Florida Union Free School District, Impartial Hearing Decision

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

{}, Petitioners,

Hearing Officer: Michael Lazan

v. Case # 96338

UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

INTRODUCTION

This is a case filed on behalf of {}t. A Due Process Complaint (“Complaint”) was received by Florida Union Free School District (“District”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) on March 28, 2016 in regard to the Student. I was appointed to preside on March 30, 2016.

An amended Complaint was filed on April 11, 2016. This Complaint contained one issue that must be expedited pursuant to Part 201 of the regulations. After a hearing date on May 3, 2016, I rendered a decision on that issue on May 17, 2016. (Briefs attached as IHO Exhibits 1 and 2)

The District submitted a combined response/partial motion to dismiss by letter dated April 23, 2016. An email correspondence sent the next day by the parents’ advocate opposed this motion. On May 25, 2016, I dismissed three of the issues in the case. I also listed the issues to be decided in the case in view of the informal nature of the Due Process Complaint: 1) District violated Child Find; 2) District failed to provide Prior Written Notices; 3) District failed to provide/provided inappropriate FBA/behavioral evaluations; 4) District failed to provide/provided inappropriate BIP and behavioral plans; 5) District failed to provide IEE; 6) District failed to provide appropriate educational placement after Student started to receive services at home; 7) District failed to provide appropriate educational placement while Student was at BOCES; 8) District IEP(s) failed to address Student noise sensitivity/failed to consider audiology evaluation; 9) District failed to implement IEP when Student was at home with regard to counseling/behavioral therapy; 10) District IEP(s) failed to provide parent training/counseling; 11) District IEP(s) failed to provide assistive technology; 12) District IEP(s) failed to provide appropriate speech and language goals; and 13) District IEP(s) failed to provide “sensory diet.”

Three hearing dates followed, and the parties provided briefs thereafter. (IHO Exh. 4, 5) Because of the extensiveness of the testimony and issues in this case, to allow the parties to write briefs and to allow this IHO to write this decision, two timelines extensions were granted here. For each such extension, this IHO determined that the application for extension were consistent with the regulatory requirements in 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.5(j)(5)(ii) and (iii). (IHO Exh. 6)

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Student is a nine-year-old who is now, as a result of an order issued by this hearing officer, {}.

For the 2014-2015 school year, in the second grade, he started at a program at {}. He was, however, considered to be polite and friendly in a 1:1 situation or small group situation, and behaved better in small non-academic activity. (Exh. D-13)

{}, he was asked to leave this program in or about December, 2014. (Tr. @ 1022) An IEP meeting was then held in December, 2014. The District felt that the Student could attend a program at {} but the parents did not want the Student to attend {} program at the time since they felt that the Student did not have autism. He was therefore placed at an 8:1+2 program in the District at {}. (Exh. D-3) The IEP also recommended a small teacher-to-student ratio with minimal distractions, with a considerable amount of 1:1 instruction, teacher redirection, a structured environment, and a “motivator” to complete work.

A Functional Behavior Assessment and Behavior Intervention Plan was conducted of the Student in December, 2014. (D-13) This FBA determined that the Student’s {}. Recommended were counseling, social skills training, enhanced staff support during out of class activities, breaks, consistent messages by all staff, a behavioral contract, “choices,” functional communication training, not terminating demands based on inappropriate behaviors, differential reinforcement of other behavior. (Exh. D-13)

The Student did not do well at {}. In May, 2015, the parties signed a settlement agreement resolving all claims through to June 30, 2015. Also in May, 2015, the parties agreed that, for the remainder of the 2014-2015 school year, the Student would receive a 6:1:2 placement at the BOCES placement at {}. (Tr. @ 346, 1033)

The Student made improvements in his behavior at this placement according to the staff at {}. (Tr. @ 351) As a result, at the IEP meeting on July 16, 2015, the placement was continued to be recommended. The student’s teacher {} was at the meeting and she indicated that the Student had adjusted to the classroom at {}. His interactions with peers had improved, the December 4, 2014 BIP that had been previously developed was considered to be working reasonably well. (Exh. D-5) The IEP also recommended a small teacher-to-student ratio with minimal distractions, a considerable amount of 1:1 instruction, teacher redirection, a structured environment, and a “motivator” to complete work. The parents were attracted to the fact that the teacher assigned to this class was someone that the student had enjoyed success with. (Tr. @ 347-349)

However, in the 2015-2016 year, he immediately began to have {}

At the very least by late October, the Student was {}

Additional IEP meetings were held on November 13, 2015, December 11, 2015 and February 4, 2016 to try and manage the student’s behaviors. A revised BIP was reviewed at the December 11, 2015 meeting, which BIP indicated that the parents had agreed to pick the student up {}. By the February, 2016 meeting, the CSE admitted that the {} placement was not appropriate for the Student. (Tr. @ 734) The parties then agreed to put the Student on home instruction. (Tr. @ 661-662)

Efforts to find a day program for the Student were unsuccessful for the remainder of the school year. (Tr. @ 762) A tutor was assigned, but the tutor quit because {} (Tr. @ 756) As a result, the tutoring location was changed to the local elementary school, with and services. (Tr. @ 392-393) The instruction was to last for 90 minutes per day with a classroom aide, but instead lasted less time. (Tr. @ 869, 908) Before the instruction started, the tutor tried to prepare him for learning by addressing {} felt that the Student made some improvements in terms of his behavior and felt he was ready to rejoin a small classroom in his home school. (Tr. @ 911) The therapist agreed that his behaviors had improved, as did the therapist. (Tr. @ 949, 998) There was no counseling provided to the student during home instruction. (Tr. @ 1027)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the arguments of counsel, as well as this Hearing Officer’s own legal research, the Conclusions of Law of this Hearing Officer are as follows:

In 2007 the New York State legislature passed a bill that was signed by the Governor which switches the burden from parent to District except for the second criterion in cases for tuition reimbursement or payment. Chapter 583 of the Laws of 2007.

The central purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and provided in conformance with a written IEP (i.e., free and appropriate public education, or “FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. Sects. 1400(d)(1(A), 1401(9)(D), 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. Sects. 300.17(d), 300.320; Shaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005). Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, (1982), the standard in determining whether a child is receiving a FAPE, or the “basic floor of opportunity,” is whether the child has “access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201. The IDEA, according to Rowley, imposes “no additional requirement that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child's potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.” Id. at 198.

The IEP must be evaluated prospectively as of the time of its drafting and therefore hold that retrospective testimony that the school district would have provided additional services beyond those listed in the IEP may not be considered. Further, parents who end up placing their children in public school cannot later use evidence that their child did not make progress under the IEP in order to show that it was deficient from the outset. Parents must have sufficient information in order to make an informed decision as to its adequacy prior to making a placement decision. At the time the parents must choose whether to accept the school district recommendation or to place the child elsewhere, they have only the IEP to rely on, and therefore the IEP creates considerable reliance interests for the parents. R.E. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) 1. Mootness.

A dispute must “persist” throughout the litigation, and if for some reason that dispute should “dissolve” due to a change in circumstances, the case becomes moot. Russman v. Board of Educ. of Enlarged City School Dist. of City of Watervliet, 260 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2001) The Supreme Court has recognized an exception, however, where the dispute is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The capable-of-repetition principle applies only “where the following two circumstances are simultaneously present: (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998).

In Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), the Supreme Court addressed the mootness exception where a child had behavior problems. In Honig, a child was indefinitely suspended from school after a pattern of behavior including stealing, extorting, and making lewd sexual comments. Though the child no longer even resided within the school district at the time of the Supreme Court appeal, the court heard the child=s claims over objections about mootness, stating:

In the absence of any suggestions that (the student) has overcome his earlier difficulties, it is certainly reasonable to expect, based on his prior history of behavioral problems, that he will again engage in classroom misconduct. 484 U.S. at 320.

In applying the mootness exception, the Court stressed that the key inquiry was whether the events in question were capable of repetition, not Amore probable than not@ to be repeated. 484 U.S. at 320 n. 6. The court also noted that IDEA reviews are often Aponderous,@ suggesting that suspended students are often readmitted to school before issues can be heard in due process hearings. 484 U.S. at 317-323.

Here, the parents are seeking compensatory education as a result of the alleged FAPE violations. As a result, even without any consideration of whether this case is capable of repetition and avoiding review, it cannot be deemed moot. Maine School Administrative District No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.2003); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C., 258 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir.2001); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir.1995). Moreover, on this record, it is clear that the dispute between the parties has not yet been resolved and that this matter is capable of repetition. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the main underlying issue, i.e., the Student’s placement, has been resolved by the parties. Compare Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dept. of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 87– 88 (2d Cir. 2005)(District removed student from school at issue, ending the underlying dispute). Accordingly, this matter is not moot and, if it is, it falls within the mootness exception since it is capable of repetition and avoiding review. 2. Child Find.

The "child find" provisions of the IDEA require each State to have policies and procedures in effect to ensure that "[a]l1 children with disabilities residing in the State ... who are in need of special education and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated." 20 U.S.C. Sect. 1412(a) (3) (A); 34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.111(a). Child find must include any children "suspected of being a child with a disability under Section 300.8 and in need of special education, even though they are advancing from grade to grade." 34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.111(c) (1).

The parents contend that there was a Child Find violation here, but this claim is misplaced, since the Student has been eligible for services during the entire time period at issue.

3. Prior Written Notices.

Prior written notice must be given to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student. 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.5(a)(1).

The parents’ brief contended that the District’s failure to provide a prior written notice after their request for an IEE constitutes FAPE denial. I agree that there is nothing in the record to indicate that this notice was ever provided. However, the parents do not explain how this procedural violation impeded the child's right to a FAPE, significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the child, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits. 20 U.S.C. Sect. 1415(f)(1)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.513(a)(2). This claim is without merit.

4. Failure to Evaluate.

The parents contend that the District failed to properly evaluate the Student in terms of his behaviors, pointing in particular to the lack of a Functional Behavior Assessment of the Student. The District has a duty to assess students in all areas of suspected disability, including, where appropriate, “social and emotional status,” “academic performance,” “communicative status and motor abilities.” 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.4(b)(6)(vii). The District also has a duty to review existing evaluation data on the child, including current classroom-based, local or State assessments, classroom based observations, and observations by teachers and related services providers. 34 CFR Sect. 300.305(a)(1)(i)-(iii)

In New York State, where a student's behavior impedes his or her learning or that of others, the CSE may be required to consider having an FBA conducted and a BIP developed for a student in certain non-disciplinary situations. 8 NYCRR 200.4(d)(3)(I); 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.22(a), (b)). An FBA is defined in State regulations as "the process of determining why a student engages in behaviors that impedes learning and how the student's behavior relates to the environment" and "include[s], but is not limited to, the identification of the problem behavior, the definition of the behavior in concrete terms, the identification of the contextual factors that contribute to the behavior (including cognitive and affective factors) and the formulation of a hypothesis regarding the general conditions under which a behavior usually occurs and probable consequences that serve to maintain it." 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.1(r)). According to State regulations, an FBA shall be based on multiple sources of data and must be based on more than the student's history of presenting problem behaviors. 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.22(a)(2). An FBA must also include a baseline setting forth the "frequency, duration, intensity and/or latency across activities, settings, people and times of the day," so that a BIP (if required) may be developed "that addresses antecedent behaviors, reinforcing consequences of the behavior, recommendations for teaching alternative skills or behaviors and an assessment of student preferences for reinforcement." 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.22(a)(3)).

The record shows that the District conducted a quite well-written and thorough FBA of the Student in December, 2014. I agree with the District that the FBA was sufficient until the Student began to present with {}. At that point, the District properly took additional data and then created a revised BIP.

The parents also appear to claim that other evaluations were appropriate for the Student given his behaviors, in particular a {}. I do agree that the parents are entitled to this evaluation because the District did not respond to the parent’s request for an IEE, as explained, infra. However, the evidence in the record is not sufficient to support the claim that the failure to conduct {} was a failure to assess the student in all areas of suspected disability. There is nothing in the record to specifically explain why this sort of testing would provide an important window on the {}.

5. IEPs/Behavioral Plans.

A free appropriate public education “must include ‘special education and related services' tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, and be ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.’ ” Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)) (internal citation omitted).

A. July IEP/BIP.

The parents contended that the IEP and BIP was inappropriate because it failed to provide parent training/counseling, assistive technology; appropriate speech and language goals, and appropriate sensory diet, and failed to address Student noise sensitivity/failed to consider audiology evaluation.

While it is true that parents of students with {}. Without the student’s classification as a student with , the parents were not entitled to parent training and counseling. It is noted that the absence of parent training and counseling is ordinarily considered to be a procedural violation that does not rise to the level of FAPE denial. R.E., 694 F.3d at 191.

With respect to other issues, the parents agreed with the IEP generally. The parents say that they were just trying to complying with the District’s demands, but the record indicates that the parents have not been shy to bring actions against the school district. In regard to the contentions regarding the Student’s {}.

The IEP did not clearly address these issues. However, the IEP did provide for therapy, which can {}. Moreover, the record shows that the {} had worked reasonably well for the Student previously, and was quiet enough for him to be able to succeed prior to the formation of the IEP. A school district can only be held responsible for what it knew prior to the formation of the IEP. Given that the Student had done reasonably well at {}, I will not find a FAPE denial on this issue in regard to the July IEP.

Regarding speech and language goals, the parents contended that the goals were the same as previous IEP. Still, there is nothing in this record to establish that the goals were inappropriate, that the speech and language goals were not reasonably calculated, or that these speech and language goals would have caused the Student to be denied a FAPE. Merely repeating a goal does not establish a per se violation of the IDEA.

With respect to the contentions regarding assistive technology, the only reference to this in the parent’s brief is that the Student used headphones when he was at {}.

Finally, the District had created a BIP in December, 2014 which was quite detailed and apparently worked to some extent to ameliorate {}. Again, a school district can only be held responsible for what it knew prior to the formation of the BIP. Given that the Student had done reasonably well at {}, I will not find a FAPE denial on this issue in regard to the BIP in July, 2015.

In sum, I find that the July, 2015 IEP (and the corresponding BIP from December, 2014) were reasonably calculated as of July, 2015. All corresponding claims are dismissed.

B. December, 2015 IEP.

By December, the Student’s {}.

To this hearing officer, it is fundamental that {}. It does not matter that the parents might have been persuaded to agree to the plan. {}Parents are not educators and Districts cannot inoculate themselves from liability by getting parents to agree to inappropriate plans. See Letter to Lipsitt, 52 IDELR 47 (OSEP Letter December 11, 2008).

As a result, I must find that the Student’s IEP and BIP from December, 2015 was inappropriate and denied the Student a FAPE.

6. Home Program.

Finally, in February, 2016, the parties agreed that the Student needed to go on home instruction while the District tried to look for a school for the Student. The parents contended that the home program was an inappropriate placement and that the District failed to implement IEP when Student was at home with regard to {}.

The District’s position is that the Student’s placement was appropriate at this time since the Student received ninety minutes of tutoring with therapy and therapy, all to be delivered at the {}. The District pointed out that the Student’s IEP did not call for counseling, and that it cannot fail to implement an IEP that has no corresponding requirement.

The parents correctly pointed out that {} the District should have at least attempted to provide more hours to the Student to ensure that he received a FAPE. Accordingly, I agree with the parents that the Student’s IEP and educational program reflecting “home” services was inappropriate. 7. I.E.E.

Federal and State regulations provide that, subject to certain limitations, a parent has the right to an I.E.E. at public expense if the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the school district. 34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.502(a), (b); 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.5(g)(1). If a parent requests an I.E.E. at public expense, the school district must, without unnecessary delay, ensure that either an I.E.E. is provided at public expense or initiate an impartial hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate or that the evaluation obtained by the parent does not meet the school district criteria. 34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.502(b)(2)(i)-(ii); 8 NYCRR Sect. 200.5(g)(1)(iv). If a school district's evaluation is appropriate, a parent may not obtain an IEE at public expense 34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.502(b)(3); 8 NYCRR 200.5(g)(1)(v); DeMerchant v. Springfield Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2572357, at *6 (D. Vt. Sept. 4, 2007). However, if the parent shows that the District evaluation is inappropriate, or if the District unnecessarily delays in seeking an impartial hearing to contest a parent's request for an I.E.E., the IHO may order that the District provide the requested I.E.E. at public expense. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 2006 WL 3734289 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) (delay in requesting an impartial hearing resulted in IHO order to fund I.E.E.).

The parents requested an I.E.E. in November, 2015, in particular for a {} The school district did not respond to the parents’ request by a hearing or by granting the request, the district waived its right to object to the I.E.E. The District pointed out that, in its response, it agreed to the I.E.E. subject to the District’s policies on reimbursement, but there is nothing in the statute that allows districts to impose conditions on the IEE where they fail to respond to the parents’ request.

REMEDY

Where Districts have failed to offer students a FAPE, courts have wide discretion to insure that students receive a FAPE going forward. As the Supreme Court has stated:

The statute directs the court to “grant such relief as [it]

determines is appropriate.” The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of relief is not further specified, except that it must be “appropriate.” Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be “appropriate” in light of the purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to provide handicapped children with “a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Education, Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 371 (1985).

The parents seek compensatory education as a remedy. In regard to compensatory education, the Circuit has previously enunciated a “gross violation” standard. Garro v. State of Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994) However, this standard is at odds with the standards in most jurisdictions. In P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 n.13 (2d Cir. 2008), the Circuit signaled that the Garro approach is only applicable where Students are over 21. In so analyzing this issue, the court referenced the seminal compensatory education case of Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In Reid, the D.C. Circuit explained that compensatory education should be fashioned without a “cookie cutter approach” and that compensatory education must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place. Id., 401 F. 3d at 524; see also Friendship Edison Public Charter School v. Nesbitt, 532 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (D.D.C. 2008) (compensatory award must be based on a "'qualitative, fact-intensive' inquiry used to craft an award 'tailored to the unique needs of the disabled student").

The parents, however, did not submit a compensatory education plan in this case. Nor did they present a witness to establish an appropriate compensatory education award in this case. Accordingly, I find it incumbent upon myself, as the hearing officer, to fashion a remedy based on the record. The record established that the Student was denied a FAPE from December, 2015 to the end of the school year, June 2016. To compensate the student for the missed services, I will therefore order that the Student receive, in total, (including the award issued in connection with the expedited case) 150 hours of compensatory education by a special education teacher and 50 hours of {}.

The parents also seek a placement for the 2016-2017 school year at a school called {}. Where Districts have failed to offer students a FAPE, courts have ordered that schools be paid for education. A hearing officer or a court may simply order a student to attend a particular private placement in the future if it is appropriate to insure that a Student receives a FAPE. Branham ex rel Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-103 n.9.

The parents, however did not call a witness from this school, as pointed out by the District. Without a witness called by the school, the District has no ability to conduct cross-examination to determine whether the recommended placement is proper. There is nothing in the record explaining why it might be that no witness from {} called. There is nothing to suggest that witnesses from this school are unavailable.

Additionally, and even more importantly, hearing officers may not order school districts to place students in non-approved schools. Z.H. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 107 F.Supp.3d 369, 375–76 (S.D.N.Y.,2015) In Z.H., Judge Castel denied the request for placement at a non-approved school, citing to Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 638 (2d Cir.1988), where the New York State Education Department administratively annulled the decision of a hearing officer who concluded that a student should be placed in a non-approved, non-public school. The parent filed an action in federal court, and the district court concluded that the student should be placed in the non-approved, non-public school, and that, as required by federal law, the non-approved school provided the same rights and benefits that the student would receive in a public school. The Second Circuit reversed, and concluded that by requiring the school district to place the student in a non-approved school, the district court acted contrary to federal law requiring such a placement to satisfy state education standards.

Given these decisions, I must decline to place the Student {} I will, however, order the District to find a placement for the Student that provides the Student with a program that is specially designed for students with {}.

RELIEF

1. The Student shall receive an additional 100 hours of compensatory special education services from a special education teacher, to be provided on a 1:1 basis (in addition to the 50 hours ordered in the “expedited” decision) at their usual and customary rate;

2. The Student shall receive 50 hours of compensatory (“ from a provider with at least five years of experience in providing , at their usual and customary rate;

3. The parents shall receive reimbursement for a evaluation, to be provided by a with at least five years of experience, at their usual and customary rate;

4. The Student shall receive a placement at a school that is specially designed for students with that have severe behavioral problems and require a significant amount of individualized attention.

5. All other requests for relief are denied.

Dated: Brooklyn, N.Y.

August 9, 2016

Michael Lazan

MICHAEL LAZAN IHO

APPEALS NOTICE

There is a right to appeal this decision to the New York State Review Officer in accordance with 8 N.Y.C.R.R. Sect. 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education.

Exhibits District 1. Amended Due Process Complaint, 4/11/16, 37 pp. 2. Answer, 4/23/16, 30 pp. (with attachment) 4. 5/15/15 IEP, 10 pp. 8. 12/11/15 IEP, 11 pp. 16. 10/30/15 BIP, 14 pp. 25. ABC data charts. 26. IEP dated 12/11/2015, 10 pp. 27. Goals, dated 6/10/16, 7 pp. 28. Service dates, 6 pp. Parents 1. E-mail dated 1/3/12, 2 pp. 2. Consent form, /10/14, 1 Page. 4. 12/2/2014 FBA, 18 pp. 5. 12/15/14 IEP, 9 pp. 6 E-mail from 3/19/15, 2 pp. 7 Letter from , 3/20/15, 1 Page. 8. Letter from , 7/15/15, 1 page. 15. 7/16/15 IEP, 11 pp. 17. Email from mother, 10/18/15, 1 page. 18. 10/20/15 email, 2 pp. 19. 10/22/15 email, 2 pp. 21. 10/27/15 Anecdotals, 9 pp. 24. 11/15 Behavior Intervention Reports, 5 pp. 28. 12/11/2015 BIP, 4 pp. 29. Subpoena and Response, 27 pp. 32. Emails, 7 pp. 34. Emails from mother, 10/25/15, 2 pp. 36. Voice Call History, 4/1/16, 2 pp. 39 New Beginnings Curriculum, 11 pp. 49 Union Free School District Calendar 51 Three prescriptions, dated 10/21/15,3 pp. 53 Progress report, 6/2/15, 5 pp. IHO 1. Brief of District, 5/10/16, 8 pp. 2. Brief of Parent, 5/10/16, 18 pp. 3. Brief of District, 7/12/16, 31 pp. 4. Brief of Parent, 7/12/16, 82 pp. 5. Timelines Notices 2 pp.