New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION

Case Number: 180721

NYS Identifier Number N/A Student’s Name: - To be Edited and Removed by the NYC-DOE

Date of Birth: [“Confidential”]

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 06/15/20

Actual Record Close Date: 12/11/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Name Title For Date

[CONFIDENTIAL] DOE Representative DOE 06/15/20 (T)

[CONFIDENTIAL] School Psychologist DOE 06/15/20 (T)

[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 06/15/20 (T)

[CONFIDENTIAL] Mother PARENT 06/15/20 (T)

[CONFIDENTIAL] PARENT 06/15/20 (T)

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For #of Pages

N/A N/A N/A DOE N/A

PARENT’S EXHIBITS

A. Ten Day Notice August 20, 2018 2 pgs

B. Impartial Hearing Request December 20, 2018 8 pgs

C. Program Description Undated 1 pg

D. Classroom Teacher Report December 13, 2018 2 pgs

E. Class Schedule 2018-2019 1 pg

F. Payment Affidavit June 20, 2019 1 pg

G. School Attendance 2018-2019 1 pg

H. School Contract 2018-2019 1 pg | Closing Statement 07/18/20 ***Parent’s exhibit “F” was not formally received in evidence*** 12 pages

N/A N/A N/A PARENT N/A

On December 21, 2018, I was appointed as the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct a hearing pursuant to the Individual with Disabilities in Education Acct ( “IDEA”), 20 United States Code, Section 1415(f)(1), ), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law and Parts 200 and 201 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, concerning a dispute between the Parent of a(__) year old student attending a private school and the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) - District: , concerning the student’s special education program. After adjournments were granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on June 15, 2020. The Parent opted to submit a written closing statements that was received on July 18, 2020. (P-l) A list of the witnesses who appeared and the documents taken into evidence is annexed to this decision.

BACKGROUND

In this case, the Parent alleges that the student was denied a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2018-2019 school year. At the impartial hearing, the Parent seeks the following relief: (a) That the student’s placement at the private school be fully funded for the 2018-2019 school year.

THE DOE’S CASE

The DOE called (1) witness to testify on its behalf, who did not testify on direct examination via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5{j][3][xii][f]. The Parent crossed examine the DOE’s witness. (T-53-9) The DOE di not submit any documents in evidence. In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the DOE’s case is incorporated in the decision below.

THE PARENT’S CASE

The Parent called (1) witness to testify on her behalf who did not testify via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5{j][3][xiiJ[f]. The Parent also submitted (8) documents into evidence. The DOE cross examined the Parent’s witness. (T-89-106)

In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence for and against the Parent's case is incorporated in the decision below.

FINDINGS OF FACTS & DECISION

Two purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B] and Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982])

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the DOE complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07 and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) While school districts are required to comply with all IDEA procedures, not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA.

(See A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003] and Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007)

Under the IDEA, if a procedural violation is alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. (See 20 U.S.C. §

141 5[fI[S][EIlii]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 [N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008] and Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 [S.D.N.Y. 2007] aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 [2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008))

The IDEA directs that, in general, an impartial hearing officer's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1415/f][3][E][i]). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203) However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." (See Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 [2d Cir. 1998] and Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189) The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents.” (See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted] and Grim, 346 F.3d at 379) Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. (See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379 and Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132) Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is ‘likely to produce progress, not regression,’ and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial advancement.” (See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008] and Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15) The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some ‘meaningful’ benefit." (See Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997] and Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192) The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment ( “LRE”). (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; E.G. v. City sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 [S.D.N.Y. 2009] and Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 [W.D.N.Y. 2008])

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student's needs (34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals related to those needs (34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.4{[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]; SRO No. 07-018; 06-059; 06-029; 04-046; 02-014; 01-095 and 93-09) Subsequent to its development, an IEP must be properly implemented. (See 8 NYCRR 200.4[e][7] and SRO No. 08-087)

The DOE may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim.

(See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993] and Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]) In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007] and Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]) "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148)

The New York State Legislature amended the Education Law to place the burden of production and persuasion upon the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement. (See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c], as amended by Ch. 583 of the Laws of 2007) The amended law took effect for impartial hearings commenced on or after October 14, 2007; therefore, it applies to the instant case. (See SRO No. 08-016)

A private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 419)

A parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14) The private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02-014 and 01-105) Parents seeking reimbursement "bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even if the IEP was inappropriate.” (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112 and M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 104 [2d Cir. 2000])

"Subject to certain limited exceptions, 'the same considerations and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool [dlistrict's placement is appropriate should be considered in determining the appropriateness of the parents’ placement...." (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d at 364 [2d Cir. 2006]

[quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 and identifying exceptions]) Parents need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65) When determining whether the parents’ unilateral placement is appropriate, "[uJltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina

City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]]) A "private placement is only appropriate if it provides ‘education instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child." (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [emphasis in original], citing Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365 quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89)

The Second Circuit has set forth the standard for determining whether parents have carried their burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of their unilateral placement.

No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents’ unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65).

The IDEA allows that tuition reimbursement may be reduced or denied if parents do not provide “notice” of the unilateral placement either at the most recent CSE meeting prior to removing the child from public school, or by written notice ten business days before such removal, "that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense." (See 20 U.S.C. §

1412[a][10][C][iii][l] and 34 C.F.R. § 300.148[d][1]) This statutory provision "serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise an appropriate plan, and determine whether a [FAPE] can be provided in the public schools." (See Greenland sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 [1st Cir. 2004]) Although a reduction in reimbursement is discretionary, courts have upheld the denial of tuition reimbursement in cases where it was shown that parents failed to comply with this statutory provision.

(See Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160; Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 [1st Cir. 2004]; Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 523-24 [6th Cir. 2003]; Rafferty v. Cranston Public Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 27 [1st Cir. 2002]); SRO No. 07

133; 07-120; 07-115; 07-098; 07-079; 07-075; 07-038; 07-032; 06-122; 06-069; 06-057; 06-042; 06-041; 06-035; 05-092 and 04-022)

The final criterion for a reimbursement award is that the parent's claim be supported by equitable considerations. Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; M.C. v. Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000] and Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required"]) Such considerations "include the parties’ compliance or noncompliance with state and federal regulations pending review, the reasonableness of the parties’ positions, and like matters." (See Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 [N.D.N.Y. 2001], citing Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d at 773, 801-02 [1st Cir. 1984], aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]) With respect to equitable considerations, the IDEA provides that tuition reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, fail to engage with potential placements offered by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii]; Thies v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 344728 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2008]; M.V. v. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 53181 at *5 [N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2008]; Bettinger v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2007 WL 4208560, at *4 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007]; Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417-18 [S.D.N.Y. 2005], aff'd, 2006 WL 2335140 [2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2006] and Voluntown, 226 F.3d at n.9)

In the absence of evidence demonstrating that petitioners failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of tuition reimbursement. (SRO No. 04-049)

In sum, substance and relevant part, the testamentary and documentary evidence in this case is as follows: The DOE argues that for the 2018-2019 school year, there were two IEPs created for the student, with one created on November 13, 2017, that recommended a 15:1 special class with related services of speech, 2x30 in a group setting and 1x30 individually, and another IEP that was created on December 17, 2018 that also recommended a 15:1 special class only. (T-5) For the 2018-2019 school year, the student was designated for a 10-month school year. (T-9) The DOE did not object to the Parent's documentary evidence. (T-17)

The Parent argues that the November 13, 2017 IEP was developed based on a sole psychoeducational evaluation from October of 2014, that was outdated and thus renders the IEP is void on its face. (T-11)

The DOE’s first and only witness testified that she holds a certification in general education history, high school, in teaching as a second language, K through 12, and is licensed as a school psychologist. (T-27) The November 13, 2017 meeting was attended by herself as the district representative/school psychologist, a special education teacher, the from the private school, and the Parent. (T-31-2) The student was recommended for a 15:1 special class in both the individual and group service for speech and language therapy. (T-41-2) They relied upon the psychoeducational that was conducted October 20, 2014, along with an academic achievement evaluation. (T-41)

In this case, the student’s evaluative materials just do not support placing the student in an ICT class. As noted above, an appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student's needs. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][1] and 8 NYCRR 200.4{d][2][i]) A CSE is required to arrange for an appropriate reevaluation of each student with a disability if conditions warrant, but at least every three years. (See 8 NYCRR 200.4([b][4]) Here, the evaluation used at the November 13, 2017 IEP meeting was over three years old and was invalid for use and reliance upon at the IEP meeting.

Additionally, at the beginning of each school year, a school district is required to have an IEP in effect "for each child with a disability in [its] jurisdiction." (See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414[d][2][A]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.323[a] and Cerra, 427 F.3d at 194 (". . . the District fulfilled its legal obligations by providing the IEP before the first day of school.").

Federal regulations specifically direct that a school district must have an IEP in place at the beginning of the school year. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.323[a]) Accordingly, I do not find the December 17, 2018, which was created approximately (372) months into the 2018-2019 school year, can support a finding that the DOE offered the student a FAPE for that school year, which began in September of 2018. Accordingly, I find that the DOE denied the student a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year.

I now turn towards the question of whether the private school was an appropriate placement for the student for the 2018-2019 school year. As noted above, here the Parent need only demonstrate that the private school provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit her to benefit from instruction. (Gagliardo & Frank G., Supra)

The private school testified that the student works extremely hard at the private school where her work is individualize for her, which is why she is on a Regents track right. (T-83) The student was in a class of (6) girls for the 2018-2019 school year.

(T-77-8) The student attended a “social comprehension” class, which addressed her self-esteem, listening skills, and friendship building. (T-79 & P-E) The teacher report received in evidence indicates that the student's academic progress was “steady and methodical” at the private school. (P-D) I find that the records as a whole, clearly demonstrates that the private school program addresses the student’s needs and that she is progressing under the program. (Supra) The uncontroverted testamentary and documentary evidence that at the private school meets that standard. There is nothing in the record that sustains a finding that the Parent has not cooperated with the CSE.

Therefore, I find that equitable considerations do not bar an award of tuition reimbursement to the Parent.

For all of the reasons stated herein, I find that the Burlington/Carter test is satisfied in favor of the Parent and that she has met her burden under Schaffer to prevail in her request for tuition reimbursement.

NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the DOE has denied the student a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school years, and that upon its receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of services having been rendered, the DOE shall either reimburse the Parent and/or directly pay the cost of the student’s tuition and related services at the private school for the entirety of the student's 2018-2019 school year thereat; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall also conduct a re-evaluation of the student in all areas of her suspected disabilities, not evaluated within the last two years, for the 2021-2022 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that the CSE shall forthwith reconvene after the completion of the student's evaluations and consider all of the student's evaluations and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2021-2022 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either agreed upon by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: December 14, 2020

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - IHO

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public-School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov. (Rev. 07/09/20)