New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DOE DEFAULT & INQUEST

Case Number: 188769

NYS Identifier Number

Student’s Name:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 12/30/19

Actual Record Close Date: 12/30/19

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

On September 19, 2019, I was appointed as the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”)

to conduct a hearing pursuant to the Individual with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 United States Code, Section 1415(f)(1) and Part 200 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, concerning a dispute between the Parent of an year old pre-school student and the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) - Home District: , Service District: regarding the student’s special education program. After adjournments were granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties or for good cause, the pendency and impartial hearing was held on December 30, 2019. The DOE did not appear at the hearing. The Parent declined to extend the compliance date for receipt of the transcript and referencing the same in this decision.

Accordingly, the decision is written as best as possible from the undersigned’s memory and note, without reference to the record A list of the witnesses who appeared and the documents taken into evidence is annexed to this decision.

BACKGROUND

The Parent in this case alleges that the student was denied a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) in that:

The district has not developed a new IESP for this child since 2015/2016 school year. An IEP was held in May 2019. At the meeting CSE was advised by the P3 provider of the need to continue the weekly 5 periods of SETSS. The agency did not agree to the advisement and reduced the mandate to 3 periods a week. The IEP team disagreed with the goals the provider listed for the student. The parent disagrees with this determination to reduce the SETSS mandate and the lack of provider listed goals in the IEP. This was effectively an action by the district to preclude the parent’s full participation in the IEP process. The child was not provided the mandated SETSS services between the 1st of January until May 1st. This greatly hindered her progress. The child is entitled to compensatory services for the missed sessions with additional sessions to make up for the regression. As the DOE has neglected to independently evaluate this child per the parents request to see what continued goals and services are needed, by an impartial 3rd party, the parent is looking for an independent evaluation in all areas. (P-A)

Accordingly, at the impartial hearing, the Parent asserts that she is entitled to the following relief:

(a) SETSS services at an enhanced rate; and

(b) A new IEP team meeting; and

(c) New evaluations; and

(d) An Order on Pendency recognizing the student IESP dated October 27, 2015 as the student’s last agreed upon IESP; and

(e) Compensatory sessions for services missed during the 2018-2019 school year.

The Parent requested an “Order on Pendency” and the “resolution period” had ended by the date the impartial hearing was held.

A pendency hearing held during a resolution period does not commence the impartial hearing timeline. (See NYSED Memo - Questions Relating to Impartial Hearing Procedure, Sept. 2016) As such, a hearing to discuss and determine the pendency placement of the student may occur during a resolution period but such a hearing held at that time does not commence the impartial hearing itself until the resolution period has expired. (Id.) However, an impartial hearing may commence with a “pendency hearing” if it is the first hearing to take place within 14 days of (a) or (b) of section 200.5(j)(3)(iii) of the regulations, i.e., after the resolution period has expired.

(Id.)

THE PARENT’S PENDENCY REQUEST

The Parent request an “Order on Pendency” recognizing the student IESP dated October 27, 2015 as the student’s last agreed upon IESP (P-B)

THE DOE’S ARGUMENT AGAINST PENDENCY

The DOE did not appear at the hearing.

ORDER ON PENDENCY

Pendency is based on the student’s “then-current educational placement,” which the Second Circuit has defined as “(1) ‘typically the placement described in the child's most recently implemented IEP,’ (Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 287 F.3d

1176, 1180 [9th Cir. 2002]); (2) ‘the operative placement actually functioning at the time

... when the stay put provision of the IDEA was invoked,’ (Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 867 [3d Cir. 1996]); and (3) ‘[the placement at the time of] the previously implemented IEP,’ (Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625 [6th Cir. 1990]); Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 163 [2d Cir. 2004])

The then-current educational placement can be superseded by an agreement between the parties during the proceedings to change the student's placement or a final, unappealed decision on the merits by an impartial hearing officer, state review officer, or court. SRO Appeal No. 05-011; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 483-84 (2d Cir. 2002); Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 297 F.3d 195 (2002); Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-107; Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197 (OSEP 2007); Student X v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008)

On October 23, 2019, the parties executed a “Pendency Agreement” that resolved the issue of “pendency” in this case. (IHO-I) Accordingly, the undersigned need not address the issue of “pendency” herein.

THE DOE’S CASE ON THE MERITS

The DOE did not appear at the hearing.

THE PARENT’S CASE ON HE MERITS

The Parent called (1) witness to testify who is the student’s mother. In sum, substance and relevant part, the witness testified that she did not agree with the student’s latest IEP meeting and that she does not know about the evaluations that were used at that meeting. The DOE reduced the student’s SETSS service because the student’s teacher got the chance to talk about the student’s strengths and how well she was doing but was cut off and not allowed to discuss the student’s weaknesses and struggles. The student stopped receiving services around December. The student did not like the provider that was originally working with her. However, she likes the new provider and is progressing with the new provider. She requested that the student’s SETSS services be increased from (5) to (10) sessions, but the DOE gave her only (3)

sessions. Neither of the student’s current providers will accept the DOE rate. She does not know how many sessions were missed by the student.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION - DOE DEFAULT & INQUEST

IDEA ensures that students with disabilities are afforded a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1400 & Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528 [2005]) A FAPE includes special education and related services designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written IEP. (20 U.S.C. 1401(8) & 141(d) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.13) The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. (Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537)

The DOE may be required to reimburse Parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student, if the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the parent’s claim. (Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dept.

of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2nd Cir. 2005])

The first step is to determine whether the DOE offered to provide the student a FAPE. (Mrs. C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 66 [2nd Cir. 2000]) A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with procedural requirements set forth in IDEA and

(b) the IEP developed by the CSE through the procedures set forth in IDEA, is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (Bd. Of

Educ. V. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-7 [1982]) The student’s recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b), 8 NYCRR §200.6(a)[1])

The Parent bears the burden of showing that the private school placement selected is appropriate. (SRO Nos.: 95-57, 94-29 & 93-34) The Parents must show that the private school placement offers an educational program that meets the student’s special education needs. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 & SRO No. 94-20) The private school need not be approved by the state educational agency to provide instruction to children with disabilities. (Florence County School District Four et. al. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]). It is also not required that the private school employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (SRO No. 94-20)

Finally, the IHO must consider whether equitable considerations favor the Parents' request for tuition reimbursement. State Review Officer (“SRO”) Decision 06-004 holds:

Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]). Such considerations "include the parties' compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties' positions, and like matters" (Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). With respect to equitable considerations, a parent may be denied tuition reimbursement upon a finding of a failure to cooperate with the CSE in the development of an IEP or if the parent's conduct precluded the CSE's ability to develop an appropriate IEP (Warren G. v. Cumberland Co. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 [3rd Cir. 1999]; see Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-102; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 04-026). In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of tuition reimbursement. (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-

049).

In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to Parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA.

(Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 at 192 [2d Cir.

2005]) “Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance” had it offered the student a FAPE. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii] and 34

C.F.R. § 300.148)

The DOE did not appear at the hearing and failed to call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, did not submit any documents in evidence and failed to file and serve an answer or serve a “Prior Written Notice” in this case. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)[e])

“Prior Written Notice” means written statements developed in accordance with Section 200.5(a) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, and provided to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student.

It is noted that silence in a responsive pleading is an admission, and a counterclaim in federal practice is compulsory in the answer or deemed waived. (See New York Practice, 4th Edition §§223 & 224, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a) & Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690 [1966]) Here, the DOE did not serve and file a responsive pleading.

The DOE has the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement.

(See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]) Here, the DOE did not proffer any evidence that it has offered the student a FAPE. (Supra) This amounts to a concession that the agency did not offer the student a FAPE. As previously noted, the DOE did not serve and file an answer in the case, nor did the agency serve the Parent with “Prior Written Notice”, which would provide either a denial of the Parent’s allegation, or some explanation for the agency’s failure to provide a FAPE. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)[e])

It would be fundamentally unfair to allow either party to rely solely on the submission of documents in meeting its burden under law, where those documents are rife with double, triple and even unidentified hearsay sources, that cannot be cross examined. While compliance with technical rules of evidence is not required in administrative hearings, under certain circumstances, the receipt of hearsay evidence may be so prejudicial as to have a tendency to deprive a party of fair hearing. (See Strain v. Sarafan, 57 A.D.2d 525, 393 N.Y.S.2d 572, N.Y.A.D. (1977), where the hearsay testimony was of vital importance and should have been subjected to cross-examination by the petitioner…the petitioner was deprived of a meaningful hearing, Dukes v. New York City Housing Authority, 63 A.D.2d 690, 404 N.Y.S.2d 889, N.Y.A.D.

(1978), holding that the excessive reliance on hearsay evidence effectively denied petitioner the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, Claim of Evans, 254 A.D.2d 564, 678 N.Y.S.2d 696, N.Y.A.D. (3 Dept. 1998), (where in an unemployment compensation proceedings, administrative law judge (‘ALJ”) properly exercised discretion to exclude hearsay evidence to protect employer’s fundamental right of cross-examination, where claimant proffered written hearsay statement, authored by acquaintance of the employer’s president, which allegedly indicated that claimant did not resign but was fired, but the acquaintance failed to answer subpoena directing him to testify at hearing, thereby denying employer the opportunity to cross-examine him on the statement, and Alvarado v. State of New York, 110 A.D.2d 583, 488 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1st Dept. 1985), holding that a license suspension hearing against a boxer and his managers was faulty because of a lack of an opportunity “to cross-examine certain witnesses whose reports were introduced into evidence without their testifying, in violation of SAPA Section 306, subd. (3).” (Id. at 585, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 179)

However, here the DOE did not appear at the hearing and present a case-in-chief and did not controvert the documentary evidence submitted by the Parent. (Supra) The credibility of the documentary evidence was not rebutted by the agency and the documentary evidence is clearly relevant and material to the issues to be determined. I find the documentary and testamentary evidence submitted by the Parent in this case to be credible and uncontroverted in this case. However, that evidence is not conclusive.

As noted above, the DOE’s failure to appear and present a case at the hearing is a concession that it denied the student a FAPE and that if the Parent meets her burden under Schaffer v. Weast, the Parent is entitled to the proven relief she seeks. This leaves, as the primary issue to be resolved through impartial hearing, what relief and/or compensatory education remedy, if any, is available and appropriate to remediate the denial of a FAPE. (SRO No. 17-033) It is noted that the DOE was required under the due process procedures set forth in New York State law, to address its burdens in the due process hearing context by describing its views, based on a fact-specific inquiry set forth in an evidentiary record, regarding an appropriate relief and/or compensatory education remedy that most reasonably and efficiently could place the student in the position that he would have been but for the denial of a FAPE. (See Doe v. E. Lyme Bd.

of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 457 [2d Cir. 2015], cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2022 [2016], quoting Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [noting that the "'ultimate award [of compensatory education] must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place'"]) When, as here, the DOE does not appear at the hearing and does not present any case, the hearing process essentially becomes an “inquest” as to the appropriate relief.

The DOE has conceded liability by failing to present a case and meet its burden under the law. New York State law has placed the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing on the school district, unlike states which align the burden of production and persuasion consistent with Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58-62 [2005]. It is not an IHO's responsibility to craft the DOE’s position regarding the primary issue in the case, for the denial of FAPE. The undersigned finds that the DOE failed to adhere to the requirements of the law, has denied the student in this case a FAPE and that the Parent may be entitled to the proven relief she has requested.

I now turn to the question of whether the DOE should be required to reimburse and/or pay for the private educational services and relief requested for the student, because the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, and the relief sought and services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the Parent’s claim. (Burlington, Florence and Cerra, Supra) The Parent need only demonstrate that the requested services are specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit her to benefit from the instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).

Where sought as relief, a private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs.

(See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F.

Supp. 2d at 419) A parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14)

The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02-014 and 01-105) Parents also need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65) When determining whether the parents' unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]])

There is a request for compensatory educational services in this case and in either case, an IHO cannot determine the amount of compensatory education that a student requires unless the record provides him with sufficient “insight about the precise types of education services the student needs to progress.” (Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad.

Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F. Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008] citing Branham v.

District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005]) Pertinent findings to enable an IHO to tailor the ultimate award to the student’s unique needs should include the nature and severity of the student’s disability, the student’s specialized educational needs, the link between those needs and the services requested, and the student’s current educational abilities. (See Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005], see also Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F.

Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008]) The Parent has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.” (See Phillips v. District of Columbia, 2010 WL 3563068, at *6, 55 IDELR 101 [D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2010] quoting Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate

Campus v. Nesbitt (“Nesbitt II”), 583 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172, 51 IDELR 125 [D.D.C. 2008])

State regulations provide in relevant part that "[t]he decision of the impartial hearing officer shall be based solely upon the record of the proceeding before the impartial hearing officer and shall set forth the reasons and the factual basis for the determination. (See 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v])

Shaffer decision of the Supreme Court of the United States issued on November 14, 2005, held as follows:

“We hold no more than we must to resolve the case at hand: The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case, that party is Brian, as represented by his parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in turn bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is, therefore affirmed.” (Supra, III, ¶2) (See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.

49, 58-62 [2005] (emphasis added)

The DOE’s default constitutes an admission of liability, but not of damages, which remains the Parent’s burden to prove. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 & City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 at 128 [2d Cir. 2011])

The Parent’s Request for SETSS Services at an Enhanced Rate

“SETSS” are not defined in State or federal laws or regulations and are not identified on the State continuum of special education services. A reference to the service as "direct" is in keeping with the language used in State regulations for consultant teacher services (See 8 NYCRR 200.6[d])

State regulations distinguish between "direct consultant teacher services," which consist of "specially designed individualized or group instruction provided by a certified special education teacher . . .to a student with a disability," from "indirect consultant teacher services," which consist of "consultation provided by a certified special education teacher . . .to regular education teachers" (8 NYCRR 200.1[m] [emphasis added]; see 8 NYCRR 200.6[d]).

The Parent testified that the student’s SETSS service were cut and that the student missed an unknown number of SETSS services. However, there is no evidence in the hearing record to establish that the Parent has incurred any financial obligation to pay the difference between the enhanced rate and the district rate. The student's mother did not testify that she had to "make a specific arrangement" or otherwise enter into "a contract or an actual agreement" with the provider to pay the provider if the impartial hearing process did not result in an award of the enhanced rate. She also did not testify that, if she was unsuccessful at the impartial hearing, she would like to pay the difference between the DOE's rate and the enhanced rate but that she could not "afford" to make those payments. Therefore, even if the Parent prevailed on the merits of her claim, it would be unclear at this juncture whether or not any relief would be warranted absent evidence that the provider was owed additional compensation based on an agreement with the Parent or the DOE. In any event, it is unnecessary to speculate on this state of affairs since the evidence in the hearing record does not support a finding that the DOE failed to make available to the student special education programs and services on an equitable basis, as the Parent testified that at the most recent meeting, the DOE did offer the student (3) sessions of SETSS and no substantive evidence of the Parent’s efforts to secure a provider and/or the providers she did contact was entered into the record. (See Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1])

Accordingly, the Parent’s request for SETSS services at an enhanced rate must be denied.

The Parent’s Request for “Independent Educational Evaluations” (“IEE”)

If the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the school district, the parent has a right to obtain an independent evaluation at public expense. Regulations of the Commissioner of Education § 200.5(g). (“NYCRR § 200.5”) If the parent request an independent educational evaluation at public expense, the school district must, without unnecessary delay, either ensure an independent evaluation is provided at public expense or initiate an impartial hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate or that the evaluation obtained by the parent does not meet the school district criteria. 8 NYCRR § 200.5(g)(iv).

Additionally, 34 C.F.R. 300.502(d) and 8 NYCRR 200.5(i)(3)(vi) provide that if a hearing officer requests an independent educational evaluation as part of a hearing, the cost of the evaluation must be at public expense.

The Parent testified that she does not know what evaluations were reviewed at the student’s IEP meeting. Additionally, the is nothing in the record that shows she objected to the DOE’s evaluations or requested evaluations and/or which evaluations she objected to or requested. It is evident that the DOE did not file a DPC in this case to defend its position, but I do not find the Parent’s testimony entirely credible and the record itself is insufficient to award IEEs. However, I will order the DOE to re-evaluate the student in all areas of her suspected disabilities that have not been evaluated in the last two years.

The Parent’s Request for Compensatory Educational Services

As noted above, an IHO cannot determine the amount of compensatory education that a student requires unless the record provides him with sufficient “insight about the precise types of education services the student needs to progress.” (See Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter Sch. and Branham, supra) Additionally, the Parent has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.” (See Phillips, supra) Here, the record is devoid of any substantive evidence in this regard. I find that the record does not support an award on compensatory educational services at this time.

There is nothing in the record that sustains a finding that the Parent has not cooperated with the CSE.

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that pursuant to the pendency provisions under the IDEA and the parties’ “Pendency Agreement” (IHO-I), the issue has been resolved by the same and need not be addressed by this decision; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall forthwith conduct a re-evaluation of the student in all areas of her suspected disabilities for the student’s 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that the CSE shall forthwith reconvene and consider all of the student’s evaluations upon their completion and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either resolved by the parties, withdrawn or not addressed by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: December 31, 2019 Edgar De Leon

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - I.H.O.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

The parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to obtain a review of this decision by a State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Part 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, Section 4404 of the Education Law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Directions and forms can be found on the Office of State Review website: http://www.sro.nysed.gov/RevisedRegulationsOverview.html

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For # of Pages

N/A N/A DOE N/A N/A

A DPC 09/11/19 PARENT 05

B IESP 10/27/15 PARENT 09

C Progress Report 12/09/19 PARENT 06

I Pendency Agreement 10/23/19 IHO 03

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Name Title For Date

“No Appearance” N/A DOE 12/30/19 Advocate PARENT 12/30/19

Mother PARENT 12/30/19