STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW
26-311
Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by his parents, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the New York City Department of Education
Appearances: Law Offices of Adam Dayan, PLLC, attorneys for petitioners, by Jason Marin, Esq.
I. Introduction
This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. Petitioners (the parents) appeal from the decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which denied their request to be reimbursed for the costs of their son's tuition at the Kulanu Academy (Kulanu) for the 2025-26 school year. The appeal must be dismissed.
II. Overview—Administrative Procedures
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).
A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]). The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4[a]). The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5). The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]). The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).
III. Facts and Procedural History
Given the disposition of this matter, a full recitation of the student's educational history is not warranted. Briefly, the student in this matter began receiving speech-language therapy, occupational therapy (OT), and applied behavioral analysis (ABA) services through the Early Intervention Program (EIP) (see Parent Ex. C at p. 2). The student attended a center-based preschool program, where he received ABA services and "other supports"; when the student aged out of preschool, his parents enrolled him at Reach for the Stars Learning Center, where he remained through the 2022-23 school year (id.). Thereafter, beginning with the 2023-24 school year, the student has continuously attended Kulanu (see Parent Exs. T ¶ 25; U ¶ 9).[1]
During the 2024-25 school year, on April 10, 2025, the parents executed an "Enrollment Contract" with Kulanu for the student's attendance during the 2025-26 school year, in a 12-month program beginning July 7, 2025 and concluding on July 25, 2026 (Parent Ex. K at pp. 1, 7).[2]
A CSE convened on May 6, 2025, and finding that the student remained eligible to receive special education as a student with autism, developed an IEP for the student for the 2025-26 school year with an implementation date of July 7, 2025 (see Parent Ex. D at pp. 1, 24).[3] The May 2025 CSE recommended the following 12-month special education program for the student: a 12:1+1 special class for instruction in mathematics, English language arts (ELA), social studies, and sciences; related services consisting of two 40-minute session per week of counseling in a small group, four 40-minute sessions per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), two 40-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy, two 40-minute sessions per week of speech-language therapy in a small group; and the services of a full-time, individual paraprofessional as behavior support (id. at pp. 17-19). The May 2025 CSE also recommended four 60-minute sessions per year of parent counseling and training services, special transportation, testing accommodations, and a coordinated set of transition activities for the student (id. at pp. 17, 20-21, 23-24). At that time, the May 2025 CSE indicated in the IEP that the student required "strategies, including positive behavioral interventions, supports and other strategies to address behaviors that impede[d] the student's learning or that of others" (id. at p. 7). The May 2025 CSE also indicated in the IEP that the student required a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) (id.).[4]
Attached to an email dated June 13, 2025, the parents sent the district a letter describing their concerns with the student's May 2025 IEP, the FBA and BIP, and their belief that the student required 1:1 applied behavioral analysis (ABA) instruction to make progress (see Parent Ex. I at pp. 1-2).
By letter dated June 16, 2025, the parents notified the district of their intention to unilaterally place the student at Kulanu for the 2025-26 school year (12-month program) and to seek public funding from the district for such placement (see Parent Ex. B at pp. 1-2). The parents described their objections to the May 2025 IEP and noted that they had not received an assigned public school site for the 2025-26 school year (id. at p. 2). The parents requested that the district provide transportation services for the student to attend Kulanu, with an individual transportation paraprofessional, beginning July 2025 (id.).
In separate letters, both dated June 25, 2025, the district provided the parents with a prior written notice summarizing the special education program recommendations for the student for the 2025-26 school year and a school location letter identifying the assigned public school site within which the student's IEP would be implemented for the 2025-26 school year (see Parent Exs. E at pp. 1-4; F at p 1).
By due process complaint notice dated October 26, 2025, the parents alleged that the district failed to offer the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2025-26 school year based on various procedural and substantive violations (see Parent Ex. A at pp. 1, 7-12). As relief, the parents requested an order directing the district to reimburse or directly fund the costs of the student's tuition at Kulanu for the 2025-26 school year, for the district to fund the costs of the home-based ABA services for the student (12 hours per week), and for the district to provide transportation services for the student's attendance at Kulanu (id. at pp. 12-13).
On December 5, 2025, the parties proceeded to an impartial hearing, which concluded on January 20, 2026, before an IHO with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) (see Tr. pp. 1-40).[5], [6] In a decision dated February 9, 2026, the IHO found that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2025-26 school year, the parents' unilateral placement of the student at Kulanu was appropriate, and equitable considerations weighed in favor of the parents' request to fund the student's placement at Kulanu, but at the contracted amount (see IHO Decision at pp. 2-4). The IHO denied the parents' request for funding of related services at Kulanu as the parents had only submitted an estimate of the costs for services to be provided and had not submitted evidence of the service actually provided to the student (id at pp. 3-4). The IHO also found that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement or funding for the costs of home-based ABA services for the 2025-26 school year, noting that the parents had not secured a provider or established that the student required a home-based ABA program to make progress (id. at p. 4). As relief, the IHO ordered the district to fund the costs of the student's tuition at Kulanu and dismissed any remaining claims (id. at pp. 4-5).
IV. Appeal for State-Level Review
The parents appeal, alleging that the IHO erred by reducing the amount of tuition reimbursement awarded pursuant to equitable considerations. More specifically, the parents contend that the IHO erred by finding that the hearing record failed to establish the delivery of the student's related services at Kulanu during the 2025-26 school year and thus, improperly concluded that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for those costs. As relief, the parents seek an order directing the district to fund the full costs of the student's tuition and related services at Kulanu for the 2025-26 school year.[7]
The district did not interpose an answer to the parents' request for review.
V. Applicable Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).
A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 [2d Cir. 2014]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]). The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement" (Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 [2017]). While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203). However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189). "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379). Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132). Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]). The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403 [holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"]; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192). The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).[8]
A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252). In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192). "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).
VI. Discussion—Service of Pleadings
As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether the appeal should be dismissed due to improper service of the request for review.
An appeal from an IHO's decision to an SRO—whether the appeal is by a district or a parent—must be initiated by timely personal service of a verified request for review and other supporting documents, if any, upon respondent (8 NYCRR 279.4[b], [c]). Personal service on a school district is made "by delivering a copy thereof to the district clerk, to a trustee or member of the board of education of such school district, to the superintendent of schools, or to a person who has been designated by the board of education to accept service" (8 NYCRR 279.4[b]).
Generally, the failure to comply with the practice requirements of Part 279 of the State regulations, including the failure to properly serve an initiating pleading in a timely manner, may result in the rejection of the submitted documents or the dismissal of a request for review by an SRO (8 NYCRR 279.8[a]; 279.13; see B.C. v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 971 F. Supp. 2d 356, 365-66 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013] [upholding an SRO's dismissal of a parent's appeal where, among other procedural deficiencies, the amended petition was not personally served upon the district]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 16-015 [dismissing a parent's appeal for failure to effectuate proper personal service of the petition upon the district where the parent served a district employee not authorized to accept service]; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 06-117 [dismissing a parent's appeal for failure to effectuate proper personal service in a timely manner where the parent served a CSE chairperson and, thereafter, served the superintendent but not until after the time permitted by State regulation expired]; see also Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-042 [dismissing parent's appeal for failure to properly effectuate service of the petition in a timely manner where the parent served the district's counsel by overnight mail]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-013 [dismissing parent's appeal for failure to timely effectuate personal service of petition upon the district]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-012 [dismissing parents' appeal for failure to timely effectuate personal service of petition upon the district]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-099 [dismissing parents' appeal for failure to timely effectuate personal service of the petition upon the district]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 05-082 [dismissing a district's appeal for failure to personally serve the petition upon the parent where the district served the parent's former counsel by overnight mail]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 05-060 [dismissing a district's appeal for failing to timely file a hearing record on appeal]; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 05-045 [dismissing a parent's appeal for, among other reasons, failure to effectuate proper personal service where the parent served a school psychologist]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 01-048 [dismissing a district's appeal for failure to personally serve the petition upon the parent where the district served the parent by facsimile]).
Here, the district has not responded to the parents' request for review. Accordingly, the affidavits of service submitted by the parents must be sufficient on their face to establish that the request for review was served on the district in compliance with State regulation. Here, the parents, who are represented by an attorney, filed a notice of intention to seek review with case information statement, and a verified request for review (without a notice of request for review), and an affidavit of verification, with the Office of State Review. The parents also filed two affidavits of service, both dated March 20, 2026 (see Mar. 26, 2026 Affs. of Serv.).[9] The first affidavit of service indicates that an individual served a "Notice of Intention to Seek Review and Case Information Statement" on March 6, 2026, on the district's Department of Education by electronically transmitting a "true copy of all documents" to the Department of Education (Mar. 26, 2026 Aff. of Serv.). The same affidavit of service indicated that four individuals were "included in the service email" (id.). The affidavit of service for the Notice of Intention to Seek Review and Case Information Statement does not include or identify any email addresses for either the Department of Education or the four individuals included in the "service email"; additionally, the affidavit does not indicate that either the Department of Education or the four named individuals consented to service by email or otherwise had the authority to accept service on the district's behalf (id.). The second affidavit of service—with respect to the purported service of the request for review—indicates that the same individual, who signed the affidavit of service of the notice of intention to seek review and case information statement, served a request for review on March 20, 2026, via electronic mail, by transmitting a "true copy of all documents" to two individuals, identified solely by what appears to be their respective email addresses, and indicates further that "Respondent consented to email service on March 6, 2026" (Mar. 20, 2026 Aff. of Serv.).[10] However, there is no documentation of the consent obtained. Accordingly, there is no explanation as to why different individuals were served with papers, who may have consented to service via electronic means, or whether the consent identified a specific person or address for electronic service.
Given the descriptions in the parents' affidavits of service, the parents did not properly serve the district with the request for review in the manner required by State regulation, as personal service on the school district was not made to the district clerk, a trustee, the superintendent, or person designated by the board of education (see 8 NYCRR 279.4[b]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 20-020; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-077; see also Appeal of Villanueva, 49 Ed. Dep't Rep. 54, Decision No. 15,956 [personal service under similar regulatory provisions upon unidentified receptionist found improper]; Appeal of Baker, 47 Ed. Dep't Rep. 280, Decision No. 15,696 [service upon the executive secretary to the superintendent found under similar regulatory provisions improper]).
While State regulations do not preclude a school district and a parent from agreeing to "waive" personal service of the request for review and it is generally permitted for parties to agree to service by an alternate delivery method, there is no indication in this instance that the district agreed to accept service by electronic delivery of the request for review and supporting documents to the individuals identified in the parents' March 20, 2026 affidavits of service. Under these circumstances, given the deficiencies in compliance with Part 279 and the defect in service on the district, the appeal must be dismissed.
VII. Conclusion
In accordance with the discussion above, the parents' appeal must be dismissed for failure to properly initiate the appeal.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
Dated: May 1, 2026
Steven Krolak
STATE REVIEW OFFICER
Footnotes
[1] Kulanu has not been approved by the Commissioner of Education as a school with which districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities (see 8 NYCRR 200.1[d], 200.7).
[2] Evidence in the hearing record reflects that the student's program at Kulanu for the 2025-26 school year was expected to include the following related services: two 40-minute session per week of counseling in a small group, four 40-minute sessions per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), two 40-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy, two 40-minute sessions per week of speech-language therapy in a small group; and the services of a full-time, individual paraprofessional (see Parent Ex. L at pp. 1-2).
[3] The student's eligibility for special education as a student with autism is not in dispute (see 34 CFR 300.8[c][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][1]).
[4] The district conducted a functional behavioral assessment (FBA) of the student and developed a BIP for the student on May 6, 2025 (see generally Parent Exs. G-H).
[5] On December 9, 2025, a district representative executed a pendency implementation form, agreeing that the student's pendency services consisted of the following: reimbursement and direct funding for the costs of the student's tuition at Kulanu (12-month program) and the provision of transportation services (see Pendency Impl. Form at pp. 1-2). The district also agreed that an unappealed IHO decision, dated September 30, 2024, formed the basis of the student's pendency services, which were retroactive to the filing of the due process complaint notice (id.).
[6] During the impartial hearing, the parents sought to file an amended due process complaint notice, dated January 12, 2026; however, in a "Dismissal Order," dated January 13, 2026, the IHO denied the parents' request (see generally Amended Due Proc. Compl. Notice; Dismissal Order).
[7] The parents do not appeal or challenge the IHO's decision denying reimbursement or funding for the costs of a home-based ABA program (see generally Req. for Rev.). Accordingly, this determination has become final and binding on the parties and will not be reviewed on appeal (34 CFR 300.514[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v]; see M.Z. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 1314992, at *6-*7, *10 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013]).
[8] The Supreme Court has stated that even if it is unreasonable to expect a student to attend a regular education setting and achieve on grade level, the educational program set forth in the student's IEP "must be appropriately ambitious in light of his [or her] circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 402).
[9] Each request for review must contain a notice informing the respondent of the need to appear and answer allegations in a request for review (8 NYCRR 279.3).
[10] Only one of the two email addresses identified in the March 20, 2026 affidavit of service of the request for review and supporting documents appears to be a match for one of the four individuals identified in the affidavit of service of the notice of intention to seek review and case information statement.