New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DOE DEFAULT & INQUEST

Case Number: 189041

NYS Identifier Number

Student’s Name: - to be Redacted

by NYC-DOE

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 07/15/20

Actual Record Close Date: 11/09/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Name Title For Date Attorney DOE 07/15/20 (T) Attorney DOE 07/15/20 (T) Attorney PARENT 07/15/20 (T)

Mother PARENT 07/15/20 (T) Head of School PARENT 07/15/20 (T) Dean PARENT 07/15/20 (T)

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For # of Pages

DOE’S EXHIBITS

# N D

ame

1 Indivi 6/10

dualized

2 Prior 6/26

Written Notice

03 Closing Statement 08/14/20 09

***DOE exhibit “2” not formally received in evidence***

A 9/3/19 Due Process Complaint 9

With Confirmation

B 6/10/19 IEP 21

C 8/19/19 Ten Day Notice with Confirmation 3

D 6/26/19 Prior Written Notice 2

E 5/4/18 Neuropsychological 16

Evaluation

F 9/11/19 Medical Accommodation Form 2

G 9/9/19 HIPAA Form 1

H Undated Promotion in Doubt Letter 1

I Undated Report Card 2

J 2018 Redacted Parent Tax Return 2

K 6/25/20 Abbreviated 6

Score Report

L 2019-2020 School 7

Enrolment Contract M Undated 2019-2020 Class Schedule 1

N Undated Transitions Program 2

Description O 5/7/20 Tuition Affidavit 1

P Winter 19-20 Progress Report 6

Q Spring 19-20 Progress Report 7

R Fall 19-20 Progress Report 9

S Undated Remote Learning 2

Guide T Undated Additional Remote 2

Learning Information

U Undated Midterm Rubric 2

V 7/8/2020 Affidavit 2

W 7/8/20 Affidavit 3

X 7/8/20 Affidavit 4

Y 08/14/20 Closing Statement 20

***Parent’s exhibits “B” and “E” not formally received in evidence***

N/A N/A N/A IHO N/A

On September 23, 2019, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 and of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, concerning a dispute between the Parents of an ( year old student attending a private school and the New York City - Department of Education (“DOE”) - , regarding the student’s special education program.

After having adjournments granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on July 15, 2020. A list of the persons who appeared at the hearing and the documents entered into evidence is annexed hereto.

BACKGROUND

This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint (“DPC”)

filed by the student’s Parent through her attorney(s), and received at the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (“DOE-IHO”) on or about September 13, 2019. The DPC is carried under New York City (“NYC”) Case No.

189041. Therein, the Parent alleges that the DOE has failed to provide the student with a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2019-2020 school year. At the impartial hearing, the Parent seeks the following relief:

(a) A determination that the student was denied a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year; and

(b) An order that the DOE must provide tuition reimbursement for any amounts paid and direct and/or prospective funding for any amounts owed to the private school including tuition and any other related costs or fees for the 2019-2020 school year; and

(c) An order that the DOE provide the student with appropriate special education transportation to and from the private school; and

(d) An award of such other, further, and different relief as the IHO determines to be fair and just under the circumstances of this case.

THE DOE’S CASE

The DOE did not call any witnesses to testify on its behalf and submitted (2)

documents in evidence. (T-6, 24, D-1 & D-3) The DOE did not defend “FAPE” and did not challenge the presumption in the law that the Parent has cooperated with the agency. (Id.) In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the DOE’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

THE PARENT’S CASE

The Parent called (4) witnesses to testify on her behalf, who testified on direct testimony via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii][f]. (P-O, P-V, P-W & P-X)

The DOE crossed examined only two of the Parent’s witnesses. (T-34, 87, P-V & P-W)

The Parent also submitted (23) documents in evidence. The DOE did not object to the Parent’s documents being received in evidence, except for proposed exhibits “B” and

“E.”. (T-18) In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the Parent’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DEFAULT & INQUEST

IDEA ensures that students with disabilities are afforded a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1400 & Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528 [2005]) A FAPE includes special education and related services designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written IEP. (20 U.S.C. 1401(8) & 141(d) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.13) The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. (Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537)

The DOE may be required to reimburse Parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the parent’s claim. (Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dept.

of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2nd Cir. 2005])

The first step is to determine whether the DOE offered to provide the student a FAPE. (Mrs. C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 66 [2nd Cir. 2000]) A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with procedural requirements set forth in IDEA and

(b) the IEP developed by the CSE through the procedures set forth in IDEA, is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (Bd. Of

Educ. V. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-7 [1982]) The student’s recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b), 8 NYCRR §200.6(a)[1])

The Parent bears the burden of showing that the private school placement selected is appropriate. (SRO Nos.: 95-57, 94-29 & 93-34) The Parents must show that the private school placement offers an educational program that meets the student’s special education needs. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 & SRO No. 94-20) The private school need not be approved by the state educational agency to provide instruction to children with disabilities. (Florence County School District Four et. al. v.

Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]). It is also not required that the private school employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (SRO No. 94-20)

Finally, the IHO must consider whether equitable considerations favor the Parents' request for tuition reimbursement. State Review Officer (“SRO”) Decision 06-004 holds:

Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]). Such considerations "include the parties' compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties' positions, and like matters" (Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). With respect to equitable considerations, a parent may be denied tuition reimbursement upon a finding of a failure to cooperate with the CSE in the development of an IEP or if the parent's conduct precluded the CSE's ability to develop an appropriate IEP (Warren G. v. Cumberland Co. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 [3rd Cir. 1999]; see Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-102; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-026). In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of tuition reimbursement. (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-

049).

In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to Parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA.

(Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 at 192 [2d Cir.

2005]) “Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance” had it offered the student a FAPE. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii] and 34

C.F.R. § 300.148)

The DOE failed to call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, did not submit any documents in evidence, failed to file and serve an answer or serve a “Prior Written Notice” in this case, and did not even make an opening or a closing statement. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(e) & T-6 & 24) “Prior Written Notice” means written statements developed in accordance with Section 200.5(a) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, and provided to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student.

It is noted that silence in a responsive pleading is an admission, and a counterclaim in federal practice is compulsory in the answer or deemed waived. (See New York Practice, 4th Edition §§223 & 224, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a) & Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690 [1966])

The DOE has the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement.

(See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]) Here, the DOE did not proffer any evidence that it has offered the student a FAPE. (Supra) This amounts to a concession that the agency did not offer the student a FAPE. As previously noted, the DOE did not serve and file an answer in the case, nor did the agency serve the Parent with “Prior Written Notice”, which would provide either a denial of the Parent’s allegation, or some explanation for the agency’s failure to provide a FAPE. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)[e])

It would be fundamentally unfair to allow either party to rely solely on the submission of documents in meeting its burden under law, where those documents are rife with double, triple and even unidentified hearsay sources, that cannot be cross examined. While compliance with technical rules of evidence is not required in administrative hearings, under certain circumstances, the receipt of hearsay evidence may be so prejudicial as to have a tendency to deprive a party of fair hearing. (See Strain v. Sarafan, 57 A.D.2d 525, 393 N.Y.S.2d 572, N.Y.A.D. (1977), where the hearsay testimony was of vital importance and should have been subjected to cross-examination by the petitioner…the petitioner was deprived of a meaningful hearing, Dukes v. New York City Housing Authority, 63 A.D.2d 690, 404 N.Y.S.2d 889, N.Y.A.D.

(1978), holding that the excessive reliance on hearsay evidence effectively denied petitioner the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, Claim of Evans, 254 A.D.2d 564, 678 N.Y.S.2d 696, N.Y.A.D. (3 Dept. 1998), (where in an unemployment compensation proceedings, administrative law judge (‘ALJ”) properly exercised discretion to exclude hearsay evidence to protect employer’s fundamental right of cross-examination, where claimant proffered written hearsay statement, authored by acquaintance of the employer’s president, which allegedly indicated that claimant did not resign but was fired, but the acquaintance failed to answer subpoena directing him to testify at hearing, thereby denying employer the opportunity to cross-examine him on the statement, and Alvarado v. State of New York, 110 A.D.2d 583, 488 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1st Dept. 1985), holding that a license suspension hearing against a boxer and his managers was faulty because of a lack of an opportunity “to cross-examine certain witnesses whose reports were introduced into evidence without their testifying, in violation of SAPA Section 306, subd. (3).” (Id. at 585, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 179)

However, here the DOE did not present a case-in-chief and did not controvert the documentary evidence submitted by the Parent. (Supra) The credibility of the documentary evidence was not rebutted by the agency and the documentary evidence is clearly relevant and material to the issues to be determined. I find the documentary and testamentary evidence submitted by the Parent in this case to be credible and uncontroverted in this case.

As noted above, the DOE’s failure to present a case at the hearing is a concession that it denied the student a FAPE and that if the Parent meets her burden under Schaffer v. Weast, the Parent is entitled to the proven relief she seeks. This leaves, as the primary issue to be resolved through impartial hearing, what relief and/or compensatory education remedy, if any, is available and appropriate to remediate the denial of a FAPE. (SRO No. 17-033) It is noted that the DOE was required under the due process procedures set forth in New York State law, to address its burdens in the due process hearing context by describing its views, based on a fact-specific inquiry set forth in an evidentiary record, regarding an appropriate relief and/or compensatory education remedy that most reasonably and efficiently could place the student in the position that he would have been but for the denial of a FAPE. (See Doe v. E. Lyme Bd.

of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 457 [2d Cir. 2015], cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2022 [2016], quoting Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [noting that the "'ultimate award [of compensatory education] must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place'"]) When, as here, the DOE does not present any case at the hearing, the hearing, the hearing process essentially becomes an “inquest” as to the appropriate relief.

The DOE has conceded liability by failing to present a case and meet its burden under the law. New York State law has placed the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing on the school district, unlike states which align the burden of production and persuasion consistent with Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58-62 [2005]. It is not an IHO's responsibility to craft the DOE’s position regarding the primary issue in the case, for the denial of FAPE. The undersigned finds that the DOE failed to adhere to the requirements of the law, has denied the student in this case a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year and that the Parent may be entitled to the proven relief he has requested.

I now turn to the question of whether the DOE should be required to reimburse and/or pay for the private educational services and relief requested for the student, because the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, and the relief sought and services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the Parent’s claim. (Burlington, Florence and Cerra, Supra) The Parent need only demonstrate that the requested services are specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit her to benefit from the instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65)

Where sought as relief, a private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs.

(See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F.

Supp. 2d at 419) A parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14)

The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02-014 and 01-105) Parents also need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65) When determining whether the parents' unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"])

There is no request for compensatory educational services in this case and in either case, an IHO cannot determine the amount of compensatory education that a student requires unless the record provides him with sufficient “insight about the precise types of education services the student needs to progress.” (Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad.

Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F. Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008] citing Branham v.

District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005]) Pertinent findings to enable an IHO to tailor the ultimate award to the student’s unique needs should include the nature and severity of the student’s disability, the student’s specialized educational needs, the link between those needs and the services requested, and the student’s current educational abilities. (See Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005], see also Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F.

Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008]) The Parent has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.” (See Phillips v. District of Columbia, 2010 WL 3563068, at *6, 55 IDELR 101 [D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2010] quoting Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate

Campus v. Nesbitt (“Nesbitt II”), 583 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172, 51 IDELR 125 [D.D.C. 2008])

State regulations provide in relevant part that "[t]he decision of the impartial hearing officer shall be based solely upon the record of the proceeding before the impartial hearing officer and shall set forth the reasons and the factual basis for the determination. (See 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v])

Shaffer decision of the Supreme Court of the United States issued on November 14, 2005, held as follows:

“We hold no more than we must to resolve the case at hand: The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case, that party is Brian, as represented by his parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in turn bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is, therefore affirmed.” (Supra, III, ¶2) (See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.

49, 58-62 [2005] (emphasis added)

The party who defaults in concedes only liability and not the amount of “damages.” (See CPLR § 3215, First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Classic Collateral Corp., 44 A.D.2d 868, 355 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1974), James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 225 N.E.2d 741 (1967), McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) The DOE’s default constitutes an admission of liability, but not of damages, which remains the Parent’s burden to prove. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 & City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 at 128 [2d Cir. 2011])

In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence in this case indicates the following.

The DOE’s position that the private school is an inappropriate placement for the student because it is too restrictive and the equities do not favor the Parent. (D-3) In it accurately cited closing statement, the DOE makes the following argument:

Here, the Parent has not met their burden of demonstrating that was an appropriate placement for the 2019-2020 school year. In this case, the program at is a generalized special education program and is not specifically tailored to meet the unique needs of . On cross-examination, the Dean at , , testified that the staff at reviewed several documents pertaining to the student's profile (i.e. evaluations, teacher recommendations, and the parent interview) but he could not recall if he reviewed these particular documents for .

Tr. 37-38. Mr. [NAME] advised that these documents "would have been reviewed" but he could not confirm that they were in fact reviewed for 's case. Tr. 41-42. The overgeneralized special education program was further evidenced by the generalized class schedule that was created for . Tr. 45-46, Exhibit M.

Based on 's class schedule, he was not receiving any related services as recommended in his IEP. DOE Ex. 1. In fact, the Dean at , [NAME], testified that was already enrolled at prior to her reviewing any documentation for him. Tr. 90. (D-3)

Additionally, the DOE argues that the private school is too restrictive for the student because he is in a class with (7) students and two teachers, which does not comport with the student’s IEP dated June 10, 2019. (D-3 citing D-1 & P-W) Finally, the DOE argues that the equities do not favor the Parent because it is not clear the Parent asked the CSE about the public-school program. (D-3)

As noted above, in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the Parent has failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of tuition reimbursement. (See SRO No. 04-049) None of those conditions exist here. The Parent attended the IEP meeting held on Jun 10, 2019. (D-1) On August 19, 2019, the Parent served the DOE with “10-

Day Notice” of the student placement at the private school. (P-C) Accordingly, equitable considerations do not bar an award on behalf of the Parent.

To show the appropriateness of the private school placement, the Parent need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit him to benefit from instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65)

Here, the private school is a 10-month school which offers instruction to students in grades 4-12 with learning disabilities to remediate their skills with the goal of fostering independence, with a student ratio that ranges from 8:2 to 10:2 and 12:1 for high school students. (P-Y citing P-V) The student’s teacher is a certified speech pathologist. (P-Y citing T-58) The student receives 1:1 remedial sessions at the private school. (P-Y citing P-R) The Head of the private school testified that the student has a specialized program at the private school. (T-70-1) He also testified that the schedule was created specifically for the student and the private school addresses the student’s social-emotional needs. (P-Y citing T-60, 63-4 7 P-M)

The private school is not overly restrictive. The DOE’s argument in this regard is not persuasive as it is well settled in the law that Parents are not held as strictly to the standard of placement in the LRE as school districts are. (See Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 and M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d at 105)

Neither does the law require the private school follow the DOE’s IEP. I find that the record supports a finding that the private school is an appropriate placement for the student.

The DOE’s default is a tacit concession that the student was denied a FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year. (Supra) Based on the record, I find that the private school was an appropriate placement for the student for the 2019-2020 school year in that it is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., Gagliardo, and Berger, supra)

The IDEA specifically includes transportation, as well as any modifications or accommodations necessary in order to assist a student to benefit from his or her special education, in its definition of related services. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1401[26], see also 34 CFR 300.34[a], [c][16]) In addition, State law defines special education as “specially designed instruction . . . and transportation, provided at no cost to the parents to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” and requires school districts to provide disabled students with “suitable transportation to and from special classes or programs.”

(See Educ. Law §§ 4401[1], 4402[4][a], see also Educ. Law § 4401[2] and 8 NYCRR 200.1[ww]) Specialized transportation must be included on a student's IEP if required to assist the student to benefit from special education. (SRO No. 03-053) If a CSE determines that a student with a disability requires transportation as a related service in order to receive a FAPE, the district must ensure that the student receives the necessary transportation at public expense. (See Transportation, 71 Fed. Reg. 46576 [Aug. 14, 2006]; see 8 NYCRR 200.1[ww])

The State Education Department has indicated that a CSE should consider a student's mobility, behavior, communication, physical, and health needs when determining whether or not a student requires transportation as a related service, and that an IEP “must include specific transportation recommendations to address each of the student's needs, as appropriate.” (See “Special Transportation for Students with Disabilities,” VESID Mem. [Mar. 2005]) Other relevant considerations may include the student's age, ability to follow directions, ability to function without special transportation, the distance to be traveled, the nature of the area, and the availability of private or public assistance. (See Donald B. v. Bd. of Sch. Commrs., 117 F.3d 1371, 1375 [11th Cir. 1997] and Malehorn v. Hill City Sch. Dist., 987 F. Supp. 772, 775 [D.S.D. 1997])

When reviewing the transportation provisions made for a student by a district, the relevant question is whether the transportation arrangements are appropriate to meet the student's needs. (SRO No. 03-054)

In this case, there is no indication in the hearing record as to the student's need for special transportation during the 2019-2020 school year and no verifiable indication that special transportation was previously requested. The student’s IEP dated June 10, 2019 does not recommend transportation services for the student. (D-1) The Parent’s testimony regarding the student’s need for special transportation is limited to the following:

24. For the 2019-2020 school year, due to the lack of transportation accommodations recommended by the Department, School provided transportation via a metro card. My husband and I had to purchase a metro card for ourselves to take to and from school. (P-X)

Accordingly, the hearing record does supports a finding that the student would be denied a FAPE if there was a lack of provision for special transportation.

However, this does not preclude a determination regarding the student's entitlement to transportation as available to regular education students or suitable transportation as available to students attending nonpublic schools “for the purpose of receiving services or programs similar to special education programs recommended” by the CSE. (See Educ. Law 3635; 4402[4][[d]) If the DOE has not done so already, it may consider transportation of the student to the private school in accordance with the above.

There is nothing in the record that support a finding that the Parent has not cooperated with the DOE.

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT, Its CONCESSION and after INQUEST that based upon the DOE’s default and concession of a denial of FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year, upon its receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of services having been rendered, the DOE shall either reimburse the Parent, and/or directly pay for the cost of the student’s tuition at the private school, for the entirety of the student’s 2019-2020 school year thereat; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT, It’s CONCESSION and after INQUEST that the DOE shall also conduct a re-evaluation of the student in all areas of his suspected disabilities not evaluated within the last two years, for the 2021-2022 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT, It’s CONCESSION and after INQUEST that the CSE shall forthwith reconvene after the completion of the student’s evaluations and consider all of the student’s evaluations and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2021-2022 school year; and it is further

ORDERED upon the DOE’s DEFAULT, It’s CONCESSION and after INQUEST that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either agreed upon by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: November 16, 2020 _____________________________

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - I.H.O.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the PublicSchool District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov. (Rev. 07/09/20)