STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW
26-141
Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by his parent, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the New York City Department of Education
Appearances:
Liz Vladeck, General Counsel, attorneys for respondent, by Brian J. Reimels, Esq.
I. Introduction
This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. Petitioner (the parent) appeals from a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which denied her request that respondent (the district) fund the costs of her son's services provided by Reach for the Stars Learning and Development, LLC (RFTS-LD) for the 2025-26 school year. The appeal must be dismissed.
II. Overview—Administrative Procedures
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law § 3602-c). The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programing for students with disabilities under the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).
A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]). The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4). The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5). The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]). The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).
III. Facts and Procedural History
Due to the disposition of this appeal, a full recitation of the facts and procedural history is unnecessary. Briefly, a CSE convened on April 15, 2024, and finding that the student remained eligible for special education as a student with autism, developed an IEP with a projected implementation date of May 1, 2024 (Dist. Ex. 1 at pp. 1, 39). The April 2024 CSE recommended that the student attend a general education classroom with the support of integrated co-teaching (ICT) services for all core subjects and that the student receive one 30-minute session per week of individual counseling services, one 30-minute session per week of group counseling services, one 30-minute session per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), and two 30-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy (id. at pp. 32, 33, 36). The April 2024 CSE further recommended the student receive the same services for the 12-month school year and that the parent be provided with one 60-minute session per month of individual parent counseling and training (id. at p. 32).
On May 29, 2024, an IHO (IHO I) issued a findings of fact and decision (FOFD) related to a prior proceeding involving the 2023-24 school year, in which IHO I ordered the district to fund, for the 2023-24 10-month school year, 33.5 hours per week of special education itinerant teacher (SEIT) services, two hours per week of [board-certified behavioral analyst (BCBA)] supervision, and one hour per week of parent counseling and training and to continue to fund, for the 2023-24 12-month school year, two 30-minute sessions per week of speech-language therapy and two 30-minute sessions per week of OT (Parent Ex. B at pp. 22-23).
On March 11, 2025, the parent submitted a letter to the district, notifying the district that the student would be parentally placed in a nonpublic school for the 2025-26 school year, and that the parent sought the provision of special education services from the district (Dist. Ex. 5). On November 2, 2025, the parent signed an agreement with RFTS-LD for the provision of BCBA supervision, parent counseling and training, and SEIT services for the 2025-26 school year (Parent Ex. C at pp. 2, 3). On November 5, 2025, the parent, through her advocate, notified the district that the student required extensive SEIT and BCBA services and the district failed to offer a program including those services and that, if the district did not remediate the issue, the parent would seek funding for those services from the district (Parent Ex. D).
By due process complaint notice dated September 12, 2025, the parent alleged, through her advocate, that the district denied the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2025-26 school year (Parent Ex. A). The parent alleged that the district failed to convene a CSE in advance of the 2025-26 extended school year and that the April 2024 IEP failed to meet the student's individual needs (id. at pp. 1-2). The parent requested pendency based on IHO I's May 2024 decision (id. at p. 3). As a proposed solution for the alleged denial of a FAPE for the 2025-26 school year, the parent requested an order directing the district to fund 33.5 hours per week of SEIT services, 2 hours per week of BCBA supervision, and one hour per week of parent counseling and training for the 2025-26 school year at the rates set by the provider, along with an award of compensatory education for any missed services (id. at pp. 3-4).
On October 27, 2025, the parties appeared for a preliminary conference before an IHO (IHO II) with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH); and on December 16, 2025, the parties proceeded to an impartial hearing, which concluded the same day (Tr. pp. 1-66). In a decision dated December 19, 2025, IHO II noted that the district conceded that it denied the student with a FAPE for the 2025-26 school year; however, IHO II denied the parent’s requested relief because IHO II found that the parent failed to meet her burden of proving that the unilaterally obtained services were appropriate to meet the student's unique needs (IHO Decision at pp. 3-8). IHO II also addressed equitable considerations and determined that there was no evidence that the parent did not cooperate with the district (IHO Decision at pp. 6-7). IHO II directed the CSE to convene a CSE within 15 days from the date of her decision and for the CSE to create an IEP or IESP for the student with some additional directives (id. at pp. 7-8).
IV. Appeal for State-Level Review
The parent appeals, alleging that IHO II erred by finding that the parent failed to meet her burden of proving that the unilaterally obtained services were appropriate for the student and that the hearing record did not support the parent's requested rates. The parent acknowledges that the request for review was not filed within the statutory timelines and requests that an SRO excuse the delay asserting that the delay was "due to circumstances outside the Parent’s control, as severe weather conditions in the Parent’s area prevented the Parent from timely reviewing and executing the necessary appeal documents."[1]
The district submits an answer, in which the district alleges that the parent’s request for review should be dismissed because it is untimely and because the parent failed to assert good cause for her failure to timely initiate the appeal. The district acknowledges that "the winter climate" but asserts that weather conditions by themselves do not constitute an excuse for the untimely filing. Additionally, the district argues that IHO II's ruling that the parent failed to meet her burden of proving that the unilaterally obtained services were appropriate was correct and should be affirmed.[2]
V. Applicable Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generallyForest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).
A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 [2d Cir. 2014]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]). The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement" (Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 [2017]). While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203). However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189). "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379). Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132). Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]). The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403 [holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"]; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192). The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).[3]
A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252). In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192). "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).
VI. Discussion - Timeliness of the Request for Review
As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether the parent's appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with State regulations governing appeals before the Office of State Review.
An appeal from an IHO's decision to an SRO must be initiated by timely personal service of a notice of request for review and a verified request for review and other supporting documents upon a respondent (8 NYCRR 279.4[a]). A request for review must be personally served within 40 days after the date of the IHO's decision to be reviewed (id.). If the last day for service of any pleading or paper falls on a Saturday or Sunday, service may be made on the following Monday; if the last day for such service falls on a legal holiday, service may be made on the following business day (8 NYCRR 279.11[b]). State regulation provides an SRO with the authority to dismiss sua sponte an untimely request for review (8 NYCRR 279.13; see e.g., Application of the Board of Educ., Appeal No. 17-100 [dismissing a district's appeal for failure to timely effectuate personal service on the parent]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 16-014 [dismissing a parent's appeal for failure to effectuate service in a timely manner]). However, an SRO may, in his or her sole discretion, excuse a failure to timely seek review within the 40-day timeline for good cause shown (8 NYCRR 279.13). The reasons for the failure must be set forth in the request for review (id.). "Good cause for late filing would be something like postal service error, or, in other words, an event that the filing party had no control over" (Grenon v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 3751450, at *5 [N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2006]; see T.W. v. Spencerport Cent. Sch. Dist., 891 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441 [W.D.N.Y. 2012]).
Here, the parent failed to initiate the appeal in accordance with the timelines prescribed in Part 279 of the State regulations. The IHO's decision is dated December 19, 2025; thus, the parent had until January 28, 2026 to personally serve the district with a verified request for review (see IHO Decision at p. 8; 8 NYCRR 279.4[a]).
The parent's advocate served the request for review on the district by email on February 3, 2026, six days after the deadline passed (see Parent Aff. of Personal Service). In the request for review, the parent's advocate acknowledged that the appeal was filed late and explained that "the delay was due to circumstances outside the Parent's control, as severe weather conditions in the Parent's area prevented the Parent from timely reviewing and executing the necessary appeal documents" and indicated the request for review was "filed promptly upon the Parent's first reasonable opportunity to sign and authorize the submission" (Req. for Rev. at pp. 1-2).[4], [5]
The district asserts in its answer that although the parent acknowledged the lateness of the appeal, the parent "fail[ed] to assert good cause for the failure to timely initiate the appeal" (Answer ¶ 6). The district "acknowledge[d] the winter climate that the New York City area has recently experienced, [but asserted that] weather conditions on their own do not constitute good cause to excuse the delay" (id.). The district notes that the "[p]arent d[id] not claim that they received the Decision late or that they were unable to review the Decision or work on the appeal during, let alone prior to, the winter weather… only… that they were prevented from 'signing and authorizing' the RFR" (id.). The district noted that the parent further failed to explain "why it took them an additional six days after the deadline to finalize the documents and serve the [district]" noting that the parent did not physically sign the documents and the notarization of the parent’s verification was taken electronically (id.). The parent did not reply to the district's answer to submit clarification on these assertions.
Upon review of the parent’s submission, the parent has failed to assert good cause for the delay. In particular, the parent has not asserted a specific reason as to why she was unable to complete her review and signing of the documents other than the general allegation that she was prevented from doing so due to "severe weather." Review of the request for review indicates that the parent did not physically sign any of the papers, rather, they were completed electronically. Both the notice of request for review and the request for review filed with the Office of State Review include conformed signatures and, as the district asserts in its answer, the notarization of the parent’s verification was taken electronically. Additionally, service of the request for review was made on the district via email.
Further, I note that the winter weather event used as an excuse by the parent was not unexpected in that it was forecast nationally in advance so that people could plan ahead for it. Furthermore, significant winter storms, while inconvenient, are a not an uncommon occurrence during the winter months in the northeastern United States. Parties across the State time and again encounter them during the 40-day appeal period applicable to these proceedings. Accordingly, the parent, and the parent's advocate, could have planned ahead for the deadline by serving the request for review earlier, prior to the start of the “severe weather" if they felt it necessary; parties are not required to wait until the last possible moment to serve papers on the opposing party and file them with the Office of State Review. Overall, I find the district is correct that the parent's explanation for the late service does not constitute good cause.
As the parent has failed to assert good cause for the failure to timely initiate the appeal from the IHO's decision (see 8 NYCRR 279.13), there is no basis on which to excuse the parent's failure to timely appeal the IHO's decision (see 8 NYCRR 279.13; see alsoB.D.S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 13305167, at *17 [E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2011] [noting that "[i]nadvertence, mistake or neglect does not constitute good cause"]).
Accordingly, because the parent failed to properly initiate this appeal by effectuating timely service upon the district and there was no good cause asserted for its untimeliness in the request for review, in an exercise of my discretion, the appeal is dismissed (8 NYCRR 279.13; see Vasquez v. Aviles Ramos, et al, 2026 WL 203270, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2026]; Avaras v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 2019 WL 4600870, at *11 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2019] [upholding SRO's decision to dismiss request for review as untimely for being served nine hours late notwithstanding proffered reason of process server's error]; New York City Dep't of Educ. v. S.H., 2014 WL 572583, at *5-*7 [S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014] [upholding SRO's decision to reject petition as untimely for being served one day late]; B.C. v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 971 F. Supp. 2d 356, 365-67 [S.D.N.Y. 2013]; T.W., 891 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41; Kelly v. Saratoga Springs City Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 3163146, at *4-*5 [Sept. 25, 2009] [upholding dismissal of a petition served three days late]; Keramaty v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.,2006 WL 8461781, at *14 [S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2006], at *39-*41 [S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2006] [upholding dismissal of a petition served one day late], adopted 05-CV-0006 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 18-046 [dismissing request for review for being served one day late]).
VII. Conclusion
Having found that the request for review must be dismissed because the parent failed to timely initiate the appeal, the necessary inquiry is at an end.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
Footnotes
[1] The request for review is signed by the parent as required by Part 279 when the parent is not represented by an attorney, however, the text within the request for review makes clear that that the agency that represented the parent during the impartial hearing was assisting the parent in its preparation and filing of the appeal; additionally, the agency email was noted on the parent's notice of intention to seek review, the parent advocate filled out the affidavit of service of the request for review, and the district’s answer was served on the parent advocate.
[2] On February 26, 2026, the parent's advocate requested an extension of time to submit a reply to the district's answer (see Feb. 26, 2026 Corr.). By letter dated February 27, 2026, the Office of State Review granted the parent's request to serve and file a reply until March 13, 2026 (see Feb. 27, 2026 Corr.). The parent has not filed a reply.
[3] The Supreme Court has stated that even if it is unreasonable to expect a student to attend a regular education setting and achieve on grade level, the educational program set forth in the student's IEP "must be appropriately ambitious in light of his [or her] circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 402).
[4] The request for review is dated January 28, 2026, despite having an explanation for the service of the request for review being six days late (Req. for Rev. pp. 1-2, 8).
[5] As noted by the district in its Answer, the request for review was not physically signed by the parent, "which contradicts the reasoning [p]arent g[ave] for the lateness of the pleading. Further, the notarization was done electronically, and the [p]arent d[id] not explain why this could not have been done prior to January 28, 2026" (Answer ¶ 7).