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FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number: 166190
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
District:
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Date of Hearing: June 20, 2017
July 17, 2017
August 14, 2017
August 16, 2017
Actual Record Closed Date: August 30, 2017
Hearing Officer: Bruce Olinger, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON JUNE 20, 2017
Parent, Pro Se (Via Telephone) — Student
District Representative — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON JULY 17, 2017
Parent (Via Telephone) — Student
District Representative — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON AUGUST 14, 2017
Parent, Pro Se (Via Telephone) — Student
District Representative — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON AUGUST 16, 2017
(Via Telephone) — Student
Mother — Student
INTRODUCTION
This document constitutes the Decision and Order of the undersigned, the duly designated Impartial Hearing Officer in an Impartial Hearing brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the New York State Education laws. The New York City Department of Education will be referred to as District or the DOE and the parents as Parents or and the child will be referred to as Student or .
JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(A), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR §
200.5(k).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This hearing was requested by a Due Process Complaint on May 11, 2017 by , the parent of student (Parent Ex. A). The nature of the complaint to be addressed in this decision is the Parent’s claim that the DOE failed to provide with a FAPE for the 2016/17 school year, including the failure to conduct appropriate evaluations to determine Student’s academic needs, following Parent’s request for such evaluations, and the failure to provide special education services to during the entirety of the 2016/17 school year.
As a result, Parent seeks compensatory relief for the failure to provide a FAPE during the 2016/17 school year.
The undersigned was appointed as Impartial Hearing Officer on May 12, 2017.
An Interim Order was issued on June 21, 2017, directing that the DOE conduct a evaluation of student, as well as a evaluation ( ); the interim Order further directed that the CSE reconvene following the receipt of such evaluations to create a new IESP in accordance therewith (IHO Exhibit I). Additionally, hearings were held on June 20, 2017, July 17, 2017, August 14, 2017 and August 16, 2017. During the hearing of June 20, 2017, the DOE was represented by ; during the remaining hearing dates, the DOE was represented by . The Parent appeared pro-se at all hearings. The undersigned presided during all hearing dates.
During the course of the proceedings, the parties moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter on August 1, 2017 and August 14, 2017, in order to allow for an examination of all relevant witnesses and documents, and to complete the hearing.
In considering such requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that, in allowing for adequate time for such purposes, the delays in the resolution of the matter and the extension of time for such purposes were in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, the requests for an extension of the case compliance date were granted (IHO Exhibit II). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR §
200.5(j)(5).
The hearing record was closed effective August 30 2017, the date of receipt of the final transcript of this hearing.
Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Student is a disabled child, , but dominant in . As per the results of the evaluation, noted above dated June 27, 2017 (DOE Exhibit 2), presents with . Additionally, he presents with . His are in the , as measured by , and his is likewise only in the . were and , with at the
. and were both in the
, with and both being in the
. He also exhibited .
Parent had initially requested of the DOE, on or about October 1, 2016, that be evaluated in order to determine whether he was eligible for special education services. In response to such request, the DOE conducted a Social History Evaluation, dated November 18, 2016 (DOE Exhibit 1). No further evaluations occurred until the aforementioned Interim Order was issued, pursuant to Parent’s request for an Impartial Hearing, at which time the above-noted evaluation occurred.
Such evaluation recommended, in addition to support services to address ’s , a evaluation and an evaluation. While the Interim Order authorized the evaluation, Parent declined such evaluation, despite the undersigned advising Parent that such evaluation should take place, stating that she did not believe to have deficits in . The undersigned also advised Parent that should have an evaluation, based on the recommendations contained in the evaluation, but again Parent declined same, stating that she did not consider to be deficient in his . The advice given to Parent regarding the recommended evaluations, and Parent’s declining of same, are contained in email communications marked as IHO Exhibit III.
PARENT’S POSITION
The Parents allege that Student has been denied a FAPE for the 2016/17 school year, due to the failure of the DOE to conduct appropriate evaluations to determine ’s eligibility for special education services, other than the Social History Evaluation.
Additionally, the DOE did not hold an IEP meeting for for the 2016/17 school year, did not create an IEP for for the 2016/17 school year, and did not provide any special educational services for for the 2016/17 school year. Parent seeks support services in the form of to address ’s , as set forth in the evaluation. Parent further alleges that, due to such denial of FAPE, has been harmed educationally and seeks, pursuant to the hearing request, compensatory educational services to address such denial and to compensate for the 2016/17 school year.
DISTRICTS POSITION
The District does not challenge the Parent’s claim that was denied a FAPE for the 2016/17 school year, and presented no evidence or testimony to refute Parent’s claim of a denial of FAPE for the 2016/17 school year.
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Applicable Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (a) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v.
T.A ., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); B oard of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982) 1.
1. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that –
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.
The IDEA requires a school district to have an Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) in effect for each child with a disability at the beginning of each school year. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(a); see 71 Fed. Reg. 46682 [stating that the IDEA "is clear that at the beginning of each school year, each [district] must have an IEP in effect for each child with a disability in the agency's jurisdiction.
Further, An IEP h as to be based upon appropriate evaluations. 34 C.F.R.
§300.324(a)(iii).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]; Tarlowe v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008] [noting that a CSE must consider, among other things, the "results of the initial evaluation or most recent evaluation" of the student, as well as the "'academic, developmental, and functional needs'" of the student]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).
An IEP has to be based upon appropriate evaluations. 34 C.F.R. §300.324(a)(iii).
See also 34 C.F.R. §§300.303-300.311, 300.315; 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(f). All reevaluations shall be conducted by a multidisciplinary team, including a specialist in the area of the student’s disability. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(b)(4). Children must be assessed “in all areas of suspected disability” using “a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic information.” 20 U.S.C.
§1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 10.
Additionally, 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(b)(6) provides that every reevaluation must identify “all of the special education and related services needs, whether or not commonly linked to the child’s classification.” 34 C.F.R. § 303(c)(6).
Pursuant to the Decision in L.O. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 822 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2016), "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not." R.E., 694 F.3d at 190.
Parents should be central members of IEP teams. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(A), 1414(c), 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. §§300.15; 300.303. Further, regulations provide that the parent must have an adequate opportunity to participate in the development of the child’s IEP Cerra v. Paw ling Cent. School District, 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005, requiring that the Parent be properly notified of the IEP meeting and that such meeting be scheduled at a “mutually agreed upon time and place.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.322.
An IEP must include a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals designed to meet the student's needs that result from the student's disability to enable the student to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the student's other educational needs that result from the student's disability (see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][II]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][2][i]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]). Each annual goal shall include the evaluative criteria, evaluation procedures and schedules to be used to measure progress toward meeting the annual goal during the period beginning with placement and ending with the next scheduled review by the committee (8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii][b]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][III]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.320[a][3])
A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203). However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).
Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at
132).
However, in the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Endrew F. v.
Douglas County School District, 580 U.S. __, 14 (2017), argued January 11, 2017, and decided March 22, 2017, the Court held that, while Rowley declined “to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act”, 458 U. S., at 202, it nevertheless still held that “a substantive standard was “implicit in the Act”. Rowley , 458 U. S., at 193, n. 15. It similarly held that “the statement that the Act did not “guarantee any particular level of education” simply reflects the unobjectionable proposition that the IDEA cannot and does not promise “any particular [educational] outcome.” Id.at 192. Rather, the Court in Endrew held that, “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circum stances (emphasis added), as a focus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA. The instruction offered must be “specially designed” to meet a child’s “unique needs” through an “individualized education program.” §§1401(29), (14) (emphasis added), to reflect the fact that a contemplated IEP must be focused on the “particular child that is at the core of the IDEA”. . In such case, the school is still required to ensure the student is given an IEP that requires not just academic but also functional progress and, although the goals may differ for students, each child must have an IEP that includes goals and services to enable a child to make both academic and functional progress. The court further stated that an IEP “is not a form document. It is constructed only after careful consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability, and potential for growth”. §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV), (d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv), and that “a student offered an educational program providing “merely more than de minimis progress” from year to year can hardly be said to have been offered an education at all”. The Court in Endrew further stated that “The IDEA demands more. It requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances”. And although the Supreme Court declined to elaborate on the definition of “appropriate progress” from case to case, it stated that “the adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created”. Finally, The Supreme Court in Endrew declined to hold, as it declined to hold in Rowley, that “every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to grade . . . is automatically receiving a [FAPE].” Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty v.
Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 203, n. 25 (1982).
Once a parent consents to a district's provision of special education services, such services must be provided by the district in conformity with the student's IEP (20 U.S.C. § 1401[9][D]; 34 CFR 300.17[d]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d]; 34 CFR 300.320). The school district must provide special education and related services to a student with a disability in accordance with the student's IEP and must make a good faith effort to assist the student to achieve the annual goals and, if appropriate, short-term instructional objectives or benchmarks listed in the student's IEP. See 8 NYCRR 200.4(e)(7). With regard to the implementation of a student's IEP, a denial of a FAPE occurs if the district deviates from substantial or significant provisions of the student's IEP in a material way (T.L. v. New
York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 1107652, *14 [E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012]; D.D-S., 2011 WL 3919040, at *13; A.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 812 F. Supp. 2d 492, 503 [S.D.N.Y. 2011]; see A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 370 Fed. App'x 202, 205 [2d Cir. 2010]; Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 [9th Cir. 2007]; Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 [5th Cir. 2000]). In order to show a denial of a FAPE based on a failure to implement an IEP, a party must establish more than a de minimis failure to implement all elements of the IEP, and instead must demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP (see Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d at 349; see also Fisher v. Stafford Township Bd. of Educ., 289 Fed. App'x 520, 524–25 [3d Cir. 2008]; Couture v. Bd. of Educ., 535 F.3d 1243 [10th Cir. 2008]; Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 [8th Cir. 2003]). Accordingly, in reviewing failure to implement claims under the IDEA, courts have held that it must be ascertained whether the aspects of the IEP that were not followed were substantial, or in other words, "material" (A.P., 370 Fed. App'x at 205; see Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822 [holding that a "material failure occurs when there is more than a minor discrepancy between the services a school provides to a disabled [student] and the services required by the [student's] IEP"]; see also Catalan v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73 [D. D.C. 2007] [holding that where a student missed a 'handful' of speech-language therapy sessions as a result of the therapist's absence or due to the student's fatigue, nevertheless, the student received consistent speech-language therapy in accordance with his IEP, and the district's failure to follow the IEP was excusable under the circumstances and did not amount to a failure to implement the student's program]).
Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
shall, solely by reason of his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal assistance.” 29 U.S.C. §794(a). Section 504 and the IDEA are often seen as “complementary” statutes that, to a degree, mandate parallel requirements on schools to provide special education and related services. See R.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New Y ork, 99 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted). The Section 504 regulations clarify the nature of the prohibited discrimination. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(ii)-(iii). In addition, the Section 504 regulations place similar and even parallel requirements on schools to provide a FAPE. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.33-104.37.
Evaluations: 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(c) and 8 NYCRR § 200.4(b)(1) provide that, under the IDEA, an initial evaluation must be conducted within 60 calendar days of receiving parental consent for the evaluation. A parent must also be advised of the right to request an assessment to determine the child’s educational needs. See 34 C.F.R. §
300.305(d)(1)(ii); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(b)(5)(iv).
RELATED SERVICES
As provided in 8 NYCRR 200.6(e):
Related services shall be recommended by the committee on special education to meet specific needs of a student with a disability as set forth in the individualized education program (IEP).
(1) The frequency, duration and location of each such service shall be in the IEP, based on the individual student's need for the service.
(2) For students with disabilities determined to need speech and language services, the total caseload of such students for teachers providing such services shall not exceed
65. 103 200.6
(3) When a related service is provided to a number of students at the same time, the number of students in the group shall not exceed five students per teacher or specialist except that, in the city school district of the city of New York, the commissioner shall allow a variance of up to 50 percent rounded up to the nearest whole number from the maximum of five students per teacher or specialist.
(4) A student with a disability may be provided with more than one such service in accordance with the need of the student.
(5) Related services may be provided in conjunction with a regular education program or with other special education programs and services.
A board of education may be required to pay for educational services obtained for a student by his or her parent, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parent were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parent's claim (Burlington School Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 [1985]). The failure of a parent to select a program known to be approved by the state in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement (Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]).
CHILD FIND
The purpose of the "child find" provisions of the IDEA are to identify, locate, and evaluate students who are suspected of being a student with a disability and thereby may be in need of special education and related services, but for whom no determination of eligibility as a student with a disability has been made (see Handberry v. Thompson, 446.
F.3d 335, 347-48 [2d Cir. 2006]; E.T. v. Bd. of Educ., 2012 WL 5936537, at *11 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012]; A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 572 F.Supp.2d 221, 225 [D.
Conn. 2008], aff'd, 370 Fed. App'x 202, 2010 WL 1049297 [2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2010]; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][3][A]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.111; 8 NYCRR 200.2[a][7]). The IDEA places an affirmative duty on State and local educational agencies to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing in the State "to ensure that they receive needed special education services" (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][3]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.111[a][1][i]; Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 245; E.T., 2012 WL 5936537, at *11; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][A][ii]; see also 8 NYCRR 200.2[a][7]; New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St.
Pierre, 307 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400 n.13 [N.D.N.Y. 2004])). The "child find" requirements apply to "children who are suspected of being a child with a disability . . . and in need of special education, even though they are advancing from grade to grade" (34 C.F.R. § 300.111[c][1]; see 8 NYCRR 200.2[a][7]; D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 [3d Cir. 2012]; J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635, 660 [S.D.N.Y. 2011]). To satisfy the requirements, a board of education must have procedures in place that will enable it to identify, locate, and evaluate such children (34 CFR 300.111[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.2[a][7]).
A district's child find duty is triggered when there is "reason to suspect a disability and reason to suspect that special education services may be needed to address that disability" (J.S., 826 F. Supp. 2d at 660; New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 2d at 400 n.13, quoting Dep't of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 [D. Haw.
2001]). To determine that a child find violation has occurred, school officials must have overlooked clear signs of disability and been negligent by failing to order testing, or have no rational justification for deciding not to evaluate the student (A.P., 572 F.Supp.2d at 225, citing Bd. of Educ. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 [6th Cir. 2007]). States are encouraged to develop "effective teaching strategies and positive behavioral interventions to prevent over-identification and to assist students without an automatic default to special education" (Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. D.L., 548 F.Supp.2d 815, 819 [C.D.Cal. 2008], citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400[c][5]). Additionally, the school district must initiate a referral and promptly request parental consent to evaluate a student to determine if the student needs special education services and programs if a student has not made adequate progress after an appropriate period of time when provided instruction in a school district's RtI program (8 NYCRR 200.4[a]; see also 8 NYCRR 100.2[ii]).
Because the child find obligation is an affirmative one, the IDEA does not require parents to request that the district evaluate their child (see Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [ finding that "[s]chool districts may not ignore disabled students' needs, nor may they await parental demands before providing special instruction"]; see also Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 11-153; Application of a Student Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal Nos. 11-092 & 11-094). A district's child find duty is triggered when there is "reason to suspect a disability and reason to suspect that special education services may be needed to address that disability" (J.S., 826
F. Supp. 2d at 660; New Paltz, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 400 n.13, quoting Dep't of Educ. v.
Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 [D. Haw. 2001]). To support a finding that a child find violation has occurred, school officials must have overlooked clear signs of disability and been negligent by failing to order testing, or have no rational justification for deciding not to evaluate (A.P., 572 F. Supp. 2d at 225, quoting Bd. of Educ. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 [6th Cir. 2007]). States are encouraged to develop "effective teaching strategies and positive behavioral interventions to prevent over-identification and to assist students without an automatic default to special education" (Los Angeles Unified Sch.
Dist. v. D.L., 548 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819 [C.D.Cal. 2008], citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400[c][5]).
Additionally, the school district must initiate a referral and promptly request parental consent to evaluate a student to determine if the student needs special education services and programs if a student has not made adequate progress after an appropriate period of time when provided instruction in a school district's response to intervention program (8 NYCRR 200.4[a]).
NY STATE CHILD FIND:
State regulations specify procedures for identifying students with learning disabilities, providing, among other things, that:
A student may be determined to have a learning disability if, when provided with learning experiences and instruction appropriate for the student's age or State-approved grade-level standards, the student does not achieve adequately for the student's age or to meet State-approved grade-level standards in one or more of the following areas: oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skills, reading fluency skills, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, mathematics problem solving; and . . . the student exhibits a pattern of strengths and weaknesses in performance, achievement, or both, relative to age, State-approved grade-level standards, or intellectual development that is determined by the CSE to be relevant to the identification of a learning disability. . . .(8 NYCRR 200.4[j] [3], [3] [i] [b] [emphasis added]).
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
Generally, when determining an appropriate placement on the educational continuum, a CSE should first determine the extent to which the student can be educated with nondisabled peers in a public school setting before considering a more restrictive nonpublic school option (see E.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 4495676, at *15 [E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013]; [explaining that "under the law, once [the district]
determined that [the public school setting] was the least restrictive environment in which [the student] could be educated, it was not obligated to consider a more restrictive environment, such as [the nonpublic school]"]; A.D. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 1155570, at *8 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013] [finding that "[o]nce the CSE determined that [public school setting] would be appropriate for the [s]tudent, it had identified the least restrictive environment that could meet the [s]tudent's needs and did not need to inquire into more restrictive options such as nonpublic programs"]).
The IDEA requires that a student's recommended program must be provided in the
LRE (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR
200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 111; Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 105; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; Patskin, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 428). In determining an appropriate placement in the LRE, the IDEA requires that students with disabilities be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with students who are not disabled and that special classes, separate schooling or other removal of students with disabilities from the general educational environment may occur only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; see 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.6[a][1]; Newington, 546 F.3d at 112, 120-21; Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 [3d Cir. 1993]; J.S. v. N. Colonie
Cent. Sch.
Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 74, 82 [N.D.N.Y. 2008]; Patskin, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 430; Watson
v. Kingston City Sch. Dist., 325 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144 [N.D.N.Y. 2004]; Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 982 [N.D.N.Y. 1993]). The placement of an individual student in the LRE shall "(1) provide the special education needed by the student; (2) provide for education of the student to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the student with other students who do not have disabilities; and (3) be as close as possible to the student's home" (8 NYCRR 200.1[cc]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][4][ii][b]; see 34 CFR 300.116). Consideration is also given to any potential harmful effect on students or on the quality of services that they need (34 CFR
300.116[d]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][4][ii][c]). Federal and State regulations also require that school districts ensure that a continuum of alternative placements be available to meet the needs of students with disabilities for special education and related services (34 CFR
300.115; 8 NYCRR 200.6). The continuum of alternative placements includes instruction in regular classes, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions; and the continuum makes provision for supplementary services (such as resource room or itinerant instruction) to be provided in conjunction with regular class placement (34 CFR 300.115[b]). To apply the principles described above, the Second Circuit adopted a two-pronged test for determining whether an IEP places a student in the LRE, considering (1) whether education in the general classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given student, and, if not, (2) whether the school has mainstreamed the student to the maximum extent appropriate (Newington, 546 F.3d at 119-20; see J.S., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 82; Patskin, 583
F. Supp. 2d at 430; see also M.W., 725 F.3d at 144; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217- 18; Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048-50 [5th Cir. 1989]). A determination regarding the first prong, (whether a student with a disability can be educated satisfactorily in a general education class with supplemental aids and services), is made through an examination of a non-exhaustive list of factors, including, but not limited to
"(1) whether the school district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) the educational benefits available to the child in a regular class, with appropriate supplementary aids and services, as compared to the benefits provided in a special education class; and (3) the possible negative effects of the inclusion of the child on the education of the other students in the class" (Newington, 546 F.3d at 120; see J.S., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 82; Patskin, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 430; see also M.W., 725 F.3d at 144; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217-18; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-50). If, after examining the factors under the first prong, it is determined that the district was justified in removing the student from the general education classroom and placing the student in a special class, the second prong requires consideration of whether the district has included the student in school programs with nondisabled students to the maximum extent appropriate (Newington, 546 F.3d at 120).
In fashioning a test to assess a student's placement in the LRE, the Court acknowledged that the IDEA's "'strong preference'" for educating students with disabilities alongside their nondisabled peers "'must be weighed against the importance of providing an appropriate education'" to students with disabilities (Newington, 546 F.3d at 119, see Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 692 [2d Cir.
1989]; see also Lachman v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 295 [7th Cir. 1988]). In recognizing the tension created between the IDEA's goal of "providing an education suited to a student's particular needs and its goal of educating that student with his non-disabled peers as much as circumstances allow," the Court explained that the inquiry must be fact specific, individualized, and on a case-by-case analysis regarding whether both goals have been "optimally accommodated under particular circumstances" (Newington, 546 F.3d at 119-20, citing Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044).
COMPENSATORY SERVICES
The purpose of an award of compensatory educational services or additional services is to provide an appropriate remedy for a denial of a FAPE (see E.M. v. New
York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 451 [2d Cir. 2014]. Compensatory education is a remedy designed to "make up for" a denial of a FAPE]; see also Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [holding that, in fashioning an appropriate compensatory education remedy, "the inquiry must be fact-specific, and to accomplish IDEA's purposes, the ultimate award must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place"]; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup
Sch. Dist., 31F.3d 1489, 1497 [9th Cir. 1994] [holding that "[a]ppropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA"]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 11-075; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10- 052). Accordingly, an award of additional services should aim to place the student in the position he or she would have been in had the district complied with its obligations under the IDEA (see Newington, 546 F.3d at 123 [holding that compensatory education awards should be designed so as to "appropriately address[] the problems with the IEP"]; S.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2014 WL 1311761, at *7 [E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2014] [noting that compensatory education "serves to compensate a student who was actually educated under an inadequate IEP and to catch-up the student to where he [or she] should have been absent the denial of a FAPE"] [internal quotations and citation omitted]; see also Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1289 [11th Cir. 2008] [holding that "[c]ompensatory awards should place children in the position they would have been in but for the violation of the Act"]; Bd. of Educ. v.
L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 316 [6th Cir. 2007] [holding that "a flexible approach, rather than a rote hour-by-hour compensation award, is more likely to address [the student's]
educational problems successfully"]; Reid, 401 F.3d at 518 [holding that compensatory education is a "replacement of educational services the child should have received in the first place" and that compensatory education awards "should aim to place disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district's violations of IDEA"]; Puyallup, 31 F.3d at 1497 [finding "[t]here is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed"]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 13-168; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No.12-135; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 11-132; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-091).
Compensatory education awards can be drafted under two types of approaches: a quantitative approach and a qualitative approach. With a quantitative approach, courts examine the amount of time during which a child has been deprived of a FAPE, and award compensatory services with an eye towards making up that time. See, e.g., M.C. v.
Central Regional School District, 81 F.3d 389, 297 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding generally that subject to equitable adjustment, the “child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, excluding only the time reasonably required for Case No. 166190 the school district to rectify the problem.”).
Under the qualitative approach, the examination should focus on the child’s needs; “some students may require only short, intensive compensatory programs targeted at specific problems or deficiencies” while “[o]thers may need extended programs, perhaps even exceeding hour-for-hour replacement of the time spent without FAPE.” Reid v.
District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Pursuant to this approach, there must be evidence regarding the child’s “specific educational deficits” resulting from the failure to provide FAPE and “specific compensatory measures” designed to “correct those deficits. Reid, supra at 526.
THE TESTIMONY
The first inquiry to be addressed is whether the DOE provided with a FAPE for the 2016/17 school year.
As noted above, the DOE has the burden of establishing that it provided a FAPE for a student for each school year in which a challenge is made by the Parent. In the instant case, the DOE presented one witness whose testimony is summarized immediately below.
For this witness, as well as the Parent’s testimony summarized thereafter, all numbers in parenthesis shall refer to transcript pages.
Testifying for the DOE was Dr. , a New York State licensed and at the since 1988. Dr. testified that he has been performing evaluations for about 20 years. Dr. holds a Ph.D. in . Dr. further testified he examined on June 22, 2017 after was referred to him due to (p. 61). He further testified that despite showing strength on a , such as , he nevertheless showed significant struggles with
( ), performed
, and demonstrated difficultly with , such as
(p. 62). He further testified that requires
, due to the fact that
. He testified that struggles with
, and that (p.63). As a result, Dr.
testified that he recommends to address
, as would benefit from
(p. 64).
Upon direct questioning from the undersigned, Dr. stated that his specific recommendation, based on his evaluation and the results obtained therefrom, would be ,
, and ( ),
. He further stated that , as recommended, would be more beneficial if in , and that such instruction should be (p. 68).
Dr. further testified that, although he had additionally recommended a and evaluation, which the Parent, as noted above, had declined, would still have benefited during the 2016/17 school year had he received the recommended , even in the absence of or evaluation (p. 69). Finally, Dr. testified that he believed it was important for to remain in his current class, but that he would benefit greatly by receiving the as recommended to address his educational deficits (p. 69-70).
The Parent testified that she had requested that the DOE evaluate Student in October, 2016 but that, other than a evaluation, conducted in November,
2016, no evaluation whatsoever was conducted by the DOE to assess the areas of ’s educational weaknesses (p. 30). She further testified that was not in receipt of any special educational services prior to the current school year, and noticed that was falling behind in school as he was getting older (p. 38). Additionally, Parent testified that she agreed with the findings of the evaluation that , but reiterated her choice to forego a specific evaluation at this time, as recommended by Dr.
, as she felt that educational would provide with the help he requires
(p. 32-37). She further testified that she believed the provision of would greatly benefit and, in particular, , so that would receive the benefit of
(p. 42).
On cross examination, Parent stated that one of the reasons she has declined a evaluation at this time, as recommended by Dr. , was because there has been such a long delay between her initial request for an evaluation in October, 2016 for and the date that the evaluation actually occurred, June, 2017, and that she didn’t want to continue to delay the provision of by awaiting until after summer any further evaluations (p. 47-48).
ANALYSIS
With respect to the findings and recommendations of the DOE’s own witness, Dr.
, following his evaluation of , and the only witness to provide substantive testimony as to ’s educational deficits and needs during the 2016/17 school year, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the appropriate for which is determined eligible for the 2016/17 school year is:
1)
;
2)
.
The noted immediately above to which has been determined eligible for the 2016/17 school year must, by virtue of such 2016/17 school year having already concluded, be provided as compensatory services. As noted earlier, compensatory services are required to place the child in the position he would have been had a denial of FAPE not occurred in the first place. Also as noted earlier, there are two methods for determining the appropriate level of compensatory services. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, given the disabilities of the child, and given the fact that it is impossible to determine at the present time the exact compensatory measures required to correct the deficits resulting from the denial of FAPE, the quantitative approach is determined to be the more effective and equitable form of compensatory award, as indicated below.
NOTE ON COMPENSATORY SERVICES AWARD
All compensatory services, as Ordered below, shall be based on a period of (the “school year”). Further, given the fact that the 2016/17 school year has already concluded, and given the amount of compensatory hours awarded, all such to which is determined eligible under a compensatory award shall be placed in a compensatory service “bank” to be utilized during the entire 2017/18 school year, administered as the provider sees fit, in his/her best professional judgment, to best serve the educational needs of and to maximize the benefit of such service to
Based on such school year, and ’s entitlement to , the total award of shall be for the 2016/17
school year.
Based on such school year, and ’s entitlement to , the total award of shall be of for the 2016/17
school year.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE DOE PROVIDE STUDENT THE
FOLLOWING:
1. As compensatory services for the 2016/17 school year:
a) , to be placed in a compensatory service “bank” to be utilized immediately and, thereafter, during the entire 2017/18 school year;
b) to be placed in a compensatory service “bank” to be utilized immediately and, thereafter, during the entire
2017/18 school year.
2. The DOE shall issue to Parent Related Service Authorizations (RSA’s), or arrange other suitable payment arrangement for the provision of such as directed above;
3. For all such noted above that cannot be provided at the standard DOE rate, an enhanced rate authorization shall be provided not to exceed per hour.
4. The DOE shall comply in all respects with this Decision and Order. Dated: September 13, 2017
BRUCE S. OLINGER, ESQ.
Impartial Hearing Officer BO:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
The parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to obtain a review of this decision by a State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Part 200.5(k) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, Section 4404 of the Education Law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Directions and forms can be found on the Office of State Review website: http://www.sro.nysed.gov/RevisedRegulationsOverview.html.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENT
A. Due Process Complaint 5/11/17 1 page
DOE
1. Evaluation 6/27/17 2 pages
2. Social History Evaluation 11/18//16 2 pages
IHO
I. Interim Order 6/21/17 5 pages
II. Extensions of Compliance Date 8/1/17; 8/14/17 2 pages
III. Email communications 7/17/17-7/18/17 4 pages