New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

CASE NUMBER: 570470- NYC: 224746

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

Case Number: 224746

Student's Name: [REDACTED]

Date of Birth: [REDACTED]

District: [REDACTED]

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Date of Hearing: 05/27/2022

06/07/2022 Pendency

06/08/2022

Hearing Officer: Daniel Ajello Esq.

Actual Record Close Date: 06/16/2022

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON 05/27/2022

(All present by video or telephone)

For the Student: [REDACTED]Attorney

For the Department of Education: [REDACTED], District Representative

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON 06/07/2022

(All present by video or telephone)

For the Student: [REDACTED], Law Clerk

For the Department of Education: [REDACTED], District Representative

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON 06/08/2022

(All present by video or telephone)

For the Student: [REDACTED], Law Clerk

[REDACTED], Parent

For the Department of Education: [REDACTED], District Representative

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD

PARENT

Entered 05/27/2022

• • A. Due Process Complaint (DPC), 02/24/2022, 6 pages
• • B. Individualized Education Services Program (IESP), 02/02/2022, 8 pages
• • C. Ten Day Notice, 02/24/2022, 1 page

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (DOE)

NONE

IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER

Entered 05/27/2022

• • Notice of Appointment, 05/20/2021, 4 pages

Entered 06/08/2022

• • Pendency Order, 06/07/2022, 7 pages

INTRODUCTION

On 05/20/2022, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) by the Department of Education’s Impartial Hearing Office to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1415(f) and Article 89 of the Education Law of the State of New York.

Hearing commenced, on 05/27/2022, to allow an opportunity for the DOE to defend against the allegations contained in the DPC. The DOE appeared and the Representative sought adjournment based on an inability to speak. The IHO heard the DOE Representative perfectly well and found no basis upon which to grant an adjournment. The IHO noted that if the DOE Representative felt he was incapable of appearing for the DOE he should have made other arrangements. Ultimately, the DOE did not present a case.

Parent sought a determination of the Student’s Pendency during the proceedings. (Ex A 2)

Hearing to determine Student Pendency was held on 05/27/2022, and Order was issued.

Pendency Order identified Student Pendency as including:

• • Special Education Teacher Support Services (SETSS), Direct Service, Group Service,
• • English, 3 periods per week. Commencement date of service of 02/16/2022. (IHO Ex II 6)

Appended to the record are lists of persons in attendance and the documents received in evidence.

BACKGROUND

This matter was instituted by the impartial hearing request, of 02/24/2022. (Ex A)

Parent sets forth Student uncontroverted educational history, and allegations, which led to the filing of the DPC:

• • The last program the DOE developed for the Student is an IESP, of 02/02/2022;
• • Recommendations included:
• • Special Education Teacher Support Services (SETSS), Direct Service, Group Service, English, 3 periods per week (Ex B 6);
• • Parent alleges the DOE did not supply providers for the services it recommended for the Student;
• • Parent was unsuccessful in obtaining services from the DOE standard rate providers;
• • Parent obtained services of independent service provider, for the 21-22 school year, at prevailing rate. (Ex A 2)

In light of the alleged DOE failure, the Parent seeks:

• • Funding of located service provider, at prevailing rate; and
• • Compensatory hours of service for any missed Student services. (Ex A 3)

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

At Hearing, of 06/08/2022, Parent Attorney set forth the basis of the Parent’s claim, and sought after

Relief. (T 29-30)

Parent Attorney presented one Witness whose Testimony is outlined below.

[REDACTED], Parent, Provide Testimony that included:

• • Detailing Student challenges, having a hard time academically;
• • Student used to get very upset and did not know how to express his anger;
• • Student used to get in fights with other kids (T 22-23);
• • Parent believed it would benefit the Student to have additional support (T 23);
• • Parent attended the IEP meeting where services were recommended (T 24);
• • The DOE did not contact the Parent after the IEP regarding implementing the recommended Student services; and
• • Parent searched for a service provider, and ultimately located a private agency (T 25-27).

The DOE Representative noted that the IESP meeting referred to was indeed the Student’s first IESP meeting. (T 30-31)

• • Due Process Complaint (DPC), 02/24/2022 Sets forth Parent allegations and sought after relief, as reviewed above.
• • Individualized Education Services Program (IESP), 02/02/2022 Student is classified Speech or Learning Disability. (Ex B 1)

Student is recommended to services that include:

• • Special Education Teacher Support Services (SETSS), Direct Service, Group Service, English, 3 periods per week;
• • Implementation date of 02/16/2022.
• • (Ex B 6)
• • Ten Day Notice, 02/24/2022 Parent, via Attorney, notifies the DOE that:
• • On 2/2/2022 the CSE convened an IEP meeting which recommended SETSS for [REDACTED];
• • I consent to all services recommended on this IEP being implemented by the DOE;
• • Unfortunately, I have no way of implementing these recommendations;
• • Despite my best efforts I have been unable to locate providers for the SETSS at the DOE’s standard rate;
• • I am therefore writing to you to inform you that I will have no choice but to implement the IEP on my own and seek reimbursement or direct payment from the DOE;
• • If you have any alternative options, please let me know ASAP. (Ex C 2)

FINDING OF FACTS AND DECISION

Purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3155869 [2d Cir. June 24, 2013]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012], cert. denied 2013 WL 1418840 [U.S. June 10, 2013]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998] [quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206]; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).

While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]; Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007]).

The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203). However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132 [quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989)] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379). Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132). Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and... affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 [quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130] [citations omitted]); see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]; Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15). The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).

A board of education must offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to each student with a disability residing in the school district who requires special education services or programs (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][1][A]; Educ. Law § 4402[2][a], [b][2]). However, the IDEA confers no individual entitlement to special education or related services upon students who are enrolled by their parents in nonpublic schools (see 34 CFR 300.137[a]). Although districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process for making special education services available to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools, such students are not individually entitled under the IDEA to receive some or all of the special education and related services they would receive if enrolled in a public school (see 34 CFR 300.134, 300.137[a], [c], 300.138[b]).

However, under State law, parents of a student with a disability who have privately enrolled their child in a nonpublic school may seek to obtain educational "services" for their child by filing a request for such services in the district of location where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]). "Boards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]). In such circumstances, the district of location's CSE must review the request for services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]). The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]).

Thus, under State law an eligible New York State resident student may be voluntarily enrolled by a parent in a nonpublic school, but at the same time the student is also enrolled in the public school district for the purpose of receiving special education programming under Education Law § 3602-c, services for which a public school district may be held accountable through an impartial hearing.

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184-85 [2d Cir. 2012]).

When a student with a disability is enrolled in a non-public school, New York State Education Law Section 3602-c, the dual enrollment statute, applies. Section 3602-c (2) mirrors the Federal requirement of provision of educational services to students with disabilities at public and private schools into state law. Under section 3602-c (2)(b)(1), the committee on special education must make special education programs and services available to students with disabilities attending non-public schools located within the school district, on an equitable basis, as compared to those provided to students with disabilities attending public schools within the district. Upon request of the parent, a committee on special education must develop an IESP for the student based on the student’s individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an individualized education program. Section 3602-c (2)(c) provides for due process complaints relating to compliance of the school district with child find and evaluation requirements.

State guidance explains that providing services on an "equitable basis" means that "special education services are provided to parentally placed nonpublic school students with disabilities in the same manner as compared to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007 – Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c,", VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007], available at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/publications/policy/nonpublic907.pdf). The guidance document further provides that "parentally placed nonpublic students must be provided services based on need and the same range of services provided by the district of location to its public school students must be made available to nonpublic students, taking into account the student's placement in the nonpublic school program" (id.).

The district "'need not make FAPE available'" to a student who has been parentally placed in a private school in the district of location and who has been evaluated and provided with an IESP by the district of location.

While the statutory scheme of Education Law section 3602-c places the responsibility of selecting and placing the student in a nonpublic school on the parent, the implementation of the services called for by a student's IESP falls on the district insofar as "boards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]). See, Application of Student with a Disability, SRO Appeal

16-008.

The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district.

Id.

Additionally, unlike the provisions of the IDEA, section 3602-c provides that a parent may seek review of the recommendation of the CSE pursuant to the impartial hearing and State-level review procedures pursuant to Education Law § 4404. Id. Except for in circumstances not applicable here, the burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184-85 [2d Cir.

2012]; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,

2010]).

While it may very well be permissible for a district to include the parent in the identification of a particular provider, especially if the parent is willing and able to do so, it does not follow that the responsibility to redress a parents' inability to locate a provider is shifted permanently to the parent. See, Application of Student with a Disability, SRO Appeal 17-034.

In this matter the DOE presents no evidence defending against the allegations contained in the DPC.

Evidence supports continuing Student services, as already being delivered, as indicated in the IESP. (Ex B)

The DOE does not offer any evidence to contest the Student need for the sought after services.

The DOE presents no evidence that it endeavored to locate a provider for the mandated services.

In this case, at no point during the impartial hearing did the District offer any evidence that it attempted to select or assigned a service provider to deliver the services required by the student's IESP during the 2021-2022 school year.

DOE was aware of the particular issue, since at least the time of the Ten Day Notice, back in February of 2022. (Ex C)

The district does not challenge that the parent is authorized to select a provider of her choosing.

The district does not explain why it did not simply schedule the mandated services as envisioned under the IESP and, in essence, inform the parent where and when the SETSS would be available, and at which time the parent would have the responsibility to produce the student in order to receive the services.

A district cannot be absolved of its statutory obligation to implement services for the student simply by being inactive in implementing the mandated services. The district had the obligation to provide services to the student in conformity with her IEP, or IESP (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a], [b][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1401[9][D]; 34 CFR 300.17[d]; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d]; 34 CFR 300.320).

I find the DOE failed to act to implement the mandated services for the Student, for the 21-22 school year.

Evidence is not presented to indicate the Parent in any way frustrated an attempt by the DOE to offer the Student a FAPE, or otherwise deliver the recommended Student services.

I find the evidence outlined above supports the necessity of the sought after Student services via District funding.

RATE of SETSS Services

Many similar cases have grown into what have been referred to as “enhanced rate cases”.

Before enhanced rate relief, such as sought in this case., may be considered, it must be determined whether the district denied the student section 3602-c services by failing to furnish the student with the services mandated in the relative IESP.

I note that while the cases refer to “enhanced rate” many times, as in this case, only one rate is presented.

While the statutory scheme of Education Law section 3602-c places the responsibility of selecting and placing the student in a nonpublic school on the parent, the implementation of the services called for by a student's IESP falls on the district insofar as "[b]oards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]).

While it may very well be permissible for a district to include the parent in the identification of a particular provider, especially if the parent is willing and able to do so, it does not follow that the responsibility to redress a parents' inability to locate a provider is shifted permanently to the parent.

However, beyond determining the appropriateness of the mandated services and Student entitlement thereto, the issue of a specific rate for a third party contractor delivering services to a Student, cannot appropriately determined by this IHO. Instead it is determined via the need to deliver the special education services and an Contract obligation, if one exists.

The DOE relies upon an IHO to force payment of the independent services providers. This may be because the Commissioner of Education has made it abundantly clear, having "repeatedly held that a board of education lacks authority to provide instructional services through an independent contractor" (Appeal of Sweeney, 44 Ed Dept Rep 176, Decision No. 15,139; Appeal of Woodarek, 46 Ed Dept Rep 1, Decision No. 15,422) and this application of State law requiring that core instruction provided by a school district must be performed either by teachers who are employees of the district or pursuant to a contract for special education services that a district is specifically authorized by law to enter into has been upheld in the courts (see Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. for Second Supervisory Dist. of Erie, Chautauqua & Cattaraugus Ctys. v. Univ. of State Educ. Dep't, 40 A.D.3d 1349, 1350 [3d Dep't 2007] [noting that the relevant provisions of the Education Law did not provide for instruction by employees of for-profit corporations such as Kelly Services Inc.]; see also Averback v. Bd. of Educ. of New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., New Paltz, 147 A.D.2d 152, 154 [3d Dep't 1989] [explaining that "[a]bsent a 'plain and clear' prohibition in statute or decisional law, boards of education are empowered to agree to terms of employment" of a teacher] [emphasis added]).

Additionally, in a July 29, 2009, guidance document, the State also clarified that a school district does not have the authority "to provide core instructional services through contracts with nonprofit and other entities" ("Clarifying Information [R]elated to Contracts for Instruction," Office of Special Educ. Mem. [July 2009], available at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/resources/ contractsforinstruction/documents/ contractsforinstruction2009.pdf). In response to several questions from the field, the State issued further guidance ("Q and A related to Contracts for Instruction" Office of Special Educ. Mem. [June 2010], available at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/ resources/contractsforinstruction/documents/ contractsforinstruction2010covermemo.pdf).

The State explained the statutory instances in which school districts were authorized to contract for the instruction of students including Education Law § 305(33) (for supplemental educational services, which section has since been repealed); Education Law § 3202(6) (students that are hospitalized or institutionalized); Education Law §3602-e (approved prekindergarten programs); Education Law §§4401(2) and 4402(2)(b) (special education services with other school districts, BOCES, State-operated and State-supported schools, approved private schools and the State University at Binghamton which are approved by the Commissioner of Education); Education Law § 4401(2)(n) (transition services for students with disabilities in programs such as vocational training programs approved by certain state agencies) (id.).

Moreover, the district is required by State law to locate and assign the student's publicly-provided teachers for a dually enrolled student (Educ Law § 3602- c[2][a]).

This appears to be a case where the district's initial failure to provide Student services has compelled a parent to engage in self-help and undertake the untenable task of relying upon available local agencies, and their rates imposed for services mandated by the IESP. This de facto delegation from the district to the parent of the obligation to find a SETSS provider to implement the IESP at an acceptable rate is manifestly unreasonable because it is the district's nondelegable responsibility to ensure that services are delivered, whether in accordance with an IESP, an IEP, or pursuant to the stay put rule, and cost is not a permissible reason to defer or avoid the obligation to implement a student's services (see Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]; [7][a]-[b] [providing that "[b]oards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts" and that the cost for services is recoverable from the district of residence, either directly with the consent of the parent for a district of location to share information or through the Commissioner of Education and the State Comptroller]).

Parents are required to cooperate with the provision of services by producing a child for services properly arranged for by the district, if so requested.

While districts cannot deliver special education services called for by their educational programming in an unauthorized manner, due at least in part to the requirements that school officials and employees remain accountable under the statutory and regulatory mechanisms put in place by state and federal authorities, districts can be made to pay for a privately obtained parental placement, a process that is essentially the same as the federal process under IDEA. "Parents who are dissatisfied with their child's education can unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings and can, for example, pay for private services, including private schooling. They do so, however, at their own financial risk. They can obtain retroactive reimbursement from the school district after the [IESP] dispute is resolved, if they satisfy a threepart test that has come to be known as the Burlington-Carter test" (Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 526 [2d Cir. 2020] [internal quotations and citations omitted], cert. denied sub nom., Paulino v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 2021 WL 78218 [U.S. Jan. 11, 2021], reh'g denied sub nom., De Paulino v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 2021 WL 850719 [U.S. Mar. 8, 2021]; see Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 [1993] ["Parents' failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement."]). Thus, as a practical matter this kind of dispute can really only be effectively examined using a Burlington/Carter unilateral placement framework because the administrative due process system was not designed to set rate-making policies for what has grown into a completely unregulated cottage industry of independent special education teachers that parents within the New York City Department of Education are increasingly reliant upon, an industry that is not authorized by the State in the first place.

The attempts that do not use a Burlington/Carter analysis have led to reliance upon an IHO to determine a rate for services by contracting via Ordering a relationship between the DOE and a provider which is not an appropriate exercise of the authority of an IHO.

It therefore seems reasonable that a request for SETSS funding must be assessed under this framework; namely, having found that the district failed to provide appropriate equitable services, the issue is whether the Student services delivered to the student by an Agency, constituted an appropriate unilateral placement of the student such that the cost of the Student services are reimbursable to the parent or, alternatively, should be directly paid by the district to the provider upon proof that the parent has paid for the services or is legally obligated to pay but does not have adequate funds to do so.

The question of rate, and appropriateness, is not directly addressed under what may be considered a normal market rate. The cost of the SETSS, under the Burlington-Carter test, must be fully reimbursed or directly funded by the district unless, as a matter of equitable considerations, the costs sought to be reimbursed are excessive or otherwise should be reduced or, in the case of direct funding, the parent has not demonstrated a legal obligation to pay the costs and an inability to do so.

In this instance, Parent presents uncontested evidence that a service agency has been retained, and seeks funding. (Ex A & C)

However, similar to the situation in Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 20-087 and Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 20-115, because the parent has not actually paid any money for which she must be reimbursed, this matter is in a subset of more complicated cases in which the financial injury to the parent and the appropriate remedy are less clear.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a direct payment remedy is an appropriate form of relief in some circumstances, and that "[i]ndeed, where the equities call for it, direct payment fits comfortably within the Burlington–Carter framework" (E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 453 [2d Cir. 2014]; see also Mr. and Mrs. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 430 [S.D.N.Y. 2011] [finding it appropriate to order a school district to make retroactive tuition payment directly to a private school where equitable considerations favor an award of the costs of private school tuition but the parents, although legally obligated to make tuition payments, have not done so due to a lack of financial resources]).

In this case no Parent obligation is directly evidenced.

I find that the Student is indeed entitled to the sought after services for the 21-22.

As no specific rate has been presented I find the Parent entitled to retain services at prevailing market rate, via DOE funding.

COMPENSATORY SERVICES

Compensatory education is an equitable remedy that is tailored to meet the unique circumstances of each case (Wenger v. Canastota, 979 F. Supp. 147 [N.D.N.Y. 1997]). In New York State, a student who is otherwise eligible as a student with a disability, may continue to obtain services under the IDEA until he or she receives either a local or Regents high school diploma (34 CFR 300.102[a][3][i]; 8 NYCRR 100.5[b][7][iii]; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 05-084; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 05-037), or until the conclusion of the ten-month school year in which he or she turns age 21 (Educ. Law §§ 3202[1], 4401[1], 4402[5][b]; 8 NYCRR 100.9[e], 200.1[zz]; see 34 CFR 300.102[a][1], [a][3][ii]; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-100).

The nature and extent of compensatory education services that courts have recognized varies according to the facts and circumstances of a given case; however, as a remedy that arises out of the equitable jurisdiction of 20 U.S.C. §1415, courts will craft compensatory education relief that “should aim to place disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district's violations of IDEA.” Reid, 401 F.3d, at 516; Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008)(same); see, e.g., G. ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Compensatory education involves discretionary, prospective, injunctive relief crafted by a court to remedy what might be termed an educational deficit created by an educational agency's failure over a given period of time to provide a FAPE to a student.”); see also Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1994)(Noting that “it may be a rare case when compensatory education is not appropriate” to remedy an IDEA violation.).

In determining a compensatory award, most courts seek to ascertain the child’s needs at the time the relief is sought.10 Reid, 401 F.3d 516; see, e.g., Streck, 2010 WL 4847481, at *2 (Court awarded compensatory education relief that required the school district to “open and maintain for 3 years, an escrow account,” which will be used to pay for student’s reading instruction at Landmark College and assistive technology supports.); Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 Fed. Appx. 968, 2012 WL 2612776, at *978-79 (6th Cir. July 5, 2012) (upholding IHO award of 768 hours of compensatory tutoring as “reasonable recover” for a lengthy denial of FAPE; given the student’s age, the “window of opportunity to become usefully literate ha[d] begun to close.”).

If Student is found to be entitled to compensatory education under applicable law; compensatory education is an equitable remedy that arises out of the jurisdiction of 20 U.S.C. § 1415; equitable factors do not bar relief here and no inequitable conduct was established on the part of the parents. N.R. ex rel. T.R. v. Dep’t of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City, No. 07 Cv. 9648 (BSJ), 2009 WL 874061 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (Reversing the SRO and upholding the award; Court found that it is well established that, in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the parents failed to cooperate with the CSE, or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, equitable considerations generally support a claim for tuition.); Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 21 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)( the equities—requires a balancing of both parties’ conduct and interest—not merely the actions of the parent).

There are no facts established here that show that the parent failed to cooperate or acted inequitably to interfere with the DOE’s ability to facilitate the recommended Student services, for the 21-22 school year.

Parent attempted to engage the DOE via letter, to no avail. (Ex C)

In this case the District has not established any effort to effectuate Student services.

If there are indeed undelivered Student services, to which the Student is entitled, that have not been delivered, the District is obligated to allow the Student to recoup these services, as Ordered below.

ORDER

• • The Department of Education failed facilitate the required, mandated, Student services, for the Student, for the 21-22 School Year.
• • The DOE shall fund Student services, for the 21-22 school year, commencing 02/16/2022, as follows:
• • Special Education Teacher Support Services (SETSS), Direct Service, Group Service, English, 3 periods per week, at prevailing market rate.
• • The DOE shall fund compensatory services for the Student, to be utilized by 12/31/2022, for any missed 21-22 SETSS sessions, to which the Student is entitled.
• • This decision is subject to appeal and review by the State Review Officer.

DATED: JUNE 16, 2022

DANIEL AJELLO

DANIEL AJELLO

Impartial Hearing Officer

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public-School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.

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