NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
Name Title For Date
[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 07/18/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] District Representative DOE 07/18/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 09/06/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] District Representative DOE 09/06/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 09/19/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] District Representative DOE 09/19/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 10/06/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] District Representative DOE 10/06/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 11/03/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] Parent PARENT 11/03/22 (V)
[CONFIDENTIAL] District Representative DOE 11/03/22 (V) [CONFIDENTIAL] Witness DOE 11/03/22 (V)
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD
A. Number/Letter Title Dated For # of Pages Request for Due Process 04/11/22 PARENT Proceeding and Notice of Appearance
B. Authorization for Independent 09/01/19- PARENT 02 SETSS C /15/21 PARENT 09 06/30/20 2019 to D Order of Termination 06/28/21 PARENT 01 2020 2020 to E Affirmation of Services 10/26/22 PARENT 02 From REDACTED Achieving Corporation 2021 06 pages
H. F Certificate of Information for N/A PARENT 02 SETSS Providers 2021 to 2022
G. Parent's Call List 08/23/21 PARENT 01 SETSS Contract 08/24/21 PARENT 02 pages
1. I Parent's 1040 for 2021 01/25/22 PARENT 02 Email between CSE and 10/14/21 DOE Parent 05 pages DOE
On. 2 SESIS Events Log N/A DOE 01 3 Notification of Discharge 10/19/21 DOE 01 I District Closing Brief 11/23/22 IHO 04 II Parent Closing Brief 11/23/22 IHO 03 June 16, 2022, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer ("IHO") to conduct an. impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")
20. USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After having adjournments granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on November 3, 2022. A list of the documents entered into evidence is annexed hereto. BACKGROUND This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint ("DPC") filed by the student's Parent's attorney, on or about April 11, 2022, and carried under New York City ("NYC") Case No. 225793. The Parent herein alleges that the student was denied a "free and appropriate public education" ("FAPE") for the 2021-2022 school year DOE in. that the parent alleges that the DOE failed to implement the special education services recommended on the students IESP. Parents DPC states that the ISEP includes 5 hours of. SETTS services per week for the 2021-2022 school year. However, there was no IESP that was submitted into evidence by the Parent, however an RSA was submitted on behalf of the student. The Parent and the DOE submitted written summations.
At. the impartial hearing, the Parent seeks the following relief: (a) 5 hours of individual SETTS services per week by an outside provider at an enhanced rate of $180.00 per hour. The Parents' DPC having been duly filed pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and Notice having been duly given to the DOE; and The matter having come on for a final "impartial hearing" before this IHO on November 3, 2022, and this decision being made not on the basis of the submission of testamentary evidence pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii][f],and Whereas the Parent's attorney appeared and the DOE appeared. THE DOE'S CASE The DOE called one witness to testify on its behalf and submitted (3) documents in evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the DOE's case is incorporated in the decision below. THE PARENT'S CASE The Parent had (2) witnesses testify on their behalf. One witness testified on direct testimony via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii][f]. The other witness testified live at the hearing on the record. On the hearing dates, the DOE crossed one of the affiants. The Parent also submitted (8) documents in evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the Parent's case is incorporated in the decision below. FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION Two purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B] and Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]) A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07 and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) While school districts are required to comply with all IDEA procedures, not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA. (See A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003] and Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., WL 465211, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007]) Under the IDEA, if a procedural violation is alleged, an administrative officer find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. (See 20 U.S.C. § may 2007 427 pages
An. 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 [N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008] and Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 [S.D.N.Y. 2007] aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 [2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008]) appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student's needs (34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals related to those needs (34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][2];
8. NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]; SRO No. 07-018; 06-059; 06-029; 04-046; 02-014; 01-095 and 93-09) Subsequent to its development, an IEP must be properly implemented. (See 8 NYCRR 200.4[e][7] and SRO No. 08-087) The DOE may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered DOE
by. the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim. (See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993] and Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]) In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE. (See Burlington, 471 pages
of. U.S. at 370-71; 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148) The New York State Legislature amended the Education Law to place the burden production and persuasion upon the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement. (See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c], as amended by Ch. 583 of the Laws of 2007) The amended law took effect for impartial hearings commenced on or after October 14, 2007; therefore, it applies to the instant case. (See SRO No. 08-016)
SCHOOL OF LOCATION VS. SCHOOL OF RESIDENCE
Pursuant to Education Law § 3602-c, boards of education of all school districts of the State shall furnish services to students who are residents of this State and who attend non-public schools located in such school districts, upon the timely written request of the Parent or person in parental relation of any such student. For the purpose of obtaining education for students with disabilities such request shall be reviewed by the CSE of the school district of location, which shall develop an IESP for the student based on the student's individual needs. (See Educ. Law §§ 3602-c[2][a], [2][b][1]) A school district of location recovers from the school district of residence the evaluation costs, CSE administrative costs, and special education services costs incurred. (See 8 NYCRR § 177.2, see also "Guidance on Reimbursement Claims for the Cost of Providing Special Education Services to Parentally-Placed Nonresident Students Pursuant to Education Law Section 3602-c" located at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/publications/policy/reimbursement608.htm) Available at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/publications/policy/nonpublic907.pdf, United States Education Department guidance can be found in the Federal Register at: Child Find for Parentally-Placed Private School Children with Disabilities (§ 300.131) 71 Fed. Reg. 46593 (August 14, 2006): "If a determination is made by the LEA [local educational agency] where the private school is located that a child needs special education and related services, the LEA where the child resides is responsible for making FAPE available to the child. If the parent makes clear his or her intention to keep the child enrolled in the private [school] located in another LEA, the LEA where the child resides need not make FAPE available to the child." (See Maine School Administrative District #40, 108 LRP 40513 [ME SEA, Oct. 23, 2007] [interpreting and applying the federal guidance and concluding that a district of location was not required to create an IEP for a student given the parent's intention to keep a student in a private boarding school])
While neither the IDEA nor State law preclude a parent from meeting with CSEs from both a district of location and a district of residence to develop an IESP or IEP for their consideration, the IDEA and State law also do not require both public school districts to simultaneously provide services under both schemes. Additionally, parents are generally not advised to seek evaluations from two separate districts to avoid repeated testing in close proximity of time. (See Office of Special Education guidance memorandum at p. 11). In this case, the parent accepted the public school services recommended by the CSE and provided by the district of location under the student's IESP.
For students who reside in New York, State law requires a school district of location to develop an IESP that is "based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" and to "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district." (See Educ. Law § 3602-c[b][1]) Parents are then provided the opportunity to challenge an IESP though the same due process procedures offered to students who are enrolled in a district of residence. (Id.)
The DOE argues that, "according to applicable law, special education services must be provided by the school district of location of the nonpublic school that Student attends. [REDACTED] is not in the New York City school district. Therefore, the DOE's position is that they are not responsible for funding Student's SETSS services for the school year at issue. (DOE Closing Brief)
Parent argues that they were never put on notice that the student would be discharged from the system or that the student was no longer entitled to services. Parent also argues that the student remained living in Brooklyn, the school district of residence and as such remained entitled to services.
In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence in this case is as follows:
The DOE's witness testified on direct, REDACTED. The witness is the CSE Special Education teacher assigned for CSE [REDACTED]. The witness testified as follows: she had a telephonic meeting with Parent during which Parent indicated that Student was attending a new school (T-34). The witness testified that she followed up with an email, asking Parent for the name and location of the new school in order to confirm the student's enrollment and memorialize the discussion with Parent in writing (T34) (DOE 1). Parent replied to the email, "REDACTED" (DOE 1). The witness further testified that she looked up a phone number for the new school, called the school, and confirmed Student's enrollment. (T-35). The witness testified that she then discharged the student from the system. The witness did not produce anything in writing to indicate that the Parent was put on notice prior to discharging the student.
The Parent testified as follows, "I don't recall the name REDACTED whatever that, you know, that name was. And it could be if I was once called from the Board of Ed, and they asked me which -- you know, where he was enrolled at the time, because he had just switched, you know, I -- I answered the question. But I never had any conversation indicating that it was an issue that he was in REDACTED because he was -- he was traveling back. He was -- he was getting the service over here in Brooklyn." (T-50)
SETSS SERVICES - "ENHANCED RATE"
Whereas SETSS are not defined in State or federal laws or regulations and are not identified on the State continuum of special education services. (See SRO No. 16-044); and Whereas a reference to the service as "direct" is in keeping with the language used in State regulations for consultant teacher services (See 8 NYCRR 200.6[d]); and Whereas State regulations distinguish between "direct consultant teacher services," which consist of "specially designed individualized or group instruction provided by a certified special education teacher . . .to a student with a disability," from "indirect consultant teacher services," which consist of "consultation provided by a certified special education teacher . . .to regular education teachers" (See 8 NYCRR 200.1[m] [emphasis added]; see also 8 NYCRR 200.6[d]); and Whereas regarding her efforts to obtain a DOE provider, the Parent submitted a call list that she made efforts to obtain a provider. (G); and Whereas the Parent submitted in evidence an affidavit from the private provider dated October 26, 2022 wherein she states:
1. I am the Controller of REDACTED, with an address of REDACTED. Based on my review of REDACTED books and records, and based on speaking with REDACTED personnel, I have knowledge of the facts being affirmed to herein.
2. REDACTED agreed to provide REDACTED with 5 hours of SETSS services per week for the 2021-2022 school year starting from 9/1/2021 and ending on 6/30/2022 at the rate of $180 per hour.
3. REDACTED's rate of $180/hour is commensurate with other SETSS agencies in New York City.
4. In addition to the amount paid directly to the SETSS provider, the remainder of the fee is used by REDACTED to pay for overhead, including office staff, materials, training, supervision, assessments, etc.
5. REDACTED was the SETSS provider for REDACTED during the 2021-2022 school year. She is a certified special education teacher.
6. As of October 26, 2022, REDACTED. provided 197 hours of total SETSS services to REDACTED for the 2021-2022 school year as of the date hereof.
7. The total amount due to REDACTED for the 2021-2022 school year as of October 26, 2022, is $35,460.00, calculated as follows: 197 hours x $180 per hour = $35,460.00.
8. As of the date hereof, REDACTED has received $0 for such service. and Whereas the Parent acknowledges that she received an "RSA", for SETSS services at the established DOE rate (B1-2); and Whereas there is no evidence that the Parent complied with the DOE's SETSS Authorization Form instructions that state in relevant part: "If you need assistance locating a provider, or if you have any questions, please contact the DOE person listed in Section 1 of this form."; and
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
Whereas equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; R.E., 694 F.3d at 185, 194, M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000], and Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 [noting that "[c]ourts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable"]); and Whereas the IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when Parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the Parents. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii], 34 CFR 300.148[d], E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 [2d Cir. 2014] [identifying factors relevant to equitable considerations, including whether the withdrawal of the student from public school was justified, whether the parent provided adequate notice, whether the amount of the private school tuition was reasonable, possible scholarships or other financial aid from the private school, and any fraud or collusion on the part of the parent or private school] and C.L., 744 F.3d at 840 [noting that "[i]mportant to the equitable consideration is whether the parents obstructed or were uncooperative in the school district's efforts to meet its obligations under the IDEA"]); and Whereas the Parent submitted into evidence a contract that she signed with the private provider, that states that the parent has not made any payments to the provider and the contract t relies on the parent initiating an impartial heating to recoup the fees to pay the private provider (H); and Whereas "The fundamental basis of a valid, enforceable contract is a meeting of the minds of the parties, and, if there is no meeting of the minds on all essential terms, there is no contract." (See Benicorp Ins. Co. v. National Medical Health Card Sys., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); and Whereas it is a basic tenant of contract law that an offer must be so definite as to its material terms or require such definite terms in the acceptance that the performance to be rendered by each party is reasonably certain. (See Contracts 2nd Edition, Calamari & Perillo); and Whereas the contract is void if the content of the agreement is unduly uncertain. (Id.); and Whereas while "indefiniteness" in a contract may be cured by the subsequent conduct of the parties or by a subsequent agreement of the parties, there is no credible evidence in the record that such conduct or agreement by the parties has occurred in this case. (Id.); and Whereas it has long been held, and it is well settled in the law that in cases of doubt or ambiguity, a contract must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared it and favorably to a party who had no voice in the selection of its language. (See 4 Williston, Contracts, § 621 and 10 NY Jur, Contracts, § 223); and Whereas here, there is no doubt that the relevant "contract" (actually jus a self-serving affidavit) was drafted by the private provider; and Whereas it is well established that in fashioning relief, IHOs retain the discretion to reduce or deny tuition funding or payment requests where there is collusion between Parents and private schools, or where there is evidence that the private school has artificially inflated its costs, because since the Parents have selected the unilateral placement, and their financial status is at issue the Parents have the burden of production and persuasion with respect to whether they are legally obligated for the student's tuition payments. (See Mr. and Mrs. A. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011) emphasis added); and Whereas there is no indication that the private provider has taken any measures to collect payment by way of invoices sent to the Parent, or by threatening and/or pursuing legal action against him for the fees owed; and Whereas there were no invoices submitted into evidence by the Parents for services rendered and on the days that the services were allegedly performed.
Whereas under the circumstances, I find that the private provider's contract/affidavit really contemplates payment of the private provider fees by the DOE and not the Parent; and Whereas thus, the Parent herein is actually "straw person" bring the instant claim on behalf of the private provider, not herself; and Whereas the private provider contract/affidavit is ambiguous and indefinite in its terms; and Whereas it has long been held that where the contents of an agreement are unduly uncertain, no contract is formed. (See Restatement, Second Contracts § 32, 1 Corbin § 95 and 1 Williston § 37); and Whereas it is well settled that Parents who choose to unilaterally place their child at a private school or secure private services without consent or referral by the school district do so at their own financial risk. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 15, Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74 and Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496); and Whereas the United States Supreme Court in Burlington held that "retroactive reimbursement" of private educational expenses is appropriate as an available remedy under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at pp. 370-71, Carter, 510 U.S. at 14-15, Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111 (2d Cir. 2007), explaining that parents who believe that their child has been denied a FAPE may, at their own financial risk, enroll the child in a private school and seek retroactive reimbursement for the cost of the private school], DiazFonseca v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2006), concluding that reimbursement under the IDEA allows parents to recover only actual, not anticipated, expenses for private school tuition and related expenses, Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192, noting the availability of "retroactive tuition reimbursement" under the IDEA, Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of East Islip, 145 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1998), holding that compensation for "out of pocket expenses" was appropriate, Streck v. Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 2163090, at * 2 (N.D.N.Y. July 17, 2009) and Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 299 [4th Cir. 2005]); and Whereas while the IDEA provides that a court shall grant such relief that is determined to be appropriate (20 U.S.C. § 1415[i][2][C][iii], Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2488); and Whereas the IDEA does not expressly provide for prospective payment of tuition costs; and Whereas the IDEA does provide that "a court or a hearing officer may require the "school district" to reimburse the parents for the cost of "private school" enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the school district had not made a FAPE available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment." (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii], 34 C.F.R. § 300.148[c] and SRO Nos.: 09-001, 07-032, 08-050 & 04-037); and Whereas there is no evidence in the hearing record indicating that, under the circumstances, the Parent has made any meaningful payments to the private provider, or that the private provider has ever sought payment of its fees for the 2021-2022 school year from the Parent, or that it has any real viable intention of doing so. (See S.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2009 WL 857549, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2009]); and Whereas accordingly, I must find that the Parent cannot seek tuition reimbursement or prospective relief on behalf of the private provider; and Whereas the evidence contained in the hearing record supports a finding that it was the private provider, not the Parent, who incurred the financial burden associated with the student's SETSS services for the 2021-2022 school year. (See S.W., 2009 WL 857549, at *7-*9, parent had no financial standing to sue for direct prospective payment to private placement where terms of enrollment contract absolved her of responsibility for paying tuition); and Whereas the private provider is not a party in this case and is, therefore, not entitled to relief under the IDEA. (Id.); and Whereas however, that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has determined that under the pendency doctrine, school districts may be required to directly fund pendency placements (Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 482-84 [2d Cir. 2002] and Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d195, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2002) and that courts have awarded "prospective payment" to afford access to compensatory education. (See, e.g., Streck v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 2229141 (2d Cir. May 30, 2008) and Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. System, 518 F.3d 1275, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008); and Whereas a public agency may, under certain circumstances, place a student in an approved private school, however if it does so, the placement must be a public expense and meet state standards. (See 20 U.S.C. §1412[a][10][B]]) and;
Whereas, for all of the reasons stated herein, I find that the Parent in this case is not entitled to an enhanced rate for SETSS services that she receives at her private school via a private provider that is allegedly paid $180 per hour. (P-C, see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii], 34 C.F.R. § 300.403[c], Burlington, 471 U.S. 359; Carter, 510 U.S. 7, A.A. v. Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 2d 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) and SRO Nos.: 09-001, 08-050, 07-032 & 04-037); and Whereas there is no evidence in the hearing record to establish that the Parent has incurred any financial obligation to pay the difference between the enhanced rate and the DOE rate; and Whereas, therefore, even if the Parent prevailed on the merits of her claim, it would be unclear at this juncture whether or not any relief would be warranted absent evidence that the provider was owed additional compensation based on an agreement with the Parents or the DOE; and Whereas the student's RSA mandates that the student receive 3-5 hours of individual SETTS services per week by a SETTS provider registered with the DOE ; and Whereas the DOE's actions in discharging the student from their system without any further action or notice to the parent, constitutes a denial of FAPE and the testamentary and documentary evidence submitted by the Parent and annexed hereto supports the Parent's request for relief as detailed below. Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that upon the DOE's receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of said services having been rendered, the DOE shall either reimburse the Parent and/or pay the cost of the student's receipt of (5) periods of SETSS services per week, at the established DOE rate, for the entirety of the student's 2021-2022 school year; and it is further
ORDERED that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this "Final Order" is found to be either resolved by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO's authority or unsupported by the record.
Sharifa Milena Nasser
DATED: March 23, 2023
Queens, New York Sharifa Milena Nasser- IHO
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public-School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.
An appealing party's request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov. (Rev. 07/09/20)