New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

CASE NUMBER: 579234 - NYC: 231277

NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE

TRIALS AND HEARINGS (OATH)

SPECIAL EDUCATION HEARINGS DIVISION

STUDENT, a Minor, by and through his/her Parent(s),

PETITIONER FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

against Case # 231277 THE NEW YORK CITY Dustin Johnson, Esq.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Impartial Hearing Officer

RESPONDENT

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482; the federal regulations implementing IDEA, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, et seq.; Article 89 of the New York State Education Law as well as Section 3602-c; and the New York State regulations at 8 NYCRR § Part 200, et seq.

The undersigned Impartial Hearing Officer is a certified New York State Special Education Hearing Officer, employed by the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings as a Special Education Impartial Hearing Officer, and meets all of the qualifications and requirements outlined in both federal and state statute which grant me the authority to adjudicate this hearing. Furthermore, the undersigned is not currently, nor have I ever been, an employee of the NYC Department of Education. Finally, I do not have any personal or professional interest or bias that conflicts with my objectivity to hear this matter.

II. Overview – Administrative Procedures

When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law § 3602-c). The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programing for students with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts related to IESPs, State law provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of [Education Law § 4404]," which effectuates the due process provisions called for by the IDEA (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]). Incorporated among the procedural protections of the IDEA and the analogous State law provisions is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (“SRO”) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).

III. Background and Procedural History

Petitioner is the parent of STUDENT (“Student” or “Child”). On September 1, 2022, Petitioner filed a Due Process Compliant (“Complaint” or “DPC”) against Respondent, the New York City Department of Education (“NYC DOE” or “DOE” or “District”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parent alleged, generally, that the DOE failed to provide the student a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the 2022-2023 school year (see generally P-A).

The undersigned Hearing Officer was appointed to preside over this case on September 12, 2022. On October 3, 2022, a Prehearing Conference was held (See Exhibit IHO-I). On October 25, 2022, a combined pendency hearing and impartial hearing on the merits of the DPC convened and concluded the same day.

IV. PENDENCY DISPUTE

At the purportedly disputed pendency hearing, the District stated that it was not contesting pendency. The District did not offer any documentary evidence or call any witnesses regarding pendency. The District conceded that it has a pendency obligation to provide the student with services. The District conceded that the student is entitled to 6 hours per week of Special Education Teacher Support Services (“SETSS”), as well as related services of Speech-Language Therapy and Occupational Therapy. Finally, the District conceded that the student’s current educational placement for the purposes of pendency rests in the April 30, 2019, Individualized Education Services Program (“IESP”) (see P-B).

• • APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PENDENCY

The IDEA and the New York State Education Law require that a student remain in his or her then current educational placement, unless the student's parents and the board of education otherwise agree, during the pendency of any proceedings relating to the identification, evaluation or placement of the student (20 U.S.C. § 1415[j]; Educ. Law §§ 4404[4]; 34 CFR 300.518[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[m]; see Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 531 [2d Cir. 2020] cert. denied sub nom. Paulino v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 2021 WL 78218 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2021); T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 170-71; Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 163 [2d Cir. 2004], citing Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 [2d Cir. 1982]); M.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 982 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246-47 [S.D.N.Y. 2013]; Student X v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *20 [E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008]; Bd. of Educ. of Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist. v. O'Shea, 353 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455-56 [S.D.N.Y. 2005]).

Pendency has the effect of an automatic injunction, and the party requesting it need not meet the requirements for injunctive relief such as irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and a balancing of the hardships (Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906; see Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 335 F.3d 297, 301 [4th Cir. 2003]; Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 [3d Cir. 1996]). The purpose of the pendency provision is to provide stability and consistency in the education of a student with a disability and "strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students... from school" (Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 [1987] [emphasis in original]; Evans v. Bd. of Educ. of Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 [S.D.N.Y. 1996], citing Bd. of Educ. of City of New York v. Ambach, 612 F. Supp. 230, 233 [E.D.N.Y. 1985]).

A student's placement pursuant to the pendency provision of the IDEA is evaluated independently from the appropriateness of the program offered the student by the CSE (Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160-61; Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906; O'Shea, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 459 [noting that "pendency placement and appropriate placement are separate and distinct concepts"]). The pendency provision does not require that a student remain in a particular site or location (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532; T.M., 752 F.3d at 170-71; Concerned Parents & Citizens for the Continuing Educ. at Malcolm X Pub. Sch. 79 v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 753, 756 [2d Cir. 1980]; see Child's Status During Proceedings, 71 Fed. Reg. 46709 [Aug. 14, 2006] [noting that the "current placement is generally not considered to be location-specific"]), or at a particular grade level (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 03-032; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 95-16).

Under the IDEA, the pendency inquiry focuses on identifying the student's then current educational placement (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532; Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163, citing Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906). Although not defined by statute, the phrase "then current placement" has been found to mean either: (1) the placement described in the student's most recently implemented IEP; (2) the operative placement actually functioning at the time when the due process proceeding was commenced; or (3) the placement at the time of the previously implemented IEP (Dervishi v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 653 Fed. App'x 55, 57-58 [2d Cir. June 27, 2016], quoting Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163; T.M., 752 F.3d at 170-71 [holding that the pendency provision "requires a school district to continue funding whatever educational placement was last agreed upon for the child"]; see Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 452 [2d Cir. 2015] [holding that a student's entitlement to stay-put arises when a due process complaint notice is filed]; Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee, 96 F.3d 78, 83 [3d Cir. 1996]; Letter to Baugh, 211 IDELR 481 [OSEP 1987]). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has stated that educational placement means "the general type of educational program in which the child is placed" (Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 753, 756), and that "the pendency provision does not guarantee a disabled child the right to remain in the exact same school with the exact same service providers" (T.M., 752 F.3d at 171). However, if there is an agreement between the parties on the student's educational placement during the due process proceedings, it need not be reduced to a new IEP, and the agreement can supersede the prior unchallenged IEP as the student's then-current educational placement (see Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 483-84 [2d Cir. 2002]; Evans, 921 F. Supp. at 1189 n.3; Murphy, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 366; see also Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197 [OSEP 2007]). Moreover, a prior unappealed IHO decision may establish a student's current educational placement for purposes of pendency (Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23; Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197).

Once a student's "then-current educational" placement or pendency placement has been established, it can be changed: (1) by agreement between the parties; (2) by an unappealed IHO or court decision in favor of the parents; or (3) by an SRO decision that a unilateral parental placement is appropriate (34 CFR 300.518[a], [d]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[m][1], [2]; see Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532; Schutz, 290 F.3d at 483-84; New York City Dep't of Educ. v. S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *1 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010]; Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23; Arlington, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 697; Murphy, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 366; Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197). Accordingly, implicit in the concept of “educational placement” in the stay-put provision (i.e., a pendency placement) is the idea that the parents and the school district must agree either expressly or as impliedly by law to a child’s educational program.” (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532). However, for the pendency provisions of the IDEA to apply, a due process proceeding must be currently pending. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); Education Law § 4404(4); 34 CFR 300.518(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(m); Honig, 484 U.S. at 323; Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160; Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Educ., 962 F.3d 649, 659 [2d Cir. 2020]; Letter to Winston, 213 IDELR 102 (OSEP 1987); Weaver v. Millbrook Cent. Sch. Dist., 812 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Absent one of the foregoing events, once a pendency placement has been established, it "shall not change during those due process proceedings," S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *1 [emphasis in the original]). And upon a pendency changing event, such changes apply "only on a going-forward basis" (id.). With that said, it has been held that in certain circumstances a court may, on equitable grounds, retroactively adjust a student's pendency placement if a state-level administrative decision in a parent's favor was not issued in a timely manner (see Mackey, 386 F.3d at 164-66; Arlington, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 701; O'Shea, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 457-58; Murphy, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 366-67).

• • PENDENCY FINDINGS OF FACT AND DISCUSSION

As noted above, the District indicated it was not disputing pendency, the District conceded that the last agreed upon educational placement for the Student is contained in the April 30, 2019, IESP, and the District conceded that the student is entitled to the specific services indicated within the April 30, 2019, IESP for the purposes of pendency (See Transcript and Ex. B).

Therefore, based on the District’s concessions, and as reflected in the record, I find that the Student is entitled to pendency, I find that the Student’s last agreed upon educational placement is contained within the IESP dated April 30, 2019, which recommends a Special Education Program comprising SETSS Services 6 times per week and Related Services of Speech-Language Therapy 1 time per week for 30 minutes per session, and Occupational Therapy 2 times per week for 30 minutes per session.

I take Judicial Notice that the first day of school for a 10-month student for the 2022-2023 school year was September 8, 2022, which shall be the date from which pendency services should have begun. The same date is also reflected in Petitioner’s Exhibit C-3 at paragraph 24.

Therefore, pendency for the 2022-2023 school year begins from September 8, 2022, through the date of the below decision on the merits, which finds that the student is not entitled to any services, for reasons further discussed below.

• • PENDENCY ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the purposes of Pendency only, that the DOE shall provide the Student with the mandated SETSS Services for 6 hours per week and Related Services of Speech-Language Therapy 1 time per week for 30 minutes per session, and Occupational Therapy 2 times per week for 30 minutes per session, calculated on an hour-by-hour basis, with the computation of services to start as of September 8, 2022, and to continue to the conclusion of these proceedings, as further discussed below.

DATED: SO ORDERED

11/4/2022 /s/ Dustin Johnson

Dustin Johnson, Esq., IHO

V. 2022-2023 FAPE HEARING ON THE MERITS

• • Discussion and Findings of Fact In the DPC filed by the parent, the parent alleges that the DOE denied the student a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the 2022-2023 school year because the District failed to fully and timely evaluate the Student in all areas of suspected disability, failed to hold a CSE review meeting for the Student, did not have an IESP and a special education program in place prior to the beginning of the school year, the District failed to implement the last agreed-upon IESP, the Parent’s right to meaningfully participate in the development of their child’s IESP was violated, and the District failed to recognize the student’s needs (see generally P-A).

Based on a thorough and independent review of the record before me, as further discussed below, I find that the Parent did not make a timely written request for §3602-c services, which absolves the District of legal responsibility to provide services for the 2022-2023 school year. As such, the District did not violate Federal or State law and I decline to grant the Petitioner any requested relief.

• • Education Law § 3602-c Because the Parent failed to make a timely written request for services in compliance with Education Law §3602-c for the 2022-2023 school year, I do not find that the District violated Federal or State law (see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 18-028) (see also, V.D. v. New York, 403 F. Supp. 3d 76, 84, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139815, *14, 2019 WL 3886622, “In order to receive these services, a parent must first…make a written request for services to the local school district's board of education.”).

A board of education must offer a FAPE to each student with a disability residing in the school district who requires special education services or programs (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][1][A]; Educ. Law § 4402[2][a], [b][2]). However, the IDEA confers no individual entitlement to special education or related services upon students who are enrolled by their parents in nonpublic schools (see 34 CFR 300.137[a]). Although districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process for making special education services available to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools, such students are not individually entitled under the IDEA to receive some or all of the special education and related services they would receive if enrolled in a public school (see 34 CFR 300.134, 300.137[a], [c], 300.138[b]).

However, under NY State law, parents of a student with a disability who have privately enrolled their child in a nonpublic school may seek to obtain educational "services" for their child by filing a request for such services in the district of location where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]) (emphasis added). This is commonly known in New York as the "dual enrollment" statute. "Boards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]) (emphasis added). In such circumstances, the district of location's CSE must review the request for services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602c[2][b][1]) (emphasis added). The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district (id.). Thus, under State law, an eligible New York State resident student may be voluntarily enrolled by a parent in a nonpublic school, but at the same time the student is also enrolled in the public school district for the purpose of receiving special education programming under Education Law § 3602-c, services for which a public school district may be held accountable through an impartial hearing.

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369- 70 [1985]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184-85 [2d Cir. 2012]; T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 [2d Cir. 2009]). In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]). Generally, a remedy for a deficiency in equitable services under State law should be similar to a remedy for deficient services under the IDEA.

Here, while the Parent claims in the Due Process Complaint that the District failed to properly fulfill its equitable duties and denied the student a FAPE for the 2022-2023 school year, the hearing record is devoid of any proof that the Parent made a timely written request for services by June 1, 2022, in accordance with Education Law § 3602-c. The hearing record supports the conclusion that the Parent’s themselves were the ones who failed in their duties, not the District.

Education Law § 3602-c clearly and unequivocally requires that parents who privately enroll their children in nonpublic schools and who seek to obtain educational services for students with disabilities must first file a written request for such services in the district in which the home school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a], [2-c]). Such a request from a parent then triggers the obligation a CSE has to review the parent’s request for services, develop an IESP for the student based on the student's individual needs, and then to assure that special education programs and services are made available to the student (Educ. Law § 3602c[2][b][1]).

The Parent here entirely failed to provide any testimony or evidence that the Parent timely requested an IESP or timely requested that the District provide services for the 2022-2023 school year as required under Education Law § 3602-c. Because the Parent did not make a timely written request for an IESP for the 2022-2023 school year, the Parent cannot now claim any disagreement with services for the 2022-2023 school year, as the Parent was not entitled to receive any services for the 2022-2023 school year due to the Parent’s own failure to make the legally mandated timely written request for such services.

If the Parent intends to continue to enroll the student in a nonpublic school and desires the District to provide services for the student, the Parent must comply with Education Law §3602-c by, among other things, submitting a timely written request for special education services (see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 18-028) (see also, V.D. v. New York, 403 F. Supp. 3d 76, 84, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139815, *14, 2019 WL 3886622, “In order to receive these services, a parent must…make a written request for services to the local school district's board of education.”). Should the Parent continue to find that the District is not engaging in the special education planning process or that the District is not sending a teacher to the private school to provide the requisite special education services, the procedure for obtaining private services is to send a timely notice of unilateral placement then obtain reliable proof of an agreement between the Parent and the private entity that details the essential terms under which the special education services are provided and who is legally responsible for the costs (see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 22-088).

Based on the Parent’s failure to comply with Education Law § 3602-c by failing to provide the District with the requisite timely notice and request for services, I find that the District was not in violation of Federal or State law and I find that the District is relieved of its obligation to provide any §3602-c services in this matter for the 2022-2023 school year. As such, I decline to grant the Parent any requested relief and I am dismissing the due process complaint in its entirety with prejudice.

VI. Conclusion In reaching my conclusions above, I have considered all of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, and carefully marshaled and weighed all of the evidence in the hearing record before me.

Based on the Parent’s failure to comply with Education Law § 3602-c by failing to provide the District with the requisite timely notice and request for services, I find that the District is relieved of its obligation to provide any 3602-c services in this matter for the 2022-2023 school year. As such, I decline to grant the Parent any requested relief (apart from the relief discussed within the above Pendency Order, with such pendency relief being terminated upon the date of this order) and I am dismissing the September 1, 2022, due process complaint in its entirety with prejudice.

FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE, THE SEPTEMBER 1, 2022, DUE PROCESS COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED: SO ORDERED

11/4/2022 /s/ Dustin Johnson

Dustin Johnson, Esq., IHO

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for proceedings before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.

IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION OF THE RECORD

I, Dustin Johnson, Impartial Hearing Officer in this matter, do hereby certify that the below Index of Exhibits included within this Findings of Fact and Decision itemizes the entire record before me. I further certify that the materials included in the record are either the original or a true copy of the original materials that were provided to me in this matter.

DATED: CERTIFIED BY

11/4/2022 /s/ Dustin Johnson

Dustin Johnson, Esq., IHO

CASE # 231277 EXHIBITS

Parent Exhibit

Date

Title

Number of Pages

P – A

9/1/2022

Request for Impartial Hearing

3

P – B

4/30/2019

IESP

9

P – C

10/3/22

Affidavit

4

P – D

9/5/22

Contract

3

IHO Exhibit

Date

Title

Number of Pages

IHO-I

10/3/2022

Prehearing Conference Summary and Order

9

IHO-II

9/2/2022

Full DPC and initial filing date of 9/2/2022

7