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Special Education Law
DECISIONParent PrevailedIHO Case No. 576335

New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

October 21, 2022·representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.

NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE

TRIALS AND HEARINGS (OATH)

SPECIAL EDUCATION HEARINGS DIVISION

STUDENT, a Minor, by and through his/her Parent(s),

PETITIONER FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

against Case # 229020 THE NEW YORK CITY Dustin Johnson, Esq.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Impartial Hearing Officer

RESPONDENT

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482; the federal regulations implementing IDEA, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, et seq.; Article 89 of the New York State Education Law; and the New York State regulations at 8 NYCRR § Part 200, et seq.

The undersigned Impartial Hearing Officer is a certified New York State Special Education Hearing Officer, employed by the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings as a Special Education Impartial Hearing Officer, and meets all of the qualifications and requirements outlined in both federal and state statute which grant me the authority to adjudicate this hearing. Furthermore, the undersigned is not currently, nor have I ever been, an employee of the NYC Department of Education. Finally, I do not have any personal or professional interest or bias that conflicts with my objectivity to hear this matter.

II. Overview – Administrative Procedures

When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with state and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (“SRO”) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).

III. Background and Procedural History

Petitioner is the parent of STUDENT (“Student” or “Child”). On July 11, 2022, Petitioner filed a Due Process Compliant (“Complaint” or “DPC”) against Respondent, the New York City Department of Education (“NYC DOE” or “DOE” or “District”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) alleging that the DOE failed to provide the student a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the 2022-2023 school year, seeking tuition reimbursement, requesting transportation, and that related costs be reimbursed to the parent, among other requests for relief (see generally P-A).

On July 26, 2022, the undersigned IHO was appointed to preside over this case. On August 8, 2022, a Prehearing Conference was held (See Exhibit IHO-I). On September 20, 2022, an impartial hearing on the merits of the DPC convened and concluded the same day.

IV. Applicable Standards

Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 [2d Cir. 2014]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]). The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement" (Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 [2017]). While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245).

The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203). However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189). "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created" (Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379). Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132). Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and... affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]). The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 [holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"]; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192). The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]). The Supreme Court has stated that even if it is unreasonable to expect a student to attend a regular education setting and achieve on grade level, the educational program set forth in the student's IEP "must be appropriately ambitious in light of his [or her] circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives" (Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000).

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 36970 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252). In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192). "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

A private school placement must be "proper under the Act" (Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15; Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs (see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129). A parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement (Carter, 510 U.S. at 14). The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student (Carter, 510 U.S. at 13-14). Parents seeking reimbursement "bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even if the IEP was inappropriate" (Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see M.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Yonkers, 231 F.3d 96, 104 [2d Cir. 2000]). "Subject to certain limited exceptions, 'the same considerations and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool [d]istrict's placement is appropriate should be considered in determining the appropriateness of the parents' placement'" (Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, quoting Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 364 [2d Cir. 2006]; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). Parents need not show that their unilateral placement provides every service necessary to maximize the student's potential, but rather, must demonstrate that the placement provides education instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a student (M.H., 685 F.3d at 252; Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365). When determining whether a unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether the placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits" (Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115; Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] ["evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]). A private placement is appropriate if it provides instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a student (20 U.S.C. § 1401[29]; Educ. Law § 4401[1]; 34 CFR 300.39[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[ww]; Hardison v. Bd. of Educ. of the Oneonta City Sch. Dist., 773 F.3d 372, 386 [2d Cir. 2014]; C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 836 [2d Cir. 2014]; Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 114-15; Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365).

The Second Circuit has set forth the standard for determining whether parents have carried their burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of their unilateral placement.

No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents' unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.

(Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, quoting Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).

V. Findings of Fact and Discussion The student has been classified by the DOE as a student with a disability classification of Autism (P-C-1). On June 16, 2022, the parents provided the DOE with notice of their intent to unilaterally place the student at SCHOOL(“SCHOOL”) for the 2022-2023 school year and seek tuition reimbursement (P-M).

A. FAPE

At the Due Process Hearing, the District did not offer any documentary evidence or call any witnesses to testify. The attorney for the District stated that the DOE was not putting on a “Prong one” case and indicated that while not technically conceding that the DOE had failed to offer the student a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), acknowledged that FAPE was their burden to substantiate and rested without putting on any case (see Transcript at p. 7). Despite their semantic wordplay, by not even attempting to put on a case to substantiate their burden of proof, the District has effectually conceded that it denied this student a FAPE. Moreover, a review of the record herein establishes that the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the DOE failed to offer the student an educational program reasonably calculated to offer a FAPE to this student for the 2022-2023 school year.

For these reasons, I find that the District failed to offer the student a Free Appropriate Public Education for the 2022-2023 school year as required by federal and state law.

B. Unilateral Placement In this case, as the District did not offer the student a FAPE for the 2022-2023 school year, the next issue to determine is whether the parent’s unilateral placement of the student at SCHOOL during the 2022-2023 school year was appropriate.

The parent argues that SCHOOL is an appropriate unilateral placement for the student as it provides instruction and services that are specifically designed to meet the student’s unique needs and that enable the student to make meaningful progress there. For the reasons described below, I find that the parent’s unilateral placement was appropriate.

Under the circumstances of this case, where the District failed to offer the student a FAPE for the school year in question and elected not to submit any evaluative information or assessments of the student as evidence of the District's view of the student's special education needs into the hearing record—the District has effectively abandoned any opportunity to assert its position regarding the student's special education needs and the extent to which the parent's unilateral placement either addressed or failed to address those needs. Additionally, the District's failure to enter any evaluative information into the hearing record also effectively precludes it from arguing a credible alternate view of the student's needs or successfully rebutting the evidence proffered at the hearing by the parents in support of the appropriateness of the unilateral placement for the student. Accordingly, to the extent that SCHOOL staff relied upon evaluation reports or assessments of the student to identify the student's needs and develop the student's educational program, or any allegation on the part of the District that the parent's evidence of the appropriateness of the unilateral placement was not sufficiently comprehensive for the purposes of determining the student's needs, the responsibility for such deficiency lies with the District and not the parent (see 34 CFR 300.305[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[b][5][iii]; A.D. v. Bd. of Educ., 690 F. Supp. 2d 193, 208 [S.D.N.Y. 2010] [finding that a unilateral placement was appropriate even where the private school reports were alleged by the district to be incomplete or inaccurate and finding that the fault for such inaccuracy or incomplete assessment of the student's needs lies with the district]; see also Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 21-194; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 20-131; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 18-125; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 180-049; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 15-076; Application of a Student Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal No. 15-038; 17 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 14-033; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 14-028; Application of a Student Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal No. 14-003; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 13-198; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 13-072; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-027). Moreover, because a "private placement need not provide... an IEP for the disabled student," SCHOOL had no duty to conduct the tests or evaluations typically relied upon by a district to develop an IEP (Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364).

Thus, the question of whether SCHOOL was an appropriate unilateral placement is principally determined by analyzing whether the combined program provided "educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of [the student]" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115; Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365). Furthermore, even if the District were to allege that the hearing record did not contain sufficient information to determine the student's needs, as discussed below, a review of the hearing record establishes that the evidence submitted by the parents in this case was sufficient to identify the student's unique individual needs and to satisfy the parents' burden to establish the appropriateness of the student's unilateral placement at SCHOOL for the 2022-2023 school year.

  • • The Student’s Needs In this instance, although the student's needs were not disputed by the DOE, a discussion thereof provides context for the disputed issue to be resolved—namely, whether the student's unilateral placement at SCHOOL was appropriate for the 2022-2023 school year.

Here, the parent’s unrebutted testimony via affidavit indicated that the student is diagnosed with autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (P-Y). The student communicates using approximately 3-5 words per sentence, has a difficult time understanding directions that are given to him and communicating with others, and uses a communication device to help him (id.). The student also struggles academically because he is easily distracted and cannot attend to a task for longer than a couple of minutes (id.).

The student’s other needs are also well documented throughout the hearing record (see generally P-C; P-F; P-G; P-H; P-I; P-J; P-K; P-L).

  • • SCHOOL

The hearing record substantially supports a finding that SCHOOL provides the student with specially designed instruction to address his identified academic needs (see generally P-Q; P-V; P-X; P-Y).

  • • Progress Although not dispositive, the hearing record also contains evidence to support a finding that the student made progress at SCHOOL (see P-V; P-X; P-Y).

With respect to the student's progress at SCHOOL, a finding of progress is not required for a determination that a student's unilateral placement is adequate (Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist. v. R.C., 2013 WL 563377, at *9-*10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2013] [noting that evidence of academic progress is not dispositive in determining whether a unilateral placement is appropriate]; see M.B. v. Minisink Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 523 Fed. App'x 76, 78, 2013 WL 1277308 [2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2013]; D.DS. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., 506 Fed. App'x 80, 81, 2012 WL 6684585, [2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2012]; L.K. v. Ne. Sch. Dist., 932 F. Supp. 2d 467, 486-87 [S.D.N.Y. 2013]; C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 913 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34, 39 [S.D.N.Y. 2012]; G.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2009 WL 2432369, at *3 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009]; Omidian v. Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 904077, at *22-*23 [N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009]; see also Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364). However, a finding of progress is, nevertheless, a relevant factor to be considered (Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115, citing Berger, 348 F.3d at 522 and Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 [1st Cir. 2002]).

Based upon the foregoing, the hearing record demonstrates sufficient evidence describing how SCHOOL addressed the student's special educational needs and how the program is reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits on the student. Therefore, I find that SCHOOL was an appropriate unilateral placement for the student.

C. Equitable Considerations

Having determined that the District failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2022-2023 school year and that SCHOOL constituted an appropriate unilateral placement for the student for the 2022-2023 school year, the final criterion for a reimbursement award is that the parent’s claim must be supported by equitable considerations. Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; R.E., 694 F.3d at 185, 194; M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable"]; L.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 674 Fed. App'x 100, 101 [2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2017]).

With respect to equitable considerations, the IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents (20 U.S.C. § 1412 [a][10][C][iii]; 34 CFR 300.148[d]; E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 [2d Cir. 2014] [identifying factors relevant to equitable considerations, including whether the withdrawal of the student from public school was justified, whether the parent provided adequate notice, whether the amount of the private school tuition was reasonable, possible scholarships or other financial aid from the private school, and any fraud or collusion on the part of the parent or private school]; C.L., 744 F.3d at 840 [noting that "[i]mportant to the equitable consideration is whether the parents obstructed or were uncooperative in the school district's efforts to meet its obligations under the IDEA"]).

Reimbursement may also be reduced or denied if parents do not provide notice of the unilateral placement either at the most recent CSE meeting prior to their removal of the student from public school, or by written notice 10 business days before such removal, "that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense" (20 U.S.C. § 14129(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I); see 34 CFR 300.148(d)(1)). This statutory provision "serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise an appropriate plan, and determine whether a [FAPE] can be provided in the public schools" (Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 [1st Cir. 2004]). Although a reduction in reimbursement is discretionary, courts have upheld the denial of reimbursement in cases where it was shown that parents failed to comply with this statutory provision (Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160; Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 [1st Cir. 2004]; Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 523-24 [6th Cir. 2003]; Rafferty v. Cranston Public Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 27 [1st Cir. 2002]); see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376; Voluntown, 226 F.3d at 68). Parents of students enrolled in private school are not exempted from 10-day notice requirements (S.W. v New York City Dep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 361-63 [S.D.N.Y. 2009]).

The Second Circuit has recently reiterated that "[t]he ten-day notice requirement gives school districts an opportunity to discuss with parents their objections to the IEP and to offer changes to the IEP designed to address those objections—all before the parents enroll their child in a private school and file a due process complaint" and that "if parents unreasonably reject the school district's proposed changes to the IEP, or are otherwise uncooperative, courts and hearing officers are fully empowered to deny them reimbursement" (Bd. of Educ. of Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist. v C.S., 990 F.3d 152, 171 [2d Cir. 2021]).

However, the hearing officer must excuse the failure to provide timely notice if, in his discretion, he determines that the reason for the lack of timely notice is that the school district prevented the parents from providing the notice, the parents had not received the procedural safeguards notice advising of the requirement to provide notice, or compliance with the notice requirement would likely result in physical harm to the student (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(e)(1)).

On the record before me, I see no equitable factors that would weigh against full tuition reimbursement to the Parents. The Parent entered evidence that they provided the District with Notice of the Parent’s intent to unilaterally place the student at SCHOOL (P-M). Furthermore, the District offered no testimony or evidence to rebut the parent’s assertions and made no arguments against a finding that the equities favored the parent.

D. Special Transportation Services The IDEA specifically includes transportation, as well as any modifications or accommodations necessary in order to assist a student to benefit from his or her special education, in its definition of related services (20 U.S.C. § 1401[26]; see 34 CFR 300.34[a], [c][16]). In addition, State law defines special education as "specially designed instruction... and transportation, provided at no cost to the parents to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability," and requires school districts to provide disabled students with "suitable transportation to and from special classes or programs" (Educ. Law §§ 4401[1]; 4402[4][a]; see Educ. Law § 4401[2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[ww]).

Specialized forms of transportation must be provided to a student with a disability if necessary for the student to benefit from special education, a determination which must be made on a case-by-case basis by the CSE (Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891, 894 [1984]; Dist. of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63 [D.D.C. 2005]; see Transportation, 71 Fed. Reg. 46576 [Aug. 14, 2006]; "Questions and Answers on Serving Children with Disabilities Eligible for Transportation," 53 IDELR 268 [OSERS 2009]; Letter to Hamilton, 25 IDELR 520 [OSEP 1996]; Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 832 [OSEP 1995]; Letter to Smith, 23 IDELR 344 [OSEP 1995]). If the student cannot access his or her special education without provision of a related service such as transportation, the district is obligated to provide the service, "even if that child has no ambulatory impairment that directly causes a 'unique need' for some form of specialized transport" (Donald B. v. Bd. of Sch. Commrs., 117 F.3d 1371, 1374-75 [11th Cir. 1997] [emphasis in original]). The requested transportation must also be "reasonable when all of the facts are considered" (Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1160 [5th Cir. 1986]).

According to a guidance document, the CSE should consider a student's mobility, behavior, communication, physical, and health needs when determining whether or not a student requires transportation as a related service, and that the IEP "must include specific transportation recommendations to address each of the student's needs, as appropriate" ("Special Transportation for Students with Disabilities," VESID Mem. [Mar. 2005], available at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/publications/policy/specialtrans.pdf). Other relevant considerations may include the student's age, ability to follow directions, ability to function without special transportation, the distance to be traveled, the nature of the area, and the availability of private or public assistance (see Donald B., 117 F.3d at 1375; Malehorn v. Hill City Sch. Dist., 987 F. Supp. 772, 775 [D.S.D. 1997]).

Here, the special transportation and accommodations recommended by the June 2022 CSE included transportation from the closest safe curb location to school; adult supervision – 1:1 Paraprofessional; vehicle and/or equipment needs – air conditioning; other accommodations – limited travel time (Parent Ex. C at p. 40). As such, I find the student is entitled to the above special transportation services given that the DOE’s own CSE has recommended such transportation services.

E. Translation of Document and Translator The July 11, 2022, DPC alleges, among other deficiencies, that the DOE failed to allow the parent to meaningfully participate and failed to convene a compliant IEP team by failing to provide copies of the student’s IEP in Spanish and by failing to provide the parent with a Spanish interpreter at the June 2022 IEP meeting. Having found above that the DOE failed to provide the student with a FAPE on other grounds, I express no finding in this decision that such a failure to translate documents or failure to provide an interpreter is a basis for, or contributed to, my finding of a denial of FAPE in this matter. On the contrary, as further discussed below, I do not find that such a failure to translate documents or failure to provide an interpreter implicates a denial of FAPE.

In petitioner’s closing statement at the hearing on the merits, petitioner’s counsel requested that the IHO “order the Department provide the parent with translated IEPs and a Spanish translator at any future IEP meetings…” (see Tr. at p. 31). Such an explicit request for relief is absent from the parent’s July 11, 2022, DPC (see generally P-A). Section (e) of the July 11, 2022, DPC, titled “Proposed relief to the issues raised in the hearing request” with numbered sections from 1 thru 9, specifically lay out all of the parents proposed relief. While there was a request for a certified, independent Spanish interpreter to be provided to the parent to assist her during the resolution session as well as the hearing process (see P-A-10 at p. 2), nowhere within section (e) can a request for an order that the Department provide the parent with translated IEPs and a Spanish translator at any future IEP meetings be found (see P-A-9-10).

The IDEA and its implementing regulations provide that a party requesting an impartial hearing may not raise issues at the impartial hearing that were not raised in its original due process complaint notice unless the other party agrees (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][B]; 34 CFR 300.508[d][3][i], 300.511[d]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[i][7][i][a]; [j][1][ii]), or the original due process complaint is amended prior to the impartial hearing per permission given by the IHO at least five days prior to the impartial hearing (20 U.S.C. § 1415[c][2][E][i][II]; 34 CFR 300.507[d][3][ii]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[i][7][b]).

Here, the parents did not seek the district's agreement to expand the scope of the impartial hearing to include this specific request for relief. Nor can it be said that the district "opened the door" to these claims by raising evidence as a defense to a claim that was not identified in the due process complaint notice (M.H., 685 F.3d at 250-51). While it could be argued that a broad reading of the allegations within the DPC imply a request for such relief, even though it was not explicitly stated under section (e), the case law and record herein does not support such a request for relief, and I decline to so order. Furthermore, I would not have been inclined to order such prospective relief as proposed by the petitioner for future IEP meetings which have not occurred and may not occur for a variety of reasons.

The IDEA sets forth procedural safeguards that include providing parents an opportunity "to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child" (20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][1]). Federal and State regulations governing parental participation require that school districts take steps to ensure that parents are present at their child's IEP meetings or are afforded the opportunity to participate (34 CFR 300.322; 8 NYCRR 200.5[d]). Although school districts must provide an opportunity for parents to participate in the development of their child's IEP, mere parental disagreement with a school district's proposed IEP and placement recommendation does not amount to a denial of meaningful participation (see F.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 735 Fed. App'x 38, 40 [2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2018] [noting that "'[a] professional disagreement is not an IDEA violation'"], quoting P.K. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 371, 383 [S.D.N.Y. 2008]; T.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2015 WL 5610769, at *5 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015]; A.P. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2015 WL 4597545, at *8, *10 [S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015]; E.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 4495676, at *17 [E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013] [stating that "as long as the parents are listened to," the right to participate in the development of the IEP is not impeded, "even if the [district] ultimately decides not to follow the parents' suggestions"]; Sch. for Language & Commc'n Dev. v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 2006 WL 2792754, at *7 [E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006] ["Meaningful participation does not require deferral to parent choice"]). When determining whether a district complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements, the inquiry focuses on whether the parents "had an adequate opportunity to participate in the development" of their child's IEP (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192). Moreover, "the IDEA only requires that the parents have an opportunity to participate in the drafting process" (D.D-S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 3919040, at *11 [E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011], aff'd, 506 Fed. App'x 80 [2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2012], quoting A.E. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 2d 208, 216 [D. Conn. 2006]; see T.Y. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 420 [2d Cir. 2009] [noting that the IDEA gives parents the right to participate in the development of their child's IEP, not a veto power over those aspects of the IEP with which they do not agree]).

In addition, the district "must take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the parent understands the proceedings of the [CSE] meeting, including arranging for an interpreter for parents [who are hearing impaired] or whose native language is other than English" (34 CFR 300.322[e]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[d][5]; see also Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 13-136).[1] With respect to the translation of documents, both federal and State regulations require that a district provide parents with certain documents in their native language—including the "results of the evaluations" ("unless it is clearly not feasible to do so")—ensure that consent and procedural notices are provided in the parents' native language, and provide a translator at all times during the impartial hearing process (see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][4], [d][2]; 34 CFR 300.9[a]; 300.503[c], 300.504[d]; 8 NYCRR 154-1.3[b], 200.1[l][1], 200.4[a][9][ii], [b][6][xii], [g][2][ii], 200.5[a][4], [f][2]).

Neither the IDEA nor federal or State regulations require that a district provide parents with a copy of the IEP in their native language (Letter to Boswell, 49 IDELR 196 [OSEP 2007] [noting that while "[t]here is no requirement in IDEA or in its accompanying regulations that all IEP documents must be translated," districts are required to provide parents with full information, in their native language, of all information relevant to activities for which consent is sought]; see 34 CFR 300.9[a], 300.320; 8 NYCRR 200.1[l][1], 200.4[d][2]).[2]

Because neither the IDEA nor federal or State regulations require that a district provide parents with a copy of the IEP in their native language, and because Petitioner failed to offer any case law to the contrary, I decline to grant Petitioner’s request for relief.

Furthermore, a finding that the student did not receive a FAPE for the 2022-2023 school year could have been found in this context only if procedural inadequacies involving the failure to provide an interpreter at the June 14, 2022, CSE meeting—and the failure to provide the parents with documents translated into their native language—significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student (20 U.S.C. §1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]).

Based upon a review of the evidence in the hearing record, the mother testified that during the June 2022 IEP meeting, she asked the student’s teacher, who was also participating in the IEP meeting and who also speaks Spanish, to translate for the mother (see P-Y-4 at p. 39). Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the mother was significantly impeded or completely precluded from participating in the June 2022 IEP meeting as she herself conceded that she had access to a Spanish translator during the meeting. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the mother’s sworn affidavit, submitted in lieu of her direct testimony, is entirely in English, without any indication in the affidavit that questions were asked in Spanish or that answers were translated from Spanish to English (see generally P-Y). Also, it is equally worth noting from a thorough review of the mother’s affidavit, that the mother’s sworn testimony contains intelligible, nearly perfect English usage, grammar, and punctuation (id.).

Thus, the evidence in the hearing record supports the conclusion that the parent was not significantly impeded from participating at the June 2022 CSE meeting as she was able to seek the assistance of a translator during the CSE meeting, and any procedural irregularities resulting from the district’s failure to provide a dedicated interpreter did not, in and of itself, significantly impede the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student (20 U.S.C. §1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]) (see also, Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 20-174). Finally, as discussed above, neither the IDEA nor federal or State regulations require that a district provide parents with a copy of the IEP in their native language, thus the failure to do so would not form the basis for a denial of FAPE.

As such, based on the above, I decline to order this requested relief.[3]

VI. Conclusion In summary, a review of the evidence in the hearing record demonstrates that the District denied the student a FAPE, the parent sustained their burden to establish that SCHOOL was an appropriate unilateral placement for the student for the 2022-2023 school year, and the equities and the evidence in the hearing record supports a finding that the parent has demonstrated a legal obligation to pay the costs of tuition and an inability to do so necessitating an award of direct tuition payment to SCHOOL (see P-S; P-U; P-Y)[4], reimbursement to the parent for the tuition deposit (see P-R), at home ABA and PCAT services (see P-F-19), and special transportation services (see P-C-40).

I have reviewed the parent’s remaining contentions and find them to be either unnecessary to this decision, without merit, beyond my jurisdiction, too vague to be of use, or without sufficient basis in the record for a finding and award of relief. Accordingly, any relief not specifically discussed in this decision is denied, and all the parent’s remaining claims not discussed herein are dismissed with prejudice.

VII. Orders

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, within 60 calendar days from the date of this decision, the District shall directly pay the student’s tuition at SCHOOL for the 2022-2023 school year in the amount of $146,750.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 60 calendar days from the date of this decision, the District shall reimburse the parent in the amount of $250.00 for the tuition deposit paid by the parent. For the purposes of this Order, I find the evidence submitted in Petitioner’s Exhibit R to be adequate proof of payment made by the parent entitling the parent to immediate reimbursement. Furthermore, I find that the District has already been provided with adequate proof via this proceeding and so the District shall reimburse the parent within 60 calendar days from the date of this decision without any action on the part of the parent.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District is to provide the student with 10 hours per week of at-home Applied Behavioral Analysis services provided by a board-certified behavior analyst or licensed behavior analyst.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District is to provide the parent with 2 hours per week of at-home Parent/Caregiver Training services.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District is to provide the student with special transportation services from the closest safe curb location to SCHOOL, with adult supervision of a 1:1 Paraprofessional, in a vehicle with air conditioning, and with limited travel time.

DATED: SO ORDERED

10/21/2022 /s/ Dustin Johnson

Dustin Johnson, Esq., IHO

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for proceedings before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.

IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION OF THE RECORD

I, Dustin Johnson, Impartial Hearing Officer in this matter, do hereby certify that the below Index of Exhibits included within this Findings of Fact and Decision itemizes the entire record before me. I further certify that the materials included in the record are either the original or a true copy of the original materials that were provided to me in this matter.

DATED: CERTIFIED BY

10/21/2022 /s/ Dustin Johnson

Dustin Johnson, Esq., IHO

CASE # 229020 EXHIBITS

Parent Exhibit Number

Letter Exhibit Name Date of Pages

P-A Impartial Hearing Request 07/11/22 13

P-B IHO Case Assignment Sheet 07/25/22 3

P-C Individual Education Program 06/14/22 44

P-F Independent Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) 04/26/21 21

Skills Assessment

P-G Independent Functional Behavior Assessment (FBA)04/26/21 26 And Behavior Intervention Plan (BIP)

P-H Independent Neuropsychological Evaluation 11/19/20 22

P-I Independent Occupational Therapy Evaluation 03/12/21 26

P-J Independent Assistive Technology Evaluation 03/17/21 9

P-K Independent Speech Therapy Evaluation 03/27/21 16

P-L Physician Prescription for Feeding Therapy 10/04/21 1

P-M Ten Day Notice Letter and Responses 06/16/22 4

P-N Rate Sheet 05/05/22 2

P-O Department School Location Letter 06/23/22 1

P-P Department School Location Letter 07/26/22 1

P-Q SCHOOL Program Description 2022 5

P-R SCHOOL Parent Tuition Deposit 05/11/22 1

P-S SCHOOL 2022-2023 Enrollment Agreement 05/11/22 8

P-T SCHOOL 2022-2023 Schedule 2022 1

P-U SCHOOL Tuition Affidavit 08/31/22 1

P-V SCHOOL 2022 Progress Report 08/01/22 22

P-W Resume of Program Director Undated 2

P-X Affidavit of Program Director 09/14/22 7

P-Y Affidavit of Parent 09/19/22 7

IHO Exhibit Date Title Number of Pages

IHO-I 08/8/2022 Prehearing Conference Summary and Order 9

Footnotes

[1] Although the IDEA defines "native language" for an individual of limited English proficiency who is not a student as "the language normally used by that individual" (20 U.S.C. § 1401[20]; 34 CFR 300.29[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[ff][1]), the pertinent laws and regulations defining "limited English proficiency" only apply to students (see 20 U.S.C. § 9101[25]; 34 CFR 300.27; 8 NYCRR 200.1[iii]). In addition, the United States Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights has issued guidance indicating that a parent with limited English proficiency is one "whose primary language is other than English and who ha[s] limited English proficiency in one of the four domains of language proficiency (speaking, listening, reading, or writing)" (Dear Colleague Letter: English Learner Students and Limited English Proficient Parents at p. 37 (OCR 2015).

[2] Although not required to provide parents with a copy of an IEP in their native language, doing so would be in keeping with the spirit of the IDEA and is one way to demonstrate that the parent has been "fully informed of their child's educational program" (Letter to Boswell, 49 IDELR 196 [OSEP 2007]).

[3] While not required by law or ordered herein, the NYC DOE Special Education Standard Operating Procedures Manual updated November 16, 2021, provides guidance on seeking Translation and Interpretation Services and indicates that the DOE will translate IEPs and make interpreters available upon request. If they have not already done so, the parent may consider following the guidance therein. See https://infohub.nyced.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/specialeducationstandardoperatingproceduresmanualmarch.pdf?sfvrsn=4cdb05a0_2

[4] The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a direct payment remedy is an appropriate form of relief in some circumstances, and that "[i]ndeed, where the equities call for it, direct payment fits comfortably within the Burlington–Carter framework" (E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 453 [2d Cir. 2014]; see also Mr. and Mrs. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.,769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 430 [S.D.N.Y. 2011] [finding it appropriate to order a school district to make retroactive tuition payment directly to a private school where equitable considerations favor an award of the costs of private school tuition but the parents, although legally obligated to make tuition payments, have not done so due to a lack of financial resources]).