New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION

Case Number: 189679

NYS Identifier Number

Student’s Name:

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 01/28/20 & 05/06/20

Actual Record Close Date: 07/31/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For # of Pages

01 Withdrawn / Not Received N/A DOE N/A

02 IEP 04/15/19 DOE 15

03 S & L Assessment 01/28/19 DOE 04

04 Teacher Report 12/20/18 DOE 03

05 OT Report 12/21/18 DOE 09

06 FBA 03/22/19 DOE 08

07 BIP 03/22/19 DOE 08

08 Withdrawn / Not Received N/A DOE N/A

09 Withdrawn / Not Received N/A DOE N/A

10 PWN 05/20/19 DOE 04

11 IEP 04/10/18 DOE 18

A IHR 09/25/19 PARENT 05

B 10-Day Letter 09/05/19 PARENT 05

C Neuropsychological Evaluation 03/26/19 PARENT 12

D IEP 05/20/19 PARENT 15

E IEP 04/10/18 PARENT 13

F-G Withdrawn / Not Received N/A PARENT N/A

H Report Card 2018-2019 PARENT 12

I Progress Report 2019-2020 PARENT 12

J Attendance Report 01/09/20 PARENT 01

K Schedule 2018-2019 PARENT 01

L Affidavit of Payment 01/13/20 PARENT 01

M School Contract 07/25/19 PARENT 04

N Withdrawn / Not Received N/A PARENT N/A

O Closing Statement 06/04/20 PARENT 21

N/A N/A N/A IHO N/A

On October 7, 2019, I was appointed as the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct a hearing pursuant to the Individual with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 United States Code, Section 1415(f)(1), ), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law and Parts 200 and 201 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, concerning a dispute between the Parent of a year old student attending a private school and the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) - , concerning the student’s special education program. I was appointed after the recusal of at least one other IHO.

After adjournments were granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on May 6, 2020. The Parent’s written closing statement was received on June 4, 2020. (P-O) A list of the witnesses who appeared and the documents taken into evidence is annexed to this decision.

BACKGROUND

In this case, the Parent alleges that the student was denied a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years.

At the impartial hearing, the Parent seeks the following relief:

(a) A determination that the student has been denied a FAPE for the 2018- 2019 and 2019-2020 school years and an order that the DOE pay the private school tuition and to provide transportation to and from school; and

(b) A determination be made ordering reimbursement of transportation costs incurred by the Parent; and

(c) Attorneys’ fees be awarded; and

(d) A determination be made granting such other relief as is just and proper.

At the hearing, the DOE conceded that the student was designated for special education services for the 2018-2019 school year on a 10-month basis. (T-6) The DOE asserts that the student’s IEP date April 10, 2018 and April 15, 2019 are procedurally and substantively sound. (T-7) The Parent withdrew her claim for transportation services. (T-7)

THE DOE’S CASE

The DOE called (2) witnesses to testify on its behalf and submitted (8)

documents into evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testimony and documentary evidence for and against the DOE’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

THE PARENT’S CASE

The Parent called (1) witness to testify on her behalf and submitted (12)

documents into evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testimony and documentary for and against the Parent’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION

Two purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B] and Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,

458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982])

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07 and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) While school districts are required to comply with all IDEA procedures, not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA.

(See A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent.

Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003] and Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007])

Under the IDEA, if a procedural violation is alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a)

impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 [N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008] and Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch.

Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 [S.D.N.Y. 2007] aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 [2d Cir. Aug.

19, 2008])

The IDEA directs that, in general, an impartial hearing officer's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203) However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." (See Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 [2d Cir. 1998] and Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189) The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." (See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted] and Grim, 346 F.3d at 379)

Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379 and Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132) Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement.'" (See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008] and Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15) The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit." (See Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997] and Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192) The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (

“LRE”). (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent.

Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; E.G. v. City

Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 [S.D.N.Y. 2009] and Patskin v.

Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 [W.D.N.Y. 2008])

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student's needs (34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals related to those needs (34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]; SRO No.

07-018; 06-059; 06-029; 04-046; 02-014; 01-095 and 93-09) Subsequent to its development, an IEP must be properly implemented. (See 8 NYCRR 200.4[e][7] and

SRO No. 08-087)

The DOE may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim.

(See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993] and Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]) In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148)

The New York State Legislature amended the Education Law to place the burden of production and persuasion upon the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement. (See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c], as amended by Ch. 583 of the Laws of 2007) The amended law took effect for impartial hearings commenced on or after October 14, 2007; therefore, it applies to the instant case. (See SRO No. 08-016)

A private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 419)

A parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14) The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02-

014 and 01-105) Parents seeking reimbursement "bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even if the IEP was inappropriate." (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112 and M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 104 [2d Cir. 2000])

"Subject to certain limited exceptions, 'the same considerations and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool [d]istrict's placement is appropriate should be considered in determining the appropriateness of the parents' placement….'" (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d at 364 [2d Cir. 2006]

[quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 and identifying exceptions]) Parents need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65) When determining whether the parents' unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina

City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]]) A "private placement is only appropriate if it provides 'education instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child.'" (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [emphasis in original], citing Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365 quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89)

The Second Circuit has set forth the standard for determining whether parents have carried their burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of their unilateral placement.

No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents' unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).

The IDEA allows that tuition reimbursement may be reduced or denied if parents do not provide “notice” of the unilateral placement either at the most recent CSE meeting prior to removing the child from public school, or by written notice ten business days before such removal, "that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense." (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii][I] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148[d][1]) This statutory provision "serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise an appropriate plan, and determine whether a [FAPE] can be provided in the public schools." (See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 [1st Cir. 2004]) Although a reduction in reimbursement is discretionary, courts have upheld the denial of tuition reimbursement in cases where it was shown that parents failed to comply with this statutory provision.

(See Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160; Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 [1st Cir. 2004]; Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 523-24 [6th Cir. 2003]; Rafferty v. Cranston Public Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 27 [1st Cir. 2002]); SRO No. 07-

133; 07-120; 07-115; 07-098; 07-079; 07-075; 07-038; 07-032; 06-122; 06-069; 06-057; 06-042; 06-041; 06-035; 05-092 and 04-022)

The final criterion for a reimbursement award is that the parent's claim be supported by equitable considerations. Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M.C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000] and Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]) Such considerations "include the parties' compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties' positions, and like matters." (See Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]) With respect to equitable considerations, the IDEA provides that tuition reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, fail to engage with potential placements offered by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii]; Thies v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 344728 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2008]; M.V. v. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch.

Dist., 2008 WL 53181 at *5 [N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2008]; Bettinger v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2007 WL 4208560, at *4 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007]; Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v.

V.P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417-18 [S.D.N.Y. 2005], aff'd, 2006 WL 2335140 [2d Cir.

Aug. 9, 2006] and Voluntown, 226 F.3d at n.9)

In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of tuition reimbursement. (SRO No. 04-049)

In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence in this case indicates the following: The school psychologist that testified on behalf of the DOE stated that the student has always been a student at the DOE ASD Horizon program and was held over to repeat 3rd grade. (T-22) The ASD Horizon is a specialized program for children who are diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, where they receive small-group instruction, in a small class with 8 students per 1 teacher and 1 classroom paraprofessional. (Id.) The students participate in the regular standard curriculum of instruction for ELA, for math, for other subjects and receive related services of speech, OT, PT, depending on their needs, and have parent training and counseling once a month. (T-23)

The witness testified that the April 15, 2019 IEP meeting was attended by the special education teacher, the Parent, herself as the District Representative and the School Psychologist, a speech provider, , and a specialist who provides counseling for ASD students. (T-25-

6 & D-2) She has no direct recollection of exact time of the meeting, but assumes it was within the average, standard time of (45) minutes up to an hour. (T-26) “ATS” records, a teacher report, and the neuropsychological evaluation provided by the Parent were reviewed at the meeting. (T-28 & D-2) The reading, writing, math parts of the IEP were filled out by the classroom teacher and the social development part was compiled based on the information from the student’s counselor. (T-31 & D-2)

The witness testified that the following classroom accommodations were provided to the student: task analysis, visual prompts, modeling, small-group instruction, a computer with large text for reading, the “A to Z” reading program and technology that will read text for the student. (T-

33) The student was receiving a lot of small-group work and one-to-one support from the teacher in the classroom with accommodations and reading interventions. (Id.) It was her understanding that the Parent felt the student should continue in the program. (T-37-8) An outside speech evaluation dated January 28, 2019 was also provided to them for the meeting. (T-40 & D-3)

Occupational therapy was terminated based on the recommendation of the occupational therapy provider dated December 21, 2018. (T-42 & D-5) The student received extended time for assessments that lasted longer than (45) minutes of time and a half and receive 2-minute breaks for every (20) minutes of testing and large-print testing materials. (T-44-5) They considered but ruled out an ICT class or a 6:1:1 class setting for the student. (T-46) The student had an FBA conducted but it did not support his receipt of a BIP. (T-47-8)

On cross examination, the witness testified that the student’s speech evaluation was conducted by a school provider, not an outsider. (T-51) The student did not get glasses after the school recommended a ophthalmological evaluation and the neuropsychological evaluation that they received indicates that student was tested without glasses. (T-54) The witness agreed that from 2018 to 2019, the student progressed about six months in skill on the Fountas & Pinnell assessment. (T-58) There was no re-direct examination of the witness. (T-65)

The DOE’s second and final witness is an Assistant Principal. (T-70) He was the student’s 3rd grade teacher during the 2015-2016 school year in the ASD Horizon program. (T-

73) During the 2016-2017 school year the student repeated the 3rd grade. (T-74) He stated that his ASD program at does have a 6th grade class and that there is a seat available for the student. (T-87)

On cross examination, the witness testified that the student did not make progress in the 4th grade. (T-98) During school year 2018-2019, he had no idea of how the student was doing academically. (T-101) There was no re-direct examination of the witness. (T-103)

The Parent called the independent provider who conduct the student’s

Neuropsychological Evaluation dated March 26, 2019. (P-C) His testimony was uncontroverted by the DOE and consisted almost exclusively of a recantation of his report which is received in evidence. (T-174-207 - direct testimony, 207-14 - cross examination, 214-6 - re-direct examination, 216-7 - re-cross examination & P-C) Combined with the private school’s 1st quarter progress report, there is sufficient evidence in the record that the private school can appropriately address the student’s needs and provides him with an educational benefit. (P-C & P-H)

The Parent, along with the DOE introduced the student’s IEP dated April 10, 2018 in evidence. (D-11 & P-E) Otherwise, the DOE did not present any testimonial evidence to support that the April 10, 2018 IEP was procedurally and substantively sound. On the whole, I find that the testimony of the DOE school psychologist and a review of the student’ April 15, 2019 IEP indicate that the document is procedural and substantively sufficient and that it offered the student a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year in that it is reasonable calculated to provide more than a diminimus educational benefit to the student. (Supra & P-C)

For the 2018-2019 school year, all that the record offers is a cold review of the document itself. The April 10, 2018 IEP indicates that the related service provider/special education teacher attended the meeting, the Parent and the District Representative, as well as an “other” identified as “ .” (D-11) The Fontas and Pinell Reading Level I (End of 1st grade level) and 3rd Grade Math State Test were the evaluative materials relied upon at the meeting.

(Id.) As noted above, an appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student's needs. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][1] and 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]) Here, while the document makes substantive recommendations, the evaluative information supporting those recommendations is scant at best and no one gave testimony on behalf of the DOE indicating that those recommendations are supported by evaluations, or that the recommendations reflect the results of evaluations that identify the student’s needs.

This is fatal to the DOE’s assertion that it offered the student a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year. I find that the student was denied a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year.

What is the remedy for a denial of FAPE during the 2018-2019 school year, when the student was subsequently offered a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year? It would appear that while tuition reimbursement may be denied for the 2019-2020 school year because I have found

FAPE was offered for that school year, that some form of compensatory relief may be appropriate for the denial of FAPE for the previous 2018-2019 school year.

Parent, however, did not present any evidence as to compensatory education and there is no evidence in the record from which the I can fashion an award for compensatory education services. Therefore, I will direct in the order below that DOE pay the cost for the Parent to obtain “Independent Education Evaluation” (“IEE”) for the purpose of determining appropriate compensatory education the student should receive for the denial of FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year. Such an evaluation should appropriately consider what if any progress the student would have made during the 2018-2019 school year.

The student’s performance as of the most recent evaluations conducted and reviewed by student’s IEP team on April 15, 2019 are a likely benchmark from which to measure any progress that the student could have made during the 2018-2019 school year. (See Parents on Behalf of Student with a Disability v. District of Columbia Public Schools, Case # 2019-0225, November 20, 2019)

For all of the reasons stated herein, I find that the DOE denied the student a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year but did offer the student a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year.

Nevertheless, I will exercise my discretion as a hearing office to order that the student be re-evaluated in all areas of his suspected disabilities as indicated below and that the Parent may request compensatory education services for the denial of FAPE during the 2108-2019 as supported by the evaluation ordered below.

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Parent’s request for tuition reimbursement and/or funding for the 2019-2020 school year must be denied because it has been found that the DOE did offer the student a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall pay the cost of the student’s receipt of an independent Neuropsychological Evaluation at a cost not to exceed the reasonable and fair market rate cost for such an evaluation in New York City, to determine appropriate compensatory education for the denial of FAPE to the student for the 2018-2019 school year and that the most recent evaluations conducted and reviewed by student’s IEP team on April 15, 2019 are a likely bench mark from which to measure any progress that the student could have made during the 2018-2019 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that the Parent is hereby authorized to seek compensatory education for the denial of FAPE during the 2018-2019 school year as determined herein and with the support of the evaluation that the DOE is directed to pay for, and the evaluations ordered below, either at the reconvened IEP meeting ordered below and/or through filing and the adjudication of a new DPC; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall also conduct a re-evaluation of the student in all areas of his suspected disabilities, not covered by the independent Neuropsychological Evaluation ordered above, and not conducted within the last two years; and it is further

ORDERED that the CSE shall forthwith reconvene after the completion of the student’s evaluations and consider all of the student’s evaluations and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either agreed upon by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: August 7, 2020 _____________________________

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - IHO

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the PublicSchool District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov. (Rev. 07/09/20)

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Name Title For Date DOE Representative DOE 01/28/20 05/06/20 (T)

School Psychologist DOE 01/28/20 (T) Assistant Principal DOE 01/28/20 (T) Attorney PARENT 01/28/20 05/06/20 (T)

Mother PARENT 01/28/20 05/06/20 (T)

Psychologist PARENT 05/06/20 (T)