New York City Department of Education, Impartial Hearing Decision

FINAL ORDER

Case Number: 185882

NYS Identifier Number N/A Student's Name: [“Confidential”]

Date of Birth:

District:

Hearing Requested By: Parent

Dates(s) of Hearing: 11/20/20

Actual Record Close Date: 07/13/20

Hearing Officer: Edgar De Leon

NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED

Title For Date DOE Representative DOE 11/20/19 Attorney PARENT 11/20/19

Mother PARENT 11/20/19 Interpreter PARENT 11/20/19

On August 23, 2019, I was appointed the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to conduct an impartial hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, concerning a dispute between the Parent of a( ) year old student attending a public school and the New York City - Department of Education ( “DOE”) - District: _, regarding the student’s special education program. After having adjournments granted at the request of and with the consent of the parties, or for good cause, the impartial hearing was held on November 20, 2019. A list of the persons who appeared at the hearing in person and via affidavits and the documents entered into evidence is annexed hereto.

BACKGROUND

This case was initiated as the result of a written Due Process Complaint (“DPC”)

made by the student's Parents’ attorney(s), the and received at the Department of Education Impartial Hearing Office (“DOE-IHO”) on or about August 22, 2019. The DPC is carried under New York City (“NYC”)

185882. The Parent herein alleges that the student was denied a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 2019-2020 school year. At the impartial hearing, the Parent request the following relief: (a) A finding that the DOE failed to provide the student with substantive and procedural FAPE for the 2019-2020 school year; and (b) A finding that the June 24, 2019 IESP is not appropriate to meet the student’s individualized needs and is not reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits on him; and (c) A finding that the student is entitled to a twelve-month program consisting of no less than (10) hours per week of 1:1 SEIT/SETSS instructions; and (d) A finding that the student is entitled to receive the related services recommended in the June 24, 2019 IESP; and (e) A finding that the Parent is entitled to costs and fees; and (f) Any further relief as the Hearing Officer deems just and proper

On October 30, 2019, the parties executed a “Pendency Agreement” based upon the student’s IESP dated June 20, 2019 wherein the student received SEIT services, 20x30 1:1, speech and language therapy 2x30 1:1, occupational therapy 2x30 1:1 and physical therapy 2x30 1:1, all on a 12-monht school year basis.

FINAL ORDER

The Parents’ DPC having been duly filed pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 USC § 1415(f)(3), Article 89 of the New York State Education Law, Part 200 of the Regulations of the New York State Commissioner of Education and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and Notice having been duly given to the DOE; and The matter having come on for an “impartial hearing” before this IHO on November 20, 2019, and the parties having agreed to have this decision/order made on submission of oral arguments and testamentary and documentary evidence; and The Parent having appeared with her attorney(s), the attorney assigned and the DOE by its representative, ; and The DOE having failed to call any witnesses to testify on its behalf, and submitting only (3) documents in evidence (T-6 & 22); and Whereas the DOE argues that the central dispute for the agency that the private provider was receiving $92 per hour at a previous time and is now asking for $115 per hour (T-12); and Whereas the Parent asserts that the private provider has worked with the student for three years (T-13); and Whereas the DOE concedes that the IESP it created for the student recommends the services sought by the Parent (T-15); and Whereas the DOE did not object to any of the Parent's documentary submissions being received in evidence (T-21); and Whereas the student’s private provider testified on direct examination via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5{j][3][xii][f] and the DOE declined to cross examine the affiant (T-21-2 & P-B); and Whereas the private provider testified that she have been employed by the Parents to provide ten (10) hours of individual 1:1 SETSS services to the student to target significant delays in language/communication, social/emotional and behavioral development (P-B); and Whereas the private provider testified that she is able to provide the student with ten (10) hours per week of individual SETSS instructions for the entire 2019-2020 school year beginning from September 5, 2019 and through June 30, 2020, at the rate of $115 per hour, which is estimated to total $46,000 for the total cost of her annual service to the student, calculated as follows: ($115 x 10 hour per week x 40 weeks 2019-2020 school year) (Id.); and Whereas the DOE concedes that services are appropriate for the student and that it has paid the private provider $92 per hour for those services (T-12 & 15); and Whereas there is no evidence that the private provider has a contract with the Parent for her services; and Whereas no undated invoices were submitted in evidence for services rendered by the private provider; and The Parent thus to agreeing to have an inquest conducted based upon the testamentary and documentary evidence, regarding her damages and the relief she seeks, and this “Final Order” consented to by the parties based upon their testamentary and documentary submissions, having been presented to this IHO on the record as being in the best interest of the parties; and Whereas under the IDEA, the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing is placed upon the party seeking relief. (See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. at 59-62) On August 15, 2007, the New York State Legislature amended the Education Law to place the burden of proof upon the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement would continue to have the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. (See Educ. Law

§ 4404[1][c], as amended by Ch. 583 of the Laws of 2007) The amended statute took effect for impartial hearings commenced on or after October 14, 2007. (SRO No. 08-016); and Whereas the DOE having failed to submit any testamentary evidence and only (3) documentary in evidence to meet it burden under the law (supra); and Whereas the DOE failed to file and serve an answer but did serve a “Prior Written Notice” in this case. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(e) (D-3); and Whereas “Prior Written Notice’ meaning written statements developed in accordance with Section 200.5(a) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, and provided to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student; and Whereas silence in a responsive pleading is an admission, or that a counterclaim in federal practice is compulsory in the answer or deemed waived. (See New York Practice, 4'" Edition §§223 & 224, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a) & Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1966) and additionally, as a general matter, the parties to an impartial hearing are obligated to comply with the reasonable directives of the Impartial Hearing Officer ( “IHO”) regarding the conduct of the impartial hearing. (SRO No. 05-026, 04-103 and 04

061); and Whereas the party who defaults in concedes only liability and not the amount of “damages.” (See CPLR § 3215, First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Classic Collateral Corp., 44 A.D.2d 868, 355 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1974), James _v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 225 N.E.2d 741 (1967), McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) The DOE’s default constitutes an admission of liability, but not of damages, which remains the Parent's burden to prove. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 & City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 at 128 [2d Cir. 2011]); and Whereas as noted above, the DOE has the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement. (See Educ. Law § 4404/[1][c]); and Whereas here, the DOE did not proffer any substantive evidence that it has offered the student a FAPE, and required to provide the student with SETSS services pursuant to his IESP dated June 24, 2019 (D-2); and Whereas as noted above, the DOE did not serve and file an answer in the case, but did serve the Parent with “Prior Written Notice”, which provides either a denial of the Parent's allegation, or some explanation for the agency’s failure to provide the Parent with the relief sought; and Whereas as noted above, the DOE failed failed call any witnesses or to present a case-in-chief, submitted only (3) documents in evidence and did not controvert the testimony on behalf of the Parent or cross examine of the Parent’s affiant witness (supra) and the DOE also failed to file and serve an answer but did serve a “Prior Written Notice” in this case. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(e); and Whereas as noted above, “Prior Written Notice” means written statements developed in accordance with Section 200.5(a) of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education and provided to the parents of a student with a disability a reasonable time before the school district proposes to or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student and notifies the Parent of the agency’s rational for its position and recommendations; and Whereas as noted above, silence in a responsive pleading is an admission, or that a counterclaim in federal practice is compulsory in the answer or deemed waived.

(See New York Practice, 4" Edition §§ 223 & 224, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a) & Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1966); and Whereas as noted above, under the IDEA, the DOE has the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of production and persuasion regarding the appropriateness of such placement. (See Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]); and Whereas as noted above, the DOE did not present any direct case or proffer any substantive evidence that it has offered the student a FAPE or that the Parent is not entitled to the SETSS services sought and there is a tacit concession that the agency did not offer the student a FAPE as required by law in that the DOE did not present a case-in-chief, did not serve and file an answer in the case, but did serve the Parent with “Prior Written Notice”, which provides a denial of the Parent’s allegation, and that the Parent is entitled to the relief sought; and Whereas although it would be fundamentally unfair to allow either party to rely solely on the submission of documents in meeting its burden under law, where those documents are rife with double, triple and even unidentified hearsay sources, that cannot be cross examined; and Whereas while compliance with technical rules of evidence is not required in administrative hearings, under certain circumstances, the receipt of hearsay evidence may be so prejudicial as to have a tendency to deprive a party of fair hearing. (See Strain _v. Sarafan, 57 A.D.2d 525, 393 N.Y.S.2d 572, N.Y.A.D. (1977), where the hearsay testimony was of vital importance and should have been subjected to cross-examination by the petitioner...the petitioner was deprived of a meaningful hearing,_ Dukes v. New York City Housing Authority, 63 A.D.2d 690, 404 N.Y.S.2d 889, N.Y.A.D.

(1978), holding that the excessive reliance on hearsay evidence effectively denied petitioner the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, Claim of Evans, 254 A.D.2d 564, 678 N.Y.S.2d 696, N.Y.A.D. (3 Dept. 1998), (where in an unemployment compensation proceedings, administrative law judge (‘ALJ’) properly exercised discretion to exclude hearsay evidence to protect employer's fundamental right of cross-examination, where claimant proffered written hearsay statement, authored by acquaintance of the employer’s president, which allegedly indicated that claimant did not resign but was fired, but the acquaintance failed to answer subpoena directing him to testify at hearing, thereby denying employer the opportunity to cross-examine him on the statement, and Alvarado v. State of New York, 110 A.D.2d 583, 488 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1*' Dept. 1985), holding that a license suspension hearing against a boxer and his managers was faulty because of a lack of an opportunity “to cross-examine certain witnesses whose reports were introduced into evidence without their testifying, in violation of SAPA Section 306, subd. (3).” (Id. at 585, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 179); and Whereas here the DOE did not present a case-in-chief and made no substantive effort to controvert the testamentary and documentary evidence submitted by the Parent and the credibility of the testamentary and documentary evidence was not rebutted by the agency and the documentary evidence is clearly relevant and material to the issues to be determined; and Whereas I find the documentary and testamentary evidence submitted by the Parent in this case to be credible and completely uncontroverted and conclusive in this case; and Whereas as noted above, the DOE’s failure to present a case at the hearing is a concession that it denied the student a FAPE and that the Parent is entitled to the relief she seeks and this leaves, as the primary issue to be resolved through impartial hearing, what relief and/or compensatory education remedy, if any, is available and appropriate to remediate the denial of aFAPE. (SRO No. 17-033); and Whereas it is noted that the DOE was required under the due process procedures set forth in New York State law, to address its burdens in the due process hearing context by describing its views, based on a fact-specific inquiry set forth in an evidentiary record, regarding an appropriate relief and/or compensatory education remedy that most reasonably and efficiently could place the student in the position that he would have been but for the denial of a FAPE. (See Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 457 [2d Cir. 2015], cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2022 [2016], quoting Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 [D.C. Cir. 2005] [noting that the "ultimate award [of compensatory education] must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place’"]); and Whereas when, as here, the DOE does not present any case at the hearing, the hearing, the hearing process essentially becomes an “inquest” as to the appropriate relief; and Whereas the DOE has conceded liability by failing to present a case and meet its burden under the law because New York State law has placed the burden of production and persuasion at an impartial hearing on the school district, unlike states which align the burden of production and persuasion consistent with Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.

49, 58-62 [2005]; and Whereas it is not an IHO's responsibility to craft the DOE’s position regarding the primary issue in the case, for the denial of FAPE and the undersigned finds that the DOE failed to adhere to the requirements of the law, has denied the student in this case a FAPE and that the Parent is entitled to the relief she has requested; and Whereas when turning to the question of whether the DOE should be required to reimburse and/or pay for the private educational services and relief requested for the student, because the services offered by the DOE were inadequate or inappropriate, and the relief sought and services selected by the Parents are appropriate and equitable considerations support the Parent’s claim (Burlington, Florence and Cerra, Supra), the Parent need only demonstrate that the requested services are specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit her to benefit from the instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65); and Whereas a private school placement must be "proper under the Act." (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12, 15 and Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370), i.e., the private school offered an educational program which met the student's special education needs. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112, 115; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 and Matrejek, 471 F. Supp.

2d at 419); and Whereas a Parent's failure to select a program approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. (See Carter, 510 U.S. at 14); and Whereas the private school need not employ certified special education teachers or have its own IEP for the student. (See Carter, 510 U.S. 7; SRO No. 08-085; 08-025; 08-016; 07-097; 07-038; 02-014 and 01-105); and Whereas the Parents also need not show that the placement provides every special service necessary to maximize the student's potential. (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65) and when determining whether the parents’ unilateral placement is appropriate, "[u]ltimately, the issue turns on" whether that placement is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 [citing Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 [6th Cir. 2003] [stating "evidence of academic progress at a private school does not itself establish that the private placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the IDEA"]]); and Whereas there is no request for compensatory educational services in this case and an IHO cannot determine the amount of compensatory education that a student requires unless the record provides him with sufficient “insight about the precise types of education services the student needs to progress.” (Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter sch., 555 F. Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008] citing Branham _v. District_of

Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005]); and Whereas pertinent findings to enable an IHO to tailor the ultimate award to the student’s unique needs should include the nature and severity of the student’s disability, the student's specialized educational needs, the link between those needs and the services requested, and the student's current educational abilities. (See Branham v. District_of

Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 44 IDELR 149 [D.C. Cir. 2005], see also Mary McLeod Bethune Day Acad. Pub. Charter Sch., 555 F. Supp. 2d 130, 50 IDELR 134 [D.D.C. 2008]); and Whereas the Parent has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.” (See Phillips v. District of Columbia, 2010 WL 3563068, at *6, 55 IDELR 101 [D.D.C. Sept.

13, 2010] quoting Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt ( “Nesbitt II"), 583 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172, 51 IDELR 125 [D.D.C. 2008]); and Whereas the record in this case is completely uncontroverted by the DOE and supports a finding that the Parent is entitled to the SETSS services sought (supra) and it is unfortunate that the agency forced the Parent in this case to bring the matter to a hearing, when it offered no evidence that it provided the student with a FAPE and then did not challenge the Parents’ assertion regarding the appropriateness of the relief sought; and Whereas the DOE did not initiate this impartial hearing (DPC); and Whereas to demonstrate the appropriateness of the relief sought, the Parent need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the student to benefit from instruction. (See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 112; see Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65); and Whereas in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the Parent has failed to cooperate in the development of the IEP or otherwise engaged in conduct that precluded the development of an appropriate IEP, or failed to give proper notice, equitable considerations generally support a claim of the relief sought by the Parent, including but not limited to tuition reimbursement. (SRO No. 04-049); and Whereas there being nothing in the record consisting solely of the Parent’s testamentary and documentary submissions that sustains a finding that the Parents have not cooperated with the CSE; and Whereas the Parent has submitted the testimony of (1) witness on direct examination, live and not via affidavit pursuant to 8 NYCRR 200.5|j][3][xii][f] (P-B); and Whereas the Parents’ testamentary and documentary submissions are completely and unequivocally uncontroverted and need not be repeated herein in their entirety as they are annexed hereto for the benefit of the reader; and Whereas SETSS services are not defined in State or federal laws or regulations and are not identified on the State continuum of special education services (see SRO No. 16-044); and Whereas a reference to the service as "direct" is in keeping with the language used in State regulations for consultant teacher services (see 8 NYCRR 200.6[d]); and Whereas State regulations distinguish between "direct consultant teacher services," which consist of "specially designed individualized or group instruction provided by a certified special education teacher . . toa student with a disability,” from "indirect consultant teacher services,” which consist of "consultation provided by a certified special education teacher . . to regular education teachers" (8 NYCRR

200.1[m] [emphasis added]; see 8 NYCRR 200.6[d]); and Whereas the Parent did not submit any invoices in evidence from the Parent’s private SETSS provider for services asserted to have been rendered; and Whereas notice is taken that the SETSS Authorization form provided to Parents by the DOE states: “If you need assistance locating a provider, or if you have any questions, please contact the DOE person listed in Section 1 of this form.”; and Whereas the record is devoid of any compliance by the Parent with the SETSS Authorization form request; and Whereas equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; R.E., 694 F.3d at 185, 194, M.C. v. Voluntown

Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000], and Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 [noting that ‘[cJourts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable"|) The IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when Parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the Parents. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii], 34 CFR 300.148[d], E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 [2d Cir. 2014] [identifying factors relevant to equitable considerations, including whether the withdrawal of the student from public school was justified, whether the parent provided adequate notice, whether the amount of the private school tuition was reasonable, possible scholarships or other financial aid from the private school, and any fraud or collusion on the part of the parent or private school] and C.L., 744 F.3d at 840 [noting that "[i/mportant to the equitable consideration is whether the parents obstructed or were uncooperative in the school district's efforts to meet its obligations under the IDEA"]); and Whereas it is well settled that IHOs and SROs do not have enforcement powers and that enforcement of an order or an agreement by the parties, such as the “Pendency Agreement” in this case, can properly be sought by filing an administrative complaint with the State Education Department's Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities (VESID) pursuant to applicable federal and state regulations, or in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See 34C.F.R. §§ 300.151-300.153, 8 NYCRR 200.5[l], A.T. v. New York State Educ. Dep't., 1998 WL 765371, at *7(E.D.N.Y. 1998), Blazejewski v. Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 701 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), SRO Nos.: 06-130, 04-085 & 99-004), see also A.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 78 n.13 (2 Cir. 2005) (noting that IHOs have no enforcement mechanism of their own), SRO Nos.: 04-100 & 04-007 (recognizing that enforcement of prior orders of an [HO and/or a SRO are not properly determined by a SRO), SRO No.: 03-071 (holding that petitioner's enforcement remedies include judicial enforcement pursuant to CPLR Article 78, an action in federal court, or VESID administrative complaint procedure), SRO No. 01-086 (holding that petitioner's enforcement request was not properly before a SRO; petitioner's remedy was to seek judicial enforcement of the [HO's tuition reimbursement award), SRO No. 99-4, (holding that respondent's remedy was to seek enforcement in state or federal court, citing Blazejewski, 560 F. Supp. 701, A.T., 1998 WL 765371) and SRO Nos.: 06-044, 02-086, 04-006, 02-011 & 97-64); and Whereas the SETSS provider asserts she charges $115 per hour, but accepted

$92 per hour during the previous school year; and Whereas the DOE agrees that the student is entitled to SEIT services during a 12 month school year, but not at the rate of $115 per hour (supra); and Whereas the private SETSS provider was paid $92 per hour by the DOE the previous year, but did not introduce a contract with the agency in evidence and does not have a contract with the Parent, thus reflecting that it is the agency that is financially obligated to pay for her $115 per hour for her services (Supra); and Whereas the record reflects that SETSS services were actually provided to the student (supra); and Whereas the record does not evidence the Parent's cooperation with the requirements of the DOE’s SETSS Authorization form (supra); and Whereas no invoices submitted in evidence; and Whereas the record evidence that it has been the agency and not the Parent that has paid the private provider $92 per hour (Supra); and Whereas the record above does not evidence that the Parent has actually incurred any financial obligation to pay the difference between the enhanced rate and the DOE rate, even if the agency paid the private provider directly (supra); and Whereas the record does not indicate the Parent made a specific undisputable and enforceable arrangement or otherwise enter into an enforceable contract with the provider to pay her if the impartial hearing process did not result in an award of the enhanced rate; and Whereas even if the Parent prevailed on the merits of her claim, it would be unclear at this juncture whether or not any relief would be warranted absent evidence that the provider or the provider agency was owed additional compensation based on an enforceable agreement with the Parent or the DOE; and Whereas it is unnecessary to speculate on this case since the evidence in the hearing record does not support a finding that the DOE failed to make available to the student special education programs and services on an equitable basis since there is no credible evidence that the Parent contacted DOE as instructed in the SETSS Authorization received in evidence (see Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1] & P-B); and Whereas the DOE has failed to meet its burden under the law and the Parents’ submission clearly reflects that the SETSS services sought meet the unique needs of the student, supported by such services as are necessary that permits the student to benefit from that relief. (Gagliardo & Frank G., supra); and Whereas the Parent has received or entitled to receive the services she seeks pursuant to the parties’ “Pendency Agreement” dated October 30, 2019; and Whereas this IHO having determined that the parties’ consent to the manner of determining this “Final Order” was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily; and Whereas the parties’ oral arguments, discussions, concessions, testamentary and documentary evidence and this order having been recorded and annexed hereto; NOW therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED on the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that upon its receipt of reasonably satisfactory proof of services having been rendered, the DOE shall either reimburse the Parent and/or directly pay the cost of the student’s receipt (10) hours per week of 1:1 SEIT/SETSS instructions, at a rate not to exceed $92 per hour, and all of the related services recommended in the student’s June 24, 2019 IESP, at a rate not to exceed the reasonable and fair market rate cost for those related services in New York City, for the entirety of the student’s 2019-2020 12-month school year; and it is further

ORDERED on the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that the DOE shall forthwith conduct a re-evaluation of the student in all areas of his suspected disabilities not evaluated within the last two years; and it is further

ORDERED on the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that the CSE shall forthwith reconvene and consider all of the student’s evaluations upon their completion and any other relevant information and produce a new IEP for the remainder of the student’s 2020-2021 school year; and it is further

ORDERED on the DOE’s DEFAULT and after INQUEST that any of the other relief sought by the Parent not addressed by this decision is found to be either agreed upon by the parties, withdrawn by the Parent, outside the scope of the IHO’s authority or unsupported by the record.

DATED: July 24, 2020

New York, New York Edgar De Leon - |.H.O.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Within 40 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public-School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

An appealing party’s request for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party shall file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the Office of State Review of the State Education Department within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before an SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov. (Rev. 07/09/20)

DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO RECORD

02. Number/Letter Title Dated For #of Pages 01 Withdrawn / Not Received N/A DOE N/A IESP 06/24/19 DOE 03 pages DOE

05. 04 Withdrawn / Not Received N/A DOE N/A SEIT Report 05/30/19 DOE 06-08 Withdrawn / Not Received N/A DOE IHR 08/22/19 PARENT 05 OO> Affidavit of 11/19/19 PARENT 06 N/A 05 pages DOE

N/A N/A N/A IHO N/A