of Developmental Services, BSEA # 18-08824 (Putney-Yaceshyn, 2010); In re: Chelmsford Pub. Schs. v. Swansea Wood School, BSEA # 2203132 (Kantor Nir, 2021); In re: Student v. Boston Pub. Schs. and the Children's Center for Communication Beverly School for the Deaf, BSEA # 24-03627 (Berman 2023).
[36] Id.; see also In Re: Belmont and Devereaux, BSEA # 2103476 (Figueroa, 2020) (stay-put applied to a private residential special education program that was found not to be appropriate for a student, but for which modifications could be made, until another appropriate program was identified, and for whom, at the time of the hearing, no viable alternative educational placement had been identified).
[37] See 603 CMR 28.08(7).
[38] Student & Concord & Natick Pub. Schs. (Corrected Ruling on Mother’s Request for “Stay[-]Put” Order), BSEA # 18-00182 (Berman, 2017).
[39] See Millay v. Surry Sch. Dep't, 584 F. Supp. 2d 219, 230 (D. Me. 2008) (“the Court concludes that [] Y.M.'s stay[-]put placement is the last placement that Ms. Millay and the MDOE or Surry agreed to be appropriate”); see also In re: Student v. North Middlesex Regional School District and Dr. Franklin Perkins School, BSEA #2 400589 (Kantor Nir 2023).