New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINAL ORDER - PENDENCY NOT DISPUTED & MOOTNESS

Case Number: 175210

NYS Identifier Number N/A Student’s Name: - To be Edited & Removed by the

NYC-DOE

Date of Birth: [“Confidential”]

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 10/24/19

Actual Record Close Date: 12/14/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Name Title For Date

[CONFIDENTIAL] DOE Representative DOE 10/24/19 (T)

[CONFIDENTIAL] Attorney PARENT 10/24/19 (T)

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

Number/Letter Title Dated For #of Pages

01 M.T.D. 11/02/20 DOE 06

02 M.T.D. - Reply 11/18/20 DOE 04

A M.T.D. - Opposition 11/13/20 PARENT 07

| Motion Schedule 11/02/20 IHO 02

On June 17, 2019, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, concerning a dispute between the Parent of a (_ ) year old student attending a private school and the New York City - Department of Education ( “DOE”) - District: , regarding the student's special education program. I!was appointed after the recusal of at least one other IHO.

After having adjournments granted at the request and with the consent of the parties or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on October 24, 2019. The DOE submitted a “Motion to Dismiss” on November 2, 2020. (D-1) A motion schedule was then set by the undersigned and the Parent timely submitted her opposition to the DOE’s motion on November 13, 2020. (IHO-I & P-A) The DOE’s reply was also timely received on November 18, 2020. (D-2) The A list of the persons who appeared at the hearing and the documents entered into evidence is annexed hereto.

BACKGROUND

This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint (“DPC”) made by the student's Parent’s attorney(s), [CONFIDENTIAL] and received at the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (“DOE-IHO”) on or about July 6, 2018.

The DPC is carried under New York City (“NYC”) . The Parent herein alleges that the student was denied a “free and appropriate public education” (““FAPE”) for the 2018-2019 school year. At the impartial hearing, the Parent request the following relief: (a) An order that the student’s pendency placement for the 2018/2019 school year is the private residential program including room, board and tuition; and (b) A finding that the DOE’s failure to develop an appropriate program and placement for the 2018-2019 school year denied the student a FAPE; and (c) A finding that the DOE's failure to convene a timely CSE meeting for the 2018-2019 denied the student a FAPE; and (d) An order directing reimbursement and/or direct payment of tuition, residence costs and all related costs for the student’s placement and program at the private school in , Including transportation, lodging and meal costs for the Parent and or /guardian to travel to the private school six times yearly to participate in the planning of the student’s IEP; and (e) An order that the DOE to re-convene the CSE at the conclusion of the hearing; and (f) Payment of the Parent's attorney's fees and expenses associated with representation in this matter; and (g) Any further relief that the Hearing Officer may deem just and proper to ensure the student a free and appropriate education.

At the hearing, the Parent confirmed that she received notification that her claim for the 2019-2020 school year was approved and referred to settlement. (T-19)

The DOE moves to dismiss the Parent's DPC as moot because the Parent was awarded pendency at the proposed unilateral placement, for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years, pursuant to an order dated July 31, 2018 and inasmuch as the pendency payments were fully disbursed for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years, the claims asserted in Parent’s July 2018 and June 2019 DPCs are now moot and should be dismissed in their entirety with prejudice. (D-1) Extending the argument, the DOE states as follows: Assuming arguendo that the Parent’s counsel argues that the provision in the DPC requesting Parent’s Attorney Fees, prospective travel costs for the parent and the request that IHO “grant any further relief that the Hearing Officer may deem just and proper” is outstanding relief sufficient to maintain a “dispute between the parties.” The DOE avers that the Impartial Hearing Officer's authority is limited to a technical question of whether the specific student at issue in the impartial hearing received a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) and, if not, the remedy for same. The IDEA does not authorize an administrative officer to award attorneys’ fees or other costs to the prevailing party. (See, Application of a Student with a Disability, SRO Decision No. 11-027, p. 29). The DOE agreed to issuing pendency in this matter. Therefore, the power to grant relief- other than that which was already requested and remunerated is beyond the IHO’s authority, thereby rendering any matters of controversy in this case moot. (Id.)

The DOE further argues that the likelinood of a reoccurrence of the alleged conduct complained of in this case is conjectural and mere speculation is not sufficient to claim an exception and that the limited exceptions to the mootness doctrine do not apply, as the claims asserted by Parent are now moot and must be dismissed in their entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Id.)

The Parent opposes the DOE’s “Motion to Dismiss” and argues that the DOE has a history of ignoring correspondence from the Parent's attorney, requesting additional information and documents, seemingly as a means to prolong the settlement negotiations until it was able to ensure that pendency payments satisfied student's tuition obligations and that there are remaining issues of fact for litigation and a reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and, in fact, has already recurred. (P-A) Pointedly, the Parent argues the following:

Even when the question of reimbursement for a particular school year is no longer at issue due to required pendency payments, it often “falls squarely within the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine’, as administrative review of an IEP is “ponderous”, a final judicial decision often comes at least one year after the subject school year has passed, and the alleged deficiencies in the disputed IEP are typically capable of repetition between the parties. (New York City Dept. of Educ. v. S.A., 2012 WL 6028938 *2 [S.D.N.Y. 2012], citing U.S. v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 [2d Cir. 2005], and Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Shutz, 290 F.3d 476, 479 n. 1 [2d Cir. 2002], and Lillbask v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 85 [2d Cir. 2005], and Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 369 [2d Cir. 2006], and Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9 [1985]). Here, the DOE has already repeated the same deficiencies in [STUDENT INITIALS] educational program for the 2020/21 school year; a separate impartial hearing is currently underway regarding [STUDENT INITIALS] placement at the [PRIVATE SCHOOL NAME] School for the 2020/21 school year. Thus, the DOE’s claim that the exceptions to the mootness doctrine “do not apply” (DOE Motion, pg. 4), is entirely without merit. (Id.)

In its reply to the Parent’s opposition, the DOE argues that the Parent’s opposition failed to address that there are “no ongoing controversies” nor is there a live “dispute between the parties’, as the Parent concedes that the parties were working toward a settlement in this matter, further indicating that there are no live triable issues.

(D-2) What’s more, as for the Parent’s assertion that the matter is capable of repetition; counsel noted that Honig involved a twenty (20) year old student but drew an incorrect parallel to the behavior “capable of repetition’, because the Court specifically noted in substance:

“It is respondent Smith's very inability to conform his conduct to socially acceptable norms that renders him “handicapped” within the meaning of the EHA. See 20 U.S.C. 1401(1); 34 CFR 300.5(b)(8) (1987). As noted above, the record is replete with evidence that Smith is unable to govern his aggressive, impulsive behavior--indeed, his notice of suspension acknowledged that "Jack's actions seem beyond his control." In the absence of any suggestion that respondent has overcome his earlier difficulties, it is certainly reasonable to expect, based on his prior history of behavioral problems, that he will again engage in classroom misconduct. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that Smith's future educational placement will so perfectly suit his emotional and academic needs that further disruptions on his part are improbable. We think it equally probable that, should he do so, respondent will again be subjected to the same unilateral school action for which he initially sought relief.” (Id.)

Here, the DOE argues, the student is a ( ) year old student, that was unilaterally placed at a residential placement and has had pendency at said placement since the 2018-2019 school year, to present, where student remains at that placement and she will turn ( ) years old on , thus protecting her under the IDEA and she will be able to remain at the placement until the conclusion of the 2020-2021 school year. (Id.) Accordingly, the DOE argues that not only is the likelihood of a reoccurrence of the alleged conduct complained of conjectural, it is a near impossibility.

The Parent in opposition, has not argued that the relief she sought at the impartial hearing, has not been received pursuant to the Order on Pendency dated July 31, 2018, or rebutted the DOE’s assertion that said relief has been provided.

FINAL ORDER - PENDENCY

The Parents’ DPC having been duly filed pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and Notice having been duly given to the DOE; and The matter having come on for an “impartial hearing” before this IHO, at which time the Parent appeared with her attorney(s), [CONFIDENTIAL], attorney [CONFIDENTIAL] assigned and the DOE by its Office of Legal Services, [CONFIDENTIAL] assigned; and There being no articulated dispute between the parties and no question of fact that an “Order on Pendency” was issued on July 31, 2018, wherein the Parent was awarded pendency at the proposed unilateral placement, for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years, and that the pendency payments pursuant to the order were fully disbursed for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years; and The undersigned finding that pursuant to the Order on Pendency issued on July 31, 2018, this case has been rendered moot, with the Parent having received all of the placement, services and payments she is entitled to under that Order on Pendency, or being entitled to receive all of the placement, service and payments pursuant to that order, and a hearing on the merits being rendered moot; and this proposed “Final Order” being placed on the record herein and adjudged as being in the best interest of both parties; and Whereas in Burlington the question was whether it was appropriate to reimburse parents retroactively for private-school tuition based on the merits of their claim - i.e., because the school district's IEP was inadequate and the private-school placement was appropriate - and here the basis for retroactive reimbursement is based on pendency; and Whereas in both cases, however, the Parents were due reimbursement that had been denied them by the simple passage of time, not because they were not entitled, under the IDEA, to the relief they sought; and Whereas here the argument for retroactive reimbursement is even stronger here than in Burlington because in that case there was apparently no delay based on a statutory time limit, as there is here; and Whereas in any event, here, as in Burlington, "such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii), "Means that equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief." 471 U.S. at 374, 105 S.Ct. 1996. (See Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004), and Bd. of Educ.

v. O'Shea, 353 F.Supp.2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); and Whereas current prevailing case law prohibits a district from recouping payments made pursuant to pendency. (See New York City Dep't of Educ. v. $.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *11 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010]); and Whereas in this case the Parent has now received under “pendency” and/or will receive under “pendency” all of the relief she sought at the impartial hearing if there were a finding that the student has been denied a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year, and that the 2018-2019 school year at issue has expired, which raises the question of whether the instant matter has been rendered moot by the passage of time; and Whereas there is no other relief sought by the Parent other than the relief that she would receive based upon a denial of FAPE and that she has received or will receive retroactively under the “Order on Pendency’, for the entirety of the student’s 2018-2019 school year; and

MOOTNESS

Whereas upon careful consideration of the evidence in the hearing record I find that regardless of the merits of a decision concerning whether the DOE offered the student a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year, no further meaningful relief may be granted to the Parent because she has received and/or will receive all of the relief sought pursuant to “pendency”, and thus, the Parent's case has now been rendered moot; and Whereas careful consideration of the District Court's decision rendered in V.S., 2011 WL 3273922, as discussed further below, does not compel a different result; and Whereas the dispute between the parties must at all stages be “real and live,” and not “academic,” or it risks becoming moot. (See Lillbask v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84-85 (2 Cir. 2005), Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008), J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008), see also, Chenier v. Richard W., 82 N.Y.2d 830, 832 (1993), Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714 (1980) and SRO No. 07-139); and Whereas in general, cases dealing with issues such as desired changes in IEPs, specific placements, and implementation disputes may become moot at the end of the school year because no meaningful relief can be granted. (See, e.g., SRO Nos. 06-044, 05-058, 04-027, 00-037, 00-016 & 96-37); and Whereas administrative decisions rendered in cases concerning such issues arising out of school years that have since expired may no longer appropriately address the current needs of the student. (See Daniel R.R. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1989) and SRO Nos. 07-139, 07-028, 06-070 & 04-007); and Whereas an exception provides that a claim may not be moot despite the end of a school year for which the student’s IEP was written, if the conduct complained of is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” (See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 (1988), Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 84-85, Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040 and SRO No. 04-038); and Whereas the exception applies only in limited situations (see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) and is severely circumscribed. (See Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2TM Cir. 1998); and Whereas first, it must be apparent that “the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” (See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) see Knaust, 157 F.3d at 88 and SRO No. 07-139); and Whereas second, controversies are “capable of repetition” when there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. (See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975), Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d at 714-15 and SRO No. 07-139); and Whereas to create a reasonable expectation of recurrence, repetition must be more than theoretically possible. (See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482, Russman v. Bd. Of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 120 (2TM Cir. 2001) and SRO No. 07-139); and Whereas mere speculation that the parties will be involved in a dispute over the same issue does not rise to the level of a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability of recurrence. (See Russman, 260 F.3d at 120 and SRO No. 07-139); and Whereas “mootness” may be raised at any stage of litigation. (In re Kurtzman, 194 F.3d 54, 58 (2TM Cir. 1999) and SRO No. 07-139); and Whereas in this case, there is no longer any live controversy relating to the parties’ dispute over the placement or program offered by the DOE for the 2018-2019 school year, because even if a determination on the merits demonstrated that the DOE did not offer the student a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year, in this instance, it would have no actual effect on the parties because the 2018-2019 school year expired in June of 2019, and the student remained entitled to her pendency placement funded by the DOE through the conclusion of the administrative due process; and Whereas accordingly, the Parents’ claims for the 2018-2019 school year need not be further addressed here because an IHO is not required to make a determination that is academic or will have no actual impact upon the parties. (See SRO Nos. 11-085, 09-077, 09-065, 08-104, 08-044, 07-077, 06-044, 04-006, 02-086, 02-011 & 97-64); and Whereas concerning the District Court's decision in V.S. (2011 WL 3273922), the court in that case held that in SRO No. 10-041, the SRO correctly determined that the Parents’ request for funding for the school year that was the subject of that appeal was no longer at issue where the student was educated at public expense at a private school chosen by the Parents for the duration of the school year pursuant to a pendency order.

(See V.S., 2011 WL 3273922, at *9); and Whereas noting that a decision in favor of the district in that matter would not affect its obligation to pay the costs of the student’s private school tuition, the Court nevertheless determined that the district sought redress regarding the collateral issue of the student's ongoing pendency placement for future proceedings and that had a decision been rendered by a SRO on the merits, it would have affected the student's placement. (Id.); and Whereas after careful consideration and for several reasons discussed below, | respectfully decline to adopt the reasoning as set forth in V.S., because first, the sole reason that the District Court in V.S. held that SRO No. 10-041, was not moot was because the parties required resolution of the merits of their dispute to establish the student’s pendency placement in future proceedings. (See V.S., 2011 WL 3273922, at *10) However, this rationale regarding future pendency may be read so broadly as to apply to virtually any and all IDEA proceedings involving the educational placement or services to be provided to a student, and other courts in New York have not adopted this broad approach. (See Bd. of Educ. v. O'Shea, 353 F.Supp.2d 449, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(determining the matter was moot and declining to resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute when the pendency provision provided an independent basis for doing so) see also Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2TM Cir.

2002)(ruling that the pendency provision formed a basis for awarding relief without addressing the merits of the parties’ dispute), Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 484 (2 Cir. 2002)(rejecting the district's argument that a dispute must be resolved on the merits rather than on the basis of the pendency provision), Patskin, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29 (holding that the matter was moot where the school year at issue had passed, and stating that the relevant controversy was whether the IEP that the student was provided with was an appropriate placement and that there was no reasonable expectation that the student would be subjected to that particular IEP again), M.S. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273, 278-80 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2010)(dismissing the case as moot and noting that the parents were receiving full compensation for their private school expenditures and that the proceeding was brought to obtain legal fees), J.N., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 (upholding a SRO’s determination that the case was moot), Bd. of Educ. v. Steven L., 89 F.3d 464, 468-69 (7th Cir

1996)(holding that it was not necessary to determine which party would prevail on the merits when the stay put provision controlled for the duration of the dispute and the proposed public school IEP was no longer applicable to the student), see also New York City Dep't of Educ. v. S.S., 2010 WL 983719 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010]); and Whereas the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected this rationale, holding that the stay put provision cannot be relied upon as the basis for a live controversy when the issue of liability on the substantive issues has been rendered moot. (See Marcus I. v. Dep't of Educ., 2011 WL 1979502, at *1 (9th Cir. May 23, 2011)(explaining that stay put provision 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j/) is designed to allow a student to remain in an educational institution pending litigation, but does not guarantee a student the right to remain in any particular institution because the right to a stay put placement that stems from a given adjudicatory proceeding lapses once the proceeding has concluded); and Whereas second, we must be concerned with adjudicating rights unnecessarily, particularly when it will not affect the claims that a party alleged at the outset of the due process proceeding and especially under a statutory scheme like the IDEA, which envisions that Parents and Districts will continue to convene on at least an annual basis to review a student's current IEP or educational placement, share their concerns with one another, and cooperatively and affirmatively engage in efforts to develop a new appropriate plan designed to offer the student a FAPE in the public schools. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][4][A], 34 C.F.R. § 300.324[b][1][i], see also Educ. Law § 4402[2] and 8 NYCRR 200.4[f]) and this process usually works best when it is as free as possible from acrimonious relationships that often develop after continued litigation; and Whereas third, the automatic nature of the pendency provision set forth in the IDEA (see Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2 Cir. 1982), Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 335 F.3d 297, 301 (4 Cir. 2003), Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3

Cir. 1996), and if necessary, the speed with which parties may obtain State-level pendency placement reviews on an interlocutory basis under New York's regulatory scheme (see 8 NYCRR 279.10[d]) strongly diminishes the need to establish future pendency placements for future school years and such determinations are better left until the proceedings under which the right arises are commenced and the issue of the student's pendency placement is actually in dispute; and Whereas, the Court's comment that a decision on the merits in V.S. would be useful (2011 WL 3273922, at *10), raises a concern that the decision has the effect of removing the much-needed discretion of administrative hearing officers to focus on both fairly and efficiently resolving disputes while retaining the discretion of how best to allocate their adjudicative resources to address ever growing dockets; and Whereas for the forgoing reasons, | decline to find that the Parents’ claim for tuition reimbursement for the 2018-2019 school year continues to be a live controversy, because I find that the matter has been rendered moot by the passage of time and that the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply in this case because the matter is not capable of repetition and would not evade review; and Whereas while the Parent may elect to challenge the IEP developed for the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years and seek tuition reimbursement for the student at her private school for those school years in a subsequent due process proceeding, the issues presented in such a claim could be different as the placement recommended for the 2019-2020 school year; and Whereas each year the elements of a tuition reimbursement claim must be analyzed separately. (See Mrs. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 67 (2TM Cir.

2000)(examining the prongs of the Burlington/Carter test separately for each school year at issue), Snyder v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 2009 WL 3246579, *9-*10 (D.Md. Sept. 29, 2009), Omidian v. Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 904077, at *21-*26 (N.D.N.Y.

Mar. 31 2009)(analyzing each year of a multi-year tuition reimbursement claim separately), Student X_v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) and SRO Nos. 09-071 & 09-055) and, accordingly, the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here as I do not find this matter to be capable of repetition yet evading review. (See Honig, 484 U.S. at 318-23, Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 84-85, Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040 and SRO 04-038); and Whereas additionally, the Mayor's policy announced on June 24, 2014 that was implemented September 1, 2014 and includes the following changes in New York City:

*« Expedite Decisions: Where settlement is appropriate, DOE will seek settlement within (15) days of receiving notice of parent intent to unilaterally place their child in a school.

« Reduce Extended Legal Battles: The DOE will refrain from re-litigating settled or decided cases, unless there is a change in the IEP placement recommendation. The DOE will avoid unnecessary litigation in cases where the agency is unable to offer a placement, or when a child is about to enter the final grade of a school.

* Reduce Paperwork: Instead of requiring parents to submit full documentation every year, the DOE will only require that paperwork every three years, allowing for income eligibility updates to be made each year, as needed.

* Expedite Payments: DOE will make tuition payments on a monthly basis when required by a program, and it will provide a payment schedule to parents following any settlement. Once parents win a claim for tuition reimbursement, the DOE will pay the tuition while the DOE appeals that decision to a higher level of review; and Whereas these changes make it even more less than likely that this matter is capable of repetition that may evade review (supra); and Whereas it is also important to note that as stated above, case law prohibits the DOE from recouping payments made pursuant to pendency. (See New York City Dep't of Educ. v. $.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *11 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010]); and This IHO having determined that the parties’ arguments for and against this “Final Order’ were made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily; and The parties’ oral arguments, discussions, concessions and this order having been recorded; Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case has been rendered “moot” pursuant to the “pendency” provisions of the IDEA, and the “Order on Pendency” dated July 31, 2018, based upon the undisputed facts cited above, and the fact that the Order on pendency is retroactive to the date the Parent filed her DPC, July 6, 2018, with said payments having been already made and received by the Parent and/or the Parent now having an absolute right to receive those payments, and said payments not being recoupable by the DOE and required upon the DOE’s receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of said services having been rendered, requiring the DOE to reimburse the Parent and/or directly pay the cost of the student’s receipt of all of the placements and services ordered by the Order on Pendency dated July 31, 2018, for the entirety of the student's 2018-2019 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that a copy of the student’s Order on Pendency dated July 31, 2018, shall accompany this order for reference; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall immediately re-evaluate the student in all areas of her suspected disabilities not evaluated within the last two years; and it is further

ORDERED that upon completion of the student’s evaluations, the CSE shall forthwith reconvene to produce a new IEP for the student that considers all of the student's available evaluations and any related information and produce a new IEP for the student’s 2021-2022 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this “Final Order’ is found to be either resolved by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: December 21, 2020

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - |.H.O.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public-School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov. (Rev. 07/09/20)