New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DOE DEFAULT & INQUEST

Case Number: 190296

NYS Identifier Number N/A Student's Name: [“Confidential”]

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 12/12/19

Actual Record Close Date: 05/11/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Title For Date DOE Representative DOE 12/12/19 Attorney PARENT 12/12/19

Father PARENT 12/1219

Director - Private School PARENT 12/12/19

On October 24, 2019, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 and of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, concerning a dispute between the Parent ofa(_) year old student attending a private school and the New York City - Department of Education (“DOE”) - District: |, regarding the student's special education program.

After having adjournments granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on December 12, 2019. A list of the persons who appeared at the hearing and the documents entered into evidence is annexed hereto.

BACKGROUND

This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint (“DPC”) filed by the student’s Parent’s attorney(s), and received at the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (“DOE-IHO”) on or about October 22, 2019. The DPC is carried under New York City (“NYC”) Case No. 190296. Therein, the Parent alleges that the DOE has failed to provide the student with a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2019-2020 school year. At the impartial hearing, the Parent seeks the following relief: (a) Reimbursement of tuition for the private school from September 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020 including reimbursement of monies paid to date and any payments made in the future, including tuition, additional tuition costs of , combined activity/accident insurance/parent’s association dues fee, and bookstore fees; and (b) |The Parent requests that all funds awarded be paid to the Escrow Account, , Esq., escrow agent; and (c) Cost of evaluations; and (d) Costs and fees; and (e) Any additional such relief as the IHO determines is appropriate.

THE DOE’S CASE

The DOE did not call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, did not submit any documents in evidence and did not file an answer in this case. (T-5-8) The DOE did not defend “FAPE”, did not challenge the presumption in the law that the Parent has cooperated with the agency and did not object to the Parents’ documents being received in evidence. (T-11) The testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the DOE’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

THE PARENT’S CASE

The Parents called (2) witnesses to testify on her behalf, one who testified on direct testimony via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5/j][3][xii][f]. (P-l) The DOE did not cross examine the Parent's affiant. (T-10-1) The Parent also submitted (9) documents in evidence that the DOE did not object to the Parent’s documents being received in evidence. (T-11) The testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the Parent’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DEFAULT & INQUEST

IDEA ensures that students with disabilities are afforded a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1400 & Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528 [2005]) A FAPE includes special education and related services designed to meet the student's unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written IEP. (20 U.S.C. 1401(8) & 141(d) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.13) The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. (Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537)

The DOE may be required to reimburse Parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the parent’s claim. (Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dept.

of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2"° Cir. 2005])

The first step is to determine whether the DOE offered to provide the student a FAPE. (Mrs. C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 66 [2° Cir. 2000]) A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with procedural requirements set forth in IDEA and (b) the IEP developed by the CSE through the procedures set forth in IDEA, is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (Bd. Of Educ. V. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-7 [1982]) The student’s recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b), 8 NYCRR §200.6(a)[1])

The Parent bears the burden of showing that the private school placement selected is appropriate. (SRO Nos.: 95-57, 94-29 & 93-34) The Parents must show that the private school placement offers an educational program that meets the student’s special education needs. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 & SRO No. 94-20) The private school need not be approved by the state educational agency to provide instruction to children with disabilities. (Florence County School District Four et. al. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]). It is also not required that the private school employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (SRO No. 94-20)

Finally, the IHO must consider whether equitable considerations favor the Parents’ request for tuition reimbursement. State Review Officer (“SRO”) Decision 06-004 holds: Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]). Such considerations "include the parties’ compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties’ positions, and like matters” (Wolfe _v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). With respect to equitable considerations, a parent may be denied tuition reimbursement upon a finding of a failure to cooperate with the CSE in the development of an IEP or if the parent's conduct precluded the CSE's ability to develop an appropriate IEP (Warren G. v. Cumberland Co. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 [3rd Cir. 1999]; see Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-102; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-026). In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a_ claim of _ tuition reimbursement. (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-049).

In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to Parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA.

(Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 at 192 [2d Cir.

2005]) “Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance” had it offered the student a FAPE. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C]ii] and 34

C.F.R. § 300.148)

The DOE failed to call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, did not submit any documents evidence, failed to file and serve an answer or file and serve a “Prior Written Notice” in this case. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(e) & T-5-8) “Prior Written Notice” means written statements developed in accordance with Section 200.5(a) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, and provided to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student.

It is noted that silence in a responsive pleading is an admission, and a counterclaim in federal practice is compulsory in the answer or deemed waived. (See New York Practice, 4°" Edition §§223 & 224, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a) & Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690 [1966])

The DOE has the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement.

(See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]) Here, the DOE did not proffer any evidence that it has offered the student a FAPE. (Supra) This amounts to a concession that the agency did not offer the student a FAPE. As previously noted, the DOE did not serve and file an answer in the case or serve the Parent with “Prior Written Notice”, which provides either a denial of the Parent's allegation, or some explanation for the agency’s failure to provide a FAPE.

(See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)[e])

It would be fundamentally unfair to allow either party to rely solely on the submission of documents in meeting its burden under law, where those documents are rife with double, triple and even unidentified hearsay sources, that cannot be cross examined. While compliance with technical rules of evidence is not required in administrative hearings, under certain circumstances, the receipt of hearsay evidence may be so prejudicial as to have a tendency to deprive a party of fair hearing. (See Strain _v. Sarafan, 57 A.D.2d 525, 393 N.Y.S.2d 572, N.Y.A.D. (1977), where the hearsay testimony was of vital importance and should have been subjected to cross-examination by the petitioner...the petitioner was deprived of a meaningful hearing,_ Dukes v. New York City Housing Authority, 63 A.D.2d 690, 404 N.Y.S.2d 889, N.Y.A.D.

(1978), holding that the excessive reliance on hearsay evidence effectively denied petitioner the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, Claim of Evans, 254 A.D.2d 564, 678 N.Y.S.2d 696, N.Y.A.D. (3 Dept. 1998), (where in an unemployment compensation proceedings, administrative law judge (‘ALJ’) properly exercised discretion to exclude hearsay evidence to protect employer's fundamental right of cross-examination, where claimant proffered written hearsay statement, authored by acquaintance of the employer’s president, which allegedly indicated that claimant did not resign but was fired, but the acquaintance failed to answer subpoena directing him to testify at hearing, thereby denying employer the opportunity to cross-examine him on the statement, and Alvarado v. State of New York, 110 A.D.2d 583, 488 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1*' Dept. 1985), holding that a license suspension hearing against a boxer and his managers was faulty because of a lack of an opportunity “to cross-examine certain witnesses whose reports were introduced into evidence without their testifying, in violation of SAPA Section 306, subd. (3).” (Id. at 585, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 179)

However, here the DOE did not present a case-in-chief and did not controvert the documentary evidence submitted by the Parent. (Supra) The credibility of the documentary evidence was not rebutted by the agency and the documentary evidence is clearly relevant and material to the issues to be determined. I find the documentary and testamentary evidence submitted by the Parent in this case to be credible.

As noted above, the DOE’s failure to present a case at the hearing is a concession that it denied the student a FAPE and that if the Parent meets her burden under Schaffer v. Weast, the Parent is entitled to the proven relief she seeks. This leaves, as the primary issue to be resolved through impartial hearing, what relief and/or compensatory education remedy, if any, is available and appropriate to remediate the denial of a FAPE. (SRO No. 17-033) It is noted that the DOE was required under the due process procedures set forth in New York State law, to address its burdens in the due process hearing context by describing its views, based on a fact-specific inquiry set forth in an evidentiary record, regarding an appropriate relief and/or compensatory education remedy that most reasonably and efficiently could place the student in the position that he would have been but for the denial of a FAPE. (See Doe v. E. Lyme Bd.

of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 457 [2d Cir. 2015], cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2022 [2016], quoting Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [noting that the "ultimate award [of compensatory education] must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place'|) When, as here, the DOE does not present any case at the hearing, the hearing, the hearing process essentially becomes an “inquest” as to the appropriate relief.

The DOE has conceded liability by failing to present a case and meet its burden under the law. New York State law has placed the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing on the school district, unlike states which align the burden of production and persuasion consistent with Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58-62 [2005]. It is not an IHO's responsibility to craft the DOE’s position regarding the primary issue in the case, for the denial of FAPE. The undersigned finds that the DOE failed to adhere to the requirements of the law, has denied the student in this case a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year and that the Parent may be entitled to the proven relief he has requested.

A gross violation of the IDEA may result from the denial of, or exclusion from, educational services for a substantial period of time. (See SRO No. 04-074, citing Mrs.

C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990), Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.

1988) and SRO No. 02-047. In Burr, exclusion from educational services for a substantial period of time was defined as “almost two years.” (See SRO No. 02-033 citing Burr “...after a severely disabled student's school was closed, prolonged delays in the administrative proceedings in obtaining a new placement resulted in a complete exclusion from any educational placement for the student for almost two years.” \|n the instant case, the student has been denied a FAPE for three consecutive school years. As such, I find that the DOE concession that is has failed to afford the student a FAPE in this case does not constitute a gross violation of FAPE under the IDEA.

I now turn to the question of whether the DOE should be required to reimburse and/or pay for the private educational services and relief requested for the student, because the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, and the relief sought and services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the Parent's claim. (Burlington, Florence and Cerra, Supra) The Parent need only demonstrate that the requested services are specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit her to benefit from the instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank.

G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).

Where sought as relief, a private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs.

(See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F.

Supp. 2d at 419) A parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14)

The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02-014 and 01-105) Parents also need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65) When determining whether the parents’ unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]])

There is no request for compensatory educational services in this case and in either case, an IHO cannot determine the amount of compensatory education that a student requires unless the record provides him with sufficient “insight about the precise types of education services the student needs to progress.” (Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad.

Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F. Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008] citing Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005]) Pertinent findings to enable an IHO to tailor the ultimate award to the student’s unique needs should include the nature and severity of the student's disability, the student’s specialized educational needs, the link between those needs and the services requested, and the student's current educational abilities. (See Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005], see also Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F.

Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008]) The Parent has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.” (See Phillips v. District of Columbia, 2010 WL 3563068, at *6, 55 IDELR 101 [D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2010] quoting Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate

Campus v. Nesbitt (“Nesbitt II”), 583 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172, 51 IDELR 125 [D.D.C. 2008])

State regulations provide in relevant part that "[t]he decision of the impartial hearing officer shall be based solely upon the record of the proceeding before the impartial hearing officer and shall set forth the reasons and the factual basis for the determination. (See 8 NYCRR 200.5{j][5][v])

Shaffer decision of the Supreme Court of the United States issued on November 14, 2005, held as follows:

“We hold no more than we must to resolve the case at hand: The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case, that party is Brian, as represented by his parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in turn bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is, therefore affirmed.” (Supra, Ill, ]2) (See_Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58-62 [2005] (emphasis added)

The party who defaults in concedes only liability and not the amount of “damages.” (See CPLR § 3215, First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Classic Collateral Corp., 44 A.D.2d 868, 355 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1974), James _v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 225 N.E.2d 741 (1967), McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) The DOE’s default constitutes an admission of liability, but not of damages, which remains the Parent's burden to prove. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 & City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 at 128 [2d Cir. 2011])

The Parent called (2) witnesses to testify on her behalf, one on direct examination via affidavit. (P-l) The DOE did not cross examine the Parent's affiant. (T11) In sum, substance and relevant part, the testimony on behalf of the Parent is as follows:

The first witness for the Parent is the Assistant to the private school’s business manager who testified via affidavit that the Parent paid $81.788.87. (P-l)

The second and final witness for the Parent testified that he has been a teacher and administrator in special education for (19) years. (T-14) He is the director of inclusion education at the private school. (T-15) The private school is a mainstream educational setting that has a support program which is referred to as and serves students that have IEPs. (T-15) An appropriate candidate for the private school is a student with language-based learning disabilities. (Id.) All of the teachers are state certified in special education with a master’s degree in an area of expertise. (T-16-7) The private school uses a computer portal called “Canvas” to track its students. (T-18)

The witness testified that the student has language-based learning disabilities with specifically dyslexia. (T-19) However, at this point the dyslexia has been broadly remediated and they do not provide remedial services for the student. (T-20) The student is in a small class setting and also has a teacher that meets with him (12) times a week. (Id.) Some of the student’s issues relate to executive functioning.

(T-24) The teacher works with the student daily to organize his materials.

(T-25) All of the student's teachers have said that he is improving, especially his teacher who said that she really sees a lot less anxiety, but all of his teachers express that the student still, needs support and seeks support daily, if not multiple times per days. (T-26) This is the student's first year at the private school. (T-27) The witness testified that the small classroom size and the one-to-one attention that the student receives in allows him to express his extensive knowledge consistently and more concisely. (T-28)

On cross examination, the witness testified that the private school works on a quarter system, with relatively short grading periods that allow for consistent feedback regarding the student efforts and his mastery and also use an online assessment for math and reading. (T-32) They do not use standardized testing. (T-33)

On re-direct examination, the witness testified that it is not necessary for the private school to use a standardized test in order to measure the student’s progress withing the academic program. (T-33) There was no re-cross examination of the witness. (Id.)

Based on the completely uncontroverted record above and the documents received in evidence, I find that the DOE did not meet its statutory obligation and denied the student a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year. I further find that the Parent is entitled to the relief she seeks as amended above. There is no basis in the record supporting a finding that the Parent has not cooperated with the agency.

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that upon its receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of services having been rendered, the DOE shall either reimburse the Parent and/or directly pay the cost of the student's tuition for the private school from September 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020 including reimbursement of monies paid to date and any payments made in the future, including tuition, additional tuition costs of , combined activity/accident insurance/parent’s association dues fee, and bookstore fees; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that the DOE shall also conduct a re-evaluation of the student in all areas of his suspected disabilities, including, but not limited to an FBA, not evaluated within the last two years, for the 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that the CSE shall forthwith reconvene after the completion of the student’s evaluations and consider all of the student's evaluations and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either agreed upon by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: May 13, 2020

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - |.H.O.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

The parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to obtain a review of this decision by a State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Part 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, Section 4404 of the Education Law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Directions and forms can be found on the Office of State Review website: http://www.sro.nysed.gov/RevisedRegulationsOverview.html

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For #of Pages

N/A N/A N/A DOE N/A

A IHR 10/22/19 PARENT 07

B Neuropsychological Evaluation 04/06/17 PARENT 15

C 10-Day Letter 08/20/19 PARENT 01

D Program Description undated PARENT 03

E School Schedule 09/19/19 PARENT 01

F End of Year Report 06/21/19 PARENT 08

G Enrollment Contract 03/07/19 PARENT 01

H Invoice 03/14/19 PARENT 01

| Affidavit of Tuition 2019-2020 PARENT (?)

N/A N/A N/A IHO N/A