New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

CASE NUMBER: 573223 - NYC: 226525

FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION 226525

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Parents

Martin J. Kehoe III, Esq.

November 10, 2022

226525

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Parents

Martin J. Kehoe III, Esq.

November 10, 2022

Case Number:

Student’s Name:

District:

Hearing Requested By:

Hearing Officer:

Actual Record Close Date:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1

II. Overview 1 a. Parents’ Position 3 b. District’s Position 3 c. Background of the Case 4 d. Student History 4 e. Legal Overview 4

III. Prong I 6 a. Did the District Present a Prima Facie Case? 6 i. Standard 6 ii. Analysis 7 iii. Conclusion 7

VI. Market Rate v. District Rate 8

I. Introduction

This document constitutes the Decision and Order of the undersigned, the duly designated Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) in an Impartial Hearing brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the New York State Education Laws. The School District will be referred to as District, the parent(s) as Parent(s) and the student will be referred to as Student.

II. Overview

This claim is for a bank of Special Education Teacher Support Services (SETSS) as additional services for SETSS that were recommended in the Individualized Education Services Program (IESP) (Ex. B)^[1], but that were never delivered during the 2021-2022 SY. This case also involves a demand for enhanced rate services for the 2021-2022 school year (SY). The Parents filed the complaint notice on May 18, 2022. (Ex. A) I was appointed as the IHO on June 28, 2022. The Parents introduced exhibits A-C into the record and called one (1) witness: the Mother. A hearing was held across multiple dates. The District did not call any witnesses or offer any exhibits.

The State Review Officer has directed that the analytical framework for deciding the type of case that is before me now is analogous to a classic “reimbursement” case. A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private education services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents’ claim. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. Of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). The analytical framework for deciding a reimbursement case is typically called a three-prong analysis. I adopt this for the instant case. See, SRO 22-046^[2]

There is also a demand for “compensatory education” in addition to tuition reimbursement (again, this issue is rendered moot by the issue of pendency services). Regarding the remedy of compensatory education, I find guidance in Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that compensatory education is not a “form of damages” because the courts act in equity when remedying IDEA violations and must “do equity and... mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case”) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)); See also, Wenger v. Canastota, 979 F. Supp. 147, 150-51 [N.D.N.Y. 1997]. a. Parents’ Position The Parents assert that for the 2021-2022 school year, the District did not implement the recommendations in the operative IESP (Ex. B). Namely, 5 periods of special education support services. (SETSS) They attempted to locate a SETSS teacher; however, they were unable to locate a provider. (Ex. A-2) Notwithstanding the implementation of pendency services, there remains a gap in the delivery of SETSS and the Parents demand additional services for 17 weeks of missed SETSS at 5 sessions per week of 85 periods of SETSS. b. District’s Position The District did not present a case, introduce evidence, nor call any witness to testify on their behalf. The District did assert an objection the need for a hearing insofar as a resolution agreement had been proffered to the Parents. c. Background of the Case

On January 13, 2022, a Committee on Special Education (CSE) meeting was held to develop an Individualized Educational Program (IESP) for the Student, where the CSE team recommended SETTS services ([REDACTED]; Direct). (Ex. B-p. 8 of 11) d. Student History The Student was [REDACTED] years old at the start of the 2021-2022 SY. The Student carried a disability classification of Learning Disability.^[3] (Ex. B-1) He was described in a January 2022 IESP as “generally cooperative, pleasant and socially appropriate.” (Ex B p. 3of 11) e. Legal Overview The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory framework established by Congress to aid the states in providing disabled children with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 612(a)(I). “A [FAPE] is available to all children with disabilities residing in the state between the ages of 3 and 21.” 20 U.S.C. § 612(a)(1)(A). The IDEA defines a FAPE as special education and related services that:

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge,

(B) meet the standards of the state educational agency,

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under § 614(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 601(9).^[4]

A FAPE is crafted through the collaboration of the disabled student’s parents, teachers, and school district administrators and is recorded in an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 614(d). The “core of the statute … is the cooperative process that [IDEA] establishes between parents and schools.” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). The IEP is, in brief, a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a disabled child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. 20 U.S.C. § 601(14). In New York State, the IEP is produced by a committee on special education (“CSE”), whose members are appointed by the board of education or trustees of the school district. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2005).

The IDEA provides numerous procedural safeguards to protect the due process rights of disabled children and their parents. See generally, 20 U.S.C. § 615. These procedures include the opportunity for parents to obtain an IEE of the child (20 U.S.C. § 615(b)(I)) and file a complaint with the state or local educational agency (20 U.S.C. § 615(b)(6)). Any such complaint is resolved through an “impartial due process hearing” in which parents of disabled children have “an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 615(b)(6). Parties to an administrative proceeding under the IDEA have the right to written findings of fact and decisions on any complaint about the provision of a FAPE. Polera v. Board of Education Newburgh, 288 F.3d 478, 482 (2nd Cir. 2002).

Education Law section 3602-c, as amended by Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007, establishes New York State’s (NYS) requirements relating to the provision of special education to students with disabilities enrolled in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by their parents. Under the provisions of section 3602-c, students with disabilities placed by their parents in nonpublic schools are entitled to receive special education services in accordance with an individualized education services program (IESP) from the public school district in which the nonpublic school is located while they receive general education from the nonpublic school where their parents enrolled them.

III. Prong I a. Did the District Present a Prima Facie Case? i. Standard

IDEA requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriately considering the child's circumstances. Endrew F. v. Douglas Co. School Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). This obligation of the District is accompanied by the requirement to demonstrate the appropriateness of the program recommended by its CSE. (Application of a Child Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal No. 93-9; Application of a Child with a Handicapping Condition, Appeal No. 92-7; Application of a Handicapped Child, 22 Ed Dept Rep 487 [1983]). To meet its burden, a board of education must be able to “... offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions...” Endrew F., Supra.

ii. Analysis

I first look to the Parents’ allegations to determine the scrutiny to apply in evaluating the District’s presentation. In the complaint notice, the Parents write the following:

As to the services recommended on the IESP, the Parent has been unable to locate a provider on their own accord and the District has failed to implement their own recommendations. Without the supports, the parental placement is untenable, and the failure to either implement the services or provide a placement warrants additional services at an enhanced rate. (Ex. A)

This is the backdrop from which I weigh the District’s presentation, mindful that the District has the burden of proof. In New York State, “[t]he board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing …” N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404 (1)(c), modifying the rule enunciated in Schaffer where “[t]he burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is on the party seeking relief.” Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 537.

The District conceded Prong I to the extent that they did not defend the failure to implement claim. L.O. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 822 F.3d 95, 111 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9239. There was no explanation for the District’s inaction, and I am left to speculate concerning the particulars of the principles that justify such inaction. iii. Conclusion

Upon review, I find that the District failed to demonstrate that they met their burden in providing the Student an IESP tailored to meet his individualized needs. I, therefore, rule for the Parents on Prong I.

VI. Market Rate v. District Rate In this type of case before me, where the parties agree regarding services to be delivered, but the Parents cannot find a District provider, there are myriad variables that influence the market rate for enhanced rate services. (i.e., language of delivery, locale of delivery, characteristics of student, agency overhead, frequency of services, etc.) The prospect of developing a full record in each of the numerous “enhanced rate” cases is daunting and while possible, in the existing environment on Special Education litigation in New York City,^[5] an option has arisen that allows for flexibility and fairness while expeditiously ensuring the timely provision of services to the Students, that all agree, require such services. Over time, I have noticed that the District’s “Implementation Unit”, when given the opportunity to execute interim orders and pendency decisions, is adept at identifying providers without issue. In effect that unit is “making the market” for enhanced rate services.

Compensatory Education

Within the Second Circuit, compensatory education has been awarded to students who are ineligible by reason of age or graduation if there has been a gross violation of the IDEA resulting in the denial of, or exclusion from, educational services for a substantial period of time (see Somoza v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2, 113 n.6 [2d Cir. 2008]; Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 [2d Cir. 1990]; Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071 [2d Cir. 1988]; Cosgrove v. Bd. of Educ., 175 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387 [N.D.N.Y. 2001].

Likewise, SROs have awarded compensatory "additional services" to students who remain eligible to attend school and have been denied appropriate services, if such deprivation of instruction could be remedied through the provision of additional services before the student becomes ineligible for instruction by reason of age or graduation (Bd. of Educ. v. Munoz, 16 A.D.3d 1142 [4th Dep't 2005] [finding it proper for an SRO to order a school district to provide "make-up services" to a student upon the school district's failure to provide those educational services to the student during home instruction]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 13-236 [upholding an additional service award of physical therapy]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal Nos. 13-226 & 13-228 [awarding additional services in the form of tutoring or other direct support from a special education teacher]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 13-208 [upholding an additional service award of 100 hours of compensatory one-to-one tutoring in math and reading]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 13-048 [awarding the student with 1:1 counseling services and 1:1 speech-language therapy in compensatory additional services]).

In fashioning an appropriate award of compensatory education, one must be mindful that the central purpose of such award is to provide a remedy for a specific denial of a FAPE (see Newington, 546 F.3d at 123 [holding that compensatory education is a remedy designed to "make up for" a denial of a FAPE]; see also Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [holding that, in fashioning an appropriate compensatory education remedy, "the inquiry must be fact-specific, and to accomplish IDEA's purposes, the ultimate award must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place"]; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 [9th Cir. 1994] [holding that "[a]ppropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA"]).

Accordingly, an award of additional services should aim to place the student in the position he or she would have been in had the district complied with its obligations under the IDEA (see Newington, 546 F.3d at 123 [holding that compensatory education awards should be designed so as to "appropriately address the problems with the IEP"]; see also Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1289 [11th Cir. 2008] [holding that "[c]ompensatory awards should place children in the position they would have been in but for the violation of the Act"]; Bd. of Educ. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 316 [6th Cir. 2007] [holding that "a flexible approach, rather than a rote hour-by-hour compensation award, is more likely to address [the student's] educational problems successfully"]; Reid, 401 F.3d at 518, 525 [holding that compensatory education is a "replacement of educational services the child should have received in the first place" and that compensatory education awards "should aim to place disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district's violations of IDEA"]; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 ["There is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed"]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 11-132; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-091). See, specifically, Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 14-014.

In this case the complaint notice identifies the issue of mandated services that are not delivered and seeks the remedy of additional services, or compensatory education services, to place the Student in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district's violations of IDEA. The Mother further articulated the particulars of their concern through testimony at the hearing. Specifically, from the Mother’s affidavit:

• • Despite my best efforts, I was unable to locate a SETSS provider for [the Student]. I made many phone calls to providers, and none of them were available to service my child. The DOE did not make available any SETSS provider.
• • As a result of the above, [the Student] did not receive SETSS from l/13/2022-5/17/2022.
• • I am requesting that [the Student] receive a bank of 85 hours of SETSS corresponding to the 17 weeks during which the District failed to implement its own recommendations. (Ex. C)

This testimony was unrebutted or otherwise challenged. Accordingly,

It is therefore ORDERED

• • The District shall create a bank^[6] of: Eighty-five periods (85) of SETSS as additional services for the portion of the 2021-2022 SY commencing on January 13, 2022 through May 17, 2022 when such services were not provided. The Parent will forfeit any services not used within two years from the date of this order.

Dated: November 10, 2022

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party's request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov.

Footnotes

[1] When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law §3602-c). The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programing for students with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts related to IESPs, State law provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of [Education Law § 4404]," which effectuates the due process provisions called for by the IDEA (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]). Incorporated among the procedural protections of the IDEA and the analogous State law provisions is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]). See, SRO #22-054

[2] In this regard the Parent asserts that pendency implementation provided services for all but the weeks of compensatory services that are being requested. Accordingly, a 3 prong analysis is not required.

[3] NYCRR Part 200.1(zz)(6) Learning disability means a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which manifests itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations, as determined in accordance with section 200.4(j) of this Part. The term includes such conditions as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia and developmental aphasia. The term does not include learning problems that are primarily the result of visual, hearing or motor disabilities, of an intellectual disability, of emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage.

[4] “Special education” is defined by the IDEA as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education. The term “related services” is defined as transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children. 20 U.S.C. § 601(26).

[5] In overruling the District objection to the instant disposition, I remain focused on the fact that the Student has been denied a FAPE for a long time during a short life, and the District has been unresponsive over the course of this case. This is an obvious example of the endemic failures that plague the NYCDOE impartial hearing process. “The failure to promptly resolve due process complaints keeps children in an ‘administrative limbo’ and, for some, delays to free appropriate public education to which they are entitled” Deusdedi Merced, Report External Review of the New York City Impartial Hearing Office, at 18-19 (2019).

[6] The District must pay a provider(s) of the Parents’ choosing at a market rate, at the time the services are provided, to be determined by the “implementation unit” of the District, in consultation with the Parents and/or their provider(s).