New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

Case Number:

Student’s Name:

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parents

Date of Hearing: April 28, 2014

August 6, 2014

Actual Record Closed Date: November 26, 2014

Hearing Officer: , Esq.

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON APRIL 28, 2014

ESQ., Attorney — Student

Parent/Mother — Student

District Representative, — DOE

Committee on Special Education Region — DOE

- Special Education Teacher, Committee on Special Education — DOE

Region (Via Telephone) — DOE

School Psychologist, Committee on Special — DOE

Education Region (Via Telephone) — DOE

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON AUGUST 6, 2014

Attorney — Student

Mother — Student

Father — Student

Principal (Via Telephone) — Student

DR., Psychologist (Via Telephone) — Student

Director (Via Telephone) — Student

CSE District Representative — DOE

Introduction

This document constitutes the Decision and Order of the undersigned, the duly designated Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) in an Impartial Hearing brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the New York State Education Laws. The School District will be referred to as District, the parent as Parent and the student will be referred to as Student. The hearing of this matter took place over several days: April 28, 2014 and August 6, 2014.

Parent’s Position

The Parent’s Complaint Notice (Ex. A) is far-reaching and is quite nuanced in light of the actual evidence presented in this case. Nonetheless, the essence of the Complaint is set forth below:

The Parent argues that the May 31, 2013 IEP (Ex. B) is procedurally and substantively flawed. (Ex. A-2) She informed the CSE that the Student was in the midst of undergoing an assessment that the CSE could use in formulating the IEP. (Id.) The Parent alleges that the CSE ignored this information and instead relied on prior evaluations—almost three

(3) years old. (Id. at 3) On this point, the Parent argues that the CSE failed to evaluate the Student for three (3) years, despite the fact that she signed and returned a Consent to

Evaluation. (Id.)

The Parent argues also that the IEP goals were inadequate, as well as improperly developed and adopted. (Id.) Specifically, sufficient data upon which to make appropriate recommendations was not collected. (Id. at 4) Therefore, the CSE failed to recommend an appropriate program. (Id. at 6)

The Parent claims that the CSE also failed to provide the Student with an appropriate transition plan as per the IDEA. (Id. at 4) The CSE failed to develop a ( ), where the need for such assessment was allegedly needed.

(Id. at 5) Similarly, the Parent claims that the CSE failed to provide the Student with a ( ), despite the fact that one was called for by the IEP. (Id. at 6)

The Parent argues that the CSE team was not duly constituted, as the special education teacher and district representative did not meet necessary criteria as defined by applicable federal and state education law. (Id.)

The Parent argues that the Private School placement is appropriate to meet the Student’s unique needs. (Id. at 8) The Parent states also that she has cooperated with the CSE and in no way impeded the CSE from offering the Student a FAPE. (Id.)

The Parent seeks reimbursement of tuition for the Private School from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; transportation to the chosen school; reimbursement for any costs of transportation that were incurred from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; payment for the cost of related services; compensatory education for related services from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; RSA’s for related services from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; reimbursement for the cost of a evaluation; and associated costs and fees.

District’s Position

The District’s position is that CSE developed an appropriate program that provided a baseline of opportunity for the Student to receive an educational benefit in the least restrictive environment. (Ex. IHO-1) The District maintains that the Private School selected by the District is not appropriate because it is not a New York State approved

Nonpublic school. (Id. at 2) The District argues also that the Parent failed to exhaust all of their administrative remedies and failed to send a timely ten (10) day notice of unilateral placement. (Id.) Therefore, the equities do not favor the Parents in this case. (Id.)

Student History

At the time the Complaint Notice was filed, the Student was years old. (Ex. A2; B-1) In this case, evidence of the Student’s psycho-educational condition reaches back to 2010. Beginning on January 2nd of that year, the Student was administered a / evaluation (the Student was then years old). (Ex. U) That evaluation indicated the Student appeared to have a ( ) equivalency score of a student who is old.

(Ex. U-4) The Student was evaluated in several other areas; he did not register an equivalency score greater than that of year-old in any area. (Id.) Also in that month, the Student was administered an academic achievement evaluation. (Ex. V) He was evaluated by way of the . The Student’s broad level was a grade equivalency, equivalent to that of a year-old. (Ex. V-1) His broad level was , equivalent to that of year old.

(Id. at 2) His broad written score was , equivalent to that of an year old. (Id.)

The Student was next administered a psychological evaluation in March of 2010. (Ex. W)

This evaluation indicated the Student’s full scale IQ was (Ex. W-1)

The Psychologist noted that the Student was within the range of ability. (Id.) Exhibit W is also the earliest documentation offered showing that the Student’s disability placed him on the . (Id. at 3)

In May of 2010, the Student was referred for a consultation. (Ex. X) The notable point from which is that the Student was identified as having a , (“ ”). (Ex. X-2) The Student was administered another test in November of 2010. (Ex. R) This report was extensive. In general, the Student was said to have demonstrated a relative strength in and a comparative weakness in . (Ex.

R-6) and within the domain represented an area of weakness. (Id.) The Student’s was in the range; and skills were ; were overall

; and abilities were in the range for

, but deficient in ; and the Student’s exhibited difficulties. (Ex. R-8-12) The Student did not undergo another evaluation until 2013. (Tr. 153)

In the interim, the Student completed the and grade during

2010/2011 and 2011/2012 school years. He attended the during the 2012/2013 school. The Student’s grade Private School report card was offered as Exhibit L. It showed generally that the Student was doing well in the context of the Private School’s Base Program (Ex. L) was an area where the Student was slower to progress. (Id.)

The next observation began on May 13, 2013. (Ex. S) The doctor summarized, noting that the Student continued in the range

, with comparatively stronger versus .

(Ex. S-12) The Student maintained and abilities. (Id.) He exhibited along with skills. (Id.) The doctor noted however, that the Student’s skills improved. (Id.) His was still an area of concern. (Id.)

In the spring of 2014, the Private School administered a .

(Ex. H-1) At the time, the Student was years old. The assessment noted that the Student’s affected his ability to in settings. (Id.) The Private School subsequently administered a . Therein it was noted that the Student had difficulty , and that this was a target area for improvement. (Id.)

Findings of Fact

The following details are established as factual findings in this case:

1. At the time the Complaint Notice was filed, the Student was years old.

He is now years old. (Ex. A-2; B-1)

2. The Student functions in the range , with comparatively versus . He maintains and abilities. (Ex. S-12)

3. The Student has difficulty . (Ex. H-1)

4. The May 31, 2013 IEP provisions regarding and are sufficiently specific. (Ex. B-17)

5. The Parent did not offer evidence or testimony to show why and services recommended by the District could not be implemented.

6. Adequate services were not provided for in the May 31, 2013 IEP. (Ex. B)

7. The District committed a procedural violation of the IDEA when it failed to consider the student's transition needs, such that the Student was deprived a

FAPE.

8. The Parent did not assert in the Complaint Notice that the IEP could not be implemented at the educational placement offered by the District. (Ex. B)

9. The Parent insinuated through testimony and the Brief in Support of Summation that the District failed to establish how the IEP could be implemented at the recommended placement. (Ex. IHO-1)

10. The Private School addressed the student’s needs by providing him with an educational program in an appropriate and supportive therapeutic setting.

11. The Student’s Private School Report Cards for the 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 school years affirm the Student’s success in a modified academic program. (Ex. L; Q)

12. The Parent was not obligated to visit the recommended placement.

Legal Background The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory framework established by Congress to aid the states in providing disabled children with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 612(a) (I). "A [FAPE] is available to all children with disabilities residing in the state between the ages of 3 and 21." 20 U.S.C. § 612(a) (1) (A).

In New York State, “The board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing . . .” (NY Educ. Law § 4404 (1)(c)) modifying the rule enunciated in Schaffer where “The burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is on the party seeking relief.” Schaffer v. W east, 546 U.S. at 537.

Discussion

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private education services obtained for a student by his or her parents if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate; the services selected by the parents were appropriate; and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim.

Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter. 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. Of Burlington

v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). This framework may be referred to as the B urlington/Carter Test. The first prong of this test; whether the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, is the proper heading under which to consider many of the alleged violations in this case.

Prong I

The purpose of IDEA is to provide students with a “basic floor of opportunity” of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefits. Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson CSD v. Rowley, 458 U.S.

176, 189-190, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982); W alczak v. Florida UFSD, 142 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir.

1998). Neither the IDEA, nor Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, requires a school district to provide special education and related services designed to maximize the potential of a disabled student. Nor do federal and state education laws require a school district to provide the best possible educational program and related services, or match those services requested by a parent. Application of a Child With a Disability (City School District of B uffalo), S.R.O. Decision 04-20 (2004). Rather, the goals and mandates of the IDEA and N.Y. Education Law are relatively modest: namely, to provide appropriate specialized education and related services sufficient for the disabled student to benefit from his/her education. S traube v. Florida UFSD, 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1175- 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Moubry v. Independent School District, 9 F. Supp.2d 1086, 1104

(D. Minn. 1998) (citing Rowley)

This straightforward obligation of the District is accompanied by the requirement to demonstrate the appropriateness of the program recommended by its CSE. (Application of a Child Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal No. 93-9; Application of a Child with a Handicapping Condition, Appeal No. 92-7; Application of a Handicapped Child, 22 Ed Dept Rep 487 [1983]). To meet its burden, a board of education must show that its recommended program is reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits (Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 [1982]). The recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (34 C.F.R. § 300.550[b]; 8 NYCRR200.6[a][1]).

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; R.E. v. New Y ork City D ep't. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2dCir. 2012]) "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (W alczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. M amaroneck Union Free Sch. 3 For the most part, these additional assertions are duplicative of those contained in the petition. 6 Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).

I turn now to the instant case and consider the allegations through the scope of the Parent’s Brief in Support of Summation. (Ex. IHO 1) I note that the Brief formally abandons many of the alleged violations initially complained of. (Id.) Though the Brief is heavy on law and short on facts, it seems the Parent’s central argument is that the District failed to demonstrate how the IEP could be implemented at the recommended placement.

(Id. at 10-13) Put simply, the Parent’s Brief makes Prong I primarily a “bricks and mortar” issue.

The Parent alleges that the IEP could not be appropriately implemented at the educational placement due to the lack of specificity on the topic of and ; the IEP could not be implemented without a transition plan; and the District did not offer evidence to refute either of these theories—basically, “the District failed to present evidence whatsoever that the IEP could have been implemented.” (Ex. IHO 1-8, 11, 13)

Generally, the Parent’s claim is that the IEP could not be implemented at the educational placement offered by the District.

The Second Circuit has established that "'educational placement' refers to the general educational program – such as the classes, individualized attention and additional services a child will receive – rather than the 'bricks and mortar' of the specific school" (T.Y . v.

New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419-20, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3277

[2010]; see K.L.A . v. W indham Southeast Supervisory Union, 2010 WL 1193082, at *2 [2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2010]; Concerned Parents & Citizens for the Continuing Educ. at Malcolm X Pub. Sch. 79 v. New Y ork City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 756 [2d Cir.

1980]).

I turn first to the Parent’s allegation that the IEP could not be implemented for its want of specificity. The May 31, 2013 IEP provides for and setting special education classroom, times per week for minutes each session. (Ex. B-17) Upon the evidence before me, I find that the provision is sufficiently specific. Furthermore, I find no support for the Parent’s claim that the District program could not implement this provision as it is written in the IEP. The Parent claims that the recommendation is not sufficiently specific; therefore, the placement could not implement the recommendation. However, the Parent did not offer evidence or testimony to show why the services could not be implemented in the District program. On the other hand, the District argues generically that the program was appropriate because it was staffed by experienced education professionals who were capable of providing the Student with individualized education services. (Ex. IHO 2-1) The Parent did not make a connection between the program offered and its capacity for implementing services. For this reason, the Parent’s allegation is dismissed.

I turn now to the Parent’s claim that the IEP could not be implemented in the recommended program without a transition plan. The Parent cites R.E. v. New Y ork City Dep’t of Educ. 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012) in effort to show that testimony is appropriate where it explains or justifies the services listed in the IEP. The R.E. Court also noted that in an impartial hearing both parties are limited to discussing the placement and services specified in the written plan and therefore reasonably known to the parties at the time of the placement decision. The Parent argues that transition services were not specified in the written plan, though they should have been. (Ex. IHO 1-8) With this, I agree.

The IDEA—to the extent appropriate for each individual student—requires that an IEP must focus on providing instruction and experiences that enables the student to prepare for later post-school activities, including postsecondary education, employment, and independent living (20 U.S.C. § 1401[34][A]; see Educ. Law § 4401[9]; 34 CFR 300.43; 8 NYCRR 200.1[fff]). Accordingly, pursuant to federal law and State regulations, an IEP for a student who is at least 16 years of age (15 under State regulations) must include appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments related to training, education, employment, and, if appropriate, independent living skills (20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][viii]; 34 CFR 300.320[b]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][ix]). It must also include the transition services needed to assist the student in reaching those goals (id.). Transition services must be "based on the individual child's needs, taking into account the child's strengths, preferences, and interests" and must include "instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school objectives, and, when appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and functional vocational evaluation" (20 U.S.C. §

1401[34][B]-[C]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[fff]).

For each child with a disability who is at least 15 years old, the CSE must include a statement of the needed transition services on the child's IEP, including, if applicable, a statement of the responsibilities of the school district and participating agency for providing services and activities which promote the child's movement from school to post school activities before the child leaves the school setting (8 NYCRR 200.4 [c][2][viii]).

The District should have included more than a mere generic statement that the Student will successfully transition: “[The Student] will continue his studies to prepare to [sic]

.” (Ex. B-7) At hearing, the Private School Director, whose testimony I credit, explained that the Student struggled with because of . (Tr. 317) The Student would . (Id. at

317-18) The Director testified also that collaborative problem solving was a necessary service for this Student, and for those similarly situated. (Id. at 319) Without planning that includes , this Student would not be able to . (Id.) Given the Student’s age, and the imminent need for developing skills beyond the classroom, the District should have at least evaluated the Student to gain an accurate understanding of his needs going forward. Notably, the CSE Special Education Teacher testified that she could not remember if a social evaluation was reviewed at the IEP meeting. (Tr. 27) The Special

Education teacher’s testimony also revealed that the meaning of assistance within the goals pertaining to support “ ” (Tr. 41) Based on this testimony, I cannot find that the generic inclusion of is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a needed service statement pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.4 [c][2][viii].

Upon the evidence before me, I find the Parent’s allegation pertaining to services is supported. This oversight attributable to the District was a serious procedural violation. If a procedural violation has occurred, relief is warranted only if the violation affected the student's right to a FAPE (J.D. v. Paw let Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 69 [2d Cir.

2000]) The District’s failure to include a statement of the needed transition services on the IEP supports a finding that the May 31, 2013 IEP—as written—would deprive the Student of a FAPE in this case.

I now address the primary charge of the Parent’s Complaint and corresponding Brief (Ex.

A; IHO-1); that the IEP could not be implemented at the educational placement offered by the District. The Parent understands that 'educational placement' refers to the program and not the 'bricks and mortar' of the specific school (T.Y .). (IHO-1-13-14) The argument precisely is that the District failed to even present evidence that the IEP could have been implemented in this program. (Id. at 13)

In New York State, “The board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing . . .” (NY Educ. Law § 4404 (1)(c))

It follows that the District must be apprised of the issues requiring proof. It must know the issue(s) upon which it carries the burden(s) of persuasion and production. The Parent did not initially allege that the IEP was unworkable in the recommended program. The Parent complained at length regarding the inappropriateness of the proposed recommendations

(see Ex. A-6-8). But, this is different than arguing that such recommendations could not feasibly be implemented. For the sake of analysis, I note the following:

The IEP recommended a placement. (Ex. B-17) The Special Education Teacher testified that the appropriateness of the placement was discussed at the CSE meeting. (Tr.

50) The recommendation was based on the Student’s progress. (Id.) There was no testimony indicating that the recommended program would not support a classroom. The IEP also provided for , services, as well as for same. (Ex. B-17) The School Psychologist testified that the recommended program was explained to the Parent.

(Tr. 88) The placement and related services were discussed. (Id.) Yet, there was no indication or admission that services named in the IEP could not be implemented. There was no indication during this conversation or anywhere else in the record. Accordingly, I find the Parent’s claim that the District failed to present evidence is largely erroneous.

Prong II

I now consider whether the Parents met their burden of proving the appropriateness of the placement of the Student at the Private School. On Prong II, New York federal courts have held that parental placements are “subject to fewer constraints than that applied to the school authorities.” S chreiber v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 700 F. Supp 529 [S.D.N.Y. 2010] The Second Circuit has clearly stated:

“ . . . [P]arents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.”

Gagliardo v. A rlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105 [2d Cir.

2007] quoting Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 [2d

Cir. 2006]

Moreover, parents "may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board." Frank G. v. Bd. of Ed. of Hyde Park [2d Cir. 2006] quoting M.S. v. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of Yonkers, 231 F.3d 96, 105 [2d Cir. 2000] citing Warren G. v.

Cum berland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 [3d Cir. 1999] (holding that "the test for the parents' private placement is that it is appropriate, and not that it is perfect").

The Parent bears the burden of proof with regard to the appropriateness of the educational program in which the Student was enrolled. (M.S., 231 F.3d at 104; A pplication of a Child with a Disability , Appeal No. 02-027) In order to meet that burden, the Parent must show that the Private School offered an educational program that met the Student’s special education needs (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; A pplication of a Child with a Disability , Appeal No. 02-027). While parents are not held as strictly to the standard of placement in the LRE as school districts are, the restrictiveness of the parental placement may be considered in determining entitlement to an award of tuition reimbursement (M.S., 231 F.3d at 105; Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 [1st Cir.

2002]).

In light of the record, I find that the Private School addressed the student’s needs by providing him with an educational program in an appropriate and supportive therapeutic setting. The Student’s Private School Report Cards for the 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 school years affirm the Student’s success in a modified academic program. (Ex. L; Q)

Equally as important in this case, and for this time period, the Private School facilitates an program where the Student is able to . (Tr. 320-

21) The Student is also afforded opportunities in through . (Tr. 324-25) The Student is thereby able to , , and . (Id.) The Director testified that their beginning-of-the-year goal was to have the Student , and by the end of the school year he was . In its Closing Brief and Memorandum of Law, the District argues the Private School is an inappropriate placement because it is not the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). (Ex.

IHO 2-8) Upon the evidence and related testimony, I find that the Parent has overcome this defense.

Prong III

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington

v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252). In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192).

"Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148). The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M .P.G. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at 7 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010]).

The DOE argues that the equities do not favor the Parent because the Parent did not bother to visit the recommended placement. (Ex. IHO 2-9) In addition, the District cites

SRO No. 11-131 to explain that equitable considerations may not support an award of tuition reimbursement where parents have failed to cooperate with a school district or have otherwise frustrated a district's attempt to offer a FAPE.

The District did not offer an example or any evidence of a failure to cooperate on the part of the Parent in this case. I find to the contrary that the Parent did in fact cooperate.

Importantly, I note here that the Parent made efforts to visit the recommended placement.

The Parent sent a letter to the CSE Chairperson on or about June 30, 2013. (Ex. C-9) This letter documents the Parent’s receipt of the FNR and her effort to visit the recommended placement documented therein. (Id.) Upon review of the record and the evidence before me, I cannot find an equitable consideration that works to offset the District’s critical oversight in this case; its failure to construct a transition plan for this Student.

The Parent’s Complaint was broad, and generally far-reaching. The Parent made numerous accusations and failed to offer evidence of their validity. Nevertheless, I find that the Student was deprived a FAPE solely in light of the District’s failure to provide adequate transition planning in the May 31, 2013 IEP. For this reason, I find the Parent is entitled to reimbursement of tuition for the Private School; reimbursement for any costs of transportation that were incurred from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; payment for the cost of related services from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; reimbursement for the RSA’s for related services from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014; and reimbursement for the cost of the evaluation. This award is fashioned compensate for the CSE’s oversight leading to the deprivation of FAPE. I note however, that the Student remained in the Private School from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014, and received appropriate services. Therefore, I find that reimbursement for compensatory education services is not an appropriate remedy.

Accordingly,

I hereby order:

1. That the District reimburse/pay the Parent/Private School for percent of the tuition at the Private School for the 2013-2014 school year upon the presentation of proper invoices/receipts for the payment of such tuition.

2. That the District reimburse/pay the Parent/Private School for any costs of transportation that were incurred from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014 upon the presentation of proper invoices/receipts;

3. That the District reimburse/pay the Parent the cost of related services from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014 upon the presentation of proper invoices/receipts;

4. That the District reimburse/pay the Parent for the cost of RSA’s for related services from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014 upon the presentation of proper invoices/receipts; and

5. That the District reimburse/pay the Parent for the cost of the evaluation upon the presentation of a proper invoice/receipt.

So Ordered, Dated: November 26, 2014

, ESQ.

Impartial Hearing Officer

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period. ” (8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.

Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

PARENT

A Hearing Request, 9/4/13, 10 pages

B IEP, 5/3/13, 24 pages

C Various Parent Letters with proof of delivery, 2010-2013, 13 pages

D Various DOE Letters including courtesy copy of FNR, 6/15/13, 5 pages

E Parent Power of Attorney, 12/7/14, 1 page

F 2nd Quarter Report and Comments, 2/5/13, 20 pages

G Academic Annual Review, 5/12/13, 17 pages

H and , 3/6/14, 3 pages

I 3rd Quarter Report Card Comments, 4/17/13 and 6/17/13, 2 pages

J 3rd Report Card 2013, 1 page

K End of the Year Progress Report, 8/13/13, 45 pages

L 2012-2013 Report Card 2012-2013, 1 page

M Goals and Objectives, 2013, 7 pages

N 2nd Quarter Report Card, 2013-2014

O Academic Annual Review, 2/24/14, 16 pages

P 34d Quarter Report Card, 3/31/14, 19 pages

Q Final Report card, 2013-2014, 1 page

R Consultation Report,

11/5/10, 18 pages

S Dr. Evaluation, 5/13-6/18/13, 22 pages

T Evaluation, 2/10, 4 pages

U Evaluation, 1/2/10-4/9/10, 6 pages

V Academic Evaluation, 2/28/10/2/5/10, 4 pages

W Psychological Report, 3/10/10, 4 pages

X Consultation, 5/6/10, 3 pages

Y Class Schedule, 2013-2014, 1 page

Z Contract, 2013-2014, 2 pages

AA Proof of Parent Payment to , 2013-2014, 9 pages BB Proof of Parent Payments to the , 2013-2014, 10 pages

CC Proof of Parent Payments to , 2013-2014, 3 pages

DD Class Schedule, 2013-2014, 1 page

EE FNR with proof of postmark, 6/15/13

FF , 11/5/10, 19 pages

DEPARTMENTN OF EDUCATION

1 IEP, 5/31/13, 22 pages

2 Final Notice of Recommendation, 6/15/13, 1 page

3 Classroom Observation, 5/10/13, 1 page

4 Evaluation, 5/13/13, 6/3/13, 22 pages

5 10-Day Notice Letter, 6/13/13, 1 page

6 School Placement Request to , 5/31/13, 4 pages

7 Report Card from , 2010/2013, 1 page

IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER

I Parent’s Brief in Support of Summation, 16 pages

II Closing Brief and Memorandum of Law for the Department of Education,

9 pages.