Impartial Hearing Decision

UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

_______________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPARTIAL

HEARING BROUGHT UPON THE REQUEST

OF A PARENT CONCERNING THEIR CHILD

AGAINST

Decision and Order

Case Number:

SCHOOL DISTRICT

______________________________________________

Introduction This document constitutes the Decision and Order of the undersigned, the duly designated Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) in an Impartial Hearing brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the New York State Education Laws. The School District will be referred to as District, the parent as Parent and the student will be referred to as Student. This is a reimbursement case. A hearing was held on multiple dates: November 6, 2017; December 4, 2017; December 7, 2017; January 9, 2018; January 18, 2018; January 29, 2018; February 26, 2018; March 12, 2018; March 29, 2018; April 16, 2018; May 14, 2018; and June 1, 2018. The parties reviewed the record and submitted briefs for consideration in writing this opinion. (Ex.s IHO 1 & IHO 2)

Overview In this Decision and Order I will briefly outline the positions of the parties and review some student history and will then move to apply a three-prong analysis to each year of this two-year “reimbursement” case, examining first whether the District met its burden to demonstrate the appropriateness of their program, second whether the Parents met their burden to demonstrate the appropriateness of the placement at the Private School, and third whether equitable considerations favor the District or the Parents in this matter. Ultimately, I find for the Parents on all issues and direct reimbursement for the cost of the unilateral placement for each of the two years in question.

Parents’ Position In the complaint notice, the Parents allege that the District denied the Student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years. The essence of their claim is that the District programming was “. . . neither effective nor individually tailored to [their daughter’s] unique needs.” (Ex.1, p.6, ¶6) As a result, she would be unable to achieve a “meaningful postsecondary experience or independent living.” (Ex. I, p.3-Dr. G evaluation) The Parents are seeking tuition reimbursement for the Private Residential School for each of the two school years at issue. (Ex. 1).

District’s Position The District’s position is that they offered the Student a FAPE for the 2016-2017 and 2017- 2018 school years. The District’s programs offered to the Student were unique (T. 105), sought after, and offered successful learning opportunities (T. 703) that were specifically tailored to meet the needs of the Student (Ex. 4 p.2); and that the residential component of the Private Residential School was not appropriate for the Student (T. 362-363-not the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE)), and finally, that the sequence of events leading to the placement suggested that the Parents had an agenda to obtain a residential placement and that they were not cooperating with the CSE (T. 133-134, 139, 157-159, IHO Ex. 1 pp. 25-26). Procedural History The Student was evaluated for early intervention services at eighteen months because of delays in language. She began receiving related services and Special Education Itinerant Teacher (SEIT) Services at age 23 months (Ex. A). Services continued under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Preschool Special Education (CPSE) and beginning in Kindergarten the Student was recognized by the CSE and was classified as (Ex. A, 3 & E). She had attended District schools since elementary school (T. 1962, 1966). Beginning in ninth-grade (the 2014-2015 school year), the Student was in the Individual Support Program (ISP) in high school.

This program is the centerpiece of the instant controversy1. It consists of special education services that offered an “inclusive environment where students would continue with their same-aged peers year after year.” (T.98). The program was hand crafted by Dr. . (“. . I believe we are the only school district that provides such a program.” (T. 104)) It consisted

The description of this program and its nuanced approach to learning was extensively developed throughout the hearing. See, for examples: Dr. M.- T. pp. 91-121, 159-160, 170, 200, 237-238, 674-678, 693-702 Dir. of Special Education B. – 298-301, 303-309, 364- 373, 386-393, 423-429, 509-510, 700-701; Dr. G. 1167-1169 1294-1297, and Parent-1966, 2070.

of special education classes which were instructed by a dually certified special education teacher, meaning that the special education teacher was also certified to teach the content area of instruction (social studies, English, etc.). The ISP was further supported by a board-certified behavior analyst whose job it was to address the social implications characteristic of students with developmental disabilities as well as a teaching assistant who pushed into the special class. (T. 100) In the classes that were not described as special classes the Student was programmed for consultant teacher services supported by a teaching assistant and the ISP teacher who is also the BCBA. (T. 365)

Leading up to the 2016-2017 school year (eleventh grade for the Student) a number of concerns arose relative to the Student’s prospects at the District. Her Mother reported school anxiety (Ex. F & T. p.1960), lack of opportunities to socialize (T. 2031-2032) and a perception that the Student could not keep up academically (T. 2021-2022), For example, Regents level coursework impacting self-esteem and regression in reading and writing. (T. 2010-2011).

The Parents had the Student evaluated by the Private Psychologist who knew the Student and counseled the Student several years earlier when she was attending the District’s middle school (T. 1136, 1138). He recently diagnosed the Student with and among other impairments and recommended a residential placement (Ex. I & 9).

In May 2016, a CSE Annual review meeting was held for the Student for the upcoming 2016-2017 school year. At that meeting CSE members disagreed with the Private Psychologist’s assessment of the Student’s social/emotional functioning and his recommendation for a residential school placement (T. 128-134, 1402). The CSE did change the Student’s classification to (which has remained (Ex.s 5, 4, 6,7 &11)), added social skills training and increased family training. The CSE recommended that the Student should continue in the ISP Program. (Ex. 5 - pp. 1,9,10,12, T.145,343). The Parents’ request for a residential program was “disregarded” (T. 2058-2066). The Parents signed a contract with the Private Residential School on June 1, 2016 (Ex. AA). They sent a letter to the District Superintendent on August 18, 2016 with their concerns about the District program (Ex. N).

In response, another CSE meeting was held on August 31, 2016 to address the Parents’ concerns. The CSE added some goals. (Ex. 4, P. 2). The Parent (Mother) was steadfast in her advocacy for a residential program. (T. 2097-2099). As to the responsiveness of the District, the Parents assert: “too little, too late” (T. 2323). The Parents sent the Student to the Private Residential School for the 2016-2017 school year. (Ex. T).

During the first year at the Private Residential School the Student progressed academically (T. 2166, 2168, 2171), emotionally (T. 2178-2179), and socially (T. 2183, 2185-2186, 2237).

A CSE Meeting was held in May 31, 2017 as an annual review for the 2017-2018 school year (triennial year, with assessments), (IEP Ex. 6). Again, the Parents requested a residential placement, but the District determined that the ISP was the least restrictive environment. The Parents sent a 10-day notice letter to the CSE on August 9, 2017 disagreeing with the program and specifying the fact that “social/developmental needs cannot be met in day placement” (Ex. V). The CSE reconvened on August 29, 2017 for the purpose of addressing the Parents’ concerns (Ex. 7 - comments section of IEP). The Parents again enrolled the Student in the Private Residential School for the 2017-2018 school year.

Legal Background The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory framework established by Congress to aid the states in providing disabled children with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 612(a)(I). “A [FAPE] is available to all children with disabilities residing in the state between the ages of 3 and 21.” 20 U.S.C. § 612(a)(1)(A). The IDEA defines a FAPE as special education and related services that:

- (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge,

- (B) meet the standards of the state educational agency,

- (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and

- (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under § 614(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 601(9).2

“Special education” is defined by the IDEA as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education. The term “related services” is defined as transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children. 20 U.S.C. § 601(26).

A FAPE is crafted through the collaboration of the disabled student’s parents, teachers, and school district administrators and is recorded in an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 614(d). The “core of the statute … is the cooperative process that [IDEA] establishes between parents and schools.” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). The IEP is, in brief, a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a disabled child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. 20 U.S.C. § 601(14). In New York State, the IEP is produced by a committee on special education (“CSE”), whose members are appointed by the board of education or trustees of the school district. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2005).

The IDEA provides numerous procedural safeguards to protect the due process rights of disabled children and their parents. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 615. These procedures include the opportunity for parents to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child (20 U.S.C. § 615(b)(I)) and file a complaint with the state or local educational agency (20 U.S.C. § 615(b)(6)). Any such complaint is resolved through an “impartial due process hearing” in which parents of disabled children have “an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 615(b)(6). Parties to an administrative proceeding under the IDEA have the right to written findings of fact and decisions on any complaint about the provision of a FAPE. Polera v. Board of Education Newburgh, 288 F.3d 478, 482 (2nd Cir. 2002).

In New York State, “[t]he board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing …” N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404 (1)(c), modifying the rule enunciated in Schaffer where “[t]he burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is on the party seeking relief.” Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 537.

With respect to due process hearings, the IDEA permits each state to determine whether it will provide a single-tier or two-tier administrative review process. 20 U.S.C. § 615(g). New York has elected to employ the two-tier approach. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404 (McKinney Supp. 2005); accord, Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 152 (2nd Cir., 1992). Under the New York scheme a parent who wishes to challenge his or her child’s IEP is entitled to a due process hearing conducted by a hearing officer appointed by the local board of education. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1) (McKinney Supp. 2005). A party dissatisfied with the decision of the hearing officer has the right to appeal the hearing officer’s decision to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2) (McKinney Supp. 2005). After these administrative remedies have been exhausted, a party may bring a proceeding pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 4 in state court or a federal action under § 615(i)(2) of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 615(i)(2)(A); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(3) (McKinney Supp. 2004).

Reimbursement Analysis A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private education services obtained for a student by his or her parents where the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate; the services selected by the parents were appropriate; and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter. 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). This framework may be referred to as the three-prong Burlington/Carter Test. The first prong of this test, whether the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, is the proper heading under which to consider the alleged violations in this case.

Prong I The Law Concerning Tuition Reimbursement and the Procedural and Substantive

Standards used in Determining FAPE A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private education services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter. 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985).

Substantive Standard The purpose of IDEA is to provide students with a “basic floor of opportunity” of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefits. Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson CSD v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189-190, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982); Walczak v. Florida UFSD, 142 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 1998). Neither the IDEA nor Article 89 of the New York State Education Law requires a school district to provide special education and related services designed to maximize the potential of a disabled student. Nor do federal and state education laws require a school district to provide the best possible educational program and related services or match those services requested by a parent. Application of a Child With a Disability (City School District of Buffalo), S.R.O. Decision 04-20 (2004). Rather, the goals and mandates of the IDEA and N.Y. Education Law are relatively modest: namely, to provide appropriate specialized education and related services sufficient for the disabled student to benefit from his/her education. Straube v. Florida UFSD, 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1175-1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Moubry v. Independent School District, 9 F. Supp.2d 1086, 1104 (D. Minn. 1998) (citing Rowley).

This straightforward obligation of the District is underscored by the obligation to demonstrate the appropriateness of the program recommended by its CSE. To meet its burden, a board of education must show that its recommended program is reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); 8 NYCRR 200.6(a)(1).x

Procedural Standard Detailed procedural provisions lie at the heart of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 615; 34 C.F.R. §§300.300-300.576; Evans v. Rhinebeck Central School District, 930 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); B.E. R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ. 874 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1989). In order to achieve the goal of providing all children with eligible disabilities with a FAPE, the IDEA statute requires that the states comply with “extensive procedural rights and safeguards” in order to receive federal funds for use in special education programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 615(a); LIH v. New York City Board of Educ., 33 IDELR 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); J.G. v. Board of Education of the Rochester City Sch. Dist., 830 F.2d 444, 445 (2d Cir. 1987).

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Act’s procedural guarantees are not mere procedural hoops through which Congress wanted state and local educational agencies to jump. See Brandon R.R. 874 F. 2d at 1041, Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998). Rather, the formality of the Act’s procedures is itself a safeguard against arbitrary or erroneous decision making. The United States Supreme Court has articulated that material procedural violations, in and of themselves, often can constitute failures to provide a FAPE. In fact, a single material violation of the Act’s procedural guarantees is a sufficient ground for holding that a school district failed to provide a FAPE. Id.

For this reason, the Supreme Court held in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), that the very first inquiry in a case of this type is to determine whether or not there have been any material procedural violations. As the Rowley Court held, “… the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid.” 458 U.S. 176.

In evaluating whether the District has complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA, I consider whether the alleged procedural violation either 1) impeded the Student’s right to a free and appropriate public education, 2) significantly impeded the Parent’s opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision of a free and appropriate education, or 3) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see also, Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp.2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2007), Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 07-007.

Factual Analysis of Parents’ Arguments for a Finding a Procedural Violation that

Resulted in the Denial of FAPE The arguments regarding procedural violations are that the District significantly impeded the Parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE by 1) predetermining the outcome of the CSE meeting, and 2) that the ISP program was so confusing that the Parents could not decipher the program.

The Predetermination Claim Regarding the predetermination claim, the Parents assert that the District was “committed” (Parents’ brief IHO 2) to their recommendation of the ISP, the CSE was of a “predetermined” mind, to deploy that program only, (See, P.F. v. Bedford Central School District, 15-CV-507 (KBF), 2016 WL 1181712), and the District thereby thwarted the Parents’ participation. In fact, there was some testimony that the ISP recommendation was the preferred program and that no other programs, in or out-of-District, were considered. (T. 221-222). In ruling that this violation did significantly impede the Parents’ role in the CSE process, I find that the context of the District position was not to intentionally preclude the Parents’ participation (“. . . even when educational authorities act with the best intentions, they may sometimes fall short of their obligations under the IDEA.” Mrs. P. v.

Newington, 546 F.3d 111). Rather, I attribute this error to the pride demonstrated by the District witnesses in the District’s program, and the effort to educate the Parents about the potential of the ISP placement. Unfortunately, the miscommunication resulted in a failure to account for the Parents’ position (the Student’s unique needs). The District personnel were simply very confident (T. 503) in their belief that the ISP placement was a very good program and that the Student was progressing in the Least Restrictive Environment. (LRE) (T. 628). This mindset of the District carried into the 2017/2018 school year as well. (T. p. 567) This was so despite the reports of substantial progress throughout the Student’s first year at the Private Residential School. (See citations in Prong II analysis infra) The problem was more than a disagreement over the appropriate placement. The Parents were effectively “minimized” (T. 1309) by the CSE’s collective failure to recognize the Parents’ position. (See, the Private Psychologist’s testimony concerning the dismissal of his independent evaluation at T. 1311 and the Parent’s view that the CSE “dismissed” her position “out of hand” and treated the Private Psychologist’s opinion regarding residential placement as invalid. (T. 2064-2065) .

The Parents had a very active role in their daughter’s education. Attendance at CSE meetings was consistent over the years. The Parents were familiar with, and cordial with District personnel, knew the Student’s teachers and related services providers and were advocating for the Student via telephone, in person visits to the District, e-mail, correspondence, the retainer of an advocate, and the commission of the Private Psychologist. Nevertheless, I find that their role in the CSE was stifled and substantially impaired. Accordingly, I find a procedural violation based upon a predetermined District approach to placement. Accordingly, I move to Prong II.

Prong II I now consider whether the Parents met their burden of proving the appropriateness of the placement of the Student at the Private School. On Prong II, New York federal courts have held that parental placements are “subject to fewer constraints than that applied to the school authorities.” Schreiber v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 700 F. Supp 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Second Circuit has clearly stated:

“… [P]arents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.

2007) quoting Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 (2d Cir. 2006).

Moreover, parents “may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board.” Frank G. v. Bd. of Ed. of Hyde Park (2d Cir. 2006) quoting M.S. v. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of Yonkers, 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) citing Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that “the test for the parents’ private placement is that it is appropriate, and not that it is perfect”).

The Parent bears the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of the educational program in which the Student was enrolled. M.S., 231 F.3d at 104; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 02-027. In order to meet that burden, the Parent must show that the Private School offered an educational program that met the Student’s special education needs. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 02-027. While parents are not held as strictly to the standard of placement in the LRE as school districts are, the restrictiveness of the parental placement may be considered in determining entitlement to an award of tuition reimbursement. M.S., 231 F.3d at 105; Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2002).

On this record I find support that the Student has a unique profile. In the most recent, contested IEP (Ex. 7), the Student was characterized in the academic domain with challenges in reading comprehension, a need for assistance to make inferences and to answer more complex or abstract questions. Her written expression scores were below average. Her math scores were in the low range and she presents with receptive language deficits. Cognitively her scores generally fall in the extremely low range. Her adaptive profile is significantly below expected levels for her age. Her Private Psychologist encapsulates her personality:

“A maturing adolescent, she possesses the emotional innocence and social naivete of one much younger. Drawn to others, [The Student’s] cognitive deficits, time needed to process incoming information, quirky neurophysiology, inattention and executive dysfunction, and anxiety combine to make for stilted social skills and much self-consciousness in the social arena.” (Ex. I)

The Private Residential School is a fit on several levels. For one, while the placement is outside of New York State, it is New York State approved (Ex. JJJ). At the residential placement the Student has exhibited progress for two years. Academically she has achieved many of the goals (Ex.s HH, II, FFF, LLL, MMM) and her grades were good. (Ex.s EEE & NNN). Socially, the Student made friends at School and kept in touch with her friends when she went home (T. 2183, 2185) She participated in clubs, took a cooking class, ran on the track team, played tennis and got together with other girls. (T. 2185-2186) Her mother noticed an immediate change in her daughter’s ability to have a back and forth conversation. (T. 2189) The Student’s Advisor stated: The Student made “significant social emotional progress” has a best friend and can maintain healthy friendships. (Ex. KKK). The Private Psychologist observed that the Student made social/emotional progress when he re-evaluated her in January of 2018 based upon the amount of information she shared and the fact that her conversation was at a more mature level than two years earlier. (T. 1666- 1668) He opined: “I really felt she was absorbing things that were being taught to her . . .. between classes, in the dorm, in counseling sessions, reinforced by teachers and other professionals who work with her through the day.” (T. 1694) Also crucial are the improvements in her ADLs. This was a girl who could not consistently get herself dressed in the morning before school. After attending the Private Residential School she quickly acquired a routine. (T. 2178-2179 & Ex.s KKK & OOO)

Prong III A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985); R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252. In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA. 471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192. “Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance” had it offered the student a FAPE. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); 34 CFR 300.148. The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c); see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).

In closing I find that the equities do not warrant a reduction in tuition reimbursement. Contrary to the District position, I find that the Parents acted cooperatively with the CSE and the District leading up to the unilateral placement and throughout the hearing process (T. 2094)

It is therefore ORDERED

The District shall provide reimbursement for payments made to the Private Residential School for the 2016-2017 school year and the 2017-2018 school year upon presentation of properly receipted invoices for same including reimbursement for necessary ancillary items such as club fees and reasonable transportation (i.e. The published federal rate for mileage) for the Student and Parents to and from the Private Residential School, and to the extent that there remains an unpaid balance, direct payment shall be made for tuition.

Dated: December 7, 2018

___________________

Martin J. Kehoe III, Esq.

Impartial Hearing Officer

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

The Parents and/or the District have a right to obtain a review of this decision by a State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Part 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, Section 4404 of the Education Law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

Directions and forms can be found on the Office of State Review website: http://www.sro.nysed.gov/RevisedRegulationsOverview.html