New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION

Case Number:

Student’s Name:

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Date of Hearing: October 24, 2012

December 13, 2012

February 1, 2013

February 25, 2013

Actual Record Closed Date: March 23, 2013

Hearing Officer: Timothy M. Mahoney, Esq.

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON OCTOBER 24, 2012

Attorney (via telephone) — Student

District Representative (via telephone) — DOE

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON DECEMBER 13, 2012

Attorney — Student

Parents

Aunt — Student

District Representative — DOE

CSE Representative (via telephone) — DOE

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON FEBRUARY 1, 2013

Attorney — Student

Parents

Parents

School Psychologist (via telephone) — Student

DR., District Representative — DOE

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON FEBRUARY 25, 2013

Attorney (via telephone) — Student

District Representative — DOE

On September 10, 2012, I was appointed to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law and Parts 200 and 201 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education, concerning a dispute of a student (“student” or “ .”) seeking an appropriate education placement from the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) for the 2012-2013 school year.

I. BACKGROUND

This case was initiated as a result of a demand for due process (“Demand,” see P-

B) filed by the student’s Parent through her attorneys, the Law Offices of , Esq. appearing, and received by the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (DOE- IHO) on or about September 7, 2012, and identified as NYC Case No.

In their demand for due process, the parents raised the following issues to be decided at hearing:

1) The DOE denied the student a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”) by convening a Committee of Special Education (“CSE”) on February 26, 2012

(a) without the appropriate members, (b) without current evaluative materials, specifically a vocational assessment for transition planning, and developing an individualized education plan (“IEP”) with (c) generalized and otherwise immeasurable goals, that (d) failed to consider mainstreaming opportunities, and (e) recommending a program that would be too restrictive for the student based on his individual needs. (See P-B); and

2) That the parents’ unilateral placement of at the special education program at for the 2012-2013 school year is appropriate and the parents are entitled to the remedy of prospective tuition reimbursement. (Id.)

A telephonic prehearing conference was held on October 24, 2012. The DOE presented its case-in-chief on December 13, 2012. The parents presented their witnesses and evidence on February 1, 2013. Oral closing statements were placed on the record on February 25, 2013. A full list of hearing participants precedes this decision; a list of exhibits accepted into the record follows1.

II. STANDARD

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c); see M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010). The Second Circuit stressed that “courts must evaluate the adequacy of an IEP prospectively as of the time of the parents’ placement decision[.]” R.E. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 195 (2d Cir 2012). In light of the Second Circuit’s decision, I directed the DOE to refrain from eliciting testimony from any witness might offer retrospective, speculative testimony as to how the student would have functioned in the recommended placement for the school year at issue. See Tr. 25-30. In that the student did not attend the placement, and the parents did not challenge whether the placement could implement the CSE’s recommended educational program, there is no issue for me to determine regarding the placement in and of itself. Instead, I find that the DOE has met their burden to be able to implement the CSE’s recommendation by issuance of a final notice of recommendation (“FNR”). See D-5.

The IDEA directs that my decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 415(f)(3)(i). The "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." Id., 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989). A school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'"

1 References to the transcript are preceded by a “Tr.” Followed by the page number. District exhibits are denoted by the prefix “D-” and parent exhibits are denoted by the prefix “P-”. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130. The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit." Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997). The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114(a)(2)(i), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); see Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132.

Not all procedural errors invalidate an IEP under the IDEA. See Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003). Under the IDEA, if a procedural violation is alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR 200.5(j)(4)(ii); see also Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

III. PRONG I

FAPE, at its most basic level, stands for the idea that a child’s individual needs are accounted for when constructing a special education program. The program addresses the child, not the child’s classification or diagnosis. To perform this task, stakeholders – here members of the CSE – must identify the abilities (and deficits) of the child (present levels of performance and needs).

The statue requires this basic floor. The IDEA, among other things, ensures that students with disabilities have available to them a Free Appropriate Public Education, or

FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see also Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 531 (2005). A FAPE includes special education and related services designed to meet the student's unique needs, provided in conformity with a written IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17(d); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320. A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, at 206-07 (1982).

The initial inquiry as to whether the DOE offered a student FAPE begins with an IEP that accurately reflects a student’s present levels of performance and his or her needs. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1); 8 NYCRR 200.4(d)(2)(i). Based on this information, the IEP must include annual goals related to those needs. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2); 8 NYCRR 200.4(d)(2)(iii). Finally, the IEP must provide for the use of appropriate special education services to address the student’s needs and implement the recommended goals. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR 200.4(d)(2)(v). Thereafter, the IEP must be implemented. 8 NYCRR 200.4(e)(7); Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-087.

The parties met to hold a CSE meeting on April 26, 2012 to develop an educational program recommendation for .’s 2012-2013 school year. See D-1. Attendees included as the regular education teacher and District representative, the student’s mother and father, as well as as the related service provider/special education teacher. See D-1 at 12.

The IEP describes ., a at the time of the meeting, as functioning on a grade level for math computation, word problems, and listening comprehension. D-1 at 1. He is functioning on a grade level for written comprehension. Id. The IEP identifies counseling as a need in order to express his feelings, work on , and improve his selfadvocacy skills. Id. . was described as on track to receive a Regent’s Diploma and to attend college following graduation. Id. Almost all of .’s needs and present levels of performance came from Mr, and .’s parents. See Id.

The CSE recommended a self-contained class in a community school for all subjects, as well as the related service of group counseling once weekly for 30 minutes a session. D-1 at 5.

New York State law requires the presence of an additional parent member at the CSE meeting that formulates a student's IEP. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1)(a); 8 NYCRR 200.3(a)(1)(viii); see Bd. of Educ. v. R.R., 2006 WL 1441375, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006). New York law provides that membership of a CSE shall include an additional parent member of a student with a disability residing in the school district or a neighboring school district, provided that such parent is not a required member if the parents of the student request that the additional parent member not participate in the meeting N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1)(a); 8 NYCRR 200.3(a)(1)(viii). Parents have the right to decline, in writing, the participation of the additional parent member at any meeting of the CSE. 8 NYCRR 200.5(c)(2)(v). Under New York State law, CSE subcommittees have the authority to perform the same functions as the CSE, with the exception of instances in which a student is considered for initial placement in a special class, or a student is considered for initial placement in a special class outside of the student's school of attendance, or whenever a student is considered for placement in a school primarily serving students with disabilities or a school outside of the student's district. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1)(d); 8 NYCRR § 200.3(c)(4). State law further provides that when a district is permitted to convene a CSE subcommittee, the subcommittee need not include an additional parent member. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1)(d); 8 NYCRR § 200.(c)(2-5).

Here, the DOE attempted to secure the attendance of parent member but was unable to find one. Tr. 36. While the State Review Office has ruled that a failure to include a parent member a review meeting is not a violation if the student was “not being considered for initial placement in special class, a school primarily serving students with disabilities, or a school outside of the student's district.” Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-042, pg. 14 (June 20, 2011)(Under State regulations, the CSE could have permissibly proceeded as a CSE subcommittee, and an additional parent member would not have been a required participant). Here, the DOE presented no testimony as to whether or not its recommendation constituted the initial placement in a special class. Therefore, I find that the District failed to ensure the attendance of a parent member at its committee. However, such an absence does not appear to have (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.

Ms. signed in as both the regular education teacher and district representative. As discussed below, there is no evidence presente4d at hearing that she was qualified to serve in either position. The IDEA requires a CSE to include, among others, not less than one regular education teacher of the student if the student is or may be attending a general education environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii); see 34 C.F.R § 300.321(a)(2); 8 NYCRR 200.3(a)(1)(ii). The regular education teacher "shall, to the extent appropriate, participate in the development of the IEP of the child, including the determination of appropriate positive behavioral interventions and supports and other strategies and supplementary aids and services, program modifications, and support for school personnel." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(3); 8 NYCRR 200.3(d).

Ms. testified that she could not recall discussing the issue of mainstreaming at the CSE meeting, and she did agree that a general education teacher would have been useful for such an issue. Tr. 70-71. However, Ms. was the regular education teacher at the CSE in question. It was her responsibility to raise the issue of mainstreaming. She failed to meet her responsibilities in this case, thereby substantively denying the student FAPE.

The subcommittee must include “a representative of the school district who is qualified to provide, administer or supervise special education and who is knowledgeable about the general education curriculum and who is knowledgeable about the availability of resources of the school district, who may also fulfill the requirement of subparagraph (iii) or (v) of this paragraph.” 8 NYCRR § 200.3(c)(2)(iv). Ms. does not appear to meet this standard in that her testimony does not suggest she is knowledgeable about the availability of resources within the school district. She was unaware of the triennial evaluation requirement, and she appeared to not understand the requirements of who must attend a CSE or subcommittee.

Furthermore, the DOE failed to ensure the attendance of a special education teacher CSE meeting. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B); 8 NYCRR § 200.3(a)(1). Mr. was signed in as the CSE’s special education teacher by Ms. . However, Mr. was not A.F.’s teacher. Rather, he is a school at who supplied to Tr. 137-38. The absence of a special education teacher (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.

I find that the DOE failed to ensure a properly constituted CSE developed A.F.’s

IEP. I further find that the error substantively denied the student FAPE. By having only one employee from the DOE attend the meeting, it was simply impossible to conceive that the CSE would be capable of developing any sort of defensible IEP.

I also note that Ms. testified that it was her practice to confer with the CSE when making a program recommendation. Tr. 56-57. It appears that she conferred with no one regarding the CSE’s recommendation. Her testimony does not show that she discussed the recommendation with the parents or Mr. . I find that the CSE failed to include the parents in its deliberations, thereby preventing the parents from participating in the formulation of their child’s education program.

The record shows that the last time the DOE evaluated A.F. for a triennial was in March of 2008. Tr. 98, P-E. There is no evidence that the DOE ever updated its evaluations. Instead, the CSE appears to have relied on a single document at its meeting – a Teacher Report. D-4. The DOE is charged with conducted triennial evaluations unless the parents and the district agree in writing that such are unnecessary. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii); 8 NNYCRR § 200.4(b)(4). I find that Ms. testimony was unreliable and self-serving when she was asked on cross-examination as to whether she had sufficient information before her to develop .’s IEP. See Tr. 72-77.

I find that the CSE lacked sufficient evaluative materials to properly and reliably determine ’s present levels of performance, educational needs, develop appropriate goals and short-term objectives, and make appropriate program recommendations.

Regarding the goals contained in the IEP, I find that the goals developed at the meeting are far too broad to meaningfully offer benefit for the student. Moreover, and without the benefit of a special education teacher, a regular education teacher, and current evaluative materials, I find that the CSE lacked even the minimum floor of information and expertise to begin developing appropriate goals.

The DOE submitted no information reflecting its efforts to determine ’s postsecondary plans or vocational strengths or abilities. The IEP in question makes no mention whatsoever of the student’s transition needs when considering his post-school future.D-1. The Commissioner’s Regulations require that:

For those students beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the student is age 15 (and at a younger age, if determined appropriate), and updated annually, the IEP shall, under the applicable components of the student’s IEP, include:

(a) under the student’s present levels of performance, a statement of the student’s needs, taking into account the student’s strengths, preferences and interests, as they relate to transition from school to post-school activities as defined in section 200.1(fff) of this Part;

(b) appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments relating to training, education, employment and, where appropriate, independent living skills;

(c) a statement of the transition service needs of the student that focuses on the student’s courses of study, such as participation in advanced-placement courses or a vocational education program;

(d) needed activities to facilitate the student’s movement from school to post-school activities, including instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives and, when appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and functional vocational evaluation; and

(e) a statement of the responsibilities of the school district and, when applicable, participating agencies for the provision of such services and activities that promote movement from school to post-school opportunities, or both, before the student leaves the school setting. 8 NYCRR 200.4(d)(2)(ix). The IEP fails to make any description of this individual student’s post-school expectations or activities. I further find that this absence substantively denies the student FAPE and independently invalidates the IEP in question.

In light of the above, I find that the February 26, 2012 fails to offer the student FAPE for the 2012-2013, and is not reasonably calculated to ensure meaningful benefit.

IV. PRONG II AND EQUITIES

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA. 471 U.S. at 370-71. "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.148.

A private school placement must be "proper under the Act." Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15; Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. This has been interpreted to mean that the private school must have offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs. See Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 and 115 (2d Cir. 2007). Parents seeking reimbursement "bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even if the IEP was inappropriate" Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2000). Parents need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65. When determining whether the parents' unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits" Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364.

The Second Circuit has set forth the standard for determining whether parents have carried their burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of their unilateral placement:

No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents' unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction. Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65.

I find that Mr. , the and the coordinator of the , provided credible and very detailed testimony as to the overall program, as well as .’s progress. He described as having , as well as difficulty with his . Tr. 143.

Mr. testified that . requires instruction from one teachers and one teaching assistant in order to receive reinforcement and individualized attention. Tr. 147, 152. A full class schedule is in the record at P-H, and ’s first quarter report card is in the record at P-G. His report card shows that is making progress, and appears to be benefitting from the instruction received from the .

. receives program and classroom modifications on a class-by-class basis in each of his core classes. also receives the support of a resource room to address his study skills, not only in his classes but for standardized tests such as the SATs. Tr. 147. Mr. testified . receives individualized support in English class, his math applications class, his reading and math classes. Tr. 142 – 53.

Mr. testified that . has been mainstreamed with significant support in two classes for his senior year. Tr. 155. during this transition to mainstream coursework, which was addressed during weekly sessions. Tr. Tr. 156. He further testified that the mainstream teachers were provided with information concerning .’s educational needs and in the mainstream setting. Tr. 155-57.

mother credibly testified as to the efforts that she made over the years to help . academically, including out-of-pocket payment for tutoring through the Tr. 89. She testified that .’s that he is now able to read on his own . Tr. 90. She testified F.’s math, writing, and study skills and how they have improved, however writing . Tr. 90-92.

The evidence submitted at hearing supports the parent’s claim that her son is benefitting from the . Moreover, the evidence supports the claim that is receiving instruction appropriate to meet his needs, and individually tailored to his unique profile. Furthermore, I find that Mr. offered reliable, credible testimony that was unimpeached throughout the hearing, and supported by the record as a whole. I find that the at is reasonably calculated to enable . to receive educational benefits.

The parents are seeking the equitable relief of direct payment of their tuition costs to the unilateral placement, otherwise known as Connors funding. The Southern District of New York has recently held that:

"[w]here . . . parents lack the financial resources to 'front' the costs of private school tuition, and in the rare instance where a private school is willing to enroll the student and take the risk that the parents will not be able to pay tuition costs—or will take years to do so—parents who satisfy the Burlington factors have a right to retroactive direct tuition payment relief."

Mr. and Mrs. A v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2011 WL 321137 at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 1, 2011); see also Connors v. Mills, 34 F.Supp. 2d 795, 805-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); S.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 646 F.Supp.2d 346, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The Mr. and Mrs. A. Court directs that administrative hearing officers retain the discretion to reduce or deny tuition funding or payment requests where there is collusion between parents and private schools or where there is evidence that the private school has artificially inflated its costs. Mr. and Mrs. A, 2011 WL 321137 at *24).

The parents’ contract with shows that the family is indebted to the school in the sum of $37,940.00 ($37,775 in tuition, $150 for activity fee, $12 for Library Fee). P-J. ’s mother testified that their total income is approximately $52,000.00 a year. See P-I. The testimony revealed that they have been unable to pay the tuition to date for the present school year, yet they remain financially obligated to do so, and that the tuition at , were the family required to pay out-of-pocket, I find would be catastrophic to the family. I find that the family is entitled to Connors relief.

Regarding the equities, I find no reason to reduce or otherwise change the award of tuition reimbursement based on the parties’ respective conduct. The parents, through their attorney, provided the DOE with the requisite 10-day notice prior to the start of the school year. See P-A. The parent credibly testified that she even went to the school to visit the program and to get information about the class that was being placed in. She sat with the principal and attempted to get as much information as possible about the program. No evidence was presented to suggest that the family impeded the DOE’s efforts to place A.F. in any manner. Based on the record before me, I find that the parent has participated with the DOE in good faith to develop an appropriate IEP for her child during the school year in question.

Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the February 26, 2012 IEP is a nullity, and the DOE is found to have failed to offer the student FAPE for the 2012-2013 school year; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall, within fifteen days of submission to the DOE by the parent of proof of payment of .’s tuition costs for the 2012-2013 school year, reimburse the parent for any tuition paid to in a sum not to exceed $37,940.00; and it is further

ORDERED that the DOE shall, within fifteen days of submission of a final affidavit detailing the expenses and tuition paid to by the parents, if any, as well as final costs for the student’s attendance at for the 2012-2013 school year, directly fund the student’s unilateral placement at for the 2012-2013 school year in a sum not exceeding $37,940.00; and it is further

ORDERED that the combined payments made to the parents and/or the unilateral placement shall in no way exceed $37,940.00. Dated: April 11, 2013

____________________________

TIMOTHY M. MAHONEY, ESQ.

Impartial Hearing Officer

TMM:gc

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period.”

(8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.

Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.

DOCUMENTAION ACCEPTED INTO THE RECORD

PARENTS

A Notice of Rejection 8/16/2012 4 pgs. B Impartial Hearing Request 9/7/2012 6 pgs. C Due Process Response 9/13/2012 3 pgs. D [omit] E Evaluation 3/4/2008 3 pgs. F Description of Program Undated 1 page G First Quarter Report Card 2012-13 1 page H 2012-13 Class Schedule 12/4/2012 8 pgs. I 2011 1040 Income Tax Return Undated 2 pgs. J 2012-13 Tuition Contract 8/8/2012 2 pgs. K Letter to CSE with Subpoena and fax receipt 12/6/2012 4 pgs. L Letter to R445 with Subpoenaand fax receipt 12/6/2012 4 pgs.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION.

1 IEP 4/26/2012 12 pgs. 2 Counseling Report 4/26/2012 1 pg. 3 Report Card for 2011-12 1 pg. 4 Teacher Report 3/8/2012 1 pg. 5 Final Notice of Recommendation 6/8/2012 1 pg.

IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER

I Subpoena 12/5/2012 5 pgs.