NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number:
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
District:
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Date of Hearing: February 12, 2015
March 4, 2015
Actual Record Closed Date: July 1, 2015
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey Schiro, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON FEBRUARY 12,
2015
ESQ., Attorney — Student
, PARENT
For the Department of Education:
, Impartial Hearing Representative
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON MARCH 4, 2015
ESQ., Attorney — Student
Parents
Director of, (via — Student
telephone) — Student
District Representative, CSE — DOE
I. JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. This hearing was requested by the attorneys for the student and the parent in a due process complaint notice dated April 2, 2014. The primary issue to be determined at this hearing is whether or not the Department of Education (the “DOE”) shall be ordered to reimburse the parents, and/or directly pay for, costs associated with the student’s unilateral private placement at the Program (“ ”) for the 2013/14 school year (Ex. P-A).[1]
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local committee on special education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y.
Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(a)-(b); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present state complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y.
Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(a), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with state and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may appeal that decision to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(k).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 2, 2014, the DOE appointed me to serve as the hearing officer in this matter. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(3)(i). In a due process response, dated April 8, 2014, the DOE denied each and every allegation contained in the parent’s due process complaint (Ex. P-B). See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(i)(4), (5). Hearings in this matter were thereafter held on February 12, 2015 and March 4, 2015.[2] Appended to this decision are:
a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the April 2, 2014 due process complaint, the student was years old and exhibits delays (Ex. P-A at 1-2).
For the 2013/14 school year, the student attended in the (Exs. P-A at 1, 3, 7, P-K at 1, P-Q, P-R, P-T, P-W). The Commissioner of Education has not approved as a nonpublic school with which public school districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities. See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(d), 200.7.
The student's current eligibility for special education and related services as a learning disabled student is not in dispute in this hearing (Exs. P-A at 2, P-C at 1). See 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.8(c)(6); 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(6).3
From 2008 through the spring of 2012, the student attended the
(formerly ) in . In his IEP
(2008/09 school year), the student’s and skills were on a instructional level. The student also displayed and (Exs. P-A at 3, P-E at 1).
During the student’s (the 2009/10 school year), he continued to struggle and present with . According to a February 5, 2010 administration of the , the student was on a instructional level for and a instructional level for . IEPs developed for the student on April 14, 2010 and January 6, 2011 reported that the student’s “ skills [were] in the for his age and his grade” (Ex. P-A at 3).
At a meeting held on May 11, 2011, the CSE developed an Individualized Education Services Plan (“IESP”) for the student.[4] The parent objected to the IESP and filed for due process. The DOE ultimately agreed to fund the student’s private middle
. 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz) . school program for the 2011/12 school year (Ex. P-A at 3).
As part of a September 7, 2012 psychoeducational evaluation, the student’s ability was administered using the -
(“ ”). The student’s score ( ) fell in the range, although his score ( ) and his score ( ) both measured in the range. The student’s score was ( ) and in (68). On the
- (“ ”), the student achieved an score
in ( ), but scored in the range in ( ) and
( ) and scored in the range in ( ). The student’s ( ) and skills ( ) also measured in the ranges (Exs. P-A at 3-4, P-E, P-F at 1).
At a meeting held on September 24, 2012, the CSE developed an IESP for the student which called for the provision of (“ ”), and / . The parent objected to the IESP, enrolled the student at and filed for due process. The DOE ultimately agreed to fund the student’s program at for the 2012/13 school year (Exs. P-A at 2, 4, P-C at 1, P-F at 1, P-G at 1, P-O, P-P).
On April 30, 2013, the parent provided the CSE with her informed written consent for a reevaluation of the student (Ex. P-L at 2). Also on April 30, 2013, the CSE completed a social history update. In that assessment, the parent informed the CSE that the student was interested in attending school. The parent also requested assistance in helping the student plan for his academic future (Exs. P-A at 4, P-
G, P-H).
As part of a May 1, 2013 educational reevaluation, the was readministered to the student. On ( ), the student performed within the range; on ( ), he performed with the range; on ( ), he performed in the range; on ( ), he performed within the range; on ( ), he performed within the range; and on ( ), he performed within the range (Exs. P-A at 4-5, P-F).
On May 1, 2013, the CSE invited the parent to attend a meeting on May 23, 2013 (Ex. P-L at 3). On May 23, 2013, the CSE convened to develop an IEP for the student for the 2013/14 school year. The CSE recommended that the student receive the majority of his instruction in a setting supported by for and . The CSE also recommended that the student receive related services of , times per week for minutes per session, and ( ) / , times per week for minutes per session (Exs. P-A at 2, P-C at 8, 13). In a final notice of recommendation
(“FNR”), dated June 18, 2013, the DOE advised the parent that the student ’s recommended program would be implemented at the on the (Exs. P-A at 2, P-I).
In a letter dated July 31, 2013, the parent informed the CSE that a program with would not provide the student with enough support to meet his needs. The parent also reported that she visited the recommended school and met with the special education coordinator, Ms. . In her July 31, 2013 letter, the parent informed the CSE that it was her understanding, from visiting the school and speaking with Ms. , that the would not be able to fulfill the program recommended for the student on his IEP (Exs. P-A at 2, P-J, P-M).
In a letter dated August 21, 2013, counsel for the student advised the CSE that the parent was rejecting its proposed program and would unilaterally place the student at for the 2013/14 school year at public expense (Exs. P-A at 2-3, P-K).
This hearing ensued.
IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The DOE
The parent’s claim for tuition reimbursement and/or direct payment for the student’s unilateral placement at for the 2013/14 school year should be denied. The CSE’s proposed program offered the student a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. was an inappropriate program for the student, as it was not a special education program. The relevant equities also mitigate against a reimbursement, and/or a direct payment, award (R. 143-145; Ex. PB).
B. The Parents
The parent is entitled to tuition reimbursement, and/or direct payment for, the student’s unilateral placement at during the 2013/14 school year. The
DOE denied the student a free appropriate public education.
appropriately addressed the student’s unique educational needs. The relevant equities also support an award of tuition reimbursement, and/or direct public funding, of the student’s tuition to (R. 41-43; Ex. P-A).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Applicable Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (a) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v. T.A ., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); B oard of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206-07 (1982).[5]
A FAPE is offered to a student when: (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3155869 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013); R.E. v. New Y ork City D ep't.
of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied 2013 WL 1418840 (U.S. June
10, 2013); M.H. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 (2d Cir. 2012); Cerra v. Paw ling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.'" W alczak v. Florida
Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see T.P. v. M amaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009).
While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and has indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not," see R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91, the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA, M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A .C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003); Perricelli v.
Carm el Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c)
caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007); R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M .H., 685 F.3d at 245; A .H. v. Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3242234, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010); E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008), aff'd, 2009 WL 3326627 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009); Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." W alczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." See W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Grim, 346 F.3d at 379.
Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement.'" See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (quoting W alczak, 142 F.3d at 130); see also T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2008); Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15. The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" See M rs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); see also Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v.
A rlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 4946429 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Patsk in v. B oard of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d
422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1);[8] NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(i); Tarlow e v. Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320(a)(2)(i), (2)(i)(A); offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim.
See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). The remedy of tuition reimbursement has been extended to authorize direct payments to a private school for educational services rendered where B urlington/Carter factors are satisfied. M r. A . v.
New Y ork City Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.W . v.
New Y ork City Dep’t of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Connors v.
Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).
B. Recommended Public Program
At a hearing held on February 12, 2015, I granted (on the record) the parent’s motion for an Order of Default precluding the DOE from offering evidence of the appropriateness of its recommended program. As set forth in detail in the hearing transcript, the DOE repeatedly failed to respond to inquiries and evidentiary requests made by counsel for the student and failed to appear, and/or come prepared, for scheduled hearings. Given the prejudice to the student that would result from further delay of the proceedings, I denied the DOE’s request to adjourn the February 12, 2015 hearing and precluded it from offering evidence at later hearings (R. 5-19, 27-33; Ex. IHO-I). See
A pplication of a Student with a Disability (New Rochelle City Sch. Dist.), Appeal No. 13-
222 at 17 n. 19 (SRO Aug. 9, 2014) (noting inherent authority of IHO to impose remedial sanction upon a party for failing to follow reasonable directives); A pplication of a Student with a Disability (New York City Dep’t of Educ.), Appeal No. 12-076 at 9 (SRO Oct. 24, 2012) (“as a general matter, the parties to an impartial hearing are obligated to comply with the reasonable directive of the IHO regarding the conduct of the impartial hearing”);
A pplication of a Student with a Disability (New York City Dep’t of Educ.), Appeal No.
09-073 at 7 (SRO Aug. 14, 2009) (holding that hearing officer properly dismissed due process complaint with prejudice based on parent’s failure to comply with reasonable directive issued during the proceeding). Accordingly, I find that the DOE failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2013/14 school year.
C. Appropriateness of
Given my finding that the DOE failed to provide the student with a FAPE during the 2013/14 school year, I turn to the appropriateness of the parent’s private program.
With respect to the second criterion for an award of reimbursement, the parents must show that the private services obtained for the student were appropriate to meet his special education needs. See Frank G. v. B oard of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 363 (2d Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007). Parents seeking reimbursement “bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even if the IEP was inappropriate.” See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112.
In order to meet that burden, a private placement must be “proper under the Act,” see Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15; Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student’s special education needs, see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; W alczak, 142 F.3d at 129. “Subject to certain limited exceptions, ‘the same considerations and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool [d]istrict’s placement is appropriate should be considered in determining the appropriateness of the parents’ placement.’” Gagliardo, 489 F. 3d at 112, quoting Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364. Parents need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student’s potential. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65.
When determining whether the parent’s unilateral placement is appropriate, “[u]ltimately, the issue turns on” whether that placement is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. at 364; see also Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115. A “private placement is only appropriate if it provides ‘education instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child.’” Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115, quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89; see also W eaver v. Millbrook Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-
692 (KMK), 111 LRP 59361 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011).
Based on the evidence entered into the hearing record, including the credible testimony of Ms. and the parent, I find that was an appropriate program for the student because it provided him with specifically designed, individualized instruction to meet his unique educational needs (R. 49-137; Exs. P-N, P-
Q, P-R, P-S).
D. Relevant Equities
The final criterion for a reimbursement award is that the parent's claim must be supported by equitable considerations. Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; R.E., 694 F.3d at 185, 194; M.C. v. V oluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2000). “Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under [the] IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required.
Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private placement was unreasonable.” Carter, 510 U.S. at 16.
The IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.148(d); S.W . v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 362-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Thies v. New Y ork City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 344728 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
4, 2008); M.V . v. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 53181, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
2, 2008); Bettinger v. New Y ork City Bd. of Educ., 2007 WL 4208560, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 20, 2007); Carm el Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V .P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), aff’d, 192 Fed. Appx. 62, 2006 WL 2335140 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2006); W erner v.
Clarkstow n Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660-661 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The IDEA allows that reimbursement may be reduced or denied if parents do not provide notice of the unilateral placement either at the most recent CSE meeting prior to removing the student from public school, or by written notice ten (10) business days before such removal, “that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense. ” See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d)(1). This statutory provision "serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise an appropriate plan, and determine whether a [FAPE] can be provided in the public schools." Greenland Sch.
Dist. v. A m y N ., 358 F.3d 150, 160 (1st Cir. 2004). Although a reduction in reimbursement is discretionary, courts have upheld the denial of reimbursement in cases where it was shown that parents failed to comply with this statutory provision. See
Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160; Ms. M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 (1st Cir.
2004); Berger, 348 F.3d at 523-24; Rafferty, 315 F.3d at 27; see also Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376; Voluntown, 226 F.3d at 68; Lauren V . v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 3085854, at * 13 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2007).
The relevant equities support an award of tuition reimbursement and/or direct payment for the student’s unilateral placement at for the 2013/14 school year. In a letter dated August 21, 2013, counsel for the student gave the DOE adequate written notice of the parent’s intent to make a unilateral placement of the student at at public expense for the 2013/14 school year (Ex. P-K). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d)(1). There is also no evidence indicating that the parent was uncooperative with the CSE (Exs. P-C, P-D, P-J, P-L), see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), or that the cost of the student’s tuition to was unreasonable (Exs. P-T, P-W), see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16.
VI. ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The parent’s claim for tuition reimbursement and/or direct payment of the student’s tuition to for the 2013/14 school year is GRANTED; and within thirty (30) days of its receipt of this Order, the DOE shall reimburse the parent for all costs associated with the student’s unilateral private placement at for the 2013/14 school year, and shall directly pay the private school for any outstanding costs associated with said placement.
Dated: July 21, 2015
JEFFREY SCHIRO, ESQ.
Impartial Hearing Officer
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period. ” (8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.
Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENTS
A. Due Process Complaint Notice/Impartial Hearing Request, 4/2/14, 9 pgs.
B. Due Process Response, 4/8/14, 3 pgs.
C. Individualized Education Program (IEP), 5/23/13, 15 pgs.
D. Case Conference Summary, 5/23/13, 2 pgs.
E. Psychoeducational Evaluation, 9/7/12, 6 pgs.
F. Educational Evaluation, 5/3/13, 3 pgs.
G. Social History Update, 4/30/13, 2 pgs.
H. Interview - Student, 5/1/13, 1 pg.
I. September Placement Notice, 6/18/13, 1 pg.
J. Letter to (CSE) from parent, 7/31/13, 3 pgs.
K. Ten Day Notice to DOE, 8/21/13, 4 pgs.
L. DOE Letters to parent, various dates, 3 pgs.
M. Copy of ’s business card, undated, 1 pg.
N. Program Description, undated, 2 pgs.
O. Teacher Final Progress Report ( ), undated, 1 pg.
P. End of Year / Progress Report, 6/13/13, 3 pgs.
Q. Report ( ), 6/13/14, 4 pgs.
R. / Progress Report, 6/2014, 2 pgs.
S. Transcript, 2012/13 & 2013/14, 1 pg.
T. Tuition Statement (2013/14), 12/5/13, 2 pgs.
U. Income Statement, 7/2/13, 1 pg.
V. Guide to Quality Individualized Education Program (IEP) Development &
Implementation (NYSED) (excerpt), 2/2010, 8 pgs.
W. Tuition Affidavit (2013/14), 2/10/15, 1 pg.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
None
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
I. E-mails between & DOE Personnel, various dates, 12 pgs.
II. Confirmation of Extension, 6/15/14, 1 pg.
III. Confirmation of Extension, 7/14/14, 1 pg.
IV. Confirmation of Extension, 8/15/14, 1 pg.
V. Confirmation of Extension, 9/14/14, 1 pg.
VI. Confirmation of Extension, 10/6/14, 1 pg.
VII. Confirmation of Extension, 11/13/14, 1 pg.
VIII. Confirmation of Extension, 12/15/14, 1 pg.
IX. Confirmation of Extension, 1/12/15, 1 pg.
X. Confirmation of Extension, 2/13/15, 1 pg.
XI. Confirmation of Extension, 3/15/15, 1 pg.
XII. Confirmation of Extension, 4/15/15, 1 pg.
XIII. Confirmation of Extension, 5/15/15, 1 pg.
XIV. Confirmation of Extension, 6/12/15, 1 pg.
XV. Confirmation of Extension, 7/10/15, 1 pg.
Footnotes
[1] References to the hearing transcript are noted as “R.” References to exhibits admitted into evidence are noted as “Ex.”
[2] Following my appointment to this case, the parties moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter several times in order to accommodate the availability of the parties’ witnesses and in order to allow for adequate time for my review of the hearing record taken on the extensive issues raised in the parent’s due process complaint. In considering those requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that the stated reasons for the extensions justified the delay in the resolution of the matter and that the reasons for the requested extensions were in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, requests for extensions of the case compliance date were granted (R. 20-21, 147-148; Exs. IHO-II - IHO-XV). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5).
[4] Pursuant to New York State law, "[b]oards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent." N.Y. Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]. In such circumstances, the district of location's CSE must review the request for services and "develop an individualized educational services plan [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]." N.Y. Educ. Law 3602-c[2][b][1]. The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district.” Id. Additionally, unlike the provisions of the IDEA, Section 3602-c provides that a parent may seek review of the recommendation of the CSE pursuant to the impartial hearing and State-level review procedures pursuant to Education Law § 4404. Id.
[5] The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.
[8] NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(v). A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services