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Special Education Law
DECISIONMixed ResultIHO Case No. 223116

New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.

CASE NUMBER: 568053 - NYC: 223116

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

Student’s Name: REDACTED (“Student”)

Date of Birth: REDACTED

District: New York City Department of Education (“DOE” or the “District”)

Hearing Requested by: REDACTED, of the Law Offices of REDACTED, on behalf of REDACTED and REDACTED (the “Parents”) and the Student

Record Close Date: May 17, 2022

Hearing Officer: Randy Glasser, Esq.

On December 23, 2021, REDACTED, of Law Offices of REDACTED, filed a due process complaint (“DPC”) on behalf of the Parents and their child, the Student, regarding his special education program and services for the 2021/2022 school year, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”) (Parent Ex. “A”). This Hearing Officer was appointed as the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) on December 27, 2021, after the appointment of the previous Hearing Officer for this case was rescinded. A prehearing conference (“PHC”) was held on January 24, 2021, and a Hearing went forward on March 1, 2022. No one appeared for the District, while the Parents and Student were represented by REDACTED

At the prehearing conference there were two documents this IHO asked the District to produce that were marked for identification, DOE Ex. “1” – “2”. However, since no one appeared for the District at the Hearing, these documents were not entered into evidence. The Parents submitted into evidence Exhibits “A” through “K”.

Instead of appearing at the hearing, this IHO received an email from District Representative, REDACTED, stating that she could not appear because she was at another hearing and requesting that the parties be permitted to submit written closing statements (IHO Ex. “I”). Accordingly, at the Hearing this IHO directed the parties to submit written closings by midnight on March 29, 2022, to which the Parents’ counsel agreed (Tr. 116). However, after only receiving the Parent’s written closing and not the District’s by March 29, 2022, this IHO emailed the District on March 30, 2022, who requested an adjournment, which was denied (IHO Ex. “IV). Thereafter, the District sent the following email:

The Department of Education respectfully requests that if the hearing officer decides to award either tuition reimbursement or direct payment to the Parent for [the School] for the 2021-2022 school year for [the Student], that the amount awarded be reduced to reflect the portion of the instructional day that is devoted to religious studies.  There is Religious Instruction is from Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 10:15 a.m. (Parent’s Exhibit E).

(Id.).

Lists of the appearances and documentary evidence submitted in this proceeding are appended to this Decision. The compliance date for this matter was extended to May 22, 2022 (IHO Ex. “V”).

BACKGROUND AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Student is REDACTED years old, classified as a student with REDACTED, diagnosed with dyslexia and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and struggles with decoding, task maintenance and impulsivity and “when upset, or presented with at ask that he perceives to beyond his capabilities he tends to become noncompliant and verbally aggressive. [The Student’s] low mental energy and language processing difficulties keep him from completing his tasks and sustaining energy for a prolonged period of item [the Student] requires the support of a small classroom setting. Parent explained he has difficulty with decoding and blending new words while reading. Spelling and handwriting are below grade level” (Parent Ex. “K”, Tr. 100-101).

The Student’s Individualized Education Program (“IEP”), dated June 9, 2021, for the 2021/2022 school year recommends the following ten (10) month special education program and services: Special 12:1+1 Class for English Language Arts (“ELA”) eight (8) times per week, one (1) period per session, for Math, eight (8) times per week, one (1) period per session, Social Studies five (5) times per week, one (1) period per session, and Sciences five (5) times per week, one (1) period per session, along with individual counseling services, one (1) time per week, thirty (30) minutes per session, counseling in a group (of unspecified size), one (1) time per week, thirty (30) minutes per session, individual occupational therapy two (2) times per week, thirty (30) minutes per session, individual physical therapy two (2) times per week, thirty (30) minutes per session, and individual speech language therapy two (2) times per week, thirty (30) minutes per session (Parent Ex. “K” at pp. 13-14).

The Parents unilaterally placed the Student at REDACTED (the “School”) for the 2021/2022 school year, for which they are now seeking in part tuition reimbursement, and transportation from the Student’s home to the School, if not already provided (Parent Ex. “A”). The Parents also seek attorneys’ fees. However, at the prehearing conference, Parents’ counsel agreed to the fact that this IHO does not have the authority to order attorneys’ fees (Tr. 15).

The Student’s eligibility and classification are not at issue in this case.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

A. Introduction: The IDEA provides that children with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A)). A FAPE consists of specialized education and related services designed to meet a student’s unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensively written IEP (Id., 20 U.S.C. §1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17). A school district has offered a student a FAPE when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP is developed through, the IDEA's procedures, and is (c) reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). In order to meet its substantive FAPE obligations, a district must offer a student an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).

Decisions of impartial hearing officers must be on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(i)), except:

In matters alleging a procedural violation, an impartial hearing officer may find that a student did not receive a free appropriate public education only if the procedural inadequacies impeded the student’s right to a free appropriate public education, significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parent’s child, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to preclude an impartial hearing officer from ordering a school district to comply with procedural requirements under this Part and Part 201 of this Title 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii).

Id. (Emphasis added.)

School districts have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in IDEA due process hearings, except that a parent or person in parental relationship seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement has the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement (NYS Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c)).

  • • The IDEA empowers a hearing officer to grant the relief he/she deems appropriate. 34 CFR §300.516(c)(3). One such remedy is reimbursement of tuition and related expenses. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, (1985). Notably, the mere fact that the state educational agency and/or LEA has not approved the private school placement does not bar the parents from reimbursement. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, supra.

The Parents presented three (3) witnesses on their direct case; REDACTED, Ed.D., Director of the School, REDACTED, the Student’s Special Education Teacher at the School, and the Parent.

Dr. REDACTED, the Director of the School for the past forty (40) years (Tr. 44), (“School’s Director”), testified in relevant part regarding the program at the School, e.g., it’s a center based program for students with learning issues, and its instructional methodology (Tr. 45), how he knows the Student, where his program is located, number of students in his class, the School, number of staff members, and this is the Student’s fourth year at the School (there are between and fifteen (15) and twenty (20) staff members for twenty students) (Tr. 46, 47, 48), the Student’s schedule at the School (Tr. 49-52, Parent Ex. “E”), the Student’s Individualized Education Plan at the School and who developed it (Tr. 52 -53), the Student’s Behavioral Objectives, who developed these, that their purpose is so that the Student could make progress academically and behaviorally, the behavioral issues being addressed (Tr. 53-54; Parent Ex. “F”), the counseling, speech language and occupational therapy the Student receives, certifications of his providers and the goals that are addressed (Tr. 54-57), the Contract signed by the Parent with the School, the Parents have not paid any amount towards the Student’s tuition at the School for the 2021/2022 school year, which is FIFTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS ($56,800.00) (Tr. 58-60; Parent Ex. “H” and “I”), the Student has been attending the School regularly since the beginning of the 2021/2022 school year, that the School is appropriate for the Student and why, e.g., the Student has made “wonderful progress” over the past school year, academically, socially, behaviorally, in reading and decoding (Tr. 60), mainstreaming opportunities for the Student during lunch, recess and school-wide activities (Tr. 61-62), and what the Student is working on in occupational therapy (Tr. 62-63).

REDACTED, the Student’s special education teacher at the School since September 2021, testified in relevant part that the Student is in her class for the 2021/2022 school year with other seventh and eighth grade students (Tr. 72-73, 81), the Student’s reading deficiencies when he started in her class (Tr. 74-75), the reading goals she developed for the Student (Tr. 75), the progress she has seen in his ability to read and speed (Tr. 76), the writing deficiencies he exhibited at the beginning of the school year (Tr. 76-77), the goals she developed to address his areas of need (77), and the improvement she has seen in his writing since the beginning of the school year (Tr. 78), the Student’s deficiencies in math at the beginning of the school year (Tr. 78-79), his improvements in math during the school year e.g., speed (Tr. 79-80), the Individualized Education Plan she developed for the Student for the 2021/2022 school year, which includes the goals she worked on during the school year, and the progress he made on these goals, including but not limited to the goals he had mastered at that time (Tr. 80, 91-97; Parent Ex. “D”), the Student’s behavioral and social difficulties he exhibited in the class at the beginning of the school year (Tr. 81-82), strategies she implemented to address these areas of need (Tr. 82-83), improvements she has seen in his behavior and socially (Tr. 84-85), the Student needs a small class, such as hers, with six students, and why a larger class, such as a 12:1+1 is not appropriate for him (Tr. 85-86, 86-87), and the Student has shown significant growth in reading as evidenced by the fact that he moved up more than one grade level on the Woodcock Johnson testing she administered, between the end of the last school year and mid-January 2022 (Tr. 89-90).

The Parent testified in relevant part about the Student’s deficiencies, and disabilities, academically, socially, and emotionally (Tr. 100), her participation in a CSE meeting for the Student June 9, 2021 (Tr. 101-103), no one from the School participated in the meeting (Tr.104). where the CSE generally went over the goals from last year (Tr. 104-105), the team did not review any behaviorally strategies or discuss a functional behavioral assessment or behavior intervention plan for the Student (Tr. 106-107), the CSE spoke briefly about the appropriateness of the 12:1+1 class recommended for the Student, that at first she said she was “open” to check out the recommended 12:1+1 class but after speaking to her husband and the Student’s teachers she changed her mind (Tr. 107), she tried to check out or tour the recommended placement but when she contacted the school they stated that that do not have any tours or anyone who can guide the Parent around (Tr. 108), she decided to send the Student to the School in summer of 2021 and why (Tr. 119-110), she sent notice of her intention to place the Student at the School for the 2021/2022 school year to the District (Tr. 109; Parent Ex. “B”), she signed a contract with the School for the 2021/2022 school year which obligated her to pay for the Student’s tuition and that to date she has not paid any of the amount due, because she is unable to pay the tuition (Tr. 109-110), she currently makes $REDACTED as a part-time REDACTED, and that her husband, who is a REDACTED, has been REDACTED since last year when he REDACTED and is therefore REDACTED (Tr. 110-112), they do not have any other assets or property other than what is reflected in the 1040 for 2020 (Tr. 111-112), and the progress she has seen in the Student e.g., behaviorally, and in reading, at the School since the beginning of the 2021/2022 school year (Tr. 112-114).

Since the District did not appear, there were no witnesses presented on its direct case or rebuttal witnesses.

B. Tuition Reimbursement: A board of education may be required to pay for educational services obtained for a child by the child's parent, (1) if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, (2) the services selected by the parent were appropriate, and (3) equitable considerations support the parent's claim (Burlington Sch. Comm v. Mass. Dep’t. of Educ., supra; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four et al. v. Carter, supra; see also Frank G. and Dianne G. v. Board of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006), cert denied, Board of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Frank G., 2007 WL 2982269 (2007). Accordingly, the above-stated three (3) prong analysis (the “Burlington/Carter Criteria”) is applied to determine whether the board of education is required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents. Id.

The inquiry made pursuant to the first prong, may go beyond the appropriateness of the student’s IEP and/or placement and encompass other FAPE claims (see 20 USC §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. §300.148(a) and (c); Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); P.C. Oceanside Union Free Sch. Dist., 818 F. Supp. 2d 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Mr. N.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 300 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2009). To determine whether the school district made FAPE available to the student in a timely matter, Rowley’s two-part test, as modified by Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., RE-1, supra, for appropriateness should be applied. Specifically, the hearing officer must determine whether the school district complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA and whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make appropriate progress in light of her circumstances. Id. “An appropriate educational program therefore begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student’s needs, establishes annual goals related to those needs, and provides for the use of appropriate special education services.” (See Application of the Dept. of Educ., Appeal No. 07-018 (2007)). Thus, the annual goals and short-term objectives should be consistent with, and relate to, the identified needs and abilities of the student. See Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 14-078 (2015) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II); 34 CFR § 300.320(a)(2)(i); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)).

While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with a checklist of procedures for developing a student’s IEP, the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA. See A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student’s right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits to the student (20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(d)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. §300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §200.5(j)(4)(ii)).

In the instant case, the DOE failed to put on a direct case, present rebuttal testimony, submit a written closing statement, or even appear at the hearing (see infra). As aforementioned, the DOE has the statutory burden of persuasion and production in this case, to show that the program and services offered by the DOE pursuant to the Student’s IEPs were adequate or appropriate in order to satisfy Prong I of the Burlington/Carter Criteria. Accordingly, the District failed to proffer sufficient documentary or any testimonial evidence or otherwise prove that it had offered the Student a FAPE for the 2021/2022 school year, e.g., whether it offered a program that “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).

The Parents presented credible testimony and evidence proving the District’s recommended program, including but not limited to the 12:1+1 class is not appropriate for the Student, in that it does not address his needs (Tr. 85-87, 107).

As aforementioned, the District failed to put on a direct case or present rebuttal testimony. Consequently, since the hearing record is devoid of any persuasive evidence, arguments or statutory authority proffered by the District, which can adequately support a contention or otherwise negate the Parents’ allegations, it is this IHO’s finding, as discussed more fully infra that the District both procedurally and substantively denied the Student a FAPE, for the 2021/2022 school year.

Due to the DOE’s failure to satisfy the first prong of the Burlington/Carter criteria, the burden shifts to the Parents to prove that the unilateral placement was appropriate or proper. Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 369 and 370; see also Florence County Sch. Dist. Four et al. v. Carter, 510 U.S. at 15. In order to meet this burden, the Parents must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the unilateral placement provides “educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the student” (Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d. Cir. 2007)). In this regard, the court in Gagliardo explained:

No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents' unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.

Id. at 112 (quoting, Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).

However, the private school placement “need not meet the IDEA’s definition of a free and appropriate public education” or “state education standards or requirements” (Frank G. v. Board of Educ., at 364). Moreover, the private placement need not provide certified special education teachers or an IEP. Parental placements are not subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school district placement. The private school placement must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits, and must be likely to produce progress, not regression. Id.

In the instant case, the testimony and documentary evidence overwhelmingly support the Parent’s claim that the Student’s placement at the School provides him with educational instruction that is specifically designed to meet his unique special education needs, supported by such services that are necessary to permit him to benefit from instruction and established that the Student has, in fact, made meaningful progress at the School. In this regard the Student’s teacher testified how the School identified and addressed the Student’s needs in the areas of reading, writing, math, and behaviorally and the Student’s progress in these areas during the school year (e.g., reading at Tr. 74-75, 76, 89-90, writing at Tr. 76-77, math at Tr. 78-80, behaviorally and socially at Tr. 81-83), and the progress on his IEP goals (Tr. 91-97); while both the School’s Director (Tr. 60), and the Parent testified regarding his progress (Tr. 112-114). is providing is pro The determination of whether, or not equitable factors support a parent’s claim for tuition reimbursement hinges, in large part, on whether, the parent cooperated with the CSE. In the instant matter, the DOE failed to provide any evidence and/or raise any equitable factors, which would preclude or limit tuition reimbursement for the Parent’s unilateral placement of the Student at the School for the 2021/2022 school year. In addition, the Parent tried to speak with someone and/or tour the Student’s recommended placement, but the school stated that that do not have any tours or anyone who can guide the Parent around (Tr. 108), and even though the Parent provided a ten-day notice of her intention to place the Student at the School, there is no evidence that she received a reply from the District (Tr. 109, Parent Ex. “B”).

Based on the foregoing, this IHO finds that the Parents have satisfied the third prong of the Burlington/Carter Criteria for tuition reimbursement. Having met all three (3) of the Burlington/Carter Criteria, the Parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the Student’s tuition at the School for the 2021/2022 school year. The record in this case establishes that the Student’s total annual tuition at the School for the 2021/2022 school year is FIFTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS ($56,800.00), and the Parents have paid none of this amount due (see: Parent Ex. “H” and “I”, Tr. 58-60, 109-110).

However, the Parents appear to maintain it is a financial hardship to fund her child’s tuition at the School because the family’s total annual household income for 2020 was REDACTED ($REDACTED), and that they do not have any other property or assets (Parent Ex. “J”; Tr. 111-112). The Student’s father, who is a REDACTED has been REDACTED since he REDACTED last year and the mother currently earns $REDACTED a year, as a REDACTED (Tr. 111-112).

Based upon the total household income, the Parents have shown that it, would be a financial hardship for them to fund the Student’s aforementioned tuition at the School for the 2021/2022 school year, totaling FIFTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS ($56,800.00), and is therefore requesting the DOE be ordered to pay such tuition directly to the School (Parent Ex. “A”).

As explained by the Court in Mr. & Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 769 F. Supp 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2011):

Within this Circuit, a number of courts have stated or suggested in dicta that a direct tuition remedy is available where parents have presented a meritorious Burlington claim but lack the financial means to pay private school tuition out-of-pocket. For example, in Connors v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), plaintiff sought prospective payment of tuition costs at a non-approved private school, where the school district had conceded that it could not provide a FAPE to her child. Connors, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 797, 799. The school district contended that IDEA does not authorize prospective direct payment of private school tuition, and that plaintiff was required "to front the costs of unilateral and thereafter to request due process review in order to obtain reimbursement for same." Id. at 800. The court concluded that the school district could be required, under § 1415, "to pay the tuition directly" to the private school:

once the Burlington prerequisites relative to a nonapproved private school are met, and a parent show that his or her financial circumstances eliminate the opportunity for unilateral placement in the non-approved school, the public school must pay the cost of private placement immediately. Id. at 805-06.

Id. at 425.

Moreover, under 20 U.S.C. §1415((i)(2)(C)(iii) direct retroactive payment is an appropriate remedy in proceedings under IDEA (see: Mr. and Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v New York City Dept. of Educ., supra at 428, in which the court held "[W]here a private school is willing to enroll the student and take the risk that the parents will not be able to pay tuition costs or will take years to do so parents who satisfy the Burlington factors have a right to retroactive direct tuition payment relief." Id.

Since the Parents have presented a “meritorious Burlington claim but lack the financial means to pay the School’s tuition out-of-pocket”, the direct payment to the School of the Student’s tuition for the 2021/2022 school year, is an appropriate remedy in this case (see: Connors v. Mills, 34 F.Supp.2d 795 at 805-806, 132 Ed. Law Rep. 767 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), Mr. & Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., supra).

However, pursuant to the Student’s schedule and Dr. REDACTED’s testimony the Student receives religious instruction every day for one hour and fifteen minutes or 1.25 hours per day, or 6.25 hours per week, which is 18.9% of the thirty-three (33) hours of instruction he receives a week at the School (see: Infra; Parent Ex. “E”). Accordingly, the Parents are entitled to the District funding 81.1% of the Student’s tuition which equals $46,064.80 (81.1% of $56,800.00), representing the non-religious portion of the Student’s tuition for the 2021/2022 school year.

G. Transportation: As aforementioned the Parents request that a determination be made by this IHO that the District is obligated to provide transportation to the School (Parent Ex. “A”). As explained by the SRO in App. No. 18-115 (2018), citing relevant case law:

... under a more traditional application of the Burlington/Carter framework for tuition reimbursement, an order for tuition reimbursement may very likely have included the costs of the transportation sought by the parent (see Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1528 [9th Cir 1994) (finding "that the language and spirit of the IDEA encompass reimbursement for reasonable transportation and lodging expenses... as related services"); see also N.E. Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Sobol, 79 N.Y.2d 598, 608 (1992) [finding that, since a FAPE included related services such as transportation, an order of reimbursement for transportation was an appropriate remedy for a denial of a FAPE)).

Id.

Accordingly, this IHO’s decision that the Parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement, encompasses the District’s provision of reasonable transportation for the Student to the School for the 2021/2022 school year.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than thirty (30) days after this Decision, the DOE shall pay directly to the School the total amount of FORTY SIX THOUSAND SIXTY FOUR DOLLARS AND EIGHTY CENTS ($46,064.80), representing the Student’s total tuition (less 18.9%, which is the portion attributable to the nonsecular portion of the Student’s tuition) for the School for the 2021/2022 school year; and AND IT IS FURTHER ORDRED that the District is obligated to provide the Student with roundtrip transportation between his home and the School for the 2021/2022 school year.

May 17, 2022

Randy Glasser

Randy Glasser, Esq.

Impartial Hearing Officer

NAMES AND TITLES OF APPEARANCES FOR HEARING HELD ON

MARCH 1, 2022

DOE

None

PARENTS

REDACTED, Esq., REDACTED

REDACTED, Parent

REDACTED, Special Education Teacher

Dr. REDACTED, Head of School

DOCUMENTS ENTERED INTO THE RECORD

IHO Exhibits

  • • Email, 2/24/22, 1 page
  • • Email, 3/1/22, 1 page
  • • Email, 3/1/22, 1 page
  • • Email, 3/30/22, 3 pages
  • • Order of Extension, 3/22/2022, 1 page
  • • DOE Exhibits
  • • None
  • • Parent’s Exhibits
  • • Due Process Complaint, 12/23/21, 6 pages
  • • Ten-day Notice, 8/9/21, 2 pages
  • • The School’s Program Description, undated, 6 pages
  • • The School’s Individualized Education Program, 11/2021, 6 pages
  • • Schedule of Classes, 2021-2022 School Year, 1 page
  • • Behavioral Objectives, 11/24/21, 1 page
  • • Teacher’s Report, 6/3/21, 2 pages
  • • The School’s Tuition Contract, 9/1/21, 1 page
  • • The School’s Tuition Affidavit, 9/23/21, 1 page
  • • Parents’ Form 1040, 2020, 2 pages
  • • IEP, 6/9/21, 19 pages

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.