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CASE NUMBER: 598986 - NYC: 247852
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Student’s Name:1 REDACTED (“student”)
Date of Birth: REDACTED
School District: REDACTED
Hearing Requested by: REDACTED (“Parent”)
Request Date/Date Complaint Filed: 05/01/2023
Date(s) of Hearing: 06/22/2023
Actual Record Closed Date: 06/30/2023
Date of Decision: 06/30/2023
Date of Distribution if Different than Decision Date: N/A Hearing Officer: Leah Martin, Esq.
1 Personally identifiable information is attached as Appendix B, “Redaction Identification Page,” to this decision and must be removed prior to public distribution.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
JUNE 22, 2023
For the Student:
REDACTED (“Parent’s Advocate”), REDACTED (“Parent”), REDACTED (“SL Therapist2”), REDACTED (“SL Therapist1”)
For the Department of Education:
REDACTED (“DOE Representative”)
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter comes before the undersigned Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) on Parent’s Due Process Complaint (“DPC") filed on May 1, 2023. (Ex. A).2 In the DPC, Parent alleges that the Department of Education (“DOE”) failed to implement the student’s mandated speech language therapy (“SLT”) sessions for the 2022-23 school year. (Ex. A).
I was appointed on May [2], 2023. On June 5, the parties appeared virtually for a pre-hearing conference (“PHC”). At the PHC a hearing date was set. (See PHC Transcript).
On June 22, 2023, the virtual due process hearing (“DPH”) was held. It was a closed hearing. Parent was present and represented by Parent’s Advocate. DOE Representative was also present. The DOE offered no exhibits or witnesses into evidence on their direct case but did offer one rebuttal exhibit (Ex. 1). (Tr. 6-7, 35-38).[3] Parent’s Advocate entered 11 exhibits (A-K) into evidence. (Tr. 8-9). Parent’s three witnesses (Parent, SL Therapist2, and SL Therapist1) gave direct testimony by affidavit (Ex. K; D; J, respectively) and appeared at the DPH for cross examination. Oral closing arguments were made on the record. (Tr. 39-42). At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties jointly requested and were granted an extension to allow for receipt and review of the hearing transcript prior to the decision being issued. (Tr. 43; Order of Extension). The record was closed on June 30, after receipt and review of the hearing transcript.
JURISDICTION
The due process hearing (“DPH”) was held, and a decision in this matter is being rendered, pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq., and the New York State Education Law, Educ. Law §4404 et seq., and its implementing regulations, 8 NYCRR §200.5 et seq.
BACKGROUND
The student is currently in preschool and classified as a preschool student with a disability. (Ex. C-1). The student is attending a private4 preschool (“Preschool”). (Ex. A-2). The student exhibits difficulty with speech and language, gross motor, fine motor, and visual motor skills. (Ex. C-6). He “uses minimal expressive speech and articulates poorly.” (Ex. C-4). He also has sensory issues. (Ex. C-6). On September 29, 2022, the DOE held a review meeting of the committee on preschool special education (“CPSE”) and developed an IEP for the student for the 2022-23 school year. (Ex. C-1). The 9/28/22 IEP recommends five hours per day of Special Education Itinerant Teacher services in a group of two, three weekly sessions (2x30x1 and 1x30x2) of SLT, and two weekly sessions (2x30x1) of individual occupational therapy (“OT”). (Ex. C-1, 14-15). The IEP was to be implemented starting
4 Since the student is in preschool, the IEP recommends implementation at a “[c]hildcare location selected by parent.” (Ex. C-14-15). October 6, 2022. (Ex. C-14-15). Parent contends that the DOE failed to implement the student’s SLT services for the 2022-23 school year, so Parent was forced to find private providers. (Ex. A-3; K-1).5 Parent found one provider (“SL Therapist1”) who provided SLT to the student from January to May of 2023 at a rate of $300 per hour. (Ex. I-1; J-1). Parent found a second provider (“SL Therapist 2”) who is providing SLT to the student during June of 2023, at a rate of $150-175.6 (Ex. D-1; E-1). Parent is seeking direct payment to both SL Therapists, at the market rate. (Ex. A-3; Tr. 14).
ISSUES
Parent alleges that the DOE failed to implement the student’s mandated SLT services for the 2022-23 school year. (Ex. A-3). At the hearing, the DOE conceded the student’s eligibility for special education services as a preschool student with a disability and conceded that the program and services contained in the 9/28/22 IEP are appropriate for the student. (Tr. 9). The DOE did not challenge the qualifications of either of the SL Therapists, but rather argued that since they are registered DOE providers, the DOE essentially did provide the mandated services. (Tr. 9-10, 39-40). Further, the DOE argued that even if I find that they failed to implement the mandated services, because the providers are registered contractors with the DOE, they are obligated to take the DOE rate and are not eligible for an enhanced rate. (Tr. 39-40). Finally, the DOE argued that the rates charged by the providers are excessive because the services provided go beyond those that are mandated (such as individual instead of group sessions), and SL Therapist1 is charging a premium due to his own scheduling issues, which the DOE should not be obligated to pay. (Tr. 39-40).
FINDINGS OF FACT
After a full review of the record generated at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact.7 Parent was present at the September 28, 2022, CPSE meeting. (Ex. C-2). The 9/28/22 IEP does not mandate bilingual Yiddish SLT. (Ex. C-15). Despite the mandate for SLT in English, Parent only sought private providers for SLT who provide bilingual services. (Ex. A-3; K-1; Tr. 17-18). Parent testified that the student does not speak English, and that she did not realize that the IEP did not provide for bilingual instruction. (Tr. 18-19).8 However, the denial of bilingual services is very clear from the face of the IEP. On the first page of the IEP, it indicates that the student is not recommended for a bilingual program (Ex. C-1). It also states that the CPSE “considered bilingual versus monolingual supports” and rejected the 5 Parent’s Advocate also argued for the first time at the hearing that the IEP was substantively “invalid” because it did not provide for Yiddish supports even though the student does not speak English. (Tr. 41-42). However, this issue was not timely raised in the DPC, so it is not a proper issue for consideration at this hearing. Parent’s Advocate also raised the issue that the student has not received the mandated OT services. (Tr. 42). However, this issue was also not raised in the DPC so it will not be considered herein. 6 The exact rate is unclear since there are no invoices in evidence and the service contract only contains a range between $150-175. (Ex. E-1). 7 The facts contained in the “Introduction and Procedural History” and “Background” sections above are incorporated here as well. 8 While I am sympathetic to the fact that the student’s primary language is Yiddish, and he should probably have been offered bilingual services in his IEP, the only issue fairly in dispute at this hearing is the failure to implement the IEP’s SLT services. Issues regarding the substantive appropriateness of the IEP’s provisions were not timely raised here. Accordingly, this analysis will be based on any failure to implement the IEP, as written, and the appropriate remedy for that failure. former. (Ex. C-1). The IEP discusses the results of the student’s evaluations at length but does not state that they were administered bilingually. (Ex. C-3-6). On page seven of the IEP, it again indicates that the student does not have limited English proficiency. (Ex. C-7). So, unless Parent simply never read the IEP, it is difficult to imagine that she did not know it only provided for English services.
Bilingual Yiddish SLT services cost more than English services9 because the materials are more expensive and because there is a shortage of available providers. (Ex. D-1-2; J-1; Tr. 24). The market rate for independent Yiddish SLT services in New York City is $150-175 per hour. (Tr. 24-25).
SL Therapist1 has a master’s degree and advanced certificates in SLT, with a bilingual extension. (Ex. J-1). He also is licensed to teach from nursery school to grade 12. (Ex. J-1). He provided three weekly individual SLT sessions to the student (two at the Preschool and one at home) from January to May of 2023. (Ex. J-1; Tr. 30, 33). He provided all individual sessions rather than two individual and one group session, as mandated, due to scheduling issues. (Tr. 30, 32-34). He also charged a premium to Parent because his schedule is very busy. (Tr. 29-30). He is charging Parent $300 per hour for his services, but he does not charge this much for all his students. (Tr. 28-30). SL Therapist1 testified that he is a registered DOE provider. (Tr. 27). He applied to be a DOE provider several years ago, and filled out an application for that purpose, but did not recall agreeing to only accept DOE rates. (Tr. 27-28).10
SL Therapist 2 has a master’s degree and advanced certificates in SLT, with a bilingual extension. (Ex. D-1; F-1). She provided three weekly individual SLT sessions to the student in her office during the month of June 2023. (Ex. D-1; Tr. 23). She provided all individual sessions rather than two individual and one group session, as mandated, due to scheduling issues. (Tr. 23). SL Therapist2 testified that she is a registered DOE provider. (Tr. 21). She applied to be a DOE provider approximately 20 years ago, and filled out an application for that purpose, but does not recall agreeing to only accept DOE rates. (Tr. 21-22). She stopped accepting the DOE rate in September of 2022 and now charges the market rate for her services. (Ex. E-1; Tr. 25).
In January 2023,[11] Parent signed a contract with SL Therapist1 for three SLT sessions per week (3x30) for the remainder of the 2022-23 school year at a rate of $300 per hour. (Ex. I-1). The contract provides that Parent is financially responsible for any amount the DOE does not pay (after the conclusion of the impartial hearing process). (Ex. I-1). SL Therapist1 stopped providing SLT to the student at the end of May due to scheduling issues. (Tr. 30). On May 24, 2023, Parent signed a contract with SL Therapist2 for SLT services for the student at a rate of $150-175 per hour. (Ex. E-1). The contract provides that 9 There is no indication in the record that the Parent contacted any English SLT providers, or what exactly the cost difference would have been. 10 While DOE Representative entered the general Prospective Independent Related Service Provider Application (Ex. 1) into evidence to support his argument that DOE providers are not eligible to receive enhanced rates, I do not find this persuasive. The form in evidence does contain language that “[t]he maximum rate allowed by the New York City DOE for Independent non-DOE providers for most Related Services is $45.00, with some exceptions.” (Ex. 1-2). However, the form in evidence is dated October 2021, which is after either of the SL Therapists applied. (See Ex. 1-1; Tr. 21-22, 27-28). Neither of the SL Therapists testified that they agreed to such a provision (Tr. 21-22, 27-28), and there is no indication in the record that prior versions of the application contained similar language. Furthermore, there is no indication in the record which exceptions are made to the $45.00 rule, or whether bilingual Yiddish instruction is one such exception. Accordingly, this form has no bearing on any of the issues in dispute at this hearing. Parent is financially responsible for any amount the DOE does not pay (after the conclusion of the impartial hearing process). (Ex. E-1). There is no indication in the record that Parent gave the DOE notice of their unilateral placement of the student or their intention to seek reimbursement for the privately obtained SLT services.
The student made some progress with SL Therapist1. (Ex. H). Examples of progress include “moderate progress in increasing his semantic and expressive language skills,” mild increase in his ability to request assistance, “increased comprehension of basic language and cognitive concepts,” “slightly improved” oral motor skills, less drooling, and “greatly improved” focus. (Ex. H-2). The student has also made some progress with SL Therapist2. (Ex. G). He “recently started to show some emergent pretend play skills,” has “started to put together simple phrases and sentences,” “has started to imitate words used during play,” and has begun to respond to simple questions related to his needs. (Ex. G-1).
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FAPE
The IDEA provides that children with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. §1400 (d)(1)(A). A FAPE consists of specialized education and related services designed to meet a student’s unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). 34 C.F.R. §300.13. A school district has offered a student a FAPE when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP is developed through the IDEA's procedures and is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). To meet its substantive FAPE obligations, a district must offer a student an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 999 (2017). The IEP must be reviewed at least annually, 34 C.F.R. §300.324(b)(1)(i), and a district must have an IEP in place for each student with a disability within its jurisdiction at the beginning of each school year, 8 NYCRR §200.4(e)(1)(ii); Davis
v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). For procedural violations, a denial of a FAPE only occurs “if the procedural inadequacies- (I) impeded the child’s right to a [FAPE]; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” 20 U.S.C. §1415 (f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. §300.513(a)(2). Further, under caselaw, failure to implement substantial or significant provisions of an IEP is a denial of a FAPE. J.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 324 F. Supp. 3d 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 431 Fed. App. 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2011).
A board of education may be required to pay for educational services obtained unilaterally by the child's parent, if (1) the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, (2) the services selected by the parent were appropriate, and (3) equitable considerations support the parent's claim. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Florence County School District Four et al. v. Carter by Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993). These three conditions (“prongs”) constitute the Burlington/Carter test.
A unilateral placement is appropriate if it is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 364 (2d Cir. 2006); Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)(“[Parents] need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.”). Educational progress can be a factor weighing in favor of the appropriateness of a unilateral placement. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that the unilateral placement is perfect or that it meets all state educational standards. Id. at 364-65; T.K. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 810 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir. 2016); M.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
The IDEA permits awards of direct payment to unilateral placement providers where the parents have not yet made payments but are legally obligated to do so. See Mr. A. ex rel. D.A. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Under Burlington/Carter, if the parents are financially obligated to pay for the contracted services and have met their prong two burden, the contract must be fully reimbursed or directly funded by the District unless, as a matter of equitable considerations, the costs are excessive or should otherwise be reduced. See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993) (“Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable”); J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 826 F.Supp.2d 635, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]his Court has broad discretion to consider the range of all relevant facts in determining whether and to what extent awarding relief is equitable.”).
Even if a parent establishes a right to reimbursement under the IDEA, "courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant." Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246-47 (2009). In making that equitable determination, a hearing officer may consider many factors, including whether a parent’s unilateral withdrawal of the child from the public school was justified, whether the parent provided the Department with adequate notice of the withdrawal, whether the amount of private-school tuition was reasonable, whether the parent should have availed themself of need-based scholarships or other financial aid from the private school, and whether there was any fraud or collusion in generating (or inflating) the tuition to be charged to the Department, or whether the arrangement with the school was fraudulent or collusive in any other respect. E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 (2d Cir. 2014). Furthermore, reimbursement for an appropriate unilateral placement may be reduced if services go beyond what is necessary for a FAPE. See Still v. DeBuono, 101 F.3d 888, 893 (2d Cir. 1996) (clarifying that an appropriate amount of reimbursement “bears a relationship to the quantum of services that the state would have been required to furnish” if they had offered a FAPE); L.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:2014cv07971, *14 (S.D.N.Y. 3/1/16) (reimbursement may be reduced “on the basis of any segregable services that the Parents provided over and above what the Department would have been require to offer … to provide a FAPE”); accord N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gustafson, 2002 WL 313798, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2/27/02) (stating that reimbursement should only be reduced if there are identifiable services, whose costs can be reasonably estimated, that are segregable from the rest of the private program and that exceed the services that constitute a FAPE).
While an IHO may consider a parent’s financial abilities when deciding whether to order reimbursement or direct payment, direct payment need not be conditioned on the parent’s inability to pay and hearing officers have broad discretion to grant appropriate relief, including direct payment. Ferreira and Rojas v. N.Y.C. Dept’ of Educ., 123 LRP 9785 (S.D.N.Y. 3/14/23) citing A.R. ex rel. F.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 2013 WL 5312537 (S.D.N.Y. 9/23/13) and Mr. & Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
In New York, school districts have the burden of proof, including the burdens of persuasion and production, in IDEA due process hearings, except that a parent seeking reimbursement for a unilateral private placement has the burdens of production and persuasion on the appropriateness of such placement. NYS Educ. Law §4404(1)(c).
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I find this situation to be akin to equitable services cases, such as Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 21-119,12 which liken these situations to tuition reimbursement cases; the District can be made to pay for special education services that a parent has paid or become legally obligated to pay. Accordingly, I will utilize the three-prong Burlington/Carter analysis in deciding this issue.
As for Prong 1, the DOE failed to offer any witnesses or evidence to contest Parent’s allegation that they failed to implement the SLT mandated by the student’s 9/28/22 IEP. Furthermore, the DOE has conceded that the services contained in that IEP are appropriate for the student, thus there is no question that he is entitled to receive them. I reject the DOE’s argument that because the SL Therapists Parent hired unilaterally are qualified DOE providers, that somehow means the DOE provided the mandated IEP services. First, the DOE provided no evidence to suggest that it even attempted to arrange for the delivery of related services here. It is uncontested that Parent arranged for services on their own. In doing so, they unilaterally chose a provider and entered a service contract. Secondly, the unilateral services were not contracted until January, approximately one third of the way through the relevant school year. There is no indication that any services were provided by the DOE during the fall semester. For these reasons, I find that the DOE has not met its burden in showing that they provided the student a FAPE for the 2022-23 school year.
As for Prong 2, I find that Parent has met their burden, with limited exceptions described below. The DOE has not contested the qualifications of the SL Therapists, and in fact has emphasized their qualifications by eliciting testimony regarding both providers’ status as qualified DOE providers. Moreover, the DOE did not contest that the student has made progress with these services. Furthermore, I find that SL Therapists have the appropriate qualifications, training, and experience. However, in terms of the actual services provided, the record contains no clinical reason why all the SLT sessions were provided on an individual basis rather than the two individual and one group session that was mandated in the IEP. Both providers simply testified that they did this for scheduling reasons. Accordingly, I find
12 See also Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal Nos. 21-029; 21-028; 21-025; 20-141; 20-140; 21-115; 20-099; 20-094; 20-087. that the third individual session went beyond what was required for a FAPE, and any excess cost as a result of this should not be borne by the DOE. With that small exception, I find that Parent has met their Prong 2 burden regarding the appropriateness of the private SLT services.
As for Prong 3, I find that the equities are mixed. The DOE did not implement the student’s mandated related services here, which weighs against them. On the other hand, Parent unilaterally obtained services that went beyond those mandated (including bilingual services, which are more costly) and failed to give the DOE any notice of their unilateral placement or intention to seek funding. Additionally, the rate charged by SL Therapist1 is objectively excessive, as he is charging nearly double the market rate in NYC. Both SL Therapists are similarly qualified, and SL Therapist2 has the additional cost of office space in which to provide sessions to the student, and yet SL Therapist2 accepts $150-175 for her sessions. It is reasonable to expect the same from SL Therapist1. Here, Parent’s Advocate requested payment at the market rate, which I find to be between $150-175. Any request for payment in excess of that range is not supported by the record. Even if it were, I would not order such a rate based on the lack of Parent’s notice to the DOE and the fact that the services provided go beyond what was mandated. For these reasons, the DOE should directly fund the SLT sessions to the SL Therapists at a rate not to exceed $175 for all sessions provided to the student during the 2022-23 10-month school year.
I have reviewed the parties’ remaining contentions and find them to be either unnecessary to this decision, without merit, beyond my jurisdiction, or without sufficient basis in the record for a finding. Accordingly, any relief not specifically discussed in this decision is denied, and all of the Parent’s remaining claims not discussed herein are dismissed with prejudice.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the New York City Department of Education shall (to the extent not previously funded through pendency) provide direct payment to SL Therapist1 and SL
Therapist2 for SLT services provided to the student during the 2022-23 10-month school year, upon receipt of invoices for the services rendered to the student during that specified period.
Payment shall be made at a rate not to exceed $175 per hour.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 30, 2023 Leah Martin, Esq._(Signed Electronically)_
Impartial Hearing Officer
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public-School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.
An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.
APPENDIX A – DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENT EXHIBITS
A. Due Process Complaint 4/25/23* 3 pages
B. Notice of Appearance 2/25/23 1 page
C. IEP 9/28/22 18 pages
D. Direct Testimony Affidavit – SL Therapist2 6/12/23 2 pages
E. Provider Contract – SL Therapist2 5/24/23* 1 page
F. License -SL Therapist2 6/23/99 1 page
G. Progress Report – SL Therapist2 6/1/23 3 pages
H. Progress Report – SL Therapist1 5/30/23 3 pages
I. Provider Contract – SL Therapist1 1/11/23 1 page
J. Direct Testimony Affidavit – SL Therapist1 6/12/23 2 pages
K. Direct Testimony Affidavit – Parent 6/16/23 2 pages
DOE’S EXHIBITS
1. NYC DOE Qualified Providers Application Oct. 2021* 4
IHO’S EXHIBITS
- - - -
*These dates differ from those on the parties’ exhibit lists but accurately reflect the dates on the exhibits.
Footnotes
[2] Exhibits shall be referred to as follows: Ex., followed by lettered designations for Parent’s Exhibits, numbered designations for DOE’s Exhibits, and roman numeral designations for Impartial Hearing Officer’s Exhibits. Exhibit designations will be followed by the page numbers as needed and appropriate. For example, Parent’s Exhibit A, page 1, will be referred to as (Ex. A-1).
[3] The hearing transcript will be referred to as “Tr.” followed by the page number within the transcript. For example: (Tr. 1).
[11] The contract states that it is an “[a]greement as of January 11, 2023…” but the signature line is undated, so it is not clear whether it was signed on January 11 or not. (Ex. I-1).