NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number:
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
District:
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Date of Hearing: April 19, 2012
May 9, 2012
Actual Record Closed Date: May 28, 2012
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey J. Schiro, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON APRIL 19, 2012
ESQ., Attorney — Student
Parents
Chairperson’s Designee, CSE — DOE
School (via telephone) — DOE
Special Education Master Teacher, (via telephone) — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSON WHO APPEARED ON MAY 9, 2012
ESQ., Attorney — Student
Parents
Consultant Teacher/ School Director, (via telephone) — Student
Teacher/ School Director, (via telephone) — Student
Chairperson’s Designee, CSE — DOE
I. INTRODUCTION - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. This hearing was requested by the attorney for the student and the parent in a due process complaint notice dated July 7, 2011 (later amended on October 26, 2011). The primary issue to be determined at this hearing is whether or not the Department of Education (the “DOE”) shall be ordered to reimburse the parent and/or directly pay for costs associated with the student’s unilateral private placement at the for the 2010/11 school year (Ex. P-A).[1]
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least , and school district representatives. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(A), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(k).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I was appointed by the DOE to hear this matter on July 6, 2011. In a letter dated July 24, 2011, I advised the parties of their rights and obligations under the New York Education Law and the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education of the State of New York (Ex. IHO-I). Hearings in this matter were held on April 19, 2012 and May 9, 2012.[2] Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the hearing request, the student was ( ) years-old, diagnosed with and educationally classified as having (Ex. SD-1 at 1).[3] For the 2010/11 school year, the student attended the grade at School (“ ”) (Exs. P-A, P-E, P-G, P-K, P-L). The Commissioner of Education has not approved as a school with which public school districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities. See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(d), 200.7. The student's eligibility for special education and related services as a student with a disability is not in dispute in this hearing (Exs. SD-1, P-A). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz).
For the 2009/10 school year, when the student was ( ) years old, the student attended the grade at (Exs. SD-1 at 3, SD-3, SD-3). In reading, the student was instructed in a group of ( ) students using the . At that time, the student displayed with ( grade level), and . In math, the student was taught in a class of ( ) students using the program, where students were instructed on and . While the student’s math class was taught at a class, the student still displayed with due to his . The student’s skills were an area of relative . The student benefitted from opportunities to his written work. (Ex. SD-1 at 3). The student received ( ) times per week, for ( ) minutes per session, to address difficulties with , and skill development (Exs. SD-1 at 3, SD-3 at 1).
On April 15, 2010, the parent signed an enrollment contract with for the student to attend its for the 2010/11 school year beginning in September, 2010 (Ex. PE).
At a meeting held on June 18, 2010, the CSE developed an IEP for the student for the 2010/11 school year. The CSE recommended that the student receive instruction in a special class in a school. The CSE also recommended that the student receive related services of individual and group and . Program modifications of review, and instruction was also recommended for the student by the CSE (Exs. SD-1 at 1, 4-5, 9, 11).
In a July 7, 2010 Final Notice of Recommendation, the DOE identified the as the student’s placement for the 2010/11 school year (Ex. SD-5).
In a letter dated August 28, 2010, the parent rejected the DOE’s proposed program for the student and indicated that she would be placing the student at at public expense for the 2010/11 school year (Ex. P-C).
IV. POSITION OF THE PARTIES
A. The DOE
The parent’s tuition reimbursement claim should be denied. The student has a . The DOE offered the student a free appropriate public education for the 2010/11 school year. was an inappropriate and overly restrictive placement for the student. Given that the parent signed an enrollment contract with in April of 2010, two (2) months before the CSE’s June 18, 2010 review meeting, the relevant equities also favor the DOE (R. 201-203).
B. The Parent
The DOE should be ordered to reimburse the parent and/or directly pay for the student’s tuition to for the 2010/11 school year. The DOE denied the student a free appropriate public education for the 2010/11 school year. The CSE which developed the student’s IEP for the 2010/11 school year was not duly constituted in that it lacked a regular education teacher of the child. The DOE also intended to place the student in a special class, although the student’s IEP called for his placement in a special class. was an appropriate program for the student and the relevant equities support a reimbursement award. The DOE should also be ordered to pay for school bus transportation to and from and related service costs (R. 203-208; Ex. P-A).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. General Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA are: (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected.[4] See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2009); Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
A FAPE is offered to a student when: (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). While school districts are required to comply with all IDEA procedures, not all procedural errors render and IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA. See A.C. v. Board of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003). Under the IDEA, if a procedural violation is alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student’s right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an impartial hearing officer’s decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(I). A school district offers a FAPE “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. However, the “IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP.” Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. The statute ensures an “appropriate” education, “not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents.” Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989). Additionally, school districts are not required to “maximize” the potential of student with disabilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Nonetheless, a school district must provide “an IEP that is ‘likely to produce progress, not regression,’ and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial advancement.’” Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see also P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2008). The IEP must be “reasonably calculated to provide some ‘meaningful’ benefit.” Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997), quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
The student’s recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (the “LRE”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114(a)(2)(I), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Also, a FAPE must be available to an eligible student “who needs special education and related services, even though the [student] has not failed or been retained in a course or grade, and is advancing from grade to grade.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(c)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(c)(5).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that accurately reflects the results of evaluations to identify the student’s needs, 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1); 8
NYCRR
§ 200.4(d)(2)(I), establishes annual goals related to those needs, 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services, 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(v).
A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c).
B. CSE Membership
Turning to the first prong of the Burlington/Carter test, I must determine whether the DOE complied with the procedural protections of the IDEA. See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192. The parent alleges that the June 18, 2010 CSE was not properly constituted (Ex. PA).
An IEP must be prepared by a CSE having each of its required members. See, e.g., Application of a Child with a Disability (Byram Hills Cent. Sch. Dist.), Appeal No. 99-54 (SRO July 31, 2000). A CSE must consist of: the parents of the student; at least one regular education teacher of the student (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular education environment); at least one special education teacher of the student, or if appropriate, at least one special education provider of the child; a school ; a representative of the school district qualified to provide or supervise the provision of special education; an individual who can interpret the evaluations being reviewed by the CSE; and an additional parent member. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(4)(A), (d)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321; N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 4402(1)(b), 4410(3), 8 NYCRR § 200.3(a).
I concur with the parent that the CSE which developed the June 18, 2010 IEP was not duly constituted in that it lacked at least one regular education teacher of the student. See 8 NYCRR § 200.3(a)(1)(ii). While Mr. sat on the CSE as a regular education teacher, he had never provided instruction to the student nor was not likely to do so in the future (R. 31, 39-40). While the absence of a required member from a CSE may, in some instances, be excused as harmless error, see Application of the New York City Dep’t of Educ., Appeal No. 11-025 at 11-12 (SRO April 7, 2011), I find that in this case the absence of a regular education teacher member of the committee significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii). In this case, the CSE was altering the student’s recommended program from a consultant team teaching (“CTT”) model described by Ms. as “a general education setting” in which percent of the students require special education, to a special class ((R. 40-41; Ex SD-1 at 2).
C. Proposed Placement
The evidence entered into the hearing record also demonstrates that the DOE deviated from substantial or significant provisions of the student's IEP in a material way and thereby precluded the student from the opportunity to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 1049297 (2d Cir. March 23, 2010); Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192 (2d Cir. 2005)
The IDEA contains no requirements that special education students be grouped in a particular manner. See, e.g., Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 12-012 at 8 (SRO March 7, 2012). However, State regulations require that in special classes, students must be suitably grouped for instructional purposes with other student having similar individual needs. See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(ww)(3)(ii); 200.6(a)(3), (h)(3).
Once a parent consents to a district’s provision of special education services, such services must be provided by the district in conformity with the student’s IEP. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9)(D), 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.17(d), 300.320. By incorrectly placing the student in a special class, rather than the recommended special class, the DOE deviated from substantial or significant provisions of the student's IEP in a material way and failed to suitably group the student for instructional purposes with other students having similar educational needs which precluded the student from the opportunity to receive educational benefits (Exs. SD-1, SD-5). See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; 8 NYCRR § 200.6(a)(3), (h)(3).
Alternatively, while the DOE attempted to explain away the discrepancy between the special class recommended in the student’s IEP and the special class present at the as voluntarily over-serving the child, I credit the CSE’s specific determination at the June 18, 2010 meeting that a “special class was considered and rejected as too restrictive” for the student (R. 71-72; Ex. SD-1 at 10). Ms. confirmed that a special class is programmatically more restrictive than a special class (R. 42). Ms. further explained that the DOE typically educates learning disabled students in a special class setting and student in a special class setting (R. 70).
D. Program
Given my finding that the DOE failed to provide the student with a FAPE during the 2010/2011 school year, I turn to the appropriateness of the parent’s private program. With respect to the second criterion for an award of reimbursement, the parent must show that the private services obtained for the student were appropriate to meet his special education needs. See Frank G. v. Board of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 363 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007). Parents seeking reimbursement “bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even if the IEP was inappropriate.” See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112.
In order to meet that burden, a private placement must be “proper under the Act,” see Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15; Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student’s special education needs, see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129. “Subject to certain limited exceptions, ‘the same considerations and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool [d]istrict’s placement is appropriate should be considered in determining the appropriateness of the parents’ placement.’” Gagliardo, 489 F. 3d at 112, quoting Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364. Parents need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student’s potential. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65. When determining whether the parent’s unilateral placement is appropriate, “[u]ltimately, the issue turns on” whether that placement is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. at 364; see also Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115. A “private placement is only appropriate if it provides ‘education instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child.’” Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115, quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89; see also Weaver v. Millbrook Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-692 (KMK), 111 LRP 59361 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011).
Based on the credible testimony offered by Ms. , Dr. and the parent, I find that was an appropriate placement for the student because it provided him with specifically designed, individualized instruction to meet his unique educational needs (R. 109, 158-159, 186; Exs. P-K, P-L).
E. Equities
The IDEA allows that reimbursement may be reduced or denied if parents do not provide notice of the unilateral placement either at the most recent CSE meeting prior to removing the student from public school, or by written notice ten (10) business days before such removal, “that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d)(1).
The IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii); Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 192 Fed. Appx. 62, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20967 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2006). “Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under [the] IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private placement was unreasonable.” Carter, 510 U.S. at 16.
In a letter dated August 28, 2010, the parent gave the DOE adequate written notice of her intent to make a unilateral placement of the student at at public expense for the 2010/11 school year (Ex. P-C). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d)(1). There is also no contention or evidence indicating that the student’s parent was uncooperative with the CSE, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), or that the cost of the student’s tuition was unreasonable (Exs. P-E, P-F, P-H, P-I, P-J), see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16.
Alternatively, while the DOE contends that the parent never intended to place the student in public school for the 2010/11 school year because she signed an enrollment contract with on April 15, 2010, prior to the June 18, 2010 CSE meeting, the parent’s pursuit of a private school is an insufficient basis for denying a claim for tuition reimbursement absent any evidence of her failure to cooperate with the development of an IEP or her interference with the selection of an appropriate placement by the DOE (Exs. SD-1 P-E). Cf. T.Y. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 2009); Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18.
F. Reimbursement, or Compensatory Education, for Related Service
As no evidence was provided by the parent of having secured private related services for the student during the 2010/11 school year (other than those included in the cost of tuition), or that the student was denied related services by the DOE prior to the 2010/11 school year, the parent’s claim for reimbursement for related services, see, e.g., Application of a Child with a Disability (New York City Dep’t of Educ.), Appeal No. 02007 (SRO December 24, 2002), and/or compensatory additional services, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Munoz, 16 A.D.3d 1142 (4th Dep’t 2005), is denied (Ex. P-A).
G. Transportation
The parent’s request for reimbursement for transportation costs to and from during the 2010/11 school year is also denied (Ex. P-A). Part B of the IDEA and its implementing regulations do not require local educational agencies (“LEAs”), i.e., school districts, to provide transportation to and from school for a child with a disability unilaterally placed by his or her parents in a private school. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.139(b)(1)(ii); Letter to Luger & Weinberg, 58 IDELR 199 (OSEP Dec. 6, 2011).
The New York Education Law, in contrast, requires that school districts provide a disabled student with suitable transportation up to a distance of fifty (50) miles to and from a nonpublic school for the purpose of receiving services or programs similar to those recommended by the local CSE in the student’s IEP. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(4)(d); Application of a Student with a Disability (Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist.), Decision No. 13,209, 33 Ed. Dept. Rep. 712, 715 (Comm’r of Educ. June 22, 1994).
However, as there were no bills or other evidence of the actual transportation costs incurred by the parent, I must dismiss this aspect of the parent’s claim in the absence of any evidence of such expenditures. See Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 01-012 (SRO Dec. 19, 2001).
VI. ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Within thirty (30) days of its receipt of this Order, the DOE shall reimburse the parent and/or directly pay for the student’s tuition and other costs associated with the student’s unilateral placement at the School for the 2010/11 school year. Dated: June 13, 2012
JEFFREY J. SCHIRO, ESQ.
Impartial Hearing Officer
JJS:gc
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period.”
(8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.
Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD ON APRIL 19, 2012
PARENT
A. Due Process Complaint Notice/Impartial Hearing Request, 10/26/11, 3 pgs.
B. Letter from parent, 7/21/10, 1 pg.
C. Letter to from parent, 8/28/10, 1 pg.
D. Letter to from parent, 9/29/10, 1 pg.
E. School Enrollment Contract, 4/15/10, 1 pg.
F. Schedule of Payments, 4/15/10, 1 pg.
G. School Official Attendance Record, 2010/11, 1 pg.
H. School Financial Affidavit, 2/8/11 & 6/21/11, 2 pgs.
I. Cancelled Check, 4/20/10, 1 pg.
J. Smart Tuition Schedule, 6/20/11, 2 pgs.
K. Student Schedule, - School, 2010/11, 1 pg.
L. Bridge Program Description, 2010/11, 5 pgs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
1. IEP, 6/18/10, 11 pgs.
2. Evaluation, 11/15/07, 5 pgs.
3. Report, 3/12/10, 5 pgs.
4. [Reserved]
5. Final Notice of Recommendation, 7/7/10, 1 pg.
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
I. Letter to Parties from IHO, 7/24/11, 5 pgs.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD ON MAY 9, 2012
PARENT
None
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
None
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
None
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD FOLLOWING THE HEARING
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
II. Confirmation of Extension, 8/12/11, 1 pg.
III. Confirmation of Extension, 9/23/11, 1 pg.
IV. Confirmation of Extension, 12/1/11, 1 pg.
V. Confirmation of Extension, 2/14/12, 1 pg.
VI. Confirmation of Extension, 3/17/12, 1 pg.
VII. Confirmation of Extension, 4/11/12, 1 pg.
VIII. Confirmation of Extension, 4/19/12, 1 pg.
Footnotes
[1] References to the hearing transcript are noted as “R.” References to exhibits admitted into evidence are noted as “Ex.”
[2] The parties moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter several times during the course of the hearing. In considering those requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that the parties’ need for additional time to present their available witnesses on the extensive issues raised in the parent’s due process complaint justified the delay in the resolution of the matter and was in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, requests for an extensions of the case compliance date were granted (R. 85-87; Exs. IHO-II, IHO-III, IHO-IV, IHO-V, IHO-VI, IHO-VII, IHO- VIII).
[3] tuberculosis, rheumatic fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead poisoning, leukemia, diabetes, attention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or , which adversely affects a student’s educational performance. 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(10).
[4] The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.