New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DOE DEFAULT & INQUEST

Case Number: 189618

NYS Identifier Number N/A Student's Name: [“Confidential”]

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 01/29/20

Actual Record Close Date: 06/15/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Title For Date Attorney DOE 01/29/20 Attorney PARENT 01/29/20

Mother PARENT 01/29/20 Head of School PARENT 01/29/20 Assistant of School PARENT 01/29/20

Teacher PARENT 01/29/20

On September 28, 2019, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, concerning a dispute between the Parent of a (_ ) year old student attending a private school and the New York City - Department of Education (“DOE”) - District: |, regarding the student's special education program.

After having adjournments granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on January 29, 2020. A list of the persons appearing at the hearing but not of the documents received in evidence in annexed hereto.

BACKGROUND

This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint (“DPC”) made by the student’s Parent via her attorney(s), and received at the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (“DOE-IHO”) on or about September 24, 2019. The DPC is carried under New York City (“NYC”)

189618. The Parent in this case alleges that the student has been denied a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2019-2020 school year. At the impartial hearing, the Parent seeks the following relief: (a) Reimbursement of the private school tuition from September 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020 including reimbursement of monies paid to date and any payments made in the future, including tuition, additional tuition costs of the Program, combined activity / accident insurance / parent’s association dues fee, and bookstore fees; and (b) Payment of the cost of evaluations; and (c) Costs and fees; and (d) Any additional such relief as the IHO determines is appropriate.

THE DOE’S CASE

The DOE did not call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, submitted (5) documents in evidence and did not object to the Parent’s. (T-6, 10 & 22-3) It is the DOE's position that as a matter of law, the Parent is not entitled to reimbursement for the neuropsychological because the evaluation was done on the Parent's own volition, without giving the DOE notice that they were disagreeing with an evaluation and the neuropsychological evaluation was obtained prior to even asking the DOE for a FAPE.

(T-9-11) The DOE’s psycho-educational evaluation was done on July 11, 2019, but the Parent’s request for a FAPE came somewhere around June 19, 2019. (T-11) The testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the DOE’s case in default is incorporated in the decision below.

THE PARENT’S CASE

The Parents called (3) witnesses to testify on her behalf, one who testified on direct examination via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5|j][3][xii][f]. (P-L) The DOE declined to cross examine the affiant. (T-22-3) The Parent also submitted (13) documents in evidence. The DOE did not object to any of the Parent's documents being received in evidence. (T-22) The Parent states that this is a student that had been at one point classified as a student with a disability and subsequently declassified in 2018, over the Parent’s objection. (T-13-4) The Parent then had her own evaluation, presented to the DOE, which then triggered the DOE to do their own investigation and prepare their own evaluation and resulted in the student being re-classified again. (T14) The Parent also notes that (15%) of the private school day is related to religious instruction and should the Hearing Officer, find in her favor, she would not object to that sort of reduction because that would makes sense under the separation of church and state. (T-15 & 69) The testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the Parent’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DOE DEFAULT & INQUEST

IDEA ensures that students with disabilities are afforded a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1400 & Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528 [2005]) A FAPE includes special education and related services designed to meet the student's unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written IEP. (20 U.S.C. 1401(8) & 141(d) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.13) The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. (Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537)

The DOE may be required to reimburse Parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the parent’s claim. (Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dept.

of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2"° Cir. 2005])

The first step is to determine whether the DOE offered to provide the student a FAPE. (Mrs. C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 66 [2° Cir. 2000]) A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with procedural requirements set forth in IDEA and (b) the IEP developed by the CSE through the procedures set forth in IDEA, is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (Bd. Of Educ. V. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-7 [1982]) The student’s recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b), 8 NYCRR §200.6(a)[1])

The Parent bears the burden of showing that the private school placement selected is appropriate. (SRO Nos.: 95-57, 94-29 & 93-34) The Parents must show that the private school placement offers an educational program that meets the student's special education needs. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 & SRO No. 94-20) The private school need not be approved by the state educational agency to provide instruction to children with disabilities. (Florence County School District Four et. al. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]). It is also not required that the private school employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (SRO No. 94-20)

Finally, the IHO must consider whether equitable considerations favor the Parents’ request for tuition reimbursement. State Review Officer (“SRO”) Decision 06-004 holds: Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]). Such considerations "include the parties’ compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties’ positions, and like matters” (Wolfe _v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). With respect to equitable considerations, a parent may be denied tuition reimbursement upon a finding of a failure to cooperate with the CSE in the development of an IEP or if the parent's conduct precluded the CSE's ability to develop an appropriate IEP (Warren G. v. Cumberland Co. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 [3rd Cir. 1999]; see Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-102; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-026). In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a_ claim of _ tuition reimbursement. (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-049).

In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to Parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA.

(Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 at 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) “Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance” had it offered the student a FAPE. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C]ii] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148)

The DOE failed to call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, submitted (5) documents in evidence, failed to file and serve an answer or serve a “Prior Written Notice” in this case, and did not object to the Parent's documentary evidence. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(e) & T-6, 10 & 22-3) “Prior Written Notice” means written statements developed in accordance with Section 200.5(a) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, and provided to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student.

It is noted that silence in a responsive pleading is an admission, and a counterclaim in federal practice is compulsory in the answer or deemed waived. (See New York Practice, 4°" Edition §§223 & 224, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a) & Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690 [1966])

The DOE has the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement.

(See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]) Here, the DOE did not proffer any evidence that it has offered the student a FAPE. (Supra) This amounts to a concession that the agency did not offer the student a FAPE. As previously noted, the DOE did not serve and file an answer in the case, nor did the agency serve the Parent with “Prior Written Notice’, which would provide either a denial of the Parent’s allegation, or some explanation for the agency’s failure to provide a FAPE. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)[e])

It would be fundamentally unfair to allow either party to rely solely on the submission of documents in meeting its burden under law, where those documents are rife with double, triple and even unidentified hearsay sources, that cannot be cross examined. While compliance with technical rules of evidence is not required in administrative hearings, under certain circumstances, the receipt of hearsay evidence may be so prejudicial as to have a tendency to deprive a party of fair hearing. (See Strain _v. Sarafan, 57 A.D.2d 525, 393 N.Y.S.2d 572, N.Y.A.D. (1977), where the hearsay testimony was of vital importance and should have been subjected to cross-examination by the petitioner...the petitioner was deprived of a meaningful hearing,_ Dukes v. New York City Housing Authority, 63 A.D.2d 690, 404 N.Y.S.2d 889, N.Y.A.D.

(1978), holding that the excessive reliance on hearsay evidence effectively denied petitioner the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, Claim of Evans, 254 A.D.2d 564, 678 N.Y.S.2d 696, N.Y.A.D. (3 Dept. 1998), (where in an unemployment compensation proceedings, administrative law judge (‘ALJ’) properly exercised discretion to exclude hearsay evidence to protect employer's fundamental right of cross-examination, where claimant proffered written hearsay statement, authored by acquaintance of the employer’s president, which allegedly indicated that claimant did not resign but was fired, but the acquaintance failed to answer subpoena directing him to testify at hearing, thereby denying employer the opportunity to cross-examine him on the statement, and Alvarado v. State of New York, 110 A.D.2d 583, 488 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1*' Dept. 1985), holding that a license suspension hearing against a boxer and his managers was faulty because of a lack of an opportunity “to cross-examine certain witnesses whose reports were introduced into evidence without their testifying, in violation of SAPA Section 306, subd. (3).” (Id. at 585, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 179)

However, here the DOE did not present a case-in-chief and did not controvert the documentary evidence submitted by the Parent. (Supra) The credibility of the documentary evidence was not rebutted by the agency and the documentary evidence is clearly relevant and material to the issues to be determined. I find the documentary and testamentary evidence submitted by the Parent in this case to be credible and uncontroverted in this case.

As noted above, the DOE’s failure to present a case at the hearing is a concession that it denied the student a FAPE and that if the Parent meets her burden under Schaffer v. Weast, the Parent is entitled to the proven relief she seeks. This leaves, as the primary issue to be resolved through impartial hearing, what relief and/or compensatory education remedy, if any, is available and appropriate to remediate the denial of a FAPE. (SRO No. 17-033) It is noted that the DOE was required under the due process procedures set forth in New York State law, to address its burdens in the due process hearing context by describing its views, based on a fact-specific inquiry set forth in an evidentiary record, regarding an appropriate relief and/or compensatory education remedy that most reasonably and efficiently could place the student in the position that he would have been but for the denial of a FAPE. (See Doe v. E. Lyme Bd.

of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 457 [2d Cir. 2015], cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2022 [2016], quoting Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [noting that the "ultimate award [of compensatory education] must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place'|) When, as here, the DOE does not present any case at the hearing, the hearing, the hearing process essentially becomes an “inquest” as to the appropriate relief.

The DOE has conceded liability by failing to present a case and meet its burden under the law. New York State law has placed the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing on the school district, unlike states which align the burden of production and persuasion consistent with Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58-62 [2005]. It is not an IHO's responsibility to craft the DOE’s position regarding the primary issue in the case, for the denial of FAPE. The undersigned finds that the DOE failed to adhere to the requirements of the law, has denied the student in this case a FAPE and that the Parent may be entitled to the proven relief she has requested. The DOE has defaulted on its statutory obligation and I find that the student was denied a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year.

The party who defaults in concedes only liability and not the amount of “damages.” (See CPLR § 3215, First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Classic Collateral Corp., 44 A.D.2d 868, 355 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1974), James _v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 225 N.E.2d 741 (1967), McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) The DOE’s default constitutes an admission of liability, but not of damages, which remains the Parent's burden to prove. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 & City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 at 128 [2d Cir. 2011])

I now turn to the question of whether the DOE should be required to reimburse and/or pay for the private educational services and relief requested for the student, because the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, and the relief sought and services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the Parents’ claim. (Burlington, Florence and Cerra, Supra) The Parent need only demonstrate that the requested services are specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit him to benefit from the instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65)

A private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 419)

A Parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14) The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02

014 and 01-105) Parents also need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364

65) When determining whether the Parents’ unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]])

There is no request for compensatory educational services in this case and in either case, an IHO cannot determine the amount of compensatory education that a student requires unless the record provides him with sufficient “insight about the precise types of education services the student needs to progress.” (Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad.

Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F. Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008] citing Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005]) Pertinent findings to enable an IHO to tailor the ultimate award to the student’s unique needs should include the nature and severity of the student’s disability, the student’s specialized educational needs, the link between those needs and the services requested, and the student's current educational abilities. (See Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005], see also Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F.

Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008]) The Parent has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.” (See Phillips v. District of Columbia, 2010 WL 3563068, at *6, 55 IDELR 101 [D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2010] quoting Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate

Campus v. Nesbitt (“Nesbitt II”), 583 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172, 51 IDELR 125 [D.D.C. 2008])

State regulations provide in relevant part that "[t]he decision of the impartial hearing officer shall be based solely upon the record of the proceeding before the impartial hearing officer and shall set forth the reasons and the factual basis for the determination. (See 8 NYCRR 200.5{j][5][v])

Shaffer decision of the Supreme Court of the United States issued on November 14, 2005, held as follows:

“We hold no more than we must to resolve the case at hand: The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case, that party as Brian, as represented by his parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in turn bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is, therefore affirmed.” (Supra, Ill, [2) (See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58-

62 [2005] (emphasis added)

Here, for the reasons stated above, the DOE did not meet its burden under the law. (Supra) I find that the student has been denied a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year.

A gross violation of the IDEA may result from the denial of, or exclusion from, educational services for a substantial period of time. (See SRO No. 04-074, citing Mrs.

C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990), Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.

1988) and SRO No. 02-047.) In Burr, exclusion from educational services for a substantial period of time was defined as “almost two years.” (See SRO No. 02-033 citing Burr “...after a severely disabled student's school was closed, prolonged delays in the administrative proceedings in obtaining a new placement resulted in a complete exclusion from any educational placement for the student for almost two years.” I do not find that the violation in this case meets the standard of a “gross violation” of FAPE.

I now turn to the question of whether the relief sought by the Parent is appropriate. As noted above, the DOE may be required to reimburse and/or pay for the private educational services and relief requested for the student, because the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, and the relief sought and services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the Parent’s claim. (Burlington, Florence & Cerra, Supra) As previously noted, the Parent need only demonstrate that the requested services are specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit her to benefit from the instruction. (Gagliardo & Frank G., Supra)

In sum, substance and relevant part, the evidence in this case is as follows: The Parent's firs witness is the assistant head of the private school. (T-26) He testified that the private school is a school for student's with language-based learning disabilities like dyslexia, decoding difficulties, reading the words off the page, but whose comprehension might be fine. (T-27) They have grades (1) through (8) and a (147) students in total. (T-28) The private school also has full time speech and an OT and two psychologists plus himself. (T-31)

The witness testified that students at the private school receive two hours a day of language arts instruction, which is the backbone of their program because the students have language-based learning disabilities., that consist of (80) minutes of reading using their research-based multisensory curriculum program called Preventing Academic Failure. (T-34) For writing, which is another (40) minutes during the day, they use The Hochman Method to teach basic writing skills, which is a research-based program that teaches expository writing in a very structured and systematic way, similar to the way PAF teaches reading in a structured way. (T-35) They also use a multisensory program for math. (Id.) He believes that the religious instruction at the private school comes out to about (15%). (T-38)

On cross examination, the witness testified that at prior hearings for this school year, he testified that the religion at the private school (17%) but added that was based on a different schedule. (T-40) The classes are all done in very small groups, with individualized instruction as part of the course. (T-41) The student receives speech and language therapy and is also is part of their social, emotional learning curriculum, which is overseen and designed by the psychologist in the middle school. (T-42-3) The private school does not participate in any state exams. (T-46) There was no re-direct examination of the witness. (T-47)

The Parent’s second witness teaches language arts and writing small group instruction at the private school. (T-50) The language arts period last (90) minutes. (Id.) The group is composed of (6) students and (1) teacher. (T-51) All of the students are in the 6" grade. (T-52) The student is making meaningful progress. (T-54)

On cross examination the witness conceded that she does not know when the student receives his speech and language therapy. (T-65) The “ Language” class is not a class it is a language leaning class. (T-67) There was nore direct examination of the witness. (Id.)

If the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the school district, the parent has a right to obtain an independent evaluation at public expense. (See

Regulations of the Commissioner of Education § 200.5(g). - “NYCRR § 200.5”) If the parent request an independent educational evaluation at public expense, the school district must, without unnecessary delay, either ensure an independent evaluation is provided at public expense or initiate an impartial hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate or that the evaluation obtained by the parent does not meet the school district criteria. (See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(g)[iv]) Additionally, 34 C.F.R. 300.502(d) and 8 NYCRR 200.5(i)(3)(vi) provide that if a hearing officer requests an independent educational evaluation as part of a hearing, the cost of the evaluation must be at public expense.

I find that the record above sufficiently establishes that the private school is an appropriate placement for the student's 2019-2020 school year but that the Parent's request for payment of the IEE is unsupported by the record. There is nothing in the record that supports a finding the Parents have not cooperated with the DOE. For all of the reasons stated herein, I find that the Parents’ are entitled to the relief they seek.

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that upon its receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of services having been rendered, the DOE shall either reimburse the Parents and/or direct pay the cost of (85%) of the student’s tuition at the private school for the 2019-2020 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that the DOE shall immediately conduct evaluations of the student in all areas of his suspected disabilities not evaluated within the last two years, for the 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that the DOE shall forthwith reconvening the CSE after the completion of the student’s evaluations and consider those evaluations and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either agreed upon by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: June 22, 2020

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - IHO

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

The parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to obtain a review of this decision by a State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Part 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, Section 4404 of the Education Law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Directions and forms can be found on the Office of State Review website: http://www.sro.nysed.gov/RevisedRegulationsOverview.html

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

01. Number/Letter Title Dated For #of Pages IEP 07/29/19 DOE 05 pages DOE

02. Meeting Minutes 07/29/19 DOE 14 pages DOE

03. Psychoeducational Evaluation 07/11/19 DOE 09 pages DOE

04. Speech Evaluation 07/11/19 DOE 05 pages DOE

05. Report Card 07/11/19 DOE 04 pages DOE

B. A IHR 09/24/19 PARENT 08 Neuro & Psych Evaluation 03/2019 PARENT 22 pages

C. Psychiatrist Letter 07/23/19 PARENT 02 pages

D. Learning Specialist Letter 07/25/19 PARENT 02 pages

E. Evaluation Consent 06/19/19 PARENT 04 pages

F. FAPE Email 2019 PARENT 02 pages

G. 10-Day Letter 08/19/19 PARENT 02 pages

H. Program Description undated PARENT 03 pages

J. | School Schedule undated PARENT 01 Final Report Card 06/24/19 PARENT 02 pages

K. Contract 06/14/19 PARENT 04 pages

L. Affidavit of Tuition undated PARENT 06 pages

M. Evaluation Invoice 10/02/19 PARENT 03 pages

N/A N/A N/A IHO N/A