Parent on Behalf of Student v. Yuba City Unified School District

On June 23, 2025, the Office of Administrative Hearings, called OAH, received a due process hearing request from Student, naming Yuba City Unified School District. OAH continued the matter on August 4, 2025, setting the due process hearing to begin on August 26, 2025. Administrative Law Judge Ashok Pathi heard this matter via videoconference on August 26, 27, and 28, and September 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, and 23, 2025.

Attorney Joshua Cruz represented Student. Parent attended all hearing days on Student’s behalf. Student did not attend the hearing. Attorneys Matejka Handley, Dee Anna Hassanpour, and Rebecca Diddams represented Yuba City. Director of Student Support Elisabeth Davit attended all hearing days on Yuba City’s behalf.

At the parties’ request, the matter was continued to October 20, 2025, for written closing briefs. The record was closed, and the matter was submitted on October 20, 2025.

ISSUES

A free appropriate public education is called FAPE. An individualized education program is called an IEP.

1. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE from the beginning of the 2023-2024 school year, through May 7, 2024, by failing to identify, assess, and find Student eligible for special education under the categories of emotional disability, other health impairment, and specific learning disability?

2. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE by failing to conduct an adequate psychoeducational assessment, dated May 7, 2024?

3. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE by failing to timely complete assessments pursuant to assessment plans dated January 11, 2024, and August 24, 2024, and review them at IEP team meetings?

4. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE from May 7, 2024, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer appropriate goals in the following areas:

a. writing;

b. math;

c. task completion;

d. staying on task; and

e. social emotional development?

5. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE from June 23, 2023, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer appropriate services in the following areas:

a. behavior;

b. social-emotional, including mental health;

c. academics; and

d. school-based health?

6. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE from June 23, 2023, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer Student home or hospital instruction during times she was hospitalized or at home unable to attend school?

7. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE from April 24, 2025, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer Student an appropriate placement, such as a nonpublic school or a residential treatment center?

8. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE between May 7, 2024 and June 23, 2025, by materially failing to implement Student’s specialized academic instruction services?

9. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE between October 30, 2024, and June 23, 2025, by materially failing to implement Student’s counseling services?

10. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE by failing to fund an independent psychoeducational evaluation pursuant to Parent’s June 3, 2025 request?

11. Did Yuba City deny Student a FAPE by failing to provide Parent with a complete copy of Student’s educational records pursuant to a May 2, 2025 request?

JURISDICTION

This hearing was held under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, its regulations, and California statutes and regulations. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2006) et seq.; Ed. Code, § 56000 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3000 et seq.) The main purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, referred to as the IDEA, are to ensure:

• All children with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment and independent living, and

• The rights of children with disabilities and their parents are protected. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1); See Ed. Code, § 56000, subd. (a).)

The IDEA affords parents and local educational agencies the procedural protection of an impartial due process hearing with respect to any matter relating to the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a FAPE to the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) & (f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511; Ed. Code, §§ 56501, 56502, and 56505; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3082.) The party requesting the hearing is limited to the issues alleged in the complaint, unless the other party consents, and has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Ed. Code, § 56502, subd. (i); Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 546 U.S. 49, 57-58, 62 [126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387]; and see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).) As the filing party, Student had the burden of proof. The factual statements in this Decision constitute the written findings of fact required by the IDEA and state law. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (e)(5).)

Student was 14 years old and in ninth grade at the time of hearing. Parent resided within Yuba City’s geographic boundaries at all relevant times. As discussed in detail below, Student has resided within and outside of Yuba City’s geographic boundaries, also called jurisdiction, at various times throughout the relevant timeframe. Student was eligible for special education under the categories of emotional disability and other health impairment.

ISSUE 1

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 2023-2024 SCHOOL YEAR, THROUGH MAY 7, 2024, BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY, ASSESS, AND FIND STUDENT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION UNDER THE CATEGORIES OF EMOTIONAL DISABILITY, OTHER HEALTH IMPAIRMENT, AND SPECIFIC LEARNING DISABILITY?

Student contends that Yuba City should have assessed her and found her eligible for special education prior to May 7, 2024. Student contends that she was eligible for special education throughout the 2023-2024 school year under the categories of specific learning disability, other health impairment, and emotional disability.

Yuba City contends that it had previously assessed Student in September 2021, and in February 2023, and considered eligibility under specific learning disability and other health impairment. Yuba City contends that both assessments revealed that Student did not meet eligibility criteria for special education. Yuba City further contends that there was no reason to reassess Student prior to January 11, 2024, when it offered to assess Student following Parent’s request and a significant change in Student’s circumstances.

A FAPE means special education and related services that are available to an eligible child that meets state educational standards at no charge to the parent or guardian. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.) Parents and school personnel develop an IEP for an eligible student based upon state law and the IDEA. (20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d)(1); and see Ed. Code, §§ 56031, 56032, 56341, 56345, subd. (a) and 56363, subd. (a); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321, and 300.501.)

In general, a child eligible for special education must be provided access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit through an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. (Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 201-204; Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1 (2017) 580 U.S. 386, 402 [137 S.Ct. 988, 1000] (Endrew F.).)

The IDEA's overall purpose is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE].” (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Charlene F. (1999) 526 U.S. 66, 73 [119 S.Ct. 992] (Cedar Rapids).) The IDEA therefore places an affirmative, ongoing duty on the state and school districts to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing in the state who are in need of special education and related services. (McIntyre v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 902, 910 [citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3), (7), 1414(a)-(c)]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a); Ed. Code, § 56301, subd. (a).) This duty is commonly referred to as “child find.” The IDEA uses the term evaluation, while the California Education Code uses the term assessment. The terms are interchangeable. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a); Ed. Code, § 56302.5.)

To ensure that children with disabilities receive an appropriate education tailored to their unique needs, the IDEA requires that when a school district has reason to suspect that a child has a disability, it must conduct a full and individual initial evaluation that ensures the child is assessed for all areas of suspected disability, using a variety of reliable and technically sound instruments. (Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unif. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2016) 822 F.3d 1105, 1109 [cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1578 (2017)] (Timothy O.); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1), (b)(2)-(3).) Either a parent or school district may request an initial evaluation. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b).)

A district’s duty to assess a child for a possible disability is broader than its duty to provide special education, and more easily triggered. A school district’s child find obligation toward a specific child is triggered when there is reason to suspect the child may have a disability, and may need special education and related services. (Ed. Code, § 56301, subd. (a).) The obligation to assess applies even if the child is advancing from grade to grade. (Ed. Code, § 56301, subd (b)(1).)

A disability becomes suspected when the district has notice that the child has displayed symptoms of that disability. (Timothy O., supra, 822 F.3d at pp. 1119-20.) A district may be put on notice through concerns expressed by parents about a child’s symptoms, opinions expressed by informed professionals, or by other less formal indicators, such as the child’s behavior at school. (Id. at pp. 1119-1121 [citing Pasatiempo v. Aizawa (9th Cir. 1996) 103 F.3d 796, and N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2008) 541 F.3d 1202].)

Once a school district is on notice that a child may have a disability, it has a duty to propose an assessment. (D.O. by and through Walker v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 394, 408 (D.O.).) This is so, regardless of the subjective views of its staff members concerning the likely outcome of such an assessment, because the identification and assessment of children who have disabilities should be a cooperative and consultative process, and parents are entitled to notification of, and the opportunity to contest, conclusions regarding their children. (Timothy O., supra, 822 F.3d at p. 1121.) The duty to assess must be fulfilled within a reasonable time after school officials are placed on notice that the child may have a qualifying disability. (D.R. ex rel. Courtney R. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist. (C.D. Cal. 2010) 746 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1144.)

The actions of a school district with respect to whether it had knowledge of, or reason to suspect, a disability, must be evaluated in light of information that the district knew, or had reason to know, at the relevant time. It is not based upon hindsight. (See Adams v. State of Oregon (9th Cir. 1999) 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (Adams) (citing Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ. (3rd Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1031, 1041) (Fuhrmann).) However, some consideration of subsequent events may be permissible if the additional data “provide[s] significant insight into the child’s condition, and the reasonableness of the school district’s action, at the earlier date.” (E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unif. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2011) 652 F.3d 999, 1006 (E.M.) [quoting Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at p. 1149].)

STUDENT’S BACKGROUND DURING THE 2022-2023 SCHOOL YEAR

Yuba City’s 2022-2023 school year ended on June 2, 2023. Accordingly, the entirety of the 2022-2023 school year predates the timeframe at issue in this matter. Nevertheless, events during the 2022-2023 school year are relevant when analyzing subsequent events which are at issue. (Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at p. 1149.)

Student was in the sixth grade during the 2022-2023 school year. During the fall semester, Student earned credits in five of her six classes, but failed her math class. While Student earned “D” grades in three of her classes, Yuba City awarded credit for those grades. The record established that Student had an accommodation plan under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), called a 504 plan, during the 2022-2023 school year. However, neither party offered a copy of Student’s 504 plan into evidence.

Yuba City conducted an initial multidisciplinary assessment of Student, with a report dated February 2023. Neither party offered a copy of this assessment report into evidence. Student’s IEP team did not find Student eligible for special education following the review of the February 2023 assessment report.

Student maintained the accommodations included in her 504 plan, and earned credits in all her classes. Student’s grades generally improved compared to the first semester.

During most of the 2022-2023 school year, Student was a foster youth, and Parent was her foster parent. However, Parent adopted Student in May 2023. As part of her adoption, Student’s first and last name changed. Accordingly, some of Student’s records identify Student by her previous name, and some by her current name.

During May 2023, Student was the target of a bullying incident. Yuba City responded to this incident by separating Student from the other students involved, such that Student and the other students would have minimal interactions at school.

Following the bullying incident at school, Student was hospitalized on a voluntary hold due to expressing suicidal ideations related to the bullying. The record was unclear how long this hospitalization lasted or any outcomes of that hospitalization.

Student offered multiple reports from her stays in the emergency room, also called the emergency department, the first being in May 2023. Much of the reports’ contents included medical information which required competent expert testimony to interpret. However, Student did not provide competent testimony to explain the information contained in the reports. Parent could not explain the reports, and testified that she had not seen many, if any, of the reports offered into evidence prior to receiving a comprehensive copy of Student’s medical records in mid-May 2025.

Certain limited, narrative portions of the reports were easily understandable. Specifically, the portions which explained the reason for Student’s visit to the emergency room, how she arrived at the hospital, and some brief historical information included in each report. However, these portions also regularly contained abbreviations, medical jargon, or acronyms, the meaning of which were not readily understandable without explanation from a competent witness.

Parent testified that Student was often taken to the emergency room for a 72-hour hold, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 5150. The parties referred to these as 5150 holds. However, the emergency room reports did not always reflect this. Accordingly, the emergency room reports established that Student was seen in the emergency room on the dates indicated and were somewhat persuasive as to the reasons behind Student’s hospital visits.

Student did not establish when she provided these records to Yuba City. The earliest time Student could have done so was mid-May 2025, when Parent received a comprehensive copy of Student’s medical records. Yuba City knew of the 5150 referrals that occurred at school, but was not contemporaneously aware of the contents of the related emergency room reports. The undersigned considered the emergency room reports and assigned them weight with the previously discussed considerations in mind. (See E.M., supra, 652 F.3d at p. 1006; and Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at p. 1149.)

Following the end of the 2022-2023 school year, on June 22, 2023, Student’s adoptive father unexpectedly passed away. Understandably, this event negatively affected Student.

YUBA CITY’S DUTY TO ASSESS AROSE DURING THE 2023-2024 SCHOOL YEAR

Yuba City’s 2023-2024 school year began on August 9, 2023. Student was in seventh grade during this school year. Student began the year enrolled and attending school within Yuba City.

Student was hospitalized on August 16, 2023, due to concerns with self-harm and suicidal ideations. This was the first of several hospitalizations which occurred during the fall semester. Student would generally be taken to the emergency room on a 5150 hold, or similar referral, as referred by her family. Student was frequently seen in the emergency room and then transferred to another inpatient hospital, sometimes referred to as a behavioral health facility, for weeks at a time. Student then would be discharged from the hospital or behavioral health facility, and would return to the emergency room on a subsequent 5150 hold, following a referral by her family.

These subsequent 5150 referrals by Student’s family were often within hours of her discharge from her last placement. For example, Student was discharged from a psychiatric hospital placement on August 25, 2023, and her family requested a 5150 hold the same day. On October 16, 2023, Student was discharged from another hospital placement, and returned to the emergency room on a 5150 hold on October 17, 2023. Without detailing every hospitalization, Student continued this pattern until she returned to Yuba City on December 11, 2023. Student was disenrolled from Yuba City during this time.

The record was not clear as to every different hospital Student had been admitted to during the 2023-2024 school year. Nevertheless, the record established Student’s hospital placements originated in the emergency room, where she was evaluated to determine whether a longer hospitalization was necessary. If so, Student was held in the emergency room until a suitable hospital was located to accommodate Student. The record established that there were no local hospitals within Yuba City equipped to provide these emergency room evaluations or hospitalizations. Thus, Student was always placed in a hospital outside of Yuba City’s jurisdiction.

Yuba City’s Director of Student Support, Elisabeth Davit, credibly explained this process. Davit’s testimony was very persuasive. Her testimony was clear and comprehensive. She appeared eager to answer questions from both parties. Davit asked to clarify questions she did not fully understand, so that she could provide accurate answers. She corrected herself when she misspoke and admitted to the error. Overall, Davit was very credible, and her testimony was accorded great weight.

Student did not refute Davit’s testimony. Rather, Parent confirmed that Student’s hospitalizations took place at various locations throughout northern California. This included Student’s hospitalizations during the fall of 2023.

Student argued that Yuba City remained Student’s responsible local educational agency, called an LEA, throughout these hospitalizations. Student also argued that Yuba City improperly disenrolled Student when she was hospitalized. However, Student’s arguments are not persuasive, because California law specifically determines a special education student’s responsible LEA when that student is hospitalized.

Generally, an LEA is responsible for providing a FAPE to students with disabilities within its jurisdiction. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A).) California law defines an LEA as a school district, a county office of education, a nonprofit charter school participating as a member of a special education local plan area, or a special education local plan area, called a SELPA. (Ed. Code, § 56026.3.) The general rule is that the school district responsible for the education of a child between the ages of six and 18 is the district in which the child’s parent or legal guardian resides. (Ed. Code, § 48200; Katz v. Los Gatos– Saratoga Joint Union High Sch. Dist. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47.)

However, this general rule is not absolute. (See e.g. N.G. v. ABC Unif. Sch. Dist. (C.D. Cal. 2014) CV-13-06929-DMG(RZx), 2014 WL 4678967 [aff.d (9th Cir. 2016) 670 Fed.Appx.540 (Mem)] (N.G.); Ed. Code, § 56167.) Education Code section 56167 provides:

(a) Individuals with exceptional needs who are placed in a public hospital, state licensed children's hospital, psychiatric hospital, proprietary hospital, or a health facility for medical purposes are the educational responsibility of the local educational agency in which the hospital or facility is located, as determined in local written agreements pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 56195.7.

California law also explains what happens when a disabled child placed in a hospital is discharged and returns home. (Gov. Code, § 7579.1.) Government Code section 7579.1, subdivision (a) requires the hospital to notify the LEA providing the child a FAPE within the hospital and receiving SELPA, that the child is being discharged from the hospital with at least 10 days’ notice. The hospital is also required to send the current IEP, as well as other specified information to help the receiving SELPA implement the child’s IEP. (Gov. Code, § 7579.1, subd. (a)(2).) Once the child is discharged, the receiving LEA is responsible for providing the Student with a FAPE “without delay” upon discharge from the hospital. (Gov. Code, § 7579.1, subd. (b).) The LEA responsible for providing the child a FAPE is “the school district of residence of the parent or guardian of the child unless the child is placed in another hospital, institution, facility, or foster family home in which case the responsibility of special education rests with the school district in which the child resides ….” (Id.)

The plain language of the statutes establish that Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA when she was hospitalized, or held in the emergency room, because none of the facilities were within Yuba City’s jurisdiction. Rather, Student’s responsible LEA was based solely upon Student being a patient at whichever hospital she was placed at that time. The record did not establish the existence of any agreement between Yuba City and the other school districts establishing that Yuba City remained Student’s responsible LEA. Further, Student’s patient status at any of these hospitals could not be construed to be an educational residential placement for which the LEA would be deemed financially responsible. (Ed. Code, § 56167.5.) The Ninth Circuit has agreed with this interpretation of the overall statutory scheme. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; see also Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. California Dept. of Educ. (9th Cir. 2011) 668 F.3d 1052 (Orange County).)

During each of her in-patient hospitalizations, Student was hospitalized outside of Yuba City’s jurisdictional boundaries. Accordingly, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA and not required to provide her a FAPE. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.) Rather, Yuba City’s responsibility for Student resumed upon her discharges from the various hospitals. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540, 541; Gov. Code, § 7579.1(b).) The situation here is nearly identical to that in N.G. In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that the LEA responsible for the hospital where that child was placed was responsible for providing a FAPE, and that the child’s home LEA was responsible after their discharge. (Id. at p. 541.) Although an unpublished case, it is highly persuasive.

The district court decision in N.G. explained the lack of case law applying Education Code sections 56167 and 56167.5. (N.G., supra, 2014 WL 4678967 at p. *4.) That court relied on Orange County in finding the LEA responsible for providing a FAPE while that child was hospitalized was the LEA in which the hospital was geographically located. (Ibid.) That court explained that neither the reviewing district court nor the Ninth Circuit in Orange County reviewed the relevant part of OAH's decision regarding Education Code sections 56167 and 56167.5, but that the reviewing courts necessarily affirmed the ALJ’s interpretation of those statutes through their holdings. (Ibid. [citing Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. A.S. (C.D. Cal 2008) 567 F.Supp.2d 1165, affd. In part, revd. in part and remanded sub nom. Orange County, supra, 668 F.3d 1052.) Accordingly, the unpublished decision in N.G. is rooted in binding precedent.

Student was disenrolled from Yuba City on August 16, 2023, following her hospital admission. Student’s nearly continuous series of hospitalizations did not end until December 2023. When Student was finally discharged, Yuba City was once again her responsible LEA, and Student re-enrolled on December 11, 2023. The record was not clear as to what, if any, educational services Student received during the fall of 2023 while she was hospitalized.

On December 14, 2023, Student expressed concerns about harming herself while at school. Student was subsequently placed on a 5150 hold. This incident took place on the Thursday before Yuba City’s winter break. Student did not return to school prior to the start of winter break.

School resumed on January 8, 2024. Yuba City offered a comprehensive initial assessment on January 11, 2024. The January 11, 2024 assessment plan included assessments in

• Academic achievement,

• Health,

• Intellectual development,

• Social-emotional-behavioral, and

• Adaptive behavior. Parent consented to the assessment plan on January 24, 2024, and returned the signed assessment plan to Yuba City staff on January 26, 2024.

Student’s attendance during the spring semester of 2024 was inconsistent. Student missed approximately three weeks of school between February and March 2024. Student was placed on three 5150 holds during that time. The first was on February 19, 2024, the second on February 22, 2024, and the last on February 25, 2024. The February 22, 2024, referral came from Yuba City staff with law enforcement placing Student on the 5150 hold.

Student’s attendance was more regular beginning in mid-March 2024 through the date of her initial IEP team meeting on May 7, 2024. At that meeting, Student’s IEP team reviewed the initial assessments, conducted pursuant to the January 11, 2024, assessment plan. The assessment included recommendations that the IEP team find Student eligible under the categories of emotional disturbance, now called emotional disability, and other health impairment. (Ed. Code, § 97; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subds. (a) and (b).) The assessment did not recommend finding Student eligible under the category of specific learning disability. Student’s IEP team determined Student was eligible under the categories of emotional disability as primary, and other health impairment as a secondary eligibility category.

YUBA CITY DID NOT FAIL TO TIMELY IDENTIFY AND ASSESS STUDENT DURING THE 2023-2024 SCHOOL YEAR

Student contends that Yuba City staff should have reassessed Student during 2023-2024 school year because the February 2023 assessors reported that Student did not put forth her best effort, which led to unreliable results. Student also contends that Yuba City misapplied the exclusionary factors for eligibility under specific learning disability, which resulted in Student not being found eligible.

Yuba City contends that it had no reason to assess Student during the 2023-2024 school year, prior to when it offered to do so in January 2024.

To the extent that Student challenges the adequacy of the February 2023 assessment and its corresponding report, this Decision makes no findings because Student did not plead an issue challenging the February 2023 assessment in her complaint. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Ed. Code, § 56502, subd. (i).) Moreover, any challenge to the February 2023 assessment would require Student to extend the two-year statute of limitations applicable to special education claims in California. (Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (l); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).) Student did plead the statute of limitations should be extended in this matter. Student did not prove that any defects that may exist in the February 2023 assessment created a duty that required Yuba City to reassess her.

Student also did not prove that Yuba City failed to identify and assess Student between August 16, 2023, and December 11, 2023. As explained above, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA during the periods of Student’s in-patient hospitalizations. (Ed. Code, § 56167.) Thus, Yuba City was not responsible for providing Student a FAPE, including conducting assessments.

Student did not prove that Yuba City should have offered to assess Student between Student’s return to Yuba City on December 11, 2023, and January 11, 2024. Due to the timing of Yuba City’s winter break, that period encompassed only nine school days.

Student argues that Yuba City only assessed Student because Parent asked. Even if that were true, that does not affect the validity of Yuba City’s offer to assess, because either a parent or school district may initiate a request for an initial evaluation. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b).) Aside from the assessments offered in the January 11, 2024, assessment plan, Student did not prove that Yuba City had any other duty to assess Student between the start of the 2023-2024 school year and May 7, 2024.

Student’s arguments that Yuba City did not timely complete the initial assessments, pursuant to the January 11, 2024 assessment plan, are addressed in full in Issue 3 below.

YUBA CITY DID NOT FAIL TO FIND STUDENT ELIGIBLE UNDER SPECIFIC LEARNING DISABILITY

Student did not prove that she was eligible for special education under the category of specific learning disability. Education Code section 56337 defines specific learning disability:

A specific learning disability, as defined in Section 1401(30) of Title 20 of the United States Code, means a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or perform mathematical calculations. The term “specific learning disability” includes conditions such as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. That term does not include a learning problem that is primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of intellectual disabilities, of emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. (Ed. Code, § 56337, subd. (a); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (10).)

Student did not offer persuasive argument or evidence that Student was eligible under the category of specific learning disability at any time during the 2023-2024 school year. Moreover, Student’s eligibility under emotional disability, which Student does not contest, is one of the exclusionary factors when considering eligibility under specific learning disability. (Ed. Code, § 56337, subd. (a); see also 5 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (10)(A).)

Student did not prove that Yuba City failed to find her eligible under specific learning disability at any time during the 2023-2024 school year.

STUDENT’S MAY 7, 2024 IEP TEAM FOUND STUDENT ELIGIBLE UNDER EMOTIONAL DISABILITY AND OTHER HEALTH IMPAIRMENT

Student’s IEP team determined that Student was eligible for special education under the categories of emotional disability, and other health impairment on May 7, 2024. Student asserts that she should have been found eligible for special education under the categories of emotional disability and other health impairment earlier than May 7, 2024. However, Student did not offer persuasive argument or evidence that Student was eligible under either category earlier than May 7, 2024.

Overall, Student did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Yuba City failed to identify, assess, and find Student eligible for special education under the categories of specific learning disability, emotional disability, or other health impairment, from the beginning of the 2023-2024 school year through May 7, 2024.

Student did not meet her burden of proving that Yuba City denied her a FAPE.

ISSUE 2

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE BY FAILING TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT, DATED MAY 7, 2024?

Student contends that the May 7, 2024 psychoeducational assessment, also called a multidisciplinary assessment, was inadequate because it did not include a classroom observation. Student also contends that the academic achievement portion of the assessment was not scored correctly.

Yuba City argues that the May 7, 2024 psychoeducational assessment meets all legal requirements, and that Student did not meet her burden of proving otherwise.

An LEA must assess a special education student in all areas of suspected disability, including if appropriate,

• Health and development,

• Vision,

• Hearing,

• Motor abilities,

• Language function,

• General intelligence,

• Academic performance,

• Communicative status,

• Self-help,

• Orientation and mobility skills,

• Career and vocational abilities and interests, and

• Social and emotional status. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4); Ed. Code, § 56320, subd. (f).)

An LEA must use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic information. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A).) No single measure or assessment shall be the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(2); Ed. Code, § 56320, subd. (e).)

Assessments must be sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the child’s special education and related service needs, whether or not commonly linked to the disability category of the child. (34 C.F.R. § 300.304 (c)(6).) The LEA must use technically sound testing instruments that demonstrate the effect that cognitive, behavioral, physical and developmental factors have on the functioning of the student. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(3); Ed. Code, § 56320, subds. (e) & (f).) Assessments must be conducted by individuals who are both “knowledgeable of [the student’s] disability” and “competent to perform the assessment, as determined by the school district, county office, or special education local plan area.” (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(iv); Ed. Code, §§ 56320, subd. (g), 56322.)

An LEA must ensure that the child is observed in the child's learning environment, including the regular classroom setting, to document the child's academic performance and behavior in the areas of difficulty. (34 C.F.R. § 300.310(a) (2006).) The information gained from this observation is particularly important when a student’s IEP team is considering eligibility under specific learning disability. (34 C.F.R. § 300.310(b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (10)(c)(5).)

Yuba City failed to conduct a classroom observation as part of the May 7, 2024, psychoeducational assessment. School psychologist Elisabeth Moreno conducted the intellectual, social-emotional-behavior, and adaptive behavior portions of the assessment. Moreno acknowledged that she did not conduct a classroom observation. Moreno explained the lack of observation resulted from Student not attending school consistently during the assessment period, which caused difficulties with scheduling assessment sessions. Moreno opined that it was her belief that observations “are not always required,” but that it was best practice to do them. Moreno’s statement reflected a misunderstanding of assessment requirements.

A school district’s failure to conduct appropriate assessments or to assess in all areas of suspected disability may constitute a procedural violation of the IDEA. (Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., et al. (9th Cir. 2006) 464 F.3d 1025, 1031.) In matters alleging a procedural violation, a due process hearing officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural violation did any of the following:

• Impeded the right of the child to a FAPE;

• Significantly impeded the opportunity of the parents to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the child of the parents; or

• Caused a deprivation of educational benefits. (20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f)(3)(E); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (f).) The hearing officer “shall not base a decision solely on nonsubstantive procedural errors, unless the hearing officer finds that the nonsubstantive procedural errors resulted in the loss of an educational opportunity to the pupil or interfered with the opportunity of the parent or guardian to participate in the formulation process of the [IEP].” (Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (j).)

Yuba City’s failure to include a classroom observation in the May 7, 2024, psychoeducational assessment was a procedural violation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that, “[a] procedural error results in the denial of an educational opportunity where, absent the error, there is a ‘strong likelihood’ that alternative educational possibilities for the student ‘would have been better considered.’” (Doug C. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ. (9th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 1038, 1047 [citing M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 634, 657 (M.L.).]) An IEP team's failure to properly consider an alternative educational plan can result in a lost educational opportunity even if the student cannot definitively demonstrate that his placement would have been different but for the procedural error. (Id.)

The absence of the required classroom observation affected the information available to Student’s IEP team regarding Student’s classroom behavior’s impacting her education. Especially considering the additional observation requirements for assessments and IEP teams considering eligibility under specific learning disability, there is a “strong likelihood” that Student’s IEP team would have considered alternative educational possibilities for Student, because the IEP team could not fully discuss Student’s potential eligibility under specific learning disability, or her classroom behaviors. Moreover, Moreno’s failure to observe was not reasoned. It was due to her misunderstanding the requirement. The evidence established that failure to observe invalidated the assessment and resulted in a denial of educational opportunity. (Doug C., supra, 720 F.3d at p. 1047 [citing M.L., supra, 394 F.3d at p. 657].)

The undersigned need not address Student’s other arguments regarding the inadequacy of the psychoeducational assessment, because it has already been found to be inadequate. Therefore, Student proved Yuba City denied Student a FAPE by failing to conduct an adequate psychoeducational assessment, dated May 7, 2024. Student’s remedies related to this issue are discussed in the Remedies section at the end of this Decision.

ISSUE 3

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE BY FAILING TO TIMELY COMPLETE ASSESSMENTS PURSUANT TO ASSESSMENT PLANS DATED JANUARY 11, 2024, AND AUGUST 24, 2024, AND REVIEW THEM AT IEP TEAM MEETINGS?

Student contends that Yuba City failed to timely complete assessments pursuant to January 11, 2024 and August 24, 2024 assessment plans. Yuba City contends that the assessments were completed timely, because Student was not made available for assessment due to inconsistent attendance. Yuba City also contends that for significant portions of the 2024-2025 school year, Student was hospitalized outside of Yuba City’s jurisdiction, and therefore the responsibility of another LEA.

Generally, an IEP required as a result of an assessment shall be developed within a total time not to exceed 60 days, not counting days between the student’s regular school sessions, terms, or days of school vacation in excess of five schooldays, from the date of receipt of the parent's written consent for assessment, unless the parent agrees, in writing, to an extension. (Ed. Code, §§ 56043, subd, (c), 56302.1, subd. (a), and 56344, subd. (a).) However, there are exceptions to the 60-day timeframe if the student moves to a different LEA after the parent consents to an assessment plan, but before the assessment is completed, or if the parent repeatedly fails or refuses to produce the child for assessment. (34 C.F.R. § 300.301(d); Ed. Code, § 56302.1, subd. (b).)

JANUARY 11, 2024 INITIAL ASSESSMENT PLAN

As explained previously, the January 11, 2024, assessment plan was an initial assessment plan. Parent consented to the assessment plan on January 24, 2024, and provided the signed assessment plan to Yuba City staff on January 26, 2024. Thus, the assessment timeline began on January 26, 2024.

The assessments were completed, and the resulting psychoeducational assessment report was reviewed, at the May 7, 2024 IEP team meeting. Parent did not agree in writing to any extension for Yuba City to complete the assessments. Student argued that more than 60 days had elapsed between January 26, 2024, and May 7, 2024, which rendered the assessment untimely.

Student’s argument was not persuasive. Yuba City’s school calendar included two separate breaks of more than five school days. The first was between February 12, 2024, and February 19, 2024; and the second was between March 29, 2024, and April 5, 2024. Those periods are excluded from the 60-day timeline. Additionally, Student was hospitalized between February 19, 2024, and February 22, 2024, and again on February 22, 2024, and February 25, 2024. Student did not return to school until March 11, 2024.

During times Student was hospitalized in February and March 2024, she was the responsibility of the LEA in which the hospital or hospitals were located. (Ed. Code, § 56167.) As explained previously, the record was unclear as to where Student was placed during these hospitalizations, but it was undisputed that none of the hospitals in which Student was placed in-patient were within Yuba City’s jurisdiction. Therefore, Student did not attend school in Yuba City for portions of the relevant assessment timeframe.

Student’s change in LEA in the middle of the assessment process affects the default 60-day timeline for completing assessments. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii); (Ed. Code, §, 56302.1, subd. (b).) California law on this point mirrors the IDEA. (Id.) Neither party offered any evidence establishing if the LEA or LEAs responsible for Student during her hospitalizations made any progress toward completing the assessments.

Education Code section 56302.1, subdivision (b)(1) explains what happens to the assessment timeline when a student starts the assessment timeline in one LEA but moves before the assessments are completed and the IEP team determines the student is eligible for special education. However, it does not provide a procedure for when a student starts the assessment timeline in one LEA, leaves to another LEA, and then returns to the first LEA, all while assessments are pending. It would be impractical for the assessment timeline to continue running for the first LEA while the student is in the second LEA, because the student may never return to the first LEA. Unless and until that student returned, the first LEA would have no responsibility for her.

Education Code section 56302.1, subdivision (b)(2) provides an LEA flexibility with the 60-day timeline when the parent repeatedly fails or refuses to produce the child for assessment. There was no evidence that Parent refused to make Student available for assessment. Nevertheless, Student was hospitalized, or otherwise not attending school within Yuba City, for significant portions of February and March 2024. Even though Student was not formally disenrolled from Yuba City during all the times she was hospitalized, as a matter of law, Yuba City was not her responsible LEA. (Ed. Code, §§ 48207, 56167.) Yuba City did not have access to her and could not conduct assessments during that time. When Student returned on March 11, 2024, Student had sporadic absences which, as school psychologist Moreno explained, made it difficult to schedule assessment sessions.

Finally, California law anticipates that the receiving LEA will have at least 10 days’ notice before the child returns from hospitalization, and it becomes responsible for that child. (Gov. Code, § 7579.1, subd. (a)(1).) Even though Student did not have an IEP at the time she was hospitalized in the fall of 2023, the policy behind Government Code section 7579.1 applies in this situation. The purpose of the statute is to facilitate a child’s return to their home LEA from the hospital LEA. Yuba City owed Student certain duties under special education law because she had been identified as a student who may require special education services. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the principles embodied in Government Code section 7579.1 here.

The record did not establish that Yuba City received notice from any of Student’s hospitals. Additionally, Parent could not clearly explain when or if she informed Yuba City of Student’s discharges, other than certain instances when Parent emailed Yuba City staff. While it was clear that Parent cared deeply about Student and meant well, her testimony was generally unconvincing. Parent regularly struggled to remember details and repeatedly stated that she had trouble remembering things. Parent also struggled to answer questions, and was evasive at times, during cross examination, or in response to the undersigned’s questions, on topics that she readily answered on direct examination. Parent’s testimony was inconsistent at times, further reducing the persuasiveness of her testimony. Taken together, Parent’s testimony was not entirely persuasive and given less than full weight.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Yuba City was entitled to some flexibility with the default 60-day timeframe for completing assessments and convening an IEP team meeting. Special education law expects that students are promptly assessed for eligibility once parents consent, but grants flexibility when the student is not reasonably available to the LEA, and when a child is moving between LEAs. Under the present circumstances, it would not be reasonable to completely reset the 60-day timeline upon Student’s return to Yuba City. Rather it would be reasonable to pause the timeline during periods of Student’s hospitalization. Accordingly, and without counting the 10 days’ notice Yuba City should have had when Student was discharged from her hospitalizations, the assessments were completed and reviewed by Student’s IEP team approximately four days late.

Delays in assessments do not automatically result in a denial of FAPE. (D.O., supra, 59 F.4th at p. 416 [citing Doug C., supra, 720 F.3d at p. 1046].) In D.O., the Ninth Circuit determined that a four-month delay in initiating an assessment did not deprive that student of any educational benefits and did not deny the student a FAPE. (Id.)

Here, the procedural error of an approximately four-day delay did not deny Student a FAPE. Education Code section 56344, subdivision (a), provides that “[a] meeting to develop an initial individualized education program for the pupil shall be conducted within 30 days of a determination that the pupil needs special education and related services.” Student’s initial IEP was developed on May 7, 2024, the same day Student’s IEP team reviewed the initial assessment report and determined Student was eligible for special education. This was well within the 30 days allowed by law.

Student did not suffer a delay in receiving an IEP and was not denied a FAPE.

AUGUST 22, 2024 ASSESSMENT PLAN TO CONDUCT SCHOOL-BASED MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT

The record established that there was no assessment plan dated August 24, 2024. The record did establish the existence of an assessment plan, dated August 22, 2024, which called for a school-based mental health assessment. Despite Student’s imprecise pleading, there was no dispute that Student’s issue related to the timeliness of the assessment conducted pursuant to the August 22, 2024 assessment plan. The parties’ presentation of evidence reflected both parties’ understanding of Student’s issue.

Student spent a significant amount of the summer between the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 school years in the hospital. Upon returning to school in the fall of 2024, Yuba City offered to conduct a school-based mental health assessment. Parent signed her consent to the assessment plan and returned it to Yuba City staff on August 23, 2024. Thus, the assessment timeline began on August 23, 2024.

The assessments were completed and the resulting school-based mental health assessment report reviewed at the April 23, 2025 IEP team meeting. Parent did not agree in writing to any extension for Yuba City to complete the assessment. Student argued that more than 60 days had elapsed between August 23, 2024, and April 23, 2025, which rendered the assessment untimely.

Student’s argument was unpersuasive, because Student did not take into account her significant hospitalizations during the 2024-2025 school year. Yuba City began the 2024-2025 school year on August 14, 2024. That same day, Student was hospitalized on a 5150 hold due to expressing suicidal ideations. Student returned to school on August 20, 2024. Student then attended school for two days following Parent’s consent to the August 22, 2024 assessment plan before being placed on another 5150 hold. This hold, which took place on August 27, 2024, was in response to Student telling Yuba City staff that she wanted to walk into traffic.

Student then began a series of hospitalizations which lasted until she returned to school on October 25, 2025. Student attended school for the remainder of October through when she was hospitalized on November 21, 2024. Student did not return to school until December 18, 2024. She was subsequently hospitalized again on December 18, 2024, and did not return to Yuba City until February 26, 2025. Student then attended Yuba City for the remainder of February and most of March 2025. She was hospitalized on March 16, 2025, for a 5150 hold, but returned to Yuba City on March 18, 2025. Student was hospitalized again on April 8, 2025, and she did not return to Yuba City prior to the end of the 2024-2025 school year. She was still hospitalized as of June 23, 2025, the date Student filed her due process complaint.

Wendy Ciotti, the school based mental health services assessor, explained that she encountered significant difficulties meeting with Student. Ciotti explained that Student’s poor attendance delayed the assessment process. However, Ciotti’s testimony was not entirely convincing. She demonstrated poor recollection of events during the 2024-2025 school year, and provided sometimes meandering answers that were not always responsive to the questions asked. Accordingly, her testimony was given less than full weight.

Ciotti completed the bulk of her assessment during October and November 2024, but it was unclear when some portions of the assessment were completed. However, emails between Ciotti and other Yuba City staff suggested that the mental health assessment was completed in January 2025. Student was hospitalized at that time and was not enrolled in Yuba City.

Notably, Student was hospitalized when her IEP team convened to review the school-based mental health assessment report on April 23, 2025. The record was unclear as to why Yuba City convened that IEP team meeting for Student at that time.

Throughout the time Student was hospitalized, Yuba City was not her responsible LEA. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.) While the record was not entirely clear which of Student’s absences were due to hospitalizations, Student was enrolled and attending school approximately 73 days, including weekends, between August 23, 2024, and April 23, 2025. Student’s attendance throughout that time was not evenly distributed, with Student missing weeks or months at a time. Yuba City staff struggled to schedule times to meet with and assess Student, as well as schedule an IEP team meeting to review the report.

Based on Student’s inconsistent enrollment, the default 60-day timeframe for Yuba City did not apply to the school-based mental health assessment for the reasons explained regarding the psychoeducational assessment above. Even if the 60-day timeframe applied, the small delay of approximately 13 days was not significant. This delay is even less significant considering Yuba City was never provided with notice of Student’s discharge by her hospitals, as required by Government Code section 7579.1, subdivision (a).

Even if the delay was significant, Student did not persuasively argue or introduce evidence proving that the delay denied her a FAPE. (D.O., supra, 59 F. 4th at p. 416 [citing Doug C., supra, 720 F.3d at p. 1046].) Yuba City offered additional school-based mental health goals and services following a review of the school-based mental health assessment at the April 23, 2025 IEP. However, Parent did not consent to those services. Although Yuba City did not have an obligation to implement Student’s IEP unless and until Yuba City became her responsible LEA, Parent’s lack of consent to the April 23, 2025 IEP would have prevented Yuba City from implementing the goals and services. Here, Student cannot claim to be denied a FAPE and seek compensatory education for Yuba City’s delay in implementing services when Parent did not consent.

Overall, Student failed to meet her burden of proving that the assessments conducted pursuant to the January 11, 2024 or August 22, 2024 assessment plans were untimely. Student also failed to prove that any delay in completing and reviewing those assessments at an IEP team meeting denied Student a FAPE.

ISSUE 4, SUBSECTIONS a THROUGH e: DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT

A FAPE FROM MAY 7, 2024, THROUGH JUNE 23, 2025, BY FAILING TO OFFER APPROPRIATE GOALS IN THE AREAS OF WRITING, MATH, TASK COMPLETION, STAYING ON TASK, AND SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT?

Student contends that the goals Yuba City offered in writing, math, task completion, staying on task, and social-emotional development were not measurable and therefore inappropriate. Specifically, Student contends that the goal baselines did not directly correspond with the skills targeted by the goals.

Yuba City contends that the goals it offered in these areas were measurable and appropriate. Yuba City also contends that Student did not meet her burden of proving otherwise.

The IEP must describe the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, and include annual goals designed to meet the child’s needs. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I) and (II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1)(2); Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (a)(1) and (2).) An IEP must contain a statement of measurable annual goals for the child, including academic and functional goals, designed to:

• Meet the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and

• Meet each of the child’s other educational needs that result from the child’s disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2)(i); Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (a)(2).)

The purpose of annual goals is to permit the IEP team to determine whether the child is making progress in an area of need. (Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (a); see also, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,471 (1999).) For each area in which a child has an identified need, the IEP team must develop measurable annual goals that are based upon the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, and which the child has a reasonable chance of attaining within a year. (Ed. Code, § 56344; Letter to Butler (United States Department of Education, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, March 25, 1988); U.S. Dept. of Educ., Notice of Interpretation, Appendix A to 34 C.F.R., part 300, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,371 (1999 regulations).)

The student’s needs must be described through a statement of present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, including how the student’s disability affects the involvement and progress in the general education curriculum. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2007); Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (a).) The IEP shall show a direct relationship between the present levels of performance, the goals and objectives, and the specific educational services to be provided. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3040.) The IEP must include a description of how the child’s progress toward meeting the annual goals will be measured, and when periodic reports of the child’s progress will be issued to the parent. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2007); Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (a)(3).)

An IEP need not contain every goal from which a student might benefit. (34 C.F.R. § 300.137; Capistrano Unif. Sch. Dist. v. S.W. (9th Cir. 2021) 21 F.4th 1125, 1134 [cert. den. 143 S.Ct. 98, 214 L.Ed.2d 20] (Capistrano).) Further, a school district is not required to develop goals for areas covered by the general curriculum for which the student needs only accommodations and modifications. (34 C.F.R. § 300, Appendix A – Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities (1999) [discussing language also contained in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)].) California "does not require additional information, beyond that explicitly required by" the IDEA. (Capistrano, supra, 21 F.4th at p. 1133 [citing Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (i)].)

An appropriate public education "does not mean the absolutely best or 'potential-maximizing' education for the individual child." (Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist.

v. A.O. by and through Owens (9th Cir. 2024) 92 F.4th 1159, 1172 (A.O.) [quoting

Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1307, 1314.) IEPs are assessed in light of information available when the IEP was developed, not in hindsight. (Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at 1149.) Based on the timeframe alleged, there are four IEP documents at issue. Each is analyzed in turn.

GOALS IN THE MAY 7, 2024 IEP WERE MEASURABLE

Student challenged the measurability of the five goals contained in the May 7, 2024 IEP. The May 7, 2024 IEP included goals in the areas of

• Writing,

• Math,

• Task completion,

• Staying on task, and

• Social-emotional development. Student argued that the baseline information included with the goals did not correspond with the language of each goal, rendering the goal unmeasurable. Student’s argument is not persuasive.

At least one court has already rejected Student’s argument, and that court’s reasoning is persuasive here. (J.L.N. by and through Nunez v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. (S.D. Cal. 2019) 17-cv-2097-L-MDD, 2019 WL 4849172.) In J.L.N., the student argued that the baselines included in his IEP did not correspond with the goals, which rendered the goals unmeasurable. The ALJ disagreed and found that the student, “did not address the goals on the merits but based the contention entirely on the general proposition that an IEP cannot include appropriate goals if it does not include adequate baselines or current levels.” (Id. at *6.) The reviewing court agreed. (Id. at *7.) The court determined that even though the baselines were inadequate, that inadequacy did not automatically render the resulting goals improper, and the student was required to demonstrate that the goals, on their own, were not appropriate. (Id.)

Like the student in J.L.N., Student did not offer persuasive evidence or argument challenging the substantive appropriateness of the goals offered in the May 7, 2024 IEP, including regarding their measurability. Each of the goals targeted a specific skill or skills, and provided a way for Student’s progress to be measured. Student did not offer any persuasive evidence or argument challenging the goals as not being appropriately ambitious in light of Student’s circumstances. (Endrew F., supra, 580 U.S. at p. 402.) Student likewise did not offer any persuasive evidence or argument that she required additional goals in any of the five areas Student has placed at issue.

Even assuming Student’s general premise is correct, the baselines in the May 7, 2024 IEP corresponded with their respective goals. For example, Student’s task completion goal baseline indicated that she completed about 50-60% of her work, and had some missing assignments. The goal called for Student to complete 70% of her work. Accordingly, there was a direct correlation between the baseline and goal.

The remaining goals included baselines which provided sufficient information about Student’s skills related to the goal. Therefore, even under Student’s approach, the baselines and goals corresponded, and the goals were measurable.

Even if the goals were not measurable, Student provided no persuasive argument or evidence that any inadequacies with the goals denied Student a FAPE. The failure to offer measurable goals is a procedural error. However, a procedural error must result in substantive harm before a child is denied a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f)(3)(E); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (f).) Based on an absence of evidence, Student did not prove that any alleged defects with the goals in the May 7, 2024 IEP impeded her right to a FAPE; significantly impeded the opportunity of Parent to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to Student; or caused a deprivation of educational benefits.

Accordingly, Student did not prove she was denied a FAPE because of inappropriate goals in the May 7, 2024 IEP.

GOALS IN THE AUGUST 12, 2024 IEP WERE MEASURABLE

Student’s IEP team convened for an amendment IEP on August 12, 2024. This was before the start of the 2024-2025 school year, which began on August 14, 2024. Student’s IEP team met to discuss Student’s needs after being hospitalized 36 days during the previous summer.

However, there were no changes to Student’s IEP goals at this meeting, and Yuba City’s offer of FAPE included the same goals as those offered in the May 7, 2024 IEP. Student offered no persuasive evidence or argument that these goals were inappropriate at the time of the August 12, 2024 IEP meeting. (Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at 1149.) For example, there was a lack of evidence that Student required changes to her goals or required additional goals. Therefore, Student did not prove she was denied a FAPE because of inappropriate goals in the August 12, 2024 amendment IEP.

YUBA CITY WAS NOT STUDENT’S RESPONSIBLE LEA AT THE TIME OF THE APRIL 23, 2025 AMENDMENT IEP

Student’s IEP team convened again on April 23, 2025, for a periodic review, also referred to as an amendment IEP. However, Student was hospitalized outside of Yuba City’s boundaries at that time. Accordingly, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.)

Nevertheless, Yuba City convened an IEP team meeting despite Student not being within their jurisdiction and being within the jurisdiction of another LEA. In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit has confirmed that a child’s home LEA, sometimes called a district of residence, does not retain responsibility for a student once they are served by another LEA. (N.F. by and through Flyte v. Antioch Unif. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2022) No. 21-16260, 2022 WL 1125645 (N.F.).)

In N.F., the student was enrolled in a charter school that acted as its own LEA. Upon that student’s enrollment in the charter, California law shifted the responsibility to provide a FAPE from the home LEA to the charter school. (Ed. Code, §§ 47641(a), 47646; 34 C.F.R. § 300.209(a).) That student subsequently sought an IEP offer from the home LEA, while still attending the charter. The district court found that, “the [home LEA] is not obligated to provide [the student] with a prospective offer of FAPE, because, like its obligation to actually provide FAPE, its obligation to extend an offer was supplanted by [the charter LEA]

upon [the student’s] enrollment at the public charter school.” (N.F. by and through Flyte v. Antioch Unif. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2021) 4:20-cv- 041230KAW, 2021 WL 3355280 at p. *6.) The district court explained that, “[w]hile there is nothing stopping a parent from asking for an offer of FAPE prior to enrollment, there is no statutory authority that requires the [home LEA] to extend an offer to a student enrolled in a public charter school that operates under a different LEA.” (Id. at p. *7.) Ultimately, the district court determined that the home LEA was not responsible for offering or providing the student a FAPE. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on appeal. (N.F., supra, 2022 WL 1125645.)

Like the situation in N.F., Student’s responsible LEA was determined by operation of California law. Specifically, Student became the responsibility of the LEA where she was hospitalized. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.) Accordingly, that LEA became responsible for her education. Yuba City was not required to develop an IEP in anticipation of Student’s return. Rather, Government Code section 7579.1, subdivision (b) required that Yuba City provide comparable services to Student’s last operative IEP pursuant to Education Code section 56325.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Yuba City is entitled to a complete defense, because Yuba City could not have failed to offer Student a FAPE when it had no duty to do so. Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA at the time of the April 23, 2025 IEP team meeting, and not required to develop an IEP in anticipation of Student’s possible return. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; N.F., supra, 2022 WL 1125645; Ed. Code, § 56167; Gov. Code, §7579.1, subd (b).)

Student failed to prove that Yuba City incurred a duty to offer a FAPE by voluntarily convening an IEP team meeting, when the law assigned that duty to another LEA.

Even if Yuba City is not entitled to a complete defense as not being the responsible LEA, Student still did not prove that the April 23, 2025 IEP denied Student a FAPE because of inappropriate goals. During the April 23, 2025 IEP team meeting, the IEP team reviewed the school-based mental health assessment. Yuba City offered two additional IEP goals related to Student’s mental health needs. The record established that the offered mental health goals pertained to Student’s social-emotional development, and thus are at issue here.

As with the previous goals, Student failed to offer any persuasive evidence or argument that the goals offered in the April 23, 2025, IEP were not appropriate. Even considering Student’s unpersuasive argument that the baselines did not match the goal, Student’s argument is still not convincing here. The two new goals addressed coping with anxiety and emotional regulation, respectively. The baselines include information related to both those skills. On their face, the goals included mechanisms for measuring Student’s progress. Therefore, even taking Student’s unpersuasive argument into consideration, the goals were measurable.

Student did not offer any persuasive evidence or argument challenging the goals as not being appropriately ambitious in light of Student’s circumstances. (Endrew F., supra, 580 U.S. at p. 402.) Student likewise did not offer any persuasive evidence or argument that she required additional goals in any of the five areas Student placed at issue.

Accordingly, Student did not prove she was denied a FAPE because of inappropriate goals in the April 23, 2025 IEP.

YUBA CITY WAS NOT STUDENT’S RESPONSIBLE LEA AT THE TIME OF THE JUNE 5, 2025 IEP TEAM MEETING, AND CHALLENGES TO THIS IEP ARE PREMATURE

Student’s IEP team convened to begin Student’s plan review, also referred to as an annual review, on June 5, 2025. Student was still hospitalized at that time. Accordingly, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA and is entitled to a complete defense. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167; Gov. Code, §7579.1, subd (b).) Even if Yuba City is not entitled to such a defense, Student’s challenge to the goals in the June 5, 2025 IEP still fails.

The record established that Student’s IEP team did not complete the annual review, including a full discussion of Student’s present levels of performance, progress on previous goals, discussion about new goals, and an offer of placement and services. Yuba City’s 2024-2025 school year ended on June 6, 2025. Student’s IEP team could not complete Student’s annual review before the end of the 2024-2025 school year, and agreed to reconvene later. Student’s IEP team did not reconvene before June 23, 2025.

Because the team did not complete the annual review, Yuba City was not able to offer new goals. Therefore, Student’s challenge to the goals offered in the June 5, 2025 IEP is premature, because the annual review was not complete prior to the filing of Student’s complaint. Accordingly, Student did not prove she was denied a FAPE because of inappropriate goals in the June 5, 2025 IEP.

Overall, Student failed to prove that Yuba City failed to offer appropriate goals in writing, math, task completion, staying on task, and social emotional development, between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025. Student did not establish any time between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025, when Student’s needs were not adequately addressed by the goals Yuba City offered in the areas at issue. Therefore, Student failed to prove she was denied a FAPE due to Yuba City’s failure to offer appropriate goals in the areas at issue.

ISSUE 5, SUBSECTIONS a THROUGH d: DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A

FAPE FROM JUNE 23, 2023, THROUGH JUNE 23, 2025, BY FAILING TO OFFER APPROPRIATE SERVICES IN THE AREAS OF BEHAVIOR, SOCIAL- EMOTIONAL, INCLUDING MENTAL HEALTH, ACADEMICS, AND SCHOOL- BASED HEALTH?

Student contends that Yuba City failed to offer Student behavior services with a behavior intervention plan, and that safety plans developed following her returns from hospitalizations should have been incorporated into her IEP. Student also contends that Yuba City delayed in offering Student counseling services, failed to offer services during the first and last weeks of school, and that the offers of specialized academic instruction were not clear. Student finally contends that Yuba City never offered a health care plan to address Student’s diagnosed medical needs, such as allergies, asthma, neurofibromatosis type 1, and psychosis.

Yuba City contends that Student failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the services Yuba City offered were inadequate, or that she required additional or different services in the areas at issue.

The IEP must comprehensively describe the child's educational needs and the corresponding special education and related services that meet those needs. (School Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. of Mass. (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 368 [105 S.Ct. 1996] (Burlington).) The IEP must identify the student's special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, including program modifications or supports. (Id. at p. 368; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4) (2007); Ed. Code, § 56345, subd. (a)(4).)

Behavior services, social emotional, including mental health services, and school-based health and nursing services are related services. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(26); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a); Ed. Code, § 56363, subd. (b).) In California, related services are called "designated instruction and services." (Ed. Code, § 56363, sub. (a).) IEPs are assessed in light of information available when the IEP was developed, not in hindsight. (Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at p. 1149.)

Based on the timeframe alleged, Student challenged Yuba City’s failure to offer Student appropriate services from June 23, 2023, to May 7, 2024, when she was found eligible for special education. Student also challenged the offers of services following Student’s eligibility for special education on May 7, 2024. There are four services at issue. Each is analyzed in turn.

JUNE 23, 2023, THROUGH MAY 7, 2024

Student argued that Yuba City denied Student a FAPE by failing to offer appropriate services in the areas at issue from June 23, 2023, through May 7, 2024. Student’s arguments are not persuasive.

Yuba City argued that Student was not eligible for special education and therefore not entitled to special education and related services.

As determined above, Student did not establish that she was eligible for special education, and therefore eligible for special education and related services, prior to May 7, 2024. Accordingly, because Student was not eligible for special education, she cannot have been denied a FAPE by not being offered special education and related services prior to her IEP team’s determination that she was eligible on May 7, 2024. Therefore, Student failed to prove that she was denied a FAPE between June 23, 2023, and May 7, 2024, when Yuba City did not offer her services in the areas of behavior, social emotional, including mental health, academics, and school-based health.

BEHAVIOR

Student argued that she had behavior needs which required a behavior intervention plan and related behavior services. Student also argued that the safety plans Yuba City developed when Student returned from hospitalizations should have been incorporated into her IEPs. Yuba City argued that Student did not have any needs which required a behavior intervention plan or behavior services.

In the case of a child whose behavior impedes his or her learning or that of others, the IEP team must consider, when appropriate, “the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.” (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(i) (2017); Ed. Code, § 56341.1, subd. (b)(1).) Areas of educational need are to be broadly construed to include the child’s academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical, and vocational needs. (Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S. (9th Cir. 1996) 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 [citing H.R. Rep. No. 410, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088, 2106].) An IEP that does not appropriately address behavior that impedes a child’s learning denies a student a FAPE. (W.A. ex rel. S.A. v. Patterson Joint Unif. Sch. Dist. (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2011) CV-F10-1317 LJO SMS 2011 WL 2925393 [citing Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark (8th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 1022, 1028-1030].)

Student asked OAH to “apply a negative inference” regarding the extent of Student’s self-injurious behaviors at school, because Yuba City had in its possession additional documents, such as suicide risk assessments, but failed to move those into evidence. (See e.g. Hardesty v. Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management Dist. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 404, 425 [citing Evid. Code, § 412].)

Student’s argument is not persuasive, in part because the technical rules of evidence do not apply to these proceedings. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3082(b).) Even considering Student’s premise, the negative inference applied would only devalue Yuba City’s evidence. (Hardesty, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 425.) It would not take the place of evidence Student otherwise failed to produce. This is especially true here, where Student failed to offer persuasive evidence or argument to establish that Student had behavioral needs which required a behavior intervention plan or behavior services. Student argued that she presented with behaviors, such as self-injurious behaviors, which should have been addressed with behavior services. Student did not establish that a behavior intervention plan or behavior services were needed here.

Rather, the record established those needs were classified as social-emotional and mental health needs, such as a manifestation of anxiety and depression, and addressed by those services. Special education law does not require schools to use any particular methodology to address a special education student’s disability-related needs. Rather, "[t]he IDEA accords educators discretion to select from various methods of meeting the individualized needs of a student, provided those practices are reasonably calculated to provide him with an educational benefit." (Crofts v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411 (9th Cir. 2022) 22 F.4th 1048, 1056-57 (Crofts) [citing R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unif. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2011) 631 F.3d 1117, 1122].) Student did not prove that any behaviors she manifested could only be addressed through a behavior intervention plan and behavior services.

Student also argued that the May 7, 2024, IEP noted that Student’s behaviors impeded her learning. Examples of these behaviors included being off task, task avoidance behaviors, and expressing negative feelings by making threats of self-harm. These three concerns were addressed by the goals included in the May 7, 2024 IEP, and Student did not prove a separate behavior plan was required. Additionally, these needs were addressed by social-emotional services, as discussed below, and Student did not prove that any behaviors she manifested could only be addressed through a behavior intervention plan and behavior services. (See Crofts, supra, 22 F.4th at pp. 1056-57.)

Student also argued that Student’s lying behaviors were not addressed by Yuba City. However, Student did not prove that Yuba City’s omission of services to address this behavior denied her a FAPE.

Student also argued that the safety plans developed by Yuba City staff following her returns from hospitalization should have been included in her IEP. While the record established Yuba City staff, along with Parent and Student, developed safety plans, neither party admitted any of those plans into evidence. Nevertheless, Student asserted that Yuba City provided Student with a full-time one-to-one aide as part of one of these safety plans. Student argues this should have been included as a behavior service in Student’s IEP.

Student’s August 12, 2024 IEP included a breakdown of additional adult supervision that Student would receive during her school day, and which individuals would provide that supervision. This breakdown was located in the notes section of the IEP, rather than in the services grid. While perhaps not ideal, the law does not dictate that the required information be in a specific portion of the IEP, if it is included elsewhere. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(d)(2007); Ed. Code § 56345(h).) Moreover, Student does not challenge that she received full-time one-to-one aide support during the 2024-2025 school year. (J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 938, 953.)

At some later point, Yuba City substituted the various adults with a single one-to-one aide. Student did not prove that this change in staffing was improper or otherwise denied her a FAPE. Yuba City would ultimately include this full-time one-to‒one aide in the service grid of the April 23, 2025 IEP under the title of Intensive Individual Services.

The remainder of Student’s arguments were not persuasive. Student offered no persuasive evidence or argument that she required behavior services during the relevant timeframe to receive a FAPE. Therefore, Student did not prove Yuba City denied her a FAPE for failing to offer an appropriate behavior intervention plan and behavior services.

SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL, INCLUDING MENTAL HEALTH

Student contends that Yuba City denied her a FAPE by delaying the offer of school-based mental health services. This argument followed Student’s argument that the school-based mental health assessment was not completed timely, already decided above. Yuba City argued that there was no delay in offering school-based mental health services, and that Parent never consented to the services it offered.

As determined in Issue 3, Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to timely complete the school-based mental health assessment. Student likewise failed to prove that Yuba City was delayed in offering, or that Student was delayed in receiving, any school-based mental health services. Critically, Parent did not consent to the offer of school-based mental health services included in the April 23, 2025 IEP. Student cannot claim to be denied a FAPE and seek compensatory education for Yuba City’s delay in implementing services to which Parent did not consent.

Student did not otherwise prove that the services Yuba City offered during the timeframe at issue were inappropriate. Student’s May 7, 2024 initial IEP included two 20- minute individual counseling sessions per month. Student did not prove that this service was inadequate to meet her needs. For example, Student did not offer expert testimony or elicit testimony from Yuba City’s service providers demonstrating Student required more than 20-minute individual counseling services monthly to make progress towards her social-emotional goals. Student unpersuasively argued that Yuba City’s assignment of Student’s counseling and guidance services to multiple possible individuals rendered it inappropriate. However, Student failed to prove that this division of responsibility was improper such that Student was denied a FAPE.

Student also argued that Yuba City’s offer of counseling and guidance services was lacking because it did not include services during the first and last weeks of the school year. The record established that those weeks were different than the rest of the regular school year. For example, the last week of the school year was generally dedicated to final exams. Regardless, Student did not prove that the lack of offered services during the first and last weeks of school denied Student a FAPE.

Student’s August 12, 2024 IEP increased Student’s individual counseling services to 30 minutes per week. Student did not prove that this service was inadequate to meet her needs.

Student’s April 23, 2025 IEP changed Student’s counseling service to the more intensive school-based mental health service. The IEP offered four 30-minute individual counseling sessions per month and 30 minutes per week of group counseling. Even if Yuba City is not entitled to a complete defense for claims related to an offer it made while it was not Student’s responsible LEA, Student did not prove that this service was inadequate to meet Student’s needs. Again, Student did not offer expert testimony or otherwise establish this offer was insufficient for Student to make progress towards her social-emotional goals.

Student also argued that Yuba City failed to offer a specific treatment, entitled “EMDR.” Student did not provide evidence of what EMDR stood for. Student asserted EMDR related to eye desensitization, as recommended by Student’s psychiatrist Dr. Darin Gould at the June 5, 2025 IEP team meeting. Gould did not testify at the hearing. Instead, Student relied on the description of his testimony in the June 5, 2025 IEP team meeting notes. The IEP team meeting notes were not verbatim transcripts, but were helpful in understanding the discussions had at the meeting.

Ultimately, Student did not define or fully explain what EMDR was. In her closing brief, Student included a link to a website that appears, based on the site address, to discuss EMDR. The undersigned did not access the link, and the website was not considered.

As determined in Issue 4 above, and discussed again below, challenges to the June 5, 2025 IEP are premature because the IEP team did not complete Student’s annual review. Nevertheless, Student did not prove that Yuba City was required to offer services utilizing the EMDR therapy. (Crofts, supra, 22 F.4th at pp. 1056-57 [citing R.P., supra, 631 F.3d at p. 1122].)

The remainder of Student’s arguments were not persuasive. Overall, Student offered no persuasive evidence or argument that the social emotional services, including mental health services Yuba City offered between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025, were inappropriate. Student also did not prove that Student required any other kind of social-emotional services, including mental health services during the relevant timeframe.

Student did not prove Yuba City denied her a FAPE for failing to offer appropriate social emotional services, including mental health services.

ACADEMICS

Student contends that the May 7, 2024, August 12, 2024, April 23, 2025 and June 5, 2025 IEPs did not include a clear written offer of specialized academic instruction services, as required by law. (A.O., supra, 92 F.4th at p. 1169 [citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519, 1526.]) However, Student did not allege an issue in the due process hearing complaint that Yuba City denied Student a FAPE for failing to make a clear written offer.

During the first week of hearing, Student’s counsel questioned witnesses regarding whether the FAPE offers were clear. Yuba City objected. When questioned, Student’s counsel could not identify this issue in the complaint.

Nevertheless, on September 3, 2025, Student filed a motion for reconsideration of the issues. The undersigned denied that motion through a written order on September 8, 2025. As explained in that order, a party requesting the hearing is limited to the issues alleged in the complaint unless the other party has consented. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Ed. Code, § 56502, subd. (i).) Because Student did not allege that Yuba City denied Student a FAPE for failing to make a clear written offer of FAPE, this Decision made no determination of whether the IEPs at issue included a clear written offer.

As also detailed in the September 8 2025, Order, Student was not required to assert all possible claims against Yuba City in the current due process matter. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(o).) If Student believes she has additional claims against Yuba City, including based on new information she received through witness testimony, she may file a separate due process complaint to have those claims heard in a separate due process matter. (Id.)

Student argued that Yuba City failed to offer specialized academic instruction in math. Student pointed to the services grid in the August 12, 2024 IEP which reflected an end to those services as of August 12, 2024. While not ideal, that entry was likely a typographical error, because Yuba City provided Student specialized academic instruction in math during the 2024-2025 school year.

Jeanna Cripe was an education specialist, also called a special education teacher, with Yuba City. Cripe held bachelor’s and master’s degrees in special education, and completed “all but dissertation” requirements for a doctorate in information. She held a mild to moderate special education teaching credential in California. She had been a special education teacher since 2009. She had taught in Iowa and Florida, before moving to Yuba City in 2022.

Cripe was Student’s special education teacher and IEP case manager during the 2024-2025 school year. As Student’s case manager, Cripe was responsible for coordinating with the other members of Student’s IEP team, scheduling IEP team meetings, and generally leading those meetings.

Student was enrolled in three classes during the 2024-2025 school year that were taught, in whole or in part, by Cripe. Cripe demonstrated a deep understanding of Student, and provided examples of Student’s behaviors in the classroom and anecdotes of Student’s time in her classes. Cripe’s testimony was clear and comprehensive, and she was eager to answer questions on both direct and cross examination. Her testimony was accorded significant weight.

Cripe provided specialized academic instruction as a co-teacher in Student’s math class during the 2024-2025 school year. Cripe worked with Student when she attended math class and implemented the specialized academic instruction consistent with the offer included in the May 7, 2024 IEP, irrespective of the end date of the service entered in the August 12, 2024 IEP amendment. Student did not refute this testimony.

Like Student’s argument regarding Yuba City’s counseling services, Student again unpersuasively argued that Yuba City denied her a FAPE by not offering specialized academic instruction services during the first and last week of school. That argument fails here for the same reasons.

The undersigned considered the remainder of Student’s arguments and rejected them. Overall, Student offered no persuasive evidence or argument that the specialized academic instruction services Yuba City offered between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025, were inappropriate. Student also did not prove that Student required any other academic services during the relevant timeframe.

Therefore, Student did not prove Yuba City denied her a FAPE for failing to offer appropriate academic services.

SCHOOL-BASED HEALTH

Student contended that Yuba City failed to offer her appropriate school-based health services, also called health and nursing services, to address her medically diagnosed conditions, including allergies, asthma, neurofibromatosis type 1, and migraines. Yuba City contended that Student did not require health and nursing services.

The United States Supreme Court has held that services provided by a school nurse to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education fall under the related services requirement of the IDEA. (Cedar Rapids, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 74-76 (school district required to provide continuous nursing service as a related service); Irving Independent Sch. Dist. v. Tatro (1984) 468 U.S. 883, 890-891 [104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664] (requiring school to provide clean intermittent catheterization to a student with spina bifida so she could attend special education classes); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).)

Health and nursing services are related services that are specifically included as designated instruction and services in California. (Ed. Code, § 56363, subd. (b)(12).) Health and nursing related services may include providing services by qualified personnel and managing the individual’s health problems on the school site. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.12, subd. (a)(1), (2).)

Yuba City acknowledged that Student had allergies that could require treatment from an Epi-Pen. Although not entered into evidence, Yuba City also acknowledged that it had developed an anaphylactic care plan accordingly.

Student did not challenge this plan. School nurse Emilee Miller explained that Student’s medical needs generally did not require intervention while at school. While Miller’s testimony was not entirely persuasive, Student did not refute it. Student offered no persuasive evidence or argument that Student’s medical conditions were affecting her at school, such that school-based health services and a related school health plan were necessary for Student to receive a FAPE. Additionally, Student’s mental health needs were addressed through the counseling and guidance and school-based mental health services otherwise offered in Student’s IEPs.

CHALLENGES TO JUNE 5, 2025 IEP ARE PREMATURE

Student’s IEP team convened to begin Student’s annual review on June 5, 2025. Student was still in the hospital at that time, and Yuba City is entitled to a complete defense because it was not Student’s responsible LEA. Even if Yuba City is not entitled to such a defense, Student’s challenge to the services in the June 5, 2025, IEP fails.

As explained previously, the record established that Student’s IEP team did not complete the annual review. Student’s IEP team did not reconvene before June 23, 2025. Because the team did not complete the annual review, Yuba City was not able to offer new services. Therefore, Student’s challenge to the services offered in the June 5, 2025 IEP is premature, because the annual review was not complete prior to the filing of Student’s complaint. Accordingly, Student did not prove she was denied a FAPE because of inappropriate services in the June 5, 2025 IEP.

Overall, Student failed to prove Yuba City failed to offer services between June 23, 2023, and when Student was found eligible for special education on May 7, 2024. Student also failed to prove that Yuba City failed to offer appropriate services in behavior, social-emotional, including mental health, academics, and school-based health, between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025. Student did not establish any time between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025, when Student’s needs were not adequately addressed by the services Yuba City offered.

Therefore, Student failed to prove she was denied a FAPE due to Yuba City’s failure to offer appropriate services.

ISSUE 6

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE FROM JUNE 23, 2023, THROUGH JUNE 23, 2025, BY FAILING TO OFFER STUDENT HOME OR HOSPITAL INSTRUCTION DURING TIMES SHE WAS HOSPITALIZED OR AT HOME UNABLE TO ATTEND SCHOOL?

Student contends that Yuba City was responsible for providing Student with home or hospital instruction while she was hospitalized or at home otherwise unable to attend school between June 23, 2023, and June 23, 2025. Yuba City contends that it was not Student’s responsible LEA while she was hospitalized, and that Student did not establish any other periods where Student required home or hospital instruction while she was at home and unable to attend school.

Students may receive individual instruction in their home, a hospital, or other health facility when a temporary disability that makes attendance in a regular program impossible or inadvisable. (Ed. Code, § 48206.3.) This individual instruction must begin no later than five working days after the school district has determined that the student will receive this service. (Ed. Code, § 48207.5.) This service is different from individualized in-home placement and instruction for purposes of providing a FAPE to a child with disabilities. (34 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.4, subd. (d).)

An IEP team may recommend special education and related services in the home or hospital. (Ed. Code, § 56363, subd. (b)(4); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.4, subd. (a).) For those pupils with exceptional needs with a medical condition, such as those related to surgery, accidents, short-term illness or medical treatment for a chronic illness, the IEP team shall review, and revise, if appropriate, the IEP whenever this is a significant change in the pupil’s current medical condition. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.4, subd. (c).)

When recommending placement for home instruction, the IEP team shall have, in the assessment information, a medical report from the attending physician and surgeon or the report of the psychologist, as appropriate, stating the diagnosed condition and certifying that the severity of the condition prevents the pupil from attending a less restrictive placement. The report shall include a projected calendar date for the pupil’s return to school. The IEP team shall meet to reconsider the IEP prior to the projected date for the pupil’s return to school. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.4, subd. (d).)

When a student with an IEP experiences an acute health problem which results in his or her non-attendance at school for more than five consecutive days, upon notification of the classroom teacher or the parent, the school principal or designee shall assure that an IEP team is convened to determine the appropriate educational services. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.17, subd. (c).)

Student did not clearly explain whether she believed Yuba City should have provided home or hospital instruction pursuant to Education Code section 48206.3, or individualized in-home placement and instruction pursuant to an IEP for purposes of providing a FAPE to a child with disabilities. (34 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.4.) Nevertheless, when considering either service, Student’s arguments were not persuasive.

As determined previously, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA when she was hospitalized. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code § 56167.) Additionally, Education Code section 48206.3, subdivision (a) provides for “individual instruction in a hospital or other residential health facility, excluding state hospitals, provided by the school district in which the hospital or other residential health facility is located.” As determined previously, Student was never hospitalized within Yuba City’s jurisdiction. Therefore, Yuba City was not responsible for providing Student a FAPE, such as through home or hospital instruction, during these times. Yuba City’s permissive ability to keep Student enrolled during these hospitalizations did not change Student’s responsible LEA. (Ed. Code, §§ 48207; 56167.)

Student argued that Yuba City provided homework packets when Student was hospitalized at various points during the 2024-2025 school year. Student further argued that Yuba City’s provision of these homework packets was an admission of its continuing responsibility for Student.

Special education teacher Cripe confirmed that she provided these homework packets. Cripe provided these packets to staff at the campus front office, pursuant to Parent’s request, but Parent never picked them up.

To the extent Student argues Cripe’s assembly of these homework packets demonstrated Yuba City’s duty to serve Student while she was hospitalized, that argument is not persuasive. Cripe’s well-intentioned attempts to provide homework packets while Student was hospitalized did not change Student’s responsible LEA. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.)

Student did not refute this principle. Parent testified that, at the time of the due process hearing, Student was hospitalized within the jurisdictional boundaries of another school district in San Mateo, California. Parent explained that Student had been receiving unspecified educational services from that LEA, through the hospital, since the school year began in August 2025.

The law anticipates Student would receive educational services from the responsible LEA for each hospital while she was hospitalized. This Decision makes no findings about any educational services Student may have or not have received during her hospitalizations. Yuba City is not responsible for any denial of FAPE, including hospital instruction, during times she was hospitalized outside of Yuba City’s jurisdiction. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.)

Yuba City could potentially be responsible for providing home or hospital instruction services during times Student was at home and unable to attend school. (Ed. Code § 56363, subd. (b)(4); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.4, subd. (a).) However, Student failed to establish any periods of time between June 23, 2023, and June 23, 2025, that Student was eligible for home or hospital instruction and within Yuba City’s jurisdiction.

Student failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Yuba City denied Student a FAPE from June 23, 2023, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer Student home or hospital instruction.

ISSUE 7

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE FROM APRIL 24, 2025, THROUGH JUNE 23, 2025, BY FAILING TO OFFER STUDENT AN APPROPRIATE PLACEMENT, SUCH AS A NONPUBLIC SCHOOL OR A RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTER?

Student contends that she requires placement in a residential treatment center, due to the severity of her mental health needs, including self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideations. Student further contends that Yuba City cannot meet her needs within one of their programs. Yuba City contends that Student does not require a residential treatment center, and if she did, such a placement is not educationally necessary. Yuba City also contends that the emotionally supported special day class offered in the April 23, 2025 IEP can meet Student’s educational needs.

THE APRIL 23, 2025 IEP IS AT ISSUE

During the prehearing conference, Student explained that the relevant timeframe for this issue was from April 24, 2025, through June 23, 2025, the date she filed her due process complaint. This issue was clarified accordingly. However, the April 23, 2025 IEP is highly relevant to both parties’ presentations at hearing. The April 23, 2025 IEP contains an entry in the notes section that suggests part of the IEP may have been administratively finalized in Yuba City’s computer system on April 24, 2025. Nevertheless, the IEP team meeting happened on August 23, 2025, and the IEP document is dated the same day.

There was no dispute that Student’s issue related to the offer of placement made in the April 23, 2025 IEP. The parties’ presentation of evidence reflected both parties’ understanding of Student’s issue.

Therefore, the April 23, 2025 IEP is at issue here.

YUBA CITY WAS NOT STUDENT’S RESPONSIBLE LEA BETWEEN APRIL 23, 2025, AND JUNE 23, 2025

Student was hospitalized outside of Yuba City’s jurisdictional boundaries beginning on April 8, 2025, and she was not discharged prior to June 23, 2025, the date Student filed her complaint. Accordingly, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA and not required to make a FAPE offer. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.) Rather, Yuba City’s responsibility to Student would resume upon her discharge from the hospital. (Ibid.; Gov. Code, § 7579.1(b).) This case is nearly identical to that in N.G. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found LEA responsible for providing a FAPE while that child was hospitalized was the LEA in which the hospital was geographically located, and that the child’s home LEA was responsible after their discharge. (Ibid.) Although N.G. is an unpublished case, it is highly persuasive here, as discussed in Issue 1.

Accordingly, Yuba City has a complete defense on this Issue. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167; Gov. Code, § 7579.1, subd (b).) Nevertheless, Yuba City convened an IEP team meeting on April 23, 2025, and made a FAPE offer. (N.F., supra, 2022 WL 1125645.) Student failed to prove that Yuba City incurred a duty to offer a FAPE voluntarily by convening an IEP, when another LEA was the responsible LEA at the time. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167; Gov. Code, §7579.1, subd. (b).) Student offered no legal authority supporting her argument that Yuba City owed her a FAPE obligation during the time she was hospitalized, or that this responsibility transferred to Yuba City by virtue of holding an IEP team meeting on April 23, 2025.

STUDENT DID NOT PROVE THAT YUBA CITY’S OFFERED PLACEMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE

Even if Yuba City is not entitled to a complete defense, Student did not prove that between April 23, 2025, and June 23, 2025, Yuba City did not offer her an appropriate placement.

A special education student’s placement is that unique combination of facilities, personnel, location, or equipment necessary to provide instructional services to her. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3042(a).) Both federal and state law required Yuba City to provide Student special education in the least restrictive environment appropriate to meet her needs. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i) (2006); Ed. Code, § 56040.1.) Yuba City must educate a special needs pupil with nondisabled peers “to the maximum extent appropriate,” and the pupil may be removed from the general education environment only when the nature or severity of the student’s disabilities is such that education in general classes with the use of supplementary aids and services “cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (D.R. by and through R.R. v. Redondo Beach Unif. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2022) 56 F.4th 636, 644 [citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)]; 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2006); Ed. Code, § 56040.1.)

Yuba City recognized that Student had significant mental health struggles, and acknowledged that Student required additional support beyond that provided in the general education setting. Accordingly, through the April 23, 2025 IEP, Yuba City offered placement in a special day class for children with emotional and mental health needs, called the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class. Multiple Yuba City staff, including program specialist Anna Clanin, persuasively testified that this self-contained classroom program had approximately four other students and was staffed with at least three adults. As explained below, Student would also be assigned an additional one-to-one aide. This program would be located at a different school site than the school Student previously attended, and Yuba City offered special education transportation.

In addition to this placement, Yuba City offered 1,415 minutes per week of specialized academic instruction to be provided in Emotionally Supported Special Day Class. Yuba City also offered four 30-minute individual school-based mental health counseling sessions per month, and 30 minutes of group school-based mental health counseling per week. Finally, Yuba City offered 1,950 minutes per week of intensive individual services, in the form of a one-to-one aide to support Student through her entire school day. Clanin explained that Student could begin attending the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class within one to two days, once Parent consented to the placement. Yuba City offered Student the option of independent instruction for the short interim period.

Student would also have access to a school social worker, such as Carrie Bevacqua. Bevacqua held a master’s degree in social work and held a pupil personnel services credential. She had been a social worker with Yuba City for over eight years and had known Student since she was in sixth grade. Bevacqua did not provide special education counseling services but provided general education counseling support to all students who needed support. Bevacqua’s testimony was thoughtful and comprehensive. She admitted when she did not remember something and was straightforward on both direct and cross examination. Her testimony was given substantial weight. Bevacqua was familiar with the offered special day class program and opined that it would meet Student’s needs.

Student did not prove that the offer of placement in the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class was not appropriate. Student provided no persuasive evidence or argument that the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class could not meet Student’s needs. For example, Student did not offer competent expert testimony from a witness familiar with Student’s educational needs and the offered program that established it was not appropriate. Rather, one of Student’s witnesses, Rebeca Madrigal, whose testimony is discussed in detail below, opined that the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class could meet Student’s needs once she was “stabilized” following residential treatment.

Student unpersuasively argued that Yuba City could not support Student, because Student’s April 23, 2025 and June 5, 2025 IEP documents did not show that Student made progress on her goals. However, Student’s IEP team did not review progress on IEP goals at the April 23, 2025 meeting, and did not have time to review Student’s progress on her goals before the June 5, 2025 meeting ended due to time constraints. Thus, there was no information regarding Student’s progress on goals reflected in the uncompleted IEP. Student’s attempts to ascribe meaning to the uncompleted portions of the IEP was not persuasive and not conclusive of what progress Student made. Even if Student made less than expected progress, Yuba City did not offer to maintain Student’s previous placement predominantly in the general education setting, further undermining Student’s argument.

As determined previously, Student’s IEP team did not complete Student’s annual review at the June 5, 2025 IEP team meeting. Thus, the only offer of placement Yuba City made during the relevant timeframe for this Issue was the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class program described above. Student did not prove this placement was inappropriate.

Therefore, Student failed to meet her burden of proving that Yuba City did not offer her an appropriate placement between April 23, 2025, and June 23, 2025.

STUDENT DID NOT ESTABLISH YUBA CITY DENIED HER A FAPE BY NOT OFFERING A NONPUBLIC SCHOOL OR A RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTER PLACEMENT

Even if Yuba City was Student’s responsible LEA between April 23, 2025, and June 23, 2025, and if Student proved that Emotionally Supported Special Day Class program described previously was not appropriate, Student did not prove that she required a nonpublic school or a residential treatment center placement to receive a

FAPE

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sacramento City Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Rachel

H. (9th Cir. 1994) 14 F.3d 1398, set forth standards to determine whether a general education classroom is the least restrictive environment for a child with a disability. The court adopted a balancing test that required the consideration of four factors:

1. the educational benefits of placement full time in a regular class;

2. the non-academic benefits of such placement;

3. the effect the student would have on the teacher and children in the regular class; and

4. the costs of mainstreaming the student. (Id. at p. 1403.)

If the IEP team determines that a child cannot be educated in a general education environment, then the least restrictive environment analysis requires determining whether the child has been mainstreamed to the maximum extent that is appropriate considering the continuum of program options. (Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Ed. (5th Cir. 1989) 874 F.2d 1036, 1050; B.S. v. Placentia-Yorba Linda Unif. Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2009) 306 Fed.Appx. 397, 400.) Mainstreaming is a term used to describe opportunities for disabled students to engage in activities with nondisabled students. (M.L., supra, 394 F.3d at p. 640, fn. 7.)

It was undisputed that a general education setting was not the appropriate placement for Student, and neither party argued for such a placement. The issue is whether placement in the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class would provide sufficient educational benefits to Student, or if she required a more restrictive placement such as a nonpublic school or a full-time residential treatment center to receive a FAPE. Accordingly, a detailed analysis of each of the Rachel H. factors is not necessary to determine that full-time general education was not an appropriate placement.

Student alleged that Yuba City denied her a FAPE by failing to offer either a nonpublic school or a residential treatment center. Those are two separate possible placements on the continuum of placement options for special education. (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.104, 300.115; Ed. Code, § 56361.) Some nonpublic schools are components of residential treatment centers, and some are standalone day programs. Despite the differences in meaning, Student used both terms interchangeably.

Student did not offer any persuasive evidence or argument that Student required a nonpublic school as a standalone day program. Student’s closing brief on this issue only discusses Student’s argument for her need for a residential treatment center placement. The undersigned will not construct or develop arguments Student did not make. (See Independent Towers of Washington v. Washington (9th Cir. 2003) 350 F.3d 925, 929 [the court cannot construct arguments for a party, and will only examine issues specifically and distinctly argued in a party’s brief]; Loewen v. Berryhill (9th Cir. 2017) 707 Fed. Appx. 907, 908 (nonpub. opn.) [citing Carmickle v. Commissioner (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1155, 1161, fn. 2 [the court is not required to address arguments made without specificity]]; Greenly v. Sara Lee Corporation (E.D.Cal. April 30, 2008, No. CIV. S–06–1775 WBS EFB) 2008 WL 1925230, at fn. 26 [“[I]t is not the responsibility of the judiciary ‘to sift through scattered papers in order to manufacture arguments for parties.’”].) Student did not prove that she required a nonpublic school placement to receive a FAPE.

Student presented evidence and more fully briefed her arguments regarding residential treatment center placement. However, Student’s arguments were not persuasive and failed to establish her educational need for a residential placement.

Residential placement is, by its nature, considerably more restrictive than day school. (See Kerkam by Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Public Schools (D.C. Cir. 1991) 931 F.2d 84, 87; G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist. (1st Cir.1991) 930 F.2d 942, 948; Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P. by and through Bess P. (3d Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 520, 534, amended (Oct. 24, 1995.) The IDEA does not define a therapeutic placement; however, both day schools and residential facilities can qualify as therapeutic placements. By their very nature, therapeutic placements require a student’s removal from the general education environment. As a result, a therapeutic placement is one of the most restrictive placements on the continuum. (34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2017).) Given their restrictive nature, removal of a student with disabilities to a residential setting complies with the least restrictive environment mandate in only extremely limited situations for students with severe disabilities who are unable to receive a FAPE in a less restrictive environment. (Carlisle, supra, 62 F.3d at p. 523; see also County of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1458, 1468 (County of San Diego) [“when day treatment fails … a residential treatment program appears singularly appropriate.”].)

A school district’s responsibility under the IDEA is to remedy the learning-related symptoms of a disability, not to treat other, non-learning related symptoms. (Forest Grove School District v. T.A. (9th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 [cert. den. 132 S.Ct. 1145] (Forest Grove).) If “the placement is a response to medical, social, or emotional problems … quite apart from the learning process,” then it cannot be considered necessary under the IDEA. (Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J. (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3d 1004, 1010 (Ashland) [quoting Clovis Unif. Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings (9th Cir. 1990) 903 F.2d 635, 643 (Clovis).) The IDEA provides that a student requires placement in a residential treatment center if such placement is necessary to provide the student with special education and related services. (34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (2006); See Clovis, supra, 903 F.2d at p. 643.)

In G.R. v. Del Mar Union Sch. Dist. (S.D. Cal., Apr. 22, 2020, No. 319CV00132AJBMSB) 2020 WL 1939020, the court discussed the law regarding when a residential placement is necessary.

The Ninth Circuit has identified three possible tests for determining when to impose responsibility for residential placements on the special education system: (1) where the placement is ‘supportive’ of the pupil’s education; (2) where medical, social, or emotional problems that require residential placement are intertwined with educational problems; and (3) when the placement is primarily to aid the student to benefit from special education. (Id. at p. *5 [citing County of San Diego, supra, 93 F.3d at p. 1468].) “Thus, the analysis for determining whether [a residential treatment center] is appropriate ultimately centers on whether the placement is necessary for educational purposes.” (Id.)

Student failed to prove that she required a residential treatment center placement for educational purposes. Student offered expert testimony from three witnesses. As explained below, none of them were persuasive.

Dr. Arman Danielyan, M.D., testified at hearing on Student’s behalf. Danielyan was a board-certified psychiatrist in child, adolescent, and adult psychiatry. He held licenses in California, Ohio, and Florida. Danielyan had postgraduate and professional experience in child and adolescent psychiatry.

Danielyan treated Student while she was placed at John Muir Behavioral Health. Danielyan provided inpatient psychiatry services to children residing at John Muir Behavior Health since 2012. He testified that he had treated Student while she was hospitalized at John Muir Behavioral Health on approximately three separate occasions. He explained that he most recently treated Student from June 16, through 24, 2025, but could not precisely remember when he previously treated Student.

Danielyan testified that Student was currently diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, also called depression, with psychotic features and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He also believed that Student had a rule out diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, but could not clearly remember. Danielyan generally struggled with answering questions about specific interactions with Student.

Student offered a letter Dr. Danielyan wrote, dated June 20, 2025. This letter was not written until after the April 23, 2025 and June 5, 2025 IEP team meetings at issue. Thus, this letter could not have been reviewed by Student’s IEP team or considered at either of the IEP team meetings at issue. Therefore, this letter was given little weight when evaluating Yuba City’s offers of FAPE within the timeframe at issue. (See E.M., supra, 652 F.3d at p. 1006; and Adams, supra, 195 F.3d at p. 1149).) Even considering the letter, and Danielyan’s related opinion, his testimony did not establish that Student required a residential treatment center for educational purposes.

In the June 20, 2025 letter, Danielyan recommended that Student “would benefit from residential treatment placement where she can be afforded 24/7 supervision and appropriate treatment that can meet her emotional and behavioral needs.” When questioned about this recommendation, Danielyan explained that a residential treatment was a “step-down” placement from a locked psychiatric hospital. Danielyan then explained that at such a residential placement, patients receive 24/7 care including nursing, counseling, social worker support, and weekly psychiatry care, but not in a locked psychiatric hospital. He explained that Student required “residential-level psychiatric care” to continue treatment rather than being discharged home. Danielyan explained that his recommendation for residential placement was based on Student’s medical history and discussions with her medical care team.

Danielyan presented as an experienced physician and a thoughtful witness, but he had little knowledge or understanding of special education, or the requirements for a residential placement under special education law. Danielyan did not hold any degrees, licenses, credentials, or certifications relevant to special education. He had never been employed by a school district, or provided services within a school setting. He never attended an IEP team meeting for Student or observed Student in an educational setting. Danielyan demonstrated a vague awareness of educationally related residential placements, but he explained that information came second hand from talking with others. Thus, Danielyan’s expertise as a medical doctor did not extend to expertise in special education. Accordingly, Danielyan’s testimony was given little weight.

The Ninth Circuit has found that a child’s physician’s recommendation for placement in a residential treatment center was a significant factor in determining a placement was required for medical purposes rather than educational purposes. (Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H. (9th Cir. 2009) 587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (E.H.) [applying standard from Clovis, supra, 903 F.2d at p. 643].) Similarly here, Danielyan’s recommendation was for a medically based residential treatment facility, rather than an educationally necessary placement. Danielyan explained that it was up to the parent or guardian of a child to set up care for the child after they were discharged, including residential treatment or outpatient therapy. He also explained that the staff at John Muir Behavioral Health often helped families with the process, such as assisting with insurance authorization. He then explained that the hospital treatment team would send a referral packet, referred to as a clinical packet, to a proposed residential treatment center after the child’s parents chose the program and their insurance agreed to cover the costs. This is not the process for placements pursuant to an IEP. Danielyan’s explanation further supports the conclusion that his recommendations were medically based. (Id. at p. 1185.) Overall, Danielyan’s testimony was not persuasive, and did not establish Student’s educational need for a residential treatment center placement.

Rebeca Madrigal testified at hearing on Student’s behalf. Madrigal was a licensed marriage and family therapist since June 2025. She held a bachelor's degree in psychology and a master’s degree in counseling psychology. Madrigal did not hold any educationally related credential, such as a teaching credential or a pupil personnel services credential. She had never worked for a school district or provided special education services pursuant to an IEP. She was unfamiliar with special education terminology, such as nonpublic schools. She conceded that she did not know when a residential treatment center placement was required under special education law.

Madrigal’s experience with Student was limited. She briefly provided therapy to Student outside of the school setting in March and April 2025. Madrigal explained that she had met with Student for two 50-minute sessions, which were focused on rapport building and assessment. Madrigal terminated services with Student on June 13, 2025, through a letter to Parent. Madrigal explained that Student required a higher level of care than she could provide, and recommended two potential residential placements. During her testimony, Madrigal explained that Student had a higher level of need that other children she had worked with. However, Madrigal’s understanding of Student’s needs and presentation appeared to come second hand, mostly from Parent.

Madrigal demonstrated a significant lack of knowledge and familiarity with Student and her family. For example, while testifying, Madrigal was unsure of Parent’s name. This lack of knowledge undermined the persuasiveness of Madrigal’s testimony.

Madrigal recommended that Student be placed in a residential treatment center. However, her opinion was not persuasive. One of the reasons Madrigal believed Student required a residential treatment center placement was due to an incident in April 2025, when Student ingested an overdose amount of another child’s medication. Madrigal explained that she heard about this event from Parent. However, it is unclear what details Parent shared with Madrigal that resulted in her opinion. The April 2025 incident was undoubtedly serious. Nevertheless, Student did not establish that this incident required Yuba City to place Student in a residential treatment center.

Madrigal attended Student’s June 5, 2025, IEP team meeting. Madrigal testified that, during the IEP team meeting, she shared her opinion that the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class offered by Yuba City could benefit Student after she “stabilized” in residential care. She did not provide an opinion about how long that process would take.

Based on her testimony and background, Madrigal’s recommendation for a residential treatment center appeared to be based on her understanding of Student’s medical needs, like that of Dr. Danielyan. Moreover, Madrigal conceded that she was not personally familiar with residential placements and that the recommendations included in her June 13, 2025 letter were made by others on her therapy team. Despite naming two placements specifically in her letter, she could not remember their names during her testimony.

Madrigal was clearly well intentioned and appeared truthful, but her limited personal knowledge of Student and unfamiliarity with special education rendered her opinions unpersuasive. Her testimony was given little weight and did not establish Student’s educational need for residential treatment center placement. (Ashland, supra, 588 F.3d at p. 1010; E.H., supra, 587 F.3d at p. 1185; Clovis, supra, 905 F.2d at p. 643.)

Margo Uhde also testified on Student’s behalf. Uhde was a wraparound services coordinator and social worker. In that capacity, Uhde helped Parent coordinate with other service providers and facilitated Student’s care with medical and community services. She held an associate’s degree in child development, a bachelor’s degree in human services and family and child services, and a master’s degree in psychology.

Uhde had extensive experience as a social worker, but her experience with Student was limited. Uhde began working with Student and her family on February 13, 2025, and explained that she only met Student in person once.

Uhde explained that Student’s support team outside of school, including her, felt that she required 24-hour supervision because of her self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideations. Uhde was concerned that Student engaged in a pattern of behaviors that indicated she required a residential treatment center level of care. Yet, Uhde undercut her opinion by stating that she was not a doctor or clinician, so she could not make recommendations about what Student’s residential placement would look like, because, “she could not legally write the referral.”

Uhde’s testimony was clear and comprehensive. She was thoughtful and careful when answering questions and stated when she did not remember something, so she did not guess. It was clear that she was concerned for Student and her wellbeing. She was somewhat evasive on cross examination at times, but that did not significantly affect the character of her testimony.

However, her training and experience was not directly relevant to special education. Uhde did not hold a teaching credential or pupil personnel services credential. She held a credential authorizing her to be a child site supervisor for school campuses, but did not explain how that credential was relevant to her opinions regarding Student’s special education needs. She had never provided special education services but had some familiarity with IEPs from working with other children. She did not demonstrate an understanding of how placement decisions are made through the IEP process. Instead, she explained her understanding that the doctor or hospital staff where Student was placed would make referrals for residential placement. Therefore, her testimony was significantly less persuasive regarding Student’s special education needs, including whether she required a residential placement for educational purposes.

Finally, as with other witnesses discussed previously, Uhde’s primary source of information about Student and Student’s behaviors outside of school was Parent. Uhde repeatedly explained that her understanding of certain events was based on her discussions with Parent, rather than from personal, firsthand knowledge. It is unclear what information Parent provided that formed the basis of Uhde’s opinions and understanding of Student’s situation and needs. Accordingly, her opinions were given little weight and did not establish Student’s need for residential placement for educational purposes. (Ashland, supra, 588 F.3d at p. 1010; E.H., supra, 587 F.3d at p. 1185; Clovis, supra, 905 F.2d at p. 643.)

The Ninth Circuit has analyzed the three possible tests from Clovis Unif. Sch. Dist., supra, 903 F.2d 635, in two illustrative cases. Each is discussed below.

In County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit found that student required residential placement for educational purposes. (County of San Diego, supra, 93 F.3d 1458.) The court found it significant that “[t]he student in that case was ‘hospitalized ... for violent outbursts related to preparing a school science report,” and “was assigned little or no homework because it was regarded as too stressful for her.” (Id. at pp. 1462-63.) The court found these facts, coupled with the student’s failures when served in a day treatment placement, relevant in finding that the student required a residential placement for educational purposes. (Id. at p. 1468.) Student did not establish similar facts here.

By contrast, in Ashland, the Ninth Circuit found that the student did not require residential placement for education purposes. (Ashland, supra, 588 F.3d 1004.) The court found it significant that the student, “was not disruptive in class[,] was well regarded by her teachers, able to learn in regular classes, and capable of benefitting from the education provided to her by the school.” (Id. at p. 1010.) Similarly, Student’s teachers Meghan Day, Tessa Hanson, Marisa Ramirez-Branco, and Cripe explained that she enjoyed school and could access her instruction, primarily provided in the general education setting, when she attended. Student’s poorer grades were due to her inconsistent and limited attendance. Student’s situation here is more in line with Ashland than County of San Diego.

Student did not address these cases in her closing brief. Rather, Student cited a district court case from Washington State. (Edmonds Sch. Dist. v. A.T. (W.D. Wash. 2017) 299 F.Supp.3d 1135 (Edmonds).) Student argues, “[i]f a student requires a medical placement, [an LEA] must also fund those medical services related to the residential placement.” However, this argument is directly contrary to the law. (E.H., supra, 587 F.3d at p. 1184 [citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (the IDEA requires a school district to pay for reasonable, non-medical expenses associated with a residential placement.)].) Moreover, the court in Edmonds determined that the placement the family chose was not a medically exempted residential placement, confirming that residential treatment centers can potentially be a placement under special education law. (Edmonds, supra, 299 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1142-43.) This general premise is not disputed, and this case does little to support Student’s overall position.

Student argued that her multiple hospitalizations by themselves demonstrated an educational necessity for residential placement. That argument is also not persuasive.

Special education law recognizes that children may require residential placement for medical reasons, and those reasons do not automatically mean a child needs that level of placement for educational purposes. (Ed. Code, § 56167.5 [Nothing in this article shall be construed to mean that the placement of any individual with exceptional needs in a hospital or health facility constitutes a necessary residential placement, as described under Section 300.104 of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations, for which the local educational agency would be responsible as an educational program option under this part]; see also Forest Grove, supra, 638 F.3d at 1238-39; Ashland, supra, 588 F.3d at p. 1010; E.H., supra, 587 F.3d at p. 1185; Clovis, supra, 903 F.2d at p. 643 [finding “[a]ll medical services are arguably ‘supportive’ of a handicapped child's education; therefore, mere ‘supportiveness’ is too broad a criterion to be the test for whether a specific service is necessary under the [IDEA] to assist a child to benefit from special education.”].)

Here, Student offered 35 emergency department reports related to Student’s 5150 holds. As determined above in Issue 1, these documents have limited use without competent expert testimony to explain the medical information included in the reports, such as terminology and shorthand. At least 22 of the 35 reports revealed that Student was referred for a 5150 hold, or related hospitalization, by Parent or from other individuals outside of school. The more recent reports also suggested Student had interpersonal difficulties with Parent or others within the home setting as the trigger for some of Student’s 5150 holds. Comparably few referrals came from school or appeared to be related to incidents at school. While not determinative of whether Student’s need for residential level of care was educationally necessary, the emergency room reports suggested that a significant portion of Student’s hospitalizations during the relevant timeframe “stemmed from issues apart from the learning process, which manifested themselves away from school grounds.” (Ashland, supra, 588 F.3d at p. 1010.)

As determined previously, Student did not prove that the offer of placement in the Emotionally Supported Special Day Class could not meet her needs. While the law does not require Student to exhaust all lesser restrictive environments to require a residential treatment center placement, the Ninth Circuit has found that a child’s success in such placements is highly relevant when considering the educational necessity of a residential treatment center. (County of San Diego, supra, 93 F.3d at 1468 [“when day treatment fails … a residential treatment program appears singularly appropriate.”])

Student raised additional arguments, including Student’s potential for rehospitalization, safety at school, and various attacks on the credibility of Yuba City staff’s testimony. Student’s claims were not supported by persuasive evidence and did not prove Student required residential center placement to receive a FAPE.

Student asked OAH to “apply a negative inference” regarding the extent of Student’s self-injurious behaviors at school, because Yuba City had in its possession additional documents, such as suicide risk assessments, but failed to move those into evidence. (See e.g. Hardesty, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 425 [citing Evid. Code, § 412].) Even assuming such a negative inference, Student failed to meet her burden of proving she required a residential treatment center to receive a FAPE.

Student did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Yuba City was responsible for making an offer of FAPE between April 23, 2025, and June 23, 2025, because she was hospitalized outside of Yuba City’s jurisdiction. Even if Yuba City was required to make an offer of FAPE, Student did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Yuba City’s placement offer was insufficient and that she required a residential treatment center placement to receive a FAPE.

ISSUE 8

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE BETWEEN MAY 7, 2024, AND JUNE 23, 2025, BY MATERIALLY FAILING TO IMPLEMENT STUDENT’S SPECIALIZED ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION SERVICES?

Student contends that Yuba City materially failed to implement all of Student’s specialized academic instruction services, referred to by the parties as SAI. Yuba City contends that it materially implemented all of Student's SAI services, and Student failed to meet her burden to prove otherwise.

A school district’s material failure to implement the child’s IEP may violate the IDEA. A material failure occurs when there is more than a minor discrepancy between the services provided to a disabled child and those required by the IEP. (Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3d 811, 815.) Van Duyn found that, “[t]here is no statutory requirement of perfect adherence to the IEP, nor any reason rooted in the statutory text to view minor implementation failures as denials of a free appropriate public education.” (Id. at p. 821.)

YUBA CITY IMPLEMENTED STUDENT’S SAI SERVICES DURING THE 2023-2024 SCHOOL YEAR

Student’s May 7, 2024 initial IEP contained the three separate SAI services. The first called for five, 30-minute sessions per week, totaling 150 minutes, in a general education math class. The second called for two 31-minute sessions per week, totaling 62 minutes, in the learning strategies class, which was an elective course. The third called for five, 30-minute sessions per week, totaling 150 minutes, in a general education English language arts, also referred to by the parties as ELA, class. All of these services were to be delivered in a group model.

The services in the math and learning strategies class were set to begin on May 7, 2024, but the ELA services were set to begin on August 7, 2024. The 2024-2025 school year started on August 14, 2024, so these services would begin at the start of the school year. Parent consented to the May 7, 2024 IEP on May 7, 2024.

Beginning on May 10, 2024, Student began a series of hospitalizations which lasted through nearly the remainder of the 2023-2024 school year. As decided previously, Yuba City was not responsible for providing Student a FAPE while she was hospitalized. Student did not prove that Yuba City materially failed to implement Student’s SAI services for the short time she was enrolled and attending school during the 2023-2024 school year following her May 7, 2024, IEP.

Student did not establish Yuba City had any duty to implement Student’s SAI services over the summer of 2024.

YUBA CITY IMPLEMENTED STUDENT’S SAI SERVICES DURING THE 2024-2025 SCHOOL YEAR

Student’s IEP team convened for an amendment IEP on August 12, 2024. Student’s IEP team agreed to change Student’s SAI services related to the learning strategies class from two 31-minute sessions per week, totaling 62 minutes, to 45 minutes per day of group services in the learning strategies classroom. Parent consented to this amendment on August 12, 2024.

Student returned to Yuba City for the beginning of the 2024-2025 school year, which began on August 14, 2024. Student attended seven school days at the start of the school year, before beginning a series of hospitalizations as described previously. Student did not prove that Yuba City materially failed to implement Student’s SAI services prior to her hospitalizations.

Student returned to school in Yuba City in late October 2025. Student attended for about a month before being hospitalized again at the end of November, shortly before Yuba City’s Thanksgiving break. Student argued that during that month, Yuba City did not materially implement Student’s SAI services. Student relied on a service log reflecting when Yuba City provided some of Student’s services, and education specialist Cripe’s explanation of that log. However, Student’s argument was not persuasive.

Cripe explained that the service log printout offer was not a document she had seen before. Rather, it was a printout from the school’s record keeping system, because of how it was formatted. However, her testimony on this point was less sure and less persuasive than the rest of her testimony. It appeared that Cripe inferred information based on reading the document, rather than testifying from direct knowledge.

Cripe persuasively explained her general process for logging her time serving students, including Student. However, the service log offered into evidence did not fully reflect the information Cripe entered into the system. Rather, the service log appeared to reflect Student’s learning strategies SAI service, because the log reflected a 45-minute group per day service, and learning strategies was Student’s only corresponding service.

The log also included entries under a different service code described as 30 minutes of individual service. Cripe believed that this must have been one of her services as well, but could not specifically answer which. She appeared to speculate that this service was related to the SAI services she provided Student, but that there was a system error during the 2024-2025 school year that may have mislabeled the service.

Student attempted to show that Cripe did not provide all of Student’s SAI services using this log. However, it became clear that not all of Student’s SAI services were recorded on this log, including those services provided by paraprofessionals in her general education English class. Thus, the log provided was not a complete accounting of Student’s SAI services and not conclusive of what services Yuba City provided during the 2024-2025 school year.

Student argued that the logs Yuba City admitted into evidence did not prove Student received her SAI services in conformity with her operative IEP. Student’s argument was not persuasive, because she had the burden to prove Yuba City materially failed to implement the services, not Yuba City. Any defect in the evidence Yuba City offered to disprove Student’s allegation did not automatically mean Student met her burden.

Student also argued that Yuba City failed to provide Student SAI services during her general education Math and English classes. Student’s arguments were not persuasive here either.

Cripe credibly explained that she was a co-teacher for Student’s math class. She and the other teacher assigned would teach lessons and assist the students in that classroom. Thus, by attending the co-taught math class, Student would receive the SAI services called for in her IEP. Student did not prove otherwise.

Student’s SAI in English was provided by a paraprofessional with teacher oversight. Marisa Ramirez-Branco, Student’s English teacher during the 2024-2025 school year credibly explained that Student received support from the paraprofessional, and her individually assigned safety aide, during the 2024-2025 school year. Ramirez- Branco’s testimony was complete and convincing. She provided detailed answers and provided anecdotes about Student’s time in her classroom, which helped demonstrate her depth of knowledge. She appeared sincere and willing to answer questions on both direct and cross examination. Her testimony was given great weight. Like her math class, by attending her English class, Student received the SAI services called for in her IEP. Student did not prove otherwise.

As determined previously, Student spent much of the spring of 2025 hospitalized. Student did attend nearly all of March and into April 2025, before returning to the hospital on April 8, 2025. Student did not prove that Yuba City materially failed to implement Student’s SAI services when she was in attendance during the spring of 2025.

Student did not return to Yuba City prior to the end of the school year on June 6, 2025. Student did not establish that Yuba City had any duty to implement Student’s SAI services while she was hospitalized beginning on April 9, 2025, through the end of the school year on June 6, 2025. Student did not prove Yuba City had a duty to implement Student’s SAI services after the school year ended through June 23, 2025.

Student asked OAH to “implement a negative inference concerning this issue,” because Yuba City had service logs in its possession but failed to move those into evidence. (See Hardesty, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 425 [citing Evid. Code, § 412].) Even assuming such a negative inference, Student failed to meet her burden. Student did not prove that Yuba City materially failed to implement her specialized academic instruction services at any time between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025.

ISSUE 9

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE BETWEEN OCTOBER 30, 2024, AND JUNE 23, 2025, BY MATERIALLY FAILING TO IMPLEMENT STUDENT’S COUNSELING SERVICES?

Student contends that Yuba City materially failed to implement all of Student’s counseling services, also referred to as counseling and guidance services. Yuba City contends that it materially implemented all of Student's counseling services, and Student failed to meet her burden to prove otherwise.

Student’s August 12, 2024 IEP offered counseling and guidance services in the amount of one 30-minute session per week. This service was to be provided by a school psychologist or school counselor. Services would not be provided on the first or last week of the school year. Parent consented to this IEP.

As determined above, Student was hospitalized at the beginning of the school year, and did not return until October 25, 2024. Student attended school four more weeks until being hospitalized again on November 21, 2024. During the time she attended in the fall of 2024, Student should have received four counseling sessions.

Student returned to school on February 26, 2025. She attended fairly consistently until she was hospitalized again on April 8, 2025. During that time, Student should have received seven counseling sessions. Student did not return to school anytime after April 8, 2025, through June 23, 2025.

Even though Student’s IEP team convened on April 23, 2025, and Yuba City offered additional mental health counseling services, Parent never consented to those services. Therefore, Yuba City was not required to implement the mental health services. The counseling and guidance services included in Student’s August 12, 2024 IEP remained in place. However, Yuba City was not responsible for implementing those counseling services while Student was the responsibility of another LEA.

It was unclear how many sessions Student received during the 2024-2025 school year. School psychologist Moreno testified that she had only seen Student a few times for counseling sessions, but could not give a specific number. She also testified that Student’s counseling services were generally provided by the school counselors. The school counselors were identified as possible service providers in Student’s August 12,

2024 IEP

There were two counselors assigned to Student’s school site: Elizabeth Braun and Guadalupe Zamora. Each counselor had a caseload divided alphabetically. Braun, who was assigned to Student, did not testify at hearing. Zamora did.

Zamora’s testimony was comprehensive and convincing. If she did not know an answer to a question, she explained why she did not know. She readily answered questions on both direct and cross examination. Her testimony was given substantial weight.

Zamora explained that Student regularly visited counselor Braun’s office, which was across the hall from Zamora’s. Student also met with Zamora at times, when Zamora was available. Student’s August 12, 2024 IEP included an accommodation to allow Student to meet with counselors as needed. The record was not clear whether Student’s visits to Braun and Zamora were related to her counseling services or because Student wanted to meet with the counselors pursuant to her accommodation.

Even if Yuba City did not provide counseling every week Student attended, Student may not have been denied a FAPE. (Van Duyn supra, 502 F.3d at p. 815.) Perfect adherence to the IEP is not required. (Id. at p. 821.) Additionally, Student’s frequent hospitalizations and resulting moves between LEAs further complicated Yuba City’s attempts to implement her counseling.

The record did not establish that any of the hospitals that served Student during the 2024-2025 school year provided Yuba City with 10-days’ notice of Student’s discharge. (Gov’t. Code, § 7579.1, subd. (b).) Rather, the evidence proved that Student was frequently discharged with little to no notice to Parent. Parent then generally contacted Yuba City staff once Student was discharged, providing Yuba City little to no notice, and certainly less than the 10 days contemplated by Government Code section 7579.1, subdivision (a). It is therefore reasonable that Student’s sudden return would make it difficult to immediately return Student to the counseling schedule for her weekly sessions. Therefore, even if Student missed some sessions when she returned from hospitalizations, Yuba City may be excused in not resuming services immediately.

Student argued that Yuba City failed to offer service logs into evidence that proved Yuba City provided Student her counseling services. However, Student bore the burden of proving Yuba City materially failed to implement the services. Yuba City did not bear the burden of disproving Student’s allegation. Therefore, Student’s argument was not persuasive.

Student again asked OAH to “include a negative inference,” because Yuba City had service logs in its possession but failed to move those into evidence. (See Hardesty, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 425 [citing Evid. Code, § 412].) Even assuming such a negative inference, Student failed to meet her burden.

Student failed to prove that Yuba City materially failed to implement her counseling services from October 30, 2024, through June 23, 2025.

ISSUE 10

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE BY FAILING TO FUND AN INDEPENDENT PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL EVALUATION PURSUANT TO PARENT’S JUNE 3, 2025 REQUEST?

Student contends that Yuba City failed to timely fund a psychoeducational independent educational evaluation following Student’s June 3, 2025 request, disagreeing with the May 7, 2024 initial psychoeducational assessment. Yuba City contends that it did not fail to timely respond to Student’s June 3, 2025 request and ultimately granted the request on August 27, 2025.

The procedural safeguards of the IDEA provide that under certain conditions a parent is entitled to obtain an independent educational evaluation at public expense. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (a)(1) (2006); Ed. Code, §§ 56329, subd. (b), 56506, subd. (c).) To obtain an independent educational evaluation, the parent must disagree with an evaluation obtained by the public agency and request an independent educational evaluation at public expense. (34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1).)

“Independent educational evaluation” means an evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner who is not employed by the public agency responsible for the education of the child in question. (34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a)(3)(i).) A parent is entitled to only one independent educational evaluation at public expense each time the public education agency conducts an assessment with which the parent disagrees. (34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(5); Ed. Code, § 56329, subd. (b).)

Following a student’s request for an independent educational evaluation, the public agency must, “without unnecessary delay,” either: (i) file a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate; or (ii) ensure that an independent educational evaluation is provided at public expense, unless the agency demonstrates in a hearing that the evaluation obtained by the parent did not meet agency criteria. (34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2); see also Ed. Code, § 56329, subd. (c) [providing that a public agency may initiate a due process hearing to show that its assessment was appropriate].) This obligation is commonly referred to as an LEA’s duty to “fund or file.” The regulations do not specify what constitutes an “unnecessary delay.” Rather, what constitutes an “unnecessary delay” is a “fact-specific inquiry” that focuses on the circumstances surrounding the delay. (L.C. by & through Cruz v. Alta Loma Sch. Dist., (9th Cir. 2021) 849 F. Appx 678, 679 (Mem) (L.C.) [citing C.W. v. Capistrano Unif. Sch. Dist., (9th Cir. 2015) 784 F.3d 1237, 1247 and J.P. v. Ripon Unif. Sch. Dist. (E.D. Cal. April 15, 2009) 2:07-CV-02084-MCE-DAD, 2009 WL 1034993 at *7].)

In L.C., the Ninth Circuit found that “[w]hen parties continued to discuss provision of an IEE, there was no unnecessary delay in the school district waiting to file for a due process hearing until the parties reached a final impasse.” (L.C., supra, 849 Fed.Appx. at p. 679.) However, when a school district's delay is “unexplained,” that weighs in favor of finding unnecessary delay. (Id. at 680 [citing Pajaro Valley Unif. Sch. Dist. v. J.S. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) No. C 06-0380 PVT, 2006 WL 3734289, at p. *3].) The Ninth Circuit also found that a school break that occurs during a request for an independent educational evaluation “must also be considered in determining the timeliness of the [school district’s] due process request.” (Id., [citing Ripon Unif. Sch. Dist., supra, 2009 WL 1034993 at p. *7].)

It is undisputed that Yuba City agreed to fund Student’s requested psychoeducational independent educational evaluation on or about August 27, 2025. Based on the date Student filed her due process complaint, the timeframe for this issue is between June 3, 2025, and June 23, 2025. Thus, the question that remains is whether Yuba City was required to fund the independent educational evaluation between June 3, 2025, and June 23, 2025, such that Student was denied a FAPE when Yuba City did not fund or file within that timeframe. The answer here is no.

Student requested the independent educational evaluation on June 3, 2025. Yuba City’s school year ended on June 6, 2025. Thus, Yuba City had less than a week’s time during the school year to consider Student’s request. Student then filed her due process complaint on June 23, 2025, less than three weeks after making the request for an independent educational evaluation and while Yuba City was still on summer recess. There is no evidence that Yuba City determined not to fund the independent educational evaluation, or that the parties otherwise reached an impasse, between June 3, 2025, and June 23, 2025.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Yuba City did not demonstrate an “unnecessary delay” in responding to Student’s independent educational evaluation request between June 3, 2025, and June 23, 2025. Student did not prove that Yuba City denied her a FAPE by not funding a psychoeducational independent educational evaluation between June 3, 2025, and June 23, 2025.

ISSUE 11

DID YUBA CITY DENY STUDENT A FAPE BY FAILING TO PROVIDE PARENT WITH A COMPLETE COPY OF STUDENT’S EDUCATIONAL RECORDS PURSUANT TO A MAY 2, 2025 REQUEST?

Student contends that Yuba City failed to provide a complete copy of Student’s educational records, also called pupil records, pursuant to a records request made by Student’s attorney on May 2, 2025. Student contends that this denied her a FAPE.

Yuba City contends that it provided Student a complete copy of the requested records, once Student alerted Yuba City to certain documents that were inadvertently excluded from the initial production. Yuba City further argues that Student suffered no harm by this delay and was not denied a FAPE.

California Education Code section 56504 states in relevant part, “[t]he parent shall have the right and opportunity to examine all school records of his or her child and to receive copies … within five business days after the request is made by the parent, either orally or in writing.” An education record under the IDEA is defined by the implementing regulations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, called FERPA. (34 C.F.R. § 300.611(b) (2006).)

An education record under FERPA includes records, files, documents, and other materials which “(i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.” (20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).) The United States Supreme Court defined the word “maintained” in this context by its ordinary meaning “to keep in existence or continuance”, to “preserve,” or “retain,” and the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he word ‘maintain’ suggests FERPA records will be kept in a filing cabinet in a records room at the school or on a permanent secure database ….” Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo (2002) 534 U.S. 426, 432-33 [122 S.Ct. 934, 151 L.Ed.2d 896]).)

In addition, a business day means Monday through Friday, except for federal and state holidays. (34 C.F.R. § 300.11(b) (2006).) In comparison, a school day is any day, including a partial day, that children attend school for instructional purposes. (34 C.F.R. § 300.11(c) (2006).)

Pupil records are “any item of information directly related to an identifiable pupil, other than directory information, that is maintained by a school district or required to be maintained by an employee in the performance of his or her duties whether recorded by handwriting, print, tapes, film, microfilm, or other means.” (Ed. Code, § 49061, subd. (b).)

“Pupil records does not include informal notes related to a pupil compiled by a school officer or employee that remain in the sole possession of the maker and are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a substitute.” (Id.) A substitute is a person who performs the duties of the individual who made the notes on a temporary basis, and does not refer to a person who permanently succeeds the maker of the notes in his or her position. (Id.)

California regulations further define pupil records as, “information relative to an individual pupil gathered within or without the school system and maintained within the school system, regardless of the physical form in which it is maintained. Essential in this definition is the idea that any information which is maintained for the purpose of second party review is considered a pupil record.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 430, subd. (d).)

Certain pupil records must be permanently maintained by a school district. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 432, subd. (b)(1).) These records include the

• Pupil’s legal name and date of birth,

• Method of verification of birth date,

• Sex of pupil,

• Place of birth,

• Names and address of a parent of a minor pupil,

• The dates of each school year and summer session when the pupil leaves and enters,

• Subjects taken during each year, half-year, summer session, or quarter, and marks or credits given,

• Verification or exemption for required immunizations; and

• Date of high school graduation or equivalent. (Id.)

Mandatory interim pupil records are those records which schools are required to compile and maintain for stipulated periods of time and are then destroyed in accordance with California statue or regulations. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 432, subd. (b)(2).) Such records include a log or record identifying those persons or organizations requesting or receiving

• Information from the record;

• Health information;

• Participation in special education programs including required tests, case studies, authorizations, and actions necessary to establish eligibility for admission or discharge;

• Language training records;

• Progress slips and/or notes required under Education Code sections 49066 and 49067;

• Parental restrictions regarding access to directory information or related stipulations;

• Parent or adult pupil rejoinders to challenged records and to disciplinary action;

• Parental authorizations or prohibitions of pupil participation in specific programs; and

• Results of standardized tests administered within the preceding three years. (Id.)

Pupil records which school districts may maintain, but are not required to, may include

• Objective counselor and/or teacher ratings,

• Standardized test results older than three years,

• Routine discipline data,

• Verified reports of relevant behavioral patterns,

• All disciplinary notes, and

• Attendance records not covered in the Administrative Code section

400. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 432, subd. (b)(3).) School districts shall not compile any other pupil records except mandatory or permitted records. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 432, subd. (b).)

It is undisputed that on Friday, May 2, 2025, Student’s counsel emailed Director Davit a written records request, seeking a complete copy of Student’s cumulative and special education records. The records request included a release of information signed by Parent.

On Friday, May 9, 2025, Yuba City, through counsel, emailed Student’s counsel documents in response to Student’s May 2, 2025 request. This response was provided within five business days. (Ed. Code, § 56504.)

Two months later, on July 9, 2025, Student’s counsel emailed Yuba City’s counsel, with a supplementary records request. This request asserted that certain documents were not provided on May 9, 2025. Examples included an initial assessment report from 2021, and certain specified general education standardized academic assessments.

Yuba City responded on July 25, 2025, with documents responsive to Student’s supplemental records request, including the initial assessment report from 2021, and certain specified general education standardized academic assessments. Yuba City explained that Student’s name had changed as part of her adoption, which occurred after the 2021 initial assessment. At hearing, Director Davit confirmed this document was not provided in response to the initial records request, and could not adequately explain why it was not included in Student’s current file.

The record established that Yuba City did not timely provide a complete copy of Student’s education records following Student’s May 2, 2025 written request. However, Student did not prove that this procedural violation denied her a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (f)(2); M.L., supra, 394 F.3d at p. 645.)

As explained above, throughout the time Student was hospitalized, Yuba City was not her responsible LEA. (N.G., supra, 670 Fed.Appx. 540; Ed. Code, § 56167.) Student was hospitalized on April 8, 2025, and remained hospitalized through and including June 23, 2025. Thus, at all times relevant to Issue 11, Yuba City was not Student’s responsible LEA. Accordingly, Yuba City is entitled to a complete defense for this Issue. Even if Yuba City was not entitled to such a defense, Student still failed to prove that she was denied a FAPE.

Student did not establish any substantive harm caused by Yuba City untimely providing a small subset of Student’s educational records. For example, Student did not establish that Parent did not previously receive copies of the 2021 assessment report, general education standardized academic assessments, or any other document provided after May 9, 2025. Student did not establish that those documents would have been helpful during discussions at Student’s June 5, 2025 IEP team meeting, which was the only IEP team meeting to be convened following Student’s records request.

Even if those records could have been helpful as part of Student’s annual review, the IEP team did not finish the annual review at that IEP team meeting, and Parent ultimately received the copies she requested. Thus, they could be discussed, if necessary, at any continuation meeting for Student’s annual review. Accordingly, Student failed to establish any denial of FAPE caused by the untimely production of the requested educational records ultimately provided on July 25, 2025.

Student also argued that Yuba City failed to provide Parent with copies of Student’s suicide risk assessments. Social worker Bevacqua’s duties included conducting suicide risk assessments when students displayed or expressed an intent to engage in self-harm or suicide.

Bevacqua explained that her standard practice regarding suicide risk assessments was to contact a child’s parents as soon as the assessment was completed. If the child scored lower on the risk assessment, Bevacqua worked with the family to coordinate possible counseling services in the community. If the child scored higher on the risk assessment, then the child would be referred for a possible 5150 hold.

Bevacqua explained that she does not provide parents with copies of these suicide risk assessment documents, and that she did not consider them student records. Rather, she explained that they are filed with a school administrator in a secure location. Considering the applicable definitions of student records, these risk assessments are educational records. (20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A); Ed. Code, § 49061, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 430, subd. (d).) Accordingly, they are subject to production pursuant to a records request. (Ed. Code, § 56504.) It is unclear how many suicide risk assessments exist, and the record established that Yuba City did not provide Parent with copies of these suicide risk assessment forms following the May 2, 2025, records request. Therefore, Yuba City committed a procedural violation.

However, Student failed to establish that this procedural violation denied her a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (f)(2).); see M.L., supra, 394 F.3d at p. 645.) Student alleged that she was denied a FAPE following Yuba City’s failure to provide records pursuant to the May 2, 2025 records request. Even if Yuba City was not entitled to a complete defense, Student offered no persuasive argument or evidence that between May 9, 2025, when the records were due, and June 23, 2025, that Yuba City’s failure to provide Parent with the risk assessment reports denied Student a FAPE. This Decision makes no findings regarding any legal significance of Yuba City not providing Parent with copies of the risk assessment reports at any other time.

Therefore, Student failed to prove that Yuba City denied her a FAPE by failing to provide Parent with a complete copy of Student’s records pursuant to a May 2, 2025, records request.

CONCLUSIONS AND PREVAILING PARTY

As required by California Education Code section 56507, subdivision (d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided.

ISSUE 1

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE from the beginning of the 2023-2024 school year, through May 7, 2024, by failing to identify, assess, and find Student eligible for special education under the categories of emotional disability, other health impairment, and specific learning disability.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 1.

ISSUE 2

Yuba City denied Student a FAPE by failing to conduct an adequate psychoeducational assessment, dated May 7, 2024.

Student prevailed on Issue 2.

ISSUE 3

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to timely complete assessments pursuant to assessment plans dated January 11, 2024, and August 22, 2024, and review them at IEP team meetings.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 3.

ISSUE 4, SUBSECTIONS a THROUGH e:

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE from May 7, 2024, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer appropriate goals in the areas of writing, math, task completion, staying on task, and social emotional development.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 4, subsections a through e.

ISSUE 5, SUBSECTIONS a THROUGH d:

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE from June 23, 2023, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer appropriate services in the areas of behavior, social emotional, including mental health, academics, and school-based health.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 5, subsections a through d.

ISSUE 6

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE from June 23, 2023, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer Student home or hospital instruction during times she was hospitalized or at home unable to attend school.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 6.

ISSUE 7

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE from April 24, 2025, through June 23, 2025, by failing to offer Student an appropriate placement, such as a nonpublic school or a residential treatment center.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 7.

ISSUE 8

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE between May 7, 2024, and June 23, 2025, by materially failing to implement Student’s specialized academic instruction services.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 8.

ISSUE 9

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE between October 30, 2024, and June 23, 2025, by materially failing to implement Student’s counseling services.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 9.

ISSUE 10

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to fund an independent psychoeducational evaluation pursuant to Parent’s June 3, 2025 request.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 10.

ISSUE 11

Yuba City did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to provide Parent with a complete copy of Student’s educational records pursuant to a May 2, 2025 request.

Yuba City prevailed on Issue 11.

REMEDIES

Student prevailed on Issue 2. Student proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Yuba City denied her a FAPE because the May 7, 2024 psychoeducational assessment lacked the required observation of the educational setting. Accordingly, Student is entitled to a remedy.

Federal courts have broad latitude to fashion appropriate equitable remedies for violations of the IDEA. (Burlington, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 37; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496.) The authority to order such relief extends to hearing officers. (Forest Grove, supra, 557 U.S. at 243-244, fn. 11.)

Student did not propose a remedy for this violation, other than an order requiring Yuba City to provide Student with a psychoeducational independent educational evaluation. However, it is undisputed that Yuba City has already agreed to fund such an independent educational evaluation, on August 27, 2025, pursuant to Student’s June 3, 2025 request. Student is only entitled to one independent educational evaluation at public expense based on the May 7, 2024 assessment. (34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(5); Ed. Code, § 56329, subd. (b).) Therefore, the undersigned cannot order Yuba City to provide an additional independent educational evaluation. Student did not offer persuasive evidence or argument for any other remedy.

However, had Yuba City not agreed to fund the psychoeducational independent educational evaluation pursuant to Student’s June 3, 2025 request, the undersigned would have ordered Yuba City to provide such an independent educational evaluation as a remedy. It is unclear whether Student has picked an independent assessor, told Yuba City of her choice, or what steps Yuba City may have taken to contract with Student’s chosen assessor. Additionally, neither party provided Yuba City’s applicable independent educational evaluation assessor criteria or policy. (34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a)(2) (2006).)

Student represents through her closing brief that “[Yuba City] has not funded the [independent educational evaluation] to date….” Student requests that Yuba City fund a psychoeducational independent educational evaluation of Parent’s choice who is bilingual in Spanish and specializes in assessing Students with severe social-emotional needs. Therefore, it appears as if the independent evaluation has not begun. Student’s request is reasonable and equitable based on the denial of FAPE proven here.

If Yuba City has not already contracted with Student’s chosen assessor, within 15 days of this Order, Yuba City shall provide Parent with a list of assessors qualified to conduct the independent psychoeducational evaluations. Parent may select an assessor from that list, or another assessor who meets Yuba City’s qualification requirements. If Parent selects an assessor not included on Yuba City’s list, Yuba City shall contract with Parent’s selected assessor within 30 days of receiving notice of Parent’s selection. Parent’s choice in assessors shall not be limited by any liability insurance Yuba City may otherwise require of non-Yuba City employees serving Yuba City students. Yuba City may choose to cover the independent evaluator under its own liability insurance policy for the duration of the independent evaluation process.

Regardless of whether Parent has already chosen an independent assessor, Yuba City shall cooperate with the independent assessor such that the independent evaluation is conducted timely. This includes ensuring staff promptly return any questionnaires or rating scales the independent assessor may send to Student’s teachers or other Yuba City employees.

Following the completion of the psychoeducational independent educational evaluation, Yuba City shall convene an IEP team meeting to review the independent evaluation within 30 days of receiving a copy of the report from either Parent or the independent evaluator, unless Parent and Yuba City agree to a different timeline. Yuba City’s duty to convene this IEP team meeting shall be tolled if Student is the responsibility of another LEA, but Parent resides within Yuba City’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, Parent may elect to convene the IEP team meeting with Student’s then-responsible LEA.

Either way, Yuba City shall fund the independent assessor’s participation in the IEP team meeting, including up to two hours of preparation time, and round-trip travel time, if the assessor chooses to participate in the IEP team meeting in person. If Student’s IEP team does not complete the review of the independent educational evaluation in a single IEP team meeting, Yuba City shall fund the assessor’s participation, as described above, for a second IEP team meeting. No further funding for additional IEP team meetings shall be required.

Student did not prevail on any other issues. Student did not prove that she was entitled to any other remedies. Accordingly, all other requested relief is denied.

ORDER

1. If Yuba City has not already contracted with Student’s chosen independent psychoeducational assessor, within 15 days of this Order, Yuba City shall provide Parent with a list of assessors qualified to conduct the independent psychoeducational evaluations. Parent may select an assessor from that list, or another assessor who meets Yuba City’s qualification requirements. If Parent selects an assessor not included on Yuba City’s list, Yuba City shall contract with Parent’s selected assessor within 30 days of receiving notice of Parent’s selection. Parent’s choice in assessors shall not be limited by any liability insurance Yuba City may otherwise require of non-Yuba City employees serving Yuba City students. Yuba City may choose to cover the independent evaluator under its own liability insurance policy for the duration of the independent evaluation process.

2. Regardless of whether Parent has already chosen an independent assessor, Yuba City shall cooperate with the independent assessor such that the independent evaluation is conducted timely. This includes ensuring staff promptly return any questionnaires or rating scales the independent assessor may send to Student’s teachers or other Yuba City employees.

3. Following the completion of the psychoeducational independent educational evaluation, Yuba City shall convene an IEP team meeting to review the independent evaluation within 30 days of receiving a copy of the report from either Parent or the independent evaluator, unless Parent and Yuba City agree to a different timeline. Yuba City’s duty to convene this IEP team meeting shall be tolled if Student is the responsibility of another LEA, but Parent resides within Yuba City’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, Parent may elect to convene the IEP team meeting with Student’s then-responsible LEA.

4. Yuba City shall fund the independent assessor’s participation in the IEP team meeting, including up to two hours of preparation time, and round-trip travel time, if the assessor chooses to participate in the IEP team meeting in person. If Student’s IEP team does not complete the review of the independent educational evaluation in a single IEP team meeting, Yuba City shall fund the assessor’s participation, as described above, for a second IEP team meeting. No further funding for additional IEP team meetings shall be required.

5. All other relief requested by Student is denied.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

This is a final administrative decision, and all parties are bound by it. Pursuant to Education Code section 56505, subdivision (k), any party may appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days of receipt.

Ashok Pathi

Administrative Law Judge

Office of Administrative Hearings