New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

Case Number: 167735

Student’s Name:

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Date of Hearing: August 30, 2017

Actual Record Closed Date: September 1, 2017

Hearing Officer: Bruce Olinger, Esq.

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON AUGUST 30, 2017

Parent (Via Telephone) — Student

District Representative (Via Telephone) — DOE

INTRODUCTION

This document constitutes the Decision and Order of the undersigned, the duly designated Impartial Hearing Officer in an Impartial Hearing brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the New York State Education laws. The New York City Department of Education will be referred to as District or the DOE and the parents as Parents or CM and the child will be referred to as Student or NC.

JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(A), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR §

200.5(k).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This hearing was requested by a Due Process Complaint on July 26, 2017 by , the parent of student (Parent Ex. A). The nature of the complaint to be addressed in this decision is the Parent’s claim that the DOE failed to provide with a FAPE for a portion of the 2016/17 school year, including the failure to conduct appropriate evaluations to determine Student’s academic needs, following Parent’s request for such evaluation on or about March 22, 2017, and the failure to provide special education services to during the relevant portion of the 2016/17 school year following any such evaluations. As a result, Parent seeks compensatory relief for the failure to provide a FAPE during such period of the 2016/17 school year.

The undersigned was appointed as Impartial Hearing Officer on July 27, 2017. A evaluation of student was ultimately conducted by the DOE following the conclusion of the 2016/17 school year, and an IESP for the 2017/18 school year, not at issue for this Decision and Order (but relevant to the findings concerning the 2016/17 school year), was thereafter created providing , as well as (DOE Exhibit 1), both of which Parent is in agreement with as an appropriate special education program for Student. Additionally, a hearing was held on August 30, 2017. The DOE was represented by and the Parent appeared pro-se. The undersigned presided during such hearing.

The hearing record was closed effective September 1, 2017, the date of receipt of the transcript of this hearing.

Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Student is a disabled child, bilingual, but dominant in English. As per the results of the evaluation, noted above, presents with , with

.

was found to be

, and was found to be . In addition, Student was found to be . With respect to , Student’s assessment indicated as evidenced by her performance on the and informal observations, achieving

.

Additionally, Student was determined to ,

, ,

, ,

, . She also presented with

. Student

was determined to have .

Parent had initially requested of the DOE, on or about March 22, 2017, that be evaluated in order to determine whether she was eligible for special education services.

The DOE did not evaluate within the required 60 day period; rather, as noted above, such evaluation did not occur until after the conclusion of the 2016/17 school year. Also as noted above, was ultimately recommended for , as well as , beginning with the 2017/18 school year, as contained in her IESP dated August 29, 2017. Parent seeks compensatory services equal to the IESP recommendation for that period during the 2016/17 school year following the request for an evaluation.

PARENT’S POSITION

The Parents allege that Student has been denied a FAPE for the relevant portion of the 2016/17 school year, due to the failure of the DOE to conduct, in a timely manner, appropriate evaluations to determine ’s eligibility for special education services.

While the DOE ultimately recommended, as part of the August 29, 2017 IESP for the 2017/18 school year, and , as noted above, Parent asserts that Student was harmed during the 2016/17 school year as a result of the DOE’s failure to conduct appropriate assessments in a timely manner, and failure to thereafter provide appropriate services in accordance with such assessment. Parent seeks the same and as articulated in the 2017/18 school year IESP as a compensatory education award for that portion of the 2016/17 school year to which Student is entitled.

DISTRICTS POSITION

The District does not challenge the Parent’s claim that was denied a FAPE for the relevant portion of the 2016/17 school year, nor does is dispute Parent’s claim that it failed to conduct appropriate evaluations of Student in a timely manner following

Parent’s request, dated March 22, 2017 for such evaluations, and additionally, presented no evidence or testimony to refute Parent’s claim of a denial of FAPE for the relevant portion of the 2016/17 school year.

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Applicable Legal Standards

Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (a) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v.

T.A ., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); B oard of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.

v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982) 1.

1. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that –

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.

The IDEA requires a school district to have an Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) in effect for each child with a disability at the beginning of each school year. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(a); see 71 Fed. Reg. 46682 [stating that the IDEA "is clear that at the beginning of each school year, each [district] must have an IEP in effect for each child with a disability in the agency's jurisdiction. Further, An IEP has to be based upon appropriate evaluations. 34 C.F.R. §300.324(a)(iii).

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]; Tarlowe v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008] [noting that a CSE must consider, among other things, the "results of the initial evaluation or most recent evaluation" of the student, as well as the "'academic, developmental, and functional needs'" of the student]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).

An IEP has to be based upon appropriate evaluations. 34 C.F.R. §300.324(a)(iii).

See also 34 C.F.R. §§300.303-300.311, 300.315; 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(f). All reevaluations shall be conducted by a multidisciplinary team, including a specialist in the area of the student’s disability. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(b)(4). Children must be assessed “in all areas of suspected disability” using “a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic information.” 20 U.S.C.

§1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 10.

Additionally, 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(b)(6) provides that every reevaluation must identify “all of the special education and related services needs, whether or not commonly linked to the child’s classification.” 34 C.F.R. § 303(c)(6).

Pursuant to the Decision in L.O. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 822 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2016), "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not." R.E., 694 F.3d at 190.

Parents should be central members of IEP teams. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(A), 1414(c), 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. §§300.15; 300.303. Further, regulations provide that the parent must have an adequate opportunity to participate in the development of the child’s IEP Cerra v. Paw ling Cent. School District, 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005, requiring that the Parent be properly notified of the IEP meeting and that such meeting be scheduled at a “mutually agreed upon time and place.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.322.

An IEP must include a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals designed to meet the student's needs that result from the student's disability to enable the student to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the student's other educational needs that result from the student's disability (see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][II]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][2][i]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]). Each annual goal shall include the evaluative criteria, evaluation procedures and schedules to be used to measure progress toward meeting the annual goal during the period beginning with placement and ending with the next scheduled review by the committee (8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii][b]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][III]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][3])

A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203). However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).

Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at

132).

However, in the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Endrew F. v.

Douglas County School District, 580 U.S. __, 14 (2017), argued January 11, 2017, and decided March 22, 2017, the Court held that, while Rowley declined “to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act”, 458 U. S., at 202, it nevertheless still held that “a substantive standard was “implicit in the Act”. Rowley , 458 U. S., at 193, n. 15. It similarly held that “the statement that the Act did not “guarantee any particular level of education” simply reflects the unobjectionable proposition that the IDEA cannot and does not promise “any particular [educational] outcome.” Id.at 192. Rather, the Court in Endrew held that, “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circum stances (emphasis added), as a focus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA. The instruction offered must be “specially designed” to meet a child’s “unique needs” through an “individualized education program.” §§1401(29), (14) (emphasis added), to reflect the fact that a contemplated IEP must be focused on the “particular child that is at the core of the IDEA”. . In such case, the school is still required to ensure the student is given an IEP that requires not just academic but also functional progress and, although the goals may differ for students, each child must have an IEP that includes goals and services to enable a child to make both academic and functional progress. The court further stated that an IEP “is not a form document. It is constructed only after careful consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability, and potential for growth”. §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV), (d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv), and that “a student offered an educational program providing “merely more than de minimis progress” from year to year can hardly be said to have been offered an education at all”. The Court in Endrew further stated that “The IDEA demands more. It requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances”. And although the Supreme Court declined to elaborate on the definition of “appropriate progress” from case to case, it stated that “the adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created”. Finally, The Supreme Court in Endrew declined to hold, as it declined to hold in Rowley, that “every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to grade . . . is automatically receiving a [FAPE].” Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty v.

Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 203, n. 25 (1982).

Once a parent consents to a district's provision of special education services, such services must be provided by the district in conformity with the student's IEP (20 U.S.C. § 1401[9][D]; 34 CFR 300.17[d]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d]; 34 CFR 300.320). The school district must provide special education and related services to a student with a disability in accordance with the student's IEP and must make a good faith effort to assist the student to achieve the annual goals and, if appropriate, short-term instructional objectives or benchmarks listed in the student's IEP. See 8 NYCRR 200.4(e)(7). With regard to the implementation of a student's IEP, a denial of a FAPE occurs if the district deviates from substantial or significant provisions of the student's IEP in a material way (T.L. v. New

York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 1107652, *14 [E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012]; D.D-S., 2011 WL 3919040, at *13; A.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 812 F. Supp. 2d 492, 503 [S.D.N.Y. 2011]; see A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 370 Fed. App'x 202, 205 [2d Cir. 2010]; Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 [9th Cir. 2007]; Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 [5th Cir. 2000]). In order to show a denial of a FAPE based on a failure to implement an IEP, a party must establish more than a de minimis failure to implement all elements of the IEP, and instead must demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP (see Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d at 349; see also Fisher v. Stafford Township Bd. of Educ., 289 Fed. App'x 520, 524–25 [3d Cir. 2008]; Couture v. Bd. of Educ., 535 F.3d 1243 [10th Cir. 2008]; Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 [8th Cir. 2003]). Accordingly, in reviewing failure to implement claims under the IDEA, courts have held that it must be ascertained whether the aspects of the IEP that were not followed were substantial, or in other words, "material" (A.P., 370 Fed. App'x at 205; see Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822 [holding that a "material failure occurs when there is more than a minor discrepancy between the services a school provides to a disabled [student] and the services required by the [student's] IEP"]; see also Catalan v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73 [D. D.C. 2007] [holding that where a student missed a 'handful' of speech-language therapy sessions as a result of the therapist's absence or due to the student's fatigue, nevertheless, the student received consistent speech-language therapy in accordance with his IEP, and the district's failure to follow the IEP was excusable under the circumstances and did not amount to a failure to implement the student's program]).

Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .

shall, solely by reason of his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal assistance.” 29 U.S.C. §794(a). Section 504 and the IDEA are often seen as “complementary” statutes that, to a degree, mandate parallel requirements on schools to provide special education and related services. See R.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New Y ork, 99 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted). The Section 504 regulations clarify the nature of the prohibited discrimination. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(ii)-(iii). In addition, the Section 504 regulations place similar and even parallel requirements on schools to provide a FAPE. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.33-104.37.

Evaluations: 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(c) and 8 NYCRR § 200.4(b)(1) provide that, under the IDEA, an initial evaluation must be conducted within 60 calendar days of receiving parental consent for the evaluation. A parent must also be advised of the right to request an assessment to determine the child’s educational needs. See 34 C.F.R. §

300.305(d)(1)(ii); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(b)(5)(iv).

RELATED SERVICES

As provided in 8 NYCRR 200.6(e):

Related services shall be recommended by the committee on special education to meet specific needs of a student with a disability as set forth in the individualized education program (IEP).

(1) The frequency, duration and location of each such service shall be in the IEP, based on the individual student's need for the service.

(2) For students with disabilities determined to need speech and language services, the total caseload of such students for teachers providing such services shall not exceed

65. 103 200.6

(3) When a related service is provided to a number of students at the same time, the number of students in the group shall not exceed five students per teacher or specialist except that, in the city school district of the city of New York, the commissioner shall allow a variance of up to 50 percent rounded up to the nearest whole number from the maximum of five students per teacher or specialist.

(4) A student with a disability may be provided with more than one such service in accordance with the need of the student.

(5) Related services may be provided in conjunction with a regular education program or with other special education programs and services.

A board of education may be required to pay for educational services obtained for a student by his or her parent, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parent were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parent's claim (Burlington School Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). The failure of a parent to select a program known to be approved by the state in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement (Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]).

COMPENSATORY SERVICES

The purpose of an award of compensatory educational services or additional services is to provide an appropriate remedy for a denial of a FAPE (see E.M. v. New

York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 451 [2d Cir. 2014]. Compensatory education is a remedy designed to "make up for" a denial of a FAPE]; see also Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [holding that, in fashioning an appropriate compensatory education remedy, "the inquiry must be fact-specific, and to accomplish IDEA's purposes, the ultimate award must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place"]; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup

Sch. Dist., 31F.3d 1489, 1497 [9th Cir. 1994] [holding that "[a]ppropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA"]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 11-075; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10- 052). Accordingly, an award of additional services should aim to place the student in the position he or she would have been in had the district complied with its obligations under the IDEA (see Newington, 546 F.3d at 123 [holding that compensatory education awards should be designed so as to "appropriately address[] the problems with the IEP"]; S.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2014 WL 1311761, at *7 [E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2014] [noting that compensatory education "serves to compensate a student who was actually educated under an inadequate IEP and to catch-up the student to where he [or she] should have been absent the denial of a FAPE"] [internal quotations and citation omitted]; see also Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1289 [11th Cir. 2008] [holding that "[c]ompensatory awards should place children in the position they would have been in but for the violation of the Act"]; Bd. of Educ. v.

L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 316 [6th Cir. 2007] [holding that "a flexible approach, rather than a rote hour-by-hour compensation award, is more likely to address [the student's]

educational problems successfully"]; Reid, 401 F.3d at 518 [holding that compensatory education is a "replacement of educational services the child should have received in the first place" and that compensatory education awards "should aim to place disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district's violations of IDEA"]; Puyallup, 31 F.3d at 1497 [finding "[t]here is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed"]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 13-168; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No.12-135; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 11-132; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-091).

Compensatory education awards can be drafted under two types of approaches: a quantitative approach and a qualitative approach. With a quantitative approach, courts examine the amount of time during which a child has been deprived of a FAPE, and award compensatory services with an eye towards making up that time. See, e.g., M.C. v.

Central Regional School District, 81 F.3d 389, 297 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding generally that subject to equitable adjustment, the “child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, excluding only the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem.”).

Under the qualitative approach, the examination should focus on the child’s needs; “some students may require only short, intensive compensatory programs targeted at specific problems or deficiencies” while “[o]thers may need extended programs, perhaps even exceeding hour-for-hour replacement of the time spent without FAPE.” Reid v.

District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Pursuant to this approach, there must be evidence regarding the child’s “specific educational deficits” resulting from the failure to provide FAPE and “specific compensatory measures” designed to “correct those deficits. Reid, supra at 526.

ANALYSIS

The first inquiry to be addressed is whether the DOE provided with a FAPE for the 2016/17 school year.

As noted above, the DOE has the burden of establishing that it provided a FAPE for a student for each school year in which a challenge is made by the Parent. In the instant case, the DOE presented no testimony or evidence to establish that a FAPE was provided for the 2016/17 school year, and presented no evidence or testimony to refute

Parent’s claim that she had requested an evaluation for Student and an appropriate educational placement for Student based on the results of the evaluation.

The Parent testified that she had requested that the DOE evaluate Student on or about March 22, 2017 (Tr. p. 14). The DOE did not dispute Parent’s testimony. In addition, the DOE acknowledges that, despite the Parent’s request for an evaluation of Student, it failed to do so until after the conclusion of the 2016/17 school year. Once the evaluation was completed, Student was determined to be eligible for as well as . Such instruction and service has been incorporated into Student’s IESP for the 2017/18 school year, and neither the Parent nor the DOE disputes the appropriateness of such placement.

Parent correctly argues that Student was eligible for the same such services during a portion of the 2016/17 school year following her request for an evaluation on March 22, 2017, as Student would have been found eligible for same had the DOE conducted its evaluations of Student in a timely manner following such request, instead of delaying the evaluation until after the end of the 2016/17 school year. As the DOE failed to conduct the evaluations within 60 days of Parent’s request, as required, it is determined that the DOE failed to provide a FAPE for Student following the request for such evaluation.

The DOE was required to conduct its evaluation of Student within 60 days of Parent’s request, as there exists no evidence in the hearing record to establish that the DOE should have known of Student’s need for special education services prior to Parent’s request. Had the DOE, therefore, complied with the requirement to conduct its evaluation within such 60 day period, Student would have been determined eligible for and no later than May 22, 2017. Thus, Student is determined eligible for , retroactive to May 22, 2017. Based on such failure to timely evaluate Student, the appropriate and for which is determined eligible for the 2016/17 school year is:

1)

;

2) .

The noted immediately above to which has been determined eligible for the relevant portion of the 2016/17 school year must, by virtue of such

2016/17 school year having already concluded, be provided as compensatory services.

As noted earlier, compensatory services are required to place the child in the position she would have been had a denial of FAPE not occurred in the first place. Also as noted earlier, there are two methods for determining the appropriate level of compensatory services. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, given the disabilities of the child, and given the fact that it is impossible to determine at the present time the exact compensatory measures required to correct the deficits resulting from the denial of FAPE, the quantitative approach is determined to be the more effective and equitable form of compensatory award, as indicated below.

NOTE ON COMPENSATORY SERVICES AWARD

Based on eligibility retroactive to May 22, 2017, and ’s entitlement to , the total award of shall be ( ) for the 2016/17 school year.

Based on eligibility retroactive to May 22, 2017, and ’s entitlement to , the total award of shall be ( ) for the 2016/17 school year.

ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE DOE PROVIDE STUDENT THE

FOLLOWING:

1. As compensatory services for the 2016/17 school year:

a) , to be placed in a compensatory service

“bank” to be utilized immediately and, thereafter, during the entire 2017/18 school year;

b) , to be placed in a compensatory service “bank” to be utilized immediately and, thereafter, during the entire

2017/18 school year.

2. The DOE shall issue to Parent Related Service Authorizations (RSA’s), or arrange other suitable payment arrangement for the provision of such and as directed above;

3. The DOE shall comply in all respects with this Decision and Order. Dated: September 22, 2017

BRUCE S. OLINGER. ESQ. BO: Impartial Hearing Officer

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

The parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to obtain a review of this decision by a State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Part 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, Section 4404 of the Education Law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

Directions and forms can be found on the Office of State Review website: http://www.sro.nysed.gov/RevisedRegulationsOverview.html.

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD

PARENT

A. Due Process Complaint 7/27//17 1 page

DOE

1. IESP 8/29/17 11 pages