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FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number:
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
District:
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Date of Hearing: March 24, 2014
November 5, 2014
Actual Record Closed Date: July 22, 2015
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey Schiro, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON MARCH 24, 2014
Advocate (via telephone) — Student
Parents
DR., District Representative — DOE
Teacher Assigned (via telephone) — DOE
Assistant Principal (via telephone) — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON NOVEMBER 5, 2014
Advocate — Student
Parents
Director, (via telephone) — Student
DR., District Representative — DOE
District Representative, — DOE
I. JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. This hearing was requested by the advocate for the student and the parents in a due process complaint notice dated October 30, 2013. The primary issue to be determined at this hearing is whether or not the Department of Education (the “DOE”) shall be ordered to reimburse the parents, and/or directly pay for, costs associated with the student’s unilateral private placement at the of for the 2012/13 school year (Ex. P-A).[1]
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local committee on special education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y.
Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(a)-(b); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present state complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y.
Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(a), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with state and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may appeal that decision to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(k).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 1, 2013, the DOE appointed me to serve as the hearing officer in this matter. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(3)(i). Hearings in this matter were thereafter held on March 24, 2014 and November 5, 2014.[2] Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the October 30, 2013 due process complaint, the student was and has difficulty with (Exs. SD-4 at 1, P-A at 1). For the 2012/13 school year, the student has attended the at the of , which has not been approved by the Commissioner of Education as a nonpublic school with which public school districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities (Ex. P-A, P-F, P-G, P-H, P-I, P-J, P-L). See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(d), 200.7. The student's eligibility for special education and related services as a student with a is not in dispute in this hearing (R. 24, 32; Exs. SD-1 at 1, SD-2, SD-3, P-A, P-D). See 34 C.F.R. §
300.8(c)(11); 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(11).[3]
As part of a March 1, 2010 psychoeducational evaluation, the student was administered the - Third Edition
(“ ”), an individually administered clinical instrument for assessing the cognitive ability of children aged . The student earned a , classifying his overall intellectual ability within the . The student’s Performance score ( ) and ( ) score both measured in the . The student’s cognitive strength was his . His cognitive weakness was his ability to be
(Ex. SD-4 at 3-4, 8-9).
The student was administered the in order to assess his . The student scored in the on his basic reading skills and sight word vocabulary ( ) and in the on ( and ( ). The student was unable to do , but scored in the on ( ) (Ex. SD-4 at 6-9).
On April 24, 2012, the CSE convened to develop an IEP for the student for the 2012/13 school year. The CSE recommended that the student receive the majority of his instruction in a setting in a school on a ( ) month basis. The CSE also recommended that the student receive related services of: individual , times per week for minutes per session;
,
session (R. 28; Exs. SD-1 at 5-6, 9- , SD-3). In a final notice of recommendation
(“FNR”), dated June 12, 2012, the DOE advised the parents that the student’s recommended program would be implemented at in (Ex. SD-2).
In a letter dated August 15, 2012, the advocate for the student advised the CSE that the parents were rejecting its proposed program and would unilaterally place the student at the of at public expense for the 2012/13 school year (Ex. P-E). This hearing ensued.
IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The DOE
The parents’ claim for tuition reimbursement and/or direct payment for the student’s unilateral placement at the of during the 2012/13 school year should be denied. The CSE’s proposed program offered the student a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. The was an inappropriate program for the student. The relevant equities also mitigate against an award of tuition reimbursement, and/or direct payment to the nonpublic school.
B. The Parents
The parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement, and/or direct payment for, the student’s unilateral placement at the of during the 2012/13 school year. The DOE denied the student a free appropriate public education. The appropriately addressed the student’s unique educational needs. The relevant equities also support an award of tuition reimbursement, and/or direct public funding, of the student’s tuition to the (Ex. P-A).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Applicable Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (a) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v. T.A ., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); B oard of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206-07 (1982).[4]
A FAPE is offered to a student when: (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3155869 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013); R.E. v. New Y ork City D ep't.
of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied 2013 WL 1418840 (U.S. June
10, 2013); M.H. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 (2d Cir. 2012); Cerra v. Paw ling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.'" W alczak v. Florida
Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009).
While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and has indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not," see R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91, the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA, M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A .C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003); Perricelli v.
Carm el Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at * (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c)
caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007); R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M .H., 685 F.3d at 245; A .H. v. Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3242234, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010); E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008), aff'd, 2009 WL 3326627 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009); Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP."
W alczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." See W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Grim, 346 F.3d at 379.
Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement.'" See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (quoting W alczak, 142 F.3d at 130); see also T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2008); Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15. The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" See M rs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); see also Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v.
A rlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573- (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 4946429 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Patsk in v. B oard of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d
422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of and functional performance, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(i); Tarlow e v. Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320(a)(2)(i), (2)(i)(A); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(v).
A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim.
See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). The remedy of tuition reimbursement has been extended to authorize direct payments to a private school for educational services rendered where B urlington/Carter factors are satisfied. M r. A . v.
New Y ork City Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.W . v.
New Y ork City Dep’t of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Connors v.
Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).
B. Composition of April 2012 CSE
Turning to the first prong of the B urlington/Carter test, I must determine whether the DOE complied with the procedural protections of the IDEA. See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192. The parent alleges that the April 2012 CSE was not duly constituted (Ex. P-A at 2).
An IEP must be prepared by a CSE having each of its required members. See, e.g., A pplication of a Child with a Disability (Byram Hills Cent. Sch. Dist.), Appeal No.
99-54 (SRO July 31, 2000). A CSE must consist of: the parents of the student; at least one regular education teacher of the student (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular education environment); at least one special education teacher of the student, or if appropriate, at least one special education provider of the child; a school psychologist; a representative of the school district qualified to provide or supervise the provision of special education; and an individual who can interpret the evaluations being reviewed by the CSE. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(4)(A), (d)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321; N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 4402(1)(b), 4410(3), 8 NYCRR § 200.3(a)
The hearing record reflects that the April 2012 CSE meeting was duly constituted.
Participants at the April 2012 CSE included: Mr. , a special education teacher who also served as the district representative; the student’s mother, Ms.
, a school psychologist; Ms. , a parent advocate; Ms. , an additional parent member; Ms. ,a ; and Ms. ,a school social worker (R. 17, 21-22; Ex. SD-1 at 11-12). There is no evidence contained in the hearing record of the parents having requested that other individuals participate in the April 2012 CSE meeting.
C. Substantive Appropriateness of Proposed Program
As noted earlier, the IDEA directs that, in general, an impartial hearing officer’s decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(I). A school district offers a FAPE “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
The IEP must be “reasonably calculated to provide some ‘meaningful’ benefit.” M rs. B.
v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997), quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at
192.
1. Goals & Objectives
The parents allege that the annual goals developed for the student were not individualized for the student or measurable (Ex. P-A at 2). An IEP must include a written statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals designed to meet the student’s needs that result from the student’s disability to enable the student to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum, and meet each of the student’s other educational needs that result from the student’s disability.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2)(i); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.4(d)(2)(iii), 200.16(3)(3). Each annual goal shall include the evaluative criteria, evaluation procedures and schedules to be used to measure progress toward meeting the annual goal during the period beginning with placement and ending with the next scheduled review by the committee. See 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)(b); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(3).
I find that the CSE’s IEP for the student for the 2012/13 school year established annual educational goals which were reasonably related to his educational deficits. The
April 24, 2012 IEP included annual goals in: , which were consistent with those educational deficits identified in the IEP and described what he could reasonably be expected to accomplish within a ( )
month period. The IEP’s annual goals also included the evaluative criteria, evaluation procedures and schedules to be used to measure the student’s progress toward meeting each annual goal (R. 56-57; Ex. SD-1 at 3-5). See 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii)(b); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(3); R.B. v. New Y ork City Dep’t of Educ., 62 IDELR 55, 113 LRP 39966 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013), aff’d, 64
IDELR 126, 114 LRP 47226 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2014); M.C. v. Rye Neck Union Free Sch.
Dist., 2008 WL 4449338, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008); W .S. v. Rye City Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 2d 134, 146-147 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
2. Program
The parents allege that the recommended would have been too large to appropriately support the student’s needs. The parents also allege that student would not have been suitably grouped with other students having similar educational needs. Lastly, the parents assert that the proposed school would have been unable to satisfy the student’s related service mandates (R. 32; Exs. SD-3, P-A at 2-3).
From the evidence entered into the hearing record, including the credible testimony of Ms. , I conclude that the recommended offered the student a FAPE in the LRE. Ms. testified at the impartial hearing that she has been a special education teacher for years and has worked at for the past twenty (20) years (R. 50-51). During the 2012/13 school year, operated one and that class had a seat available for the student (R.
52). The was led by Ms. , a certified and licensed special education teacher (R. 52-53). Duly licensed were present at during the 2012/13 school year to provide the student with IEP mandated , , and (R. 53-55; Ex.
SD-1 at 6). Ms. stated that, in Ms. ’s , the student would have been grouped with other students having similar functional academic levels
(R. 56-58; Ex. SD-1 at 1-2). Students in Ms. ’s received approximately minutes of
(R. 59-60). The students in Ms. ’s
had opportunities for instruction and socialization with non-peers during (R. 60).
Alternatively, while the parents’ primary objection to the proposed was that it was too large to meet the student’s needs (Exs. SD-3, P-A), the hearing record reflects that the student had “ ” other than difficulty with in class (Ex. SD-4 at 1), that the student’s and measured in the -to-
(Ex. SD-4 at 3), and that the proposed public school classroom had “ ” enrolled students during the 2012/13 school year which was comparable to the size of the student’s class at the (R. 62; Exs. SD-3, P-B, P-G).
D. Conclusion
I have considered the parents’ remaining arguments and have concluded that they are without merit. Having determined that the DOE offered the student a FAPE for the 2012/13 school year, it is not necessary to reach the issues of whether the student’s private placement at the was appropriate or whether relevant equitable considerations supported the parent’s tuition reimbursement/direct payment claim. See M .C. v. V oluntown, 226 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2000); W alczak, 142 F.3d at 134.
VI. ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The parents’ claim for tuition reimbursement and/or direct payment of the student’s tuition to the for the 2012/13 school year is DENIED.
Dated: August 10, 2015
JEFFREY SCHIRO, ESQ.
Impartial Hearing Officer
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period. ” (8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.
Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENTS
A. Due Process Complaint Notice/Impartial Hearing Request, 10/30/13, 4 pgs.
B. Program Description, - , undated, 2
pgs.
C. [Reserved]
D. Final Notice of Recommendation (FNR) w/ handwritten note, 6/12/12, 2 pgs.
E. Ten Day Notice, 8/15/12, 2 pgs.
F. Student Schedule, 2012/13, 1 pg.
G. Class Profile, 2012/13, 1 pg.
H. School Progress Report, 12/20/13, 1 pg.
I. Enrollment Contract, 2012/13, 1 pg.
J. Affidavit of Payments, 6/17/13, 2 pgs.
K. Proof-of-Payments, various dates, 12 pgs.
L. Attendance Record, 6/24/13, 1 pg.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
1. Individualized Education Program (IEP), 4/24/12, 12 pgs.
2. Final Notice of Recommendation (FNR), 6/12/12, 1 pg.
3. Minutes of CSE Meeting, 4/24/12, 1 pg.
4. Psycho-Educational Evaluation Report, 3/3/10, 9 pgs.
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
I. Confirmation of Extension, 1/14/14, 1 pg.
II. Confirmation of Extension, 2/9/14, 1 pg.
III. Confirmation of Extension, 3/17/14, 1 pg.
IV. Confirmation of Extension, 3/31/14, 1 pg.
V. Confirmation of Extension, 5/10/14, 1 pg.
VI. Confirmation of Extension, 6/12/14, 1 pg.
VII. Confirmation of Extension, 7/14/14, 1 pg.
VIII. Confirmation of Extension, 8/14/14, 1 pg.
IX. Confirmation of Extension, 9/13/14, 1 pg.
X. Confirmation of Extension, 10/6/14, 1 pg.
XI. Confirmation of Extension, 11/13/14, 1 pg.
XII. Confirmation of Extension, 12/12/14, 1 pg.
XIII. Confirmation of Extension, 1/12/15, 1 pg.
XIV. Confirmation of Extension, 2/11/15, 1 pg.
XV. Confirmation of Extension, 3/13/15, 1 pg.
XVI. Confirmation of Extension, 4/9/15, 1 pg.
XVII. Confirmation of Extension, 5/13/15, 1 pg.
XVIII. Confirmation of Extension, 6/12/15, 1 pg.
XIX. Confirmation of Extension, 7/10/15, 1 pg.
Footnotes
[1] References to the hearing transcript are noted as “R.” References to exhibits admitted into evidence are noted as “Ex.”
[2] Following my appointment to this case, the parties moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter several times in order to accommodate the availability of the parties’ witnesses and in order to allow for adequate time for my review of the hearing record taken on the extensive issues raised in the parent’s due process complaint. In considering those requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that the stated reasons for the extensions justified the delay in the resolution of the matter and that the reasons for the requested extensions were in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, requests for extensions of the case compliance date were granted (R. 68-69, 124-125; Exs. IHO-I - IHO-XIX). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5).
[3] Speech or language im pairm ent means a communication disorder, such as stuttering, impaired articulation, a language impairment or a voice impairment, that adversely affects a student’s educational performance. 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(11).
[4] The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.