COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student & Quincy Public Schools, Norwood Public Schools, Plymouth Public Schools and Chamberlain School BSEA # 2611822
RULING ON CHAMBERLAIN SCHOOL’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Chamberlain International School’s (Chamberlain) Motion to Dismiss (Motion) filed with the BSEA on July 15, 2026[1]. On July 16, 2026, Co-Guardian[2] filed Parent’s Opposition to Chamberlain International School’s Motion to Dismiss (Opposition). On July 17, 2026, Norwood Public Schools (Norwood) filed an Objection to Chamberlain International’s Motion to Dismiss (Norwood’s Objection). Neither Quincy Public Schools (Quincy), nor Plymouth Public Schools (Plymouth)[3] provided any response to the Motion.
No Party has requested a hearing on the Motion. Because neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer's understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing, pursuant to Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rule VI(D). For the reasons articulated, infra, the Motion is DENIED.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[4] AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
On April 9, 2026, Co-Guardian filed a Hearing Request alleging substantive violations of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to Student, who is 21 years old. Student has a history of psychotic symptoms, paranoia, disorganized thinking, self-dialogue, and command auditory hallucinations that tell him to engage in harm to himself and others, when he is on a “subtherapeutic” medication dosage. According to the Hearing Request, Student is currently homeless, fled from his last shelter location for safety reasons, and, as a result, struggles with maintaining activities of daily living skills with respect to hygiene, laundry, medication management and consistently accessing and attending school. The Hearing Request seeks relief to provide Student with his remaining required educational programming, transition planning, educational access, secure lodging[5], transportation, vocational supports, medication management supports, and other related supports to enable him to attend school regularly and graduate with a high school diploma, by the time he turns 22, consistent with his long-standing IEP Vision statement. Additionally, Co-Guardian requested that Student receive in-home occupational therapy supports pursuant to a prior agreement to provide the same; an assistive technology evaluation with implementation of its resulting recommendations; and a “driving evaluation” with related driver education and licensure support. Finally, the Hearing Request seeks compensatory services beyond Student’s 22nd birthday, if needed, “to complete diploma requirements, vocational training, transitional services or related instruction”[6].
With respect to Chamberlain, the Hearing Request contains the following allegations[7]:
1. During [Student’s] placement at Chamberlain, Petitioner repeatedly raised concerns in emails, with the LEAs copied, regarding confusion about [Student’s] MCAS status, graduation path and diploma plan. (Hearing Request Part 1(6)).
2. During this same period, [Student] was not completing meaningful work toward an MCAS-Alt portfolio and was also discussing taking MCAS with staff. (Hearing Request Part 1(7)).
3. Despite [Student’s] repeatedly documented diploma goal, no clear and timely graduation plan was developed. (Hearing Request Part 1(8)).
4. [Student] believed he was on track to graduate because neither he nor his guardians were informed otherwise. (Hearing Request Part 1(9)).
5. [On January 13, 2026] the family was informed that, although [Student] had earned approximately 134 credits, he was missing Algebra 1, Biology, and two additional science courses, as well as competency-based requirements tied to graduation. (Hearing Request Part 1(10 and 11)).
6. Previously proposed relief included in-home occupational therapy (OT) services through NESCA. Petitioner remained agreeable to those services, but they were never finalized or implemented. (Hearing Request Part 7(58)).
7. Petitioner continues to request those services, or a comparable service to the extent they remain necessary. (Hearing Request Part 7(59))[8].
On April 15, 2026, Chamberlian filed its Response to Parents’ Amended Request for Hearing (Chamberlain’s Response to Hearing Request) asserting that it is not clear what issue or claim remains with regard to Chamberlain and requesting that this be clarified specifically. Chamberlain acknowledged that it owed Student some compensatory services, consisting of Orton-Gillingham (OG) Reading hours, OT and Speech and Language (SL) services, which it had been providing virtually. However, according to Chamberlain, although the service providers for each of these services had logged on and waited through each offered session, Student had stopped showing up for OG services after March 4, 2026; had only shown up once for the twice weekly offered OT services since December 11, 2025, and had shown up 10 of the 23 offered SL services, with the last attendance on March 30, 2026[9].
According to the Motion, Chamberlain seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that dismissal is warranted as no remaining viable claims exist against Chamberlain. Specifically, Chamberlain claims it has provided the Parties with a complete copy of Student’s transcript; believes Student has acquired enough credits to graduate (but acknowledges that this is ultimately Quincy’s determination); offered sufficient services to cover any compensatory services owed[10]; and that “none” (emphasis in original) of the requests for relief in the Hearing Request pertain to Chamberlain[11].
Co-Guardian’s Opposition asserts that when viewing the allegations in the Hearing Request in the light most favorable to her, issues of material fact exist with respect to whether Chamberlain met its undisputed compensatory obligations, and as such, dismissal is not appropriate. Chamberlain only offered compensatory services remotely, despite knowing of Student’s homelessness status and lack of consistent access to the internet, electricity and accessories to charge his devices, and “stable conditions necessary to participate in virtual sessions”. Co-Guardian contends Student’s circumstances created a barrier to his participation in the services, and thus excuse lack of attendance, making the unattended sessions still owed.
Norwood’s Objection argues that dismissal of Chamberlain at this stage is premature as the issues in the Hearing Request are not wholly clarified, and until that happens it would be “untimely” to dismiss any party.
LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Motions to Dismiss and the Notice Pleading Standard.
Rule XVI(B)(1) and (4) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), allow for dismissal of a hearing request if the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over a claim or if a party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[12]. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief…”[13]. The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor”[14]. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level... [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the [hearing request] (even if doubtful in fact)”[15].
Motions to dismiss should be approached with caution, particularly when, as in the instant matter, the party filing the matter is pro se[16]. This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system [, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law[17]. However, even in such cases, “[w]hile ‘a trial judge is to employ less stringent standards in assessing pro se pleadings ... than would be used to judge the final product of lawyers,’ this leniency does not permit the district court to act as counsel for a party or to rewrite deficient pleadings”[18].
Consistent with FRCP 8(a), hearing requests filed under the IDEA need only consist of “notice pleadings”, i.e., sufficient so as to provide fair notice to the opposing party of the nature of the dispute[19]. However, “[w]hile …. detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, “… a [Student’s] obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of [] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”[20].
Guided by this legal authority, I turn to the instant Motion.
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
The Hearing Request alleges that Student was homeless and this homelessness impacted his ability to access and attend his educational programming. While it is not clear what specific educational services Student was struggling to access when the Hearing Request was filed, or specifically which of the Schools each allegation pertained to, I find that under the “notice pleadings” standard this was not necessary and the allegations pertaining to Student’s homelessness and resulting challenges were sufficient and more than prohibited “labels and conclusions” or “recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action” to provide fair notice to the Schools that the nature of the dispute involved Student’s access to any education services he was being provided with or offered at the time it was filed[21]. With respect to Chamberlain, specifically, this would involve the compensatory services it was then-offering Student.
I agree with Co-Guardian that there remains a dispute of material facts both as to whether Chamberlain offered Student meaningful compensatory services, and whether Student’s non-attendance at many of the offered services negates any responsibility for Chamberlain to make up such missed services. Compensatory services, by their very nature, are equitable remedies[22], and must be analyzed with such perspective once all relevant facts and circumstances are established. Thus, while it is undisputed that Chamberlain owed Student compensatory services, there remains a material dispute as to whether Chamberlain met that obligation, and this can only be determined after a hearing on the merits.
In addition to the compensatory services claims, based on the allegations in the Hearing Request set forth, supra, the graduation-related claims also appear to implicate Chamberlain. Chamberlain’s assertion in the Motion, without support, that it believes Student now has sufficient credits to graduate, does not, on its own, justify its dismissal with respect to these claims, at this stage. This assertion contradicts the Hearing Request allegations which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Co-Guardian, indicate that after attending Chamberlain, Student was credit deficient, missing four required courses, and had not met the competency-based requirements for graduation. It also fails to address the FAPE-based claims that Student has not received sufficient vocational training or transition services to warrant graduation. Given that Student was attending Chamberlain and/or accessing educational services Chamberlain provided during at least part of the relevant timeframe, Chamberlain may have some ongoing responsibility and liability with respect to these issues, which can also only be determined after a hearing on the merits.
Thus, as disputes of material fact remain on the issues Chamberlain asserts to be resolved, and since claims in the Hearing Request, when viewed in the light most favorable to Co-Guardian, remain viable against Chamberlain, I find that dismissal of Chamberlain as a party is not appropriate, and the Motion, is hereby DENIED.
ORDER
The Motion is DENIED. The Hearing on the merits remains scheduled for September 15 and 16, 2026. The Parties are reminded that all requests for postponements must be in writing and specify the reasons for requesting the postponement and the length of the postponement desired/agreed upon. Should the Parties reach a settlement agreement prior to the Hearing, the moving party shall submit a written withdrawal of the hearing request. Failure to appear at the Hearing may result in dismissal of the matter with or without prejudice. The Parties are encouraged to review the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals, the BSEA Reference Manual, and the BSEA Pro Se Guide which can be found at https://www.mass.gov/lists/bsea-forms-and-publications. Technical assistance is also available by contacting the BSEA by phone at 781-397-4750.
All requests for a stenographer at the Hearing on the merits must be in writing.
By the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Marguerite M. Mitchell
Marguerite M. Mitchell
Date: July 23, 2026
Footnotes
[1] The Motion references three BSEA Case Numbers, namely, 2611822, 2611983 and 2503859. BSEA Case No 2503859 is assigned to a different Hearing Officer, and this Ruling does not apply to that matter. I also note that the designation of Case No. “2611983”, which has been previously utilized on documents relating to this matter (starting with postponement Rulings issued on May 18 and 19, 2026), was a typographical error. The only accurate case number for the instant case is 2611822.
[2] The Co-Guardian filing the Opposition is also Student’s Mother.
[3] Quincy, Norwood and Plymouth will collectively be referred to as “Public Schools”, and Quincy, Norwood, Plymouth and Chamberlain will collectively be referred to as “Schools” for purposes of this Ruling.
[4] The factual statements set forth are taken as true for purposes of this Ruling only.
[5] The Hearing Request specified this is distinct from a request for residential educational programming as Student “spent approximately five years in residential facilities and declined during that time” and no longer wants to continue in such programming.
[6] Although this request for relief references the LEAs (so it is unclear if it pertains also to Chamberlain), the final prayer for relief seeks to have the BSEA “grant such other and further relief as it deems just and proper”, which would include Chamberlain.
[7] The Hearing Request indicates that Student was placed at Chamberlain but it does not provide the start/end dates for such placement, thus it is unclear if the Hearing Request allegations with respect to inappropriate transition planning and current unaddressed transition needs (set forth in Part 1(13), Part 6 and Part 7(60, 61 and 62)) also pertain to Chamberlain.
[8] The allegations contained in Part 7(59) are determined to involve Chamberlain based on Chamberlain’s Response to Hearing Request and the Motion, discussed below, both of which acknowledge it was providing compensatory OT services to Student.
[9] Although Chamberlain’s Response to Hearing Request advises Student first enrolled in Chamberlain on July 7, 2023, it did not indicate when his enrollment ended (and as noted, Chamberlain was providing compensatory services through March 30, 2026).
[10] The Motion provides the same summary of Student’s limited access to the offered compensatory services as in Chamberlain’s Response to the Hearing Request, thus it does not appear any additional compensatory services have been offered or attended since the filing of the Hearing Request.
[11] The Motion again sets forth Student’s enrollment date at Chamberlain but does not provide the date his enrollment ended.
[12] As these rules/regulations are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP and MRCP, respectively), hearing officers are generally guided by federal court decisions in deciding such motions.
[13] Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
[14] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[15] Iannacchino 451 Mass. at 636 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
[16] Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (allegations contained in a hearing request are to be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation [of their hearing request] is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled”); In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 2203555, 22 MSER 109, (Berman, 2022); see In Re: Easthampton Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 2203513, 28 MSER 35, (Kantor Nir, 2022).
[17] Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[18] Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 F.App'x 274, 276–77 (11th Cir. 2008) quoting Hepperle v. Johnston, 544 F.2d 201, 202 (5th Cir.1976).
[19] FRCP 8(a), “Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: … (2)a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief…”; see Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
[20] Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
[21] Id.
[22] Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 US 7, 16 (1993); Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 201 F.Supp.3d 187, 202 (D. Mass. 2016), aff'd, 906 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 2018) (“compensatory education may be awarded; however, [it] is ‘not an automatic entitlement but, … a discretionary remedy for nonfeasance or misfeasance in connection with a school system’s obligations under the IDEA’” (citations omitted)).