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FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Id: 527751
District Case Number: 185796
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Dates of Hearing: April 15, 2020
May 4, 2020
May 22, 2020
May 26, 2020
Actual Record Closed Date: June 2, 2020
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey Silverson, Esq. Case Id: 527751
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON APRIL 15 2020
FOR THE STUDENT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY (VIA TELEPHONE)
FOR THE DISTRICT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON MAY 4, 2020
FOR THE STUDENT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY (VIA TELEPHONE)
, PARENT (VIA TELEPHONE)
FOR THE DISTRICT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON MAY 22, 2020
FOR THE STUDENT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY (VIA TELEPHONE)
WITNESS- (VIA TELEPHONE)
WITNESS- (VIA TELEPHONE)
FOR THE DISTRICT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY (VIA TELEPHONE)
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON MAY 26, 2020
FOR THE STUDENT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY (VIA TELEPHONE)
, PARENT (VIA TELEPHONE)
FOR THE DISTRICT:
, ESQ., ATTORNEY
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 19, 2019, a due process complaint (“DPC”)[1] dated that same day was filed on behalf of (“Student” or “ ) against the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) alleging the denial of a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”), and seeking funding for the Student’s placement at (“ ” or “School”) for the 2019-2020 school year. The School is not NYS approved. Tr. 74. The
DPC also called for an order that the DOE provide bus transportation between the Parent’s home and the School. Exhibit A52 On the following day, August 20, 2019, I was appointed as the Impartial Hearing Officer regarding the matter. The Parent was represented by , Esq.
from the and the Department of
Education (“DOE”) was represented by , Esq. on behalf of District 2.[3] On September 18, 2019, the remainder of the mandatory resolution period (8 NYCRR §200.5(j)(2)) elapsed.
Later, commencing on April 15, 2020, a hearing was begun pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (I.D.E.I.A.).
The substantive part of the hearing took place on May 4, 2020, and continued on May 22, 2020 and May 26, 2020 to resolve matters raised in the due process complaint. 20 U.S.C. §1415 (f). Eventually, pursuant to joint requests from the parties, seven (7) extensions to the case timeline were issued in accordance with the Commissioner’s Regulations at 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §200.5(j)(5)(ii) and 34 C.F.R.§300.515(c). The latter three were granted for sixty-day periods. 8 NYCRR 200.5; See Exhibits I-VII. The current compliance date is August 28, 2020.
After the parties chose not to submit written closing statements4, the 2 References to the hearing transcript are noted as “Tr.”
4
See Tr. 70. record was closed on June 2, 2020, upon receipt of the full hearing date transcript, including a final correction made to the May 22, 2020 transcript.
Appended to this decision are lists of the persons in attendance at the hearings, documents received in evidence, and a statement regarding the right t\o appeal. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
II. PRELIMINARY FACTUAL BACKGROUND
turned years old on December 7th of last year, and is currently attending as a 7th grade student. Exhibit R1. The most current IEP developed by the District prior to the commencement of the 2019-2020 SY was dated June 8, 2017. Exhibit R2; See Exhibit C14. Then, after the current SY had begun, it developed another one, stemming from a meeting held on March 2, 2020. Exhibit R2; See Exhibit 1 (dated on 1-17).
The Student’s classification on both IEPs is Other Health Impairment.
Exhibits C-1, 13; 1-1, 1-14 She has taken medication over the years for dyslexia and ADHD, and is currently taking medication to help her focus.
Exhibit R2. Also, the Parent obtained a neuropsychological evaluation, which was finalized in early August 2018. See Exhibit 6.
After confirming ADHD and learning disorder diagnoses, the neurospych evaluator recommended that the Student attend a specialized school that provided intensive individualized support with a small student-to- student ratio. She also recommended that be taught using an evidence-based reading program, such as Orton-Gillingham. Exhibit R-2-3 later testified that both of those recommendations were followed at the School, including utilization of Orton Gillingham, which he testified is an evidence-based approach to reading remediation. Tr. 55
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
During their respective opening statements the parties advanced the following positions:
The DOE
In its brief opening statement, the DOE stated that it would not be presenting any witnesses to defend its burden of providing a FAPE.
Furthermore, with respect to the Parent’s obligation to demonstrate that its placement at was appropriate, the DOE added that it would rely on both the testimony of Parent’s witnesses and admitted exhibits to establish whether or not the Parent met its evidentiary burden. In sum then, it presented no witnesses and simply rested, while reserving its potential right to offer a case in rebuttal. No such case was later offered. Nor, did the DOE present a closing argument. See Tr. 75
The Parent
The Parent’s position is that the DOE denied a FAPE to her daughter by failing to offer a program or a placement for her prior to the start of the 2019- 2020 SY. Furthermore, affidavits of the Student’s parent and her academic advisor, plus documentation offered into evidence will demonstrate that is an appropriate placement for her because the program there was individually tailored to meet needs. Finally, because the Parent has fully cooperated with the DOE throughout the foregoing process, the District should be held responsible for tuition payment regarding the aforementioned
SY.
See the Parent’s Closing Argument - Tr. 76-79
While the case before me deals mostly with an examination of the appropriateness of the Student’s attendance at , I will begin with an overview of pertinent law regarding a District’s initial obligation to provide FAPE.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Legal Framework and Standard
The underlying intention of the IDEIA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) is to provide children with disabilities a FAPE. A foundational Supreme Court decision, Rowley, in defining what was meant by a FAPE held that the IDEA does not require states to “maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided non-handicapped children.” It does set a floor, however, and holds that a State furnishes a FAPE “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Board of Education
v. Rowley 458 US 176, 203 [1982].
For a child who is classified by the CSE, a threshold tool in providing a FAPE is a written, individualized education program (IEP) that is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child. Indeed, the "centerpiece" of the IDEA's education delivery system is the IEP. Murphy v. Arlington Central School District Board of Education 297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2002)
(internal citation omitted). The 2d Circuit, in Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F. 3d 119 (2d Cir. 1998), later added that the “IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP. The purpose of the Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.” Walczak @130
(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, what “the statute guarantees is an ‘appropriate’ education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents.’” Walczak at 132, citing Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d at 567. However, a school district must provide an IEP that affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere “trivial advancement.” Walczak, id. Then, further clarifying how much benefit is required to achieve FAPE, in Cerra v.
Pawling, 427 F.3d 186 (2005) at 195, the Second Circuit, citing Walczak, supra at 130 and Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1121, explained that a district fulfills its substantive obligations if its IEP leads to progress and not regression and a district court in evaluating whether a district has met its obligation, must examine the record for “objective evidence” of whether a child is likely to progress or regress under a proposed plan.[5]
Three years ago, in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137
S. Ct. 988, 998-1001 (2017) - the Supreme Court - while resolving a split within the Circuit Courts - in a unanimous decision revisited and reshaped the early substantive standard it had enunciated within Rowley. Without reversing its initial delineation of what constitutes an appropriate offering by a school district to a child within a general education environment receiving special education services, and without clarifying what constitutes a “meaningful benefit”, it addressed the appropriate treatment of a child within a special education setting, and added that while an IEP need not provide a maximal benefit to the child, it must offer more than a de minimus one.
Specifically: "To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F. id., at 999. In other words, the Court emphasized progress for the individual child given his or her unique needs. “After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement." (citations omitted) Id. Furthermore, “[t]he adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created." Thus the Court - as in its earlier Rowley decision – once again leads us to an individualized fact intensive inquiry, albeit from a different perspective, which is a focus by IEP teams on the individual child and whether appropriate progress is being made in light of that child’s unique, and often evolving circumstances.[6]
In the seminal case of Burlington, the Supreme Court addressed special education classes, for instance, in Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 392 F.3d 840 (2004), at 864, the Sixth circuit court of appeals concluded that “At the very least, the intent of Congress appears to have been to require a program providing a meaningful benefit toward the goal of self-sufficiency, especially where self-sufficiency is a realistic goal for a particular child.” It should be noted that this “Deal Standard “ of what constitutes FAPE was cited without comment in a second circuit case, A.D. v. M.D. individually and on behalf of E.D., Plaintiffs v. The Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, 690 F. Supp. 2d 193 (2009), at 217. Additionally, the third circuit has held that an Individualized Education Program (IEP) must provide “meaningful educational benefit.” T.R. ex. Rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Township Bd. Of Educ. 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000).
potential tuition reimbursement to parents, by holding that in an appropriate situation it was allowable under the Act. To make such a determination, it formulated a three-part examination of what is required to be shown. The three parts, or “Prongs” are, whether: (1) The placement offered by their school district was inadequate or inappropriate; (2) The program selected by the parent was appropriate; and, (3) If equities supported the parent’s claim.
School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Should a parent fail in either of the initial two Prongs, the inquiry terminates at that point and reimbursement is denied. Id. The Supreme Court later put the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing upon the party seeking relief. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 59-62 [2005]. However, the New York State Legislature subsequently reversed that obligation, and placed the burden of production and persuasion upon the school district instead, except as regards Prong 2, where the parent is tasked with the burden. (See Educ. Law §4401[1][c], as amended by Ch. 583 of the Laws of 2007)
Prong 1-Did the DOE Offer an Appropriate Education?
The threshold issue in this matter, and in all IDEA controversies – which essentially involve a determination of liability – is whether the DOE offered the respective student an appropriate IEP and program for the school year at issue.
Federal law provides that each public agency shall have an IEP for each child with a disability within its jurisdiction (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A)). In the matter before me, the CSE’s failure to develop a timely IEP for the 2019-2020 school year is a clear denial of a FAPE. As stated above, the DOE offered neither testimonial, nor evidentiary evidence - other than a belated March 2020 IEP – that it had met that burden. Thus, I find that it has not provided an appropriate
Supreme Court ruling. “Because we conclude that the School District failed to provide T.C. with a free and appropriate public education under the existing precedent in this circuit, we need not decide whether Endrew F. raised the bar for a free and appropriate public education or left Second Circuit precedent intact (the Supreme Court's decision certainly did not reduce the force of the requirement).” J.C. v Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8171 [2d Cir May 9, 2017, No. 16-1838]. education for for the 2019-2020 SY, and will now turn to the Parent’s burden to demonstrate that she had filled the void by providing for her daughter what the DOE has not.
As stated above, the Parent proceeded to go forward in an effort to persuade this IHO that the unilateral placement of her daughter at was appropriate. Since I find both of the Parent hearing witnesses to be credible, their overall testimony gives me a sufficient factual understanding that when combined with party exhibits and relevant law allows me to reach a decision regarding the appropriateness of the placement. I will begin with an overview of applicable law, followed by that testimony.
Prong 2-The Parent Placement
In addressing the burden that a Parent must meet to satisfy Prong 2 of Burlington, the Second Circuit disseminates a detailed outline to help decide it.
No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents' unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.
Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112, quoting Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364-65). Furthermore, unilateral placement at a private school need not be approved nor employ certified special education teachers. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 11 [1993].
Though, I note that while is not state-approved (Tr. 74), the Student’s Focus teacher, who she works one-on-one with her, is a licensed speech and language therapist. Tr. 39
Continuing with the Parent’s burden of proof, the measure of whether a unilateral placement is appropriate under the IDEA is similar but not identical to the standards applied to the DOE’s proposed placement. See A.D v. N.Y. City
Dep’t of Educ., 690 F. Supp. 2d 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The issue in sum is whether at the time of placement in the private school, the placement was reasonably calculated for the child to receive individualized educational benefit.
Frank G., supra. Although the restrictiveness of the parental placement may be considered as a factor in determining whether the parents are entitled to an award of tuition reimbursement, “parents are not as rigorously held to the standard of placement in the LRE [least restrictive environment] as are school districts.” SRO No. 19-065 at 19 (citations omitted).
The DOE – though cross-examination - did its best to uncover underlying weakness in the testimonial evidence of the advisor and parent, but was unable to do so. While it revealed a potentially minor flaw here and there7, the gist of the witness flow was that offered the young Student an appropriate placement. I will examine that testimony in tandem with documentary evidence directly below.
commenced testimony for the Parent, which consisted of a notarized affidavit entered into evidence as Exhibit S, in addition to follow-up cross and redirect examination by party counsel. For starters, he testified, that with a neuropsychological evaluation in hand, the admissions team keys in on each prospective student’s cognitive and academic scores, paying particular attention to discrepancies between the two, so as to obtain an understanding of why the particular student is struggling. Eventually, each accepted student is placed into a learning cohort based on their similar learning needs. Each cohort then has an individualized, and skill-based program. In an added layer to the cohorts, all students are given one-to-one daily instruction within what is called a “Focus” program, which distributes an individualized curriculum connected with individual learning goals.
7 For instance, on cross-examination, the Student’s mother testified that by stating in her Affidavit (Exhibit R) that her daughter was “still” reading at a 3rd grade level, she meant that while in 7th grade she was still reading at that level, that level was nevertheless better than her reading ability prior to the 7th grade back in 2017, which was “below a 3rd grade level.” Tr. 66-68
Upon acceptance by the School, [which was initially in the summer of
2016] was placed with nine other students in a cohort, except for her math class, which contained eight other students. All of her classmates have language difficulties. In addition to daily classes, she meets with her focus teacher daily for forty-five minutes. The focus teacher then meets with the School dean to help update instruction for each cohort.
Keying in on , testified that she has deficits in all areas of language expression, in addition to math. She also has difficulty with peer interaction and requires assistance with social pragmatics and emotional regulation. With respect to progress, he testified that while continues to require one-to-one support, her comprehension and ability to follow instructions has improved. Furthermore, while she continues to require significant support in conflict resolution, she has improved her self-advocacy skills and is more able to ask for help. added that has progressed in all areas of her Literature and Writing class, including making an improvement in social pragmatic skills. Overall, her course grades have shown steady progress. See Exhibits E, F, G, H, 8,10, and 11.
Thus, the available evidence in the hearing record shows that the Student was making progress at during the 2019-20 school year, which buttresses the Parent argument that the School was an appropriate placement for her because while a finding of progress is not required for a determination that a student's unilateral placement is adequate (Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist. v. R.C., 2013 WL 563377, at *9-*10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2013]; see M.B. v. Minisink Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 523 Fed App'x 76, 78
[2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2013]; D.D-S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., 506 Fed
App'x 80, 82 [2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2012]; Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364), it is nevertheless a relevant factor to be considered (Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115, citing Berger, 348 F.3d at 522 and Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 [1st Cir. 2002]).
mother also testified via Affidavit. (See Exhibit R.) She stated that due to earlier, steady progress having been made at the School, and in the absence of any placement from the DOE, she reenrolled her daughter there for the 10-month 2019-2020 SY at issue. While continues to have difficulties in some areas, she nevertheless has continued making overall progress at the School. See Exhibit R4-5. Furthermore, she testified that her daughter gets whatever she needs there. Tr. 68
In sum, based on the credible testimony provided by the School advisor and by the Student’s mother, and in the absence of any contrary evidence submitted by the DOE at hearing, I find that the record supports the finding that was an appropriate placement for , in that it provided a program specially designed with individualized instruction to meet her unique educational needs, and hence was an appropriate placement for her for the 2019-2020 school year. Having found for the Parents on both Prongs 1 and 2, I now turn to Prong 3, where I reach a similar finding.
Prong 3 - The Equities
With respect to equitable considerations, the IDEIA allows that tuition reimbursement may be reduced or denied when a parent fails to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner and inform the school district of their intent to unilaterally place the child in a private school, fails to make their child available for evaluation by the school district, or upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the Parent.
20 U.S.C. §1412[a][10][C][iii]; M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. Of Educ. 226 F3d 60, 68 (2d Cir.2000) See, Burlington, supra.
However, as detailed directly below, I find that such circumstances do not enter into the facts of this review, and will apply the discretionary equitable powers granted to me pursuant to the IDEA, accordingly.
Significantly, there has been no evidence adduced that the Student’s mother did not cooperate with the DOE, nor even with its belated CSE review.
When no IEP meeting was held in time for the commencement of the 2019- 2020 SY, in June of 2019 she served the District with a Ten-Day Notice that informed it of her intent to enroll her child at the School, and some two months later in August of 2019 she served an Amended Ten-Day Notice.
See Exhibits B and Q. Furthermore, she attended the March 2020 IEP meeting, and provided a lengthy, private neuropsychological report to the
Team. Exhibit R2; See Exhibit 6. While at the meeting, she received a placement offer, though she stated in her Affidavit that “despite repeated phone calls” she has been unable to reach anyone at the proposed placement. Exhibit R6. In sum, I find that mother fully cooperated with the District. On the other side of the equity ledger, I note that, in addition to not providing a timely IEP and placement, the DOE never even responded to the Parent’s DPC.
Prospective and Retroactive Payment
Prospective funding was addressed in Connors v. Mills 34 F.Supp.2d 795 (N.D.N.Y. 1998): While dismissing a parents’ claim for prospective tuition because she failed to present evidence that she was unable to pay it, in dicta the Court added that: “[O]nce the Burlington prerequisites relative to a non-approved private school are met, and a parent shows that his or her financial circumstances eliminate the opportunity for unilateral placement in the non-approved school, the public school must pay the cost of private placement immediately." (Id. at 805-806).
In a more recent Second Circuit case, Mr. A. ex rel. D.A. v.
NYCDOE, 769 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), retroactive direct tuition payment was addressed: “[W]here a private school is willing to enroll the student and take the risk that the parents will not be able to pay tuition costs—or will take years to do so—parents who satisfy the Burlington factors have a right to retroactive direct tuition payment relief. A contrary ruling would be entirely inconsistent with IDEA's statutory purpose, including the goal of ensuring a FAPE to the least privileged of the disabled children in our nation” Id. at 428.
In the instant matter, the Parent’s testimony states that in 2019, she made less than $35,000 in the course of being employed as a clerk. While she gave a relatively small deposit of $500 to the School on March 26, 2019, the remaining amount due is $68,000. Exhibits I, J, P and R6. I consequently find it clear that the Parent does not have the financial resources to pay for the cost of enrollment at the School.
Since I find that the record demonstrates strong Parent cooperation with the DOE, and that her financial resources are minimal, I conclude that the equities amply support her. Consequently, I choose neither to deny nor make a deduction of award to her. Therefore, as an equitable remedy, I am going to order that the District pay the full cost of tuition at for the 2019-2020 SY, which includes both the aforementioned deposit already paid by the Parent, and the amount owing beyond it.
Other Issues
I have considered all other requests and claims by the parties and find them to be without merit or insufficiently asserted. See T.B. v.
Haverstraw-Stony Point Cent. Schl. Dist., 2013 WL 118479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
citing Singleton v. City of Newburgh, 1 F.Supp.2d 306, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), claim abandoned where alleged in the complaint but not raised elsewhere in the record. For instance, the DPC requests bus transportation between the Parent’s home and the School (Exhibit A-3). However, at hearing, the Parent withdrew that request, and all other requests for relief, other than those discussed above. Tr. 74-75, 79
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The Parent’s claim for full tuition funding for the Student’s placement at for the 2019-2020 school year is GRANTED.
Within ten days, the DOE shall grant the parent with any authorizations that may be needed to obtain and have paid said funding. The DOE shall also reimburse the Parent for tuition already paid by her to the School. Dated: June 3, 2020 _______________________
Jeffrey Silverson, Esq.
Impartial Hearing Officer
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 40 days of the date of the decision, the parent and/or the school district has a right to appeal the decision to an SRO under Education Law Section 4404 and the IDEA. If either party plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review must be personally served upon the opposing party no later than 25 days after the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party's request for review must be personally served upon the opposing party within 40 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. An appealing party must file the notice of intention to seek review, notice of request for review, request for review, and proof of service with the OSR within two days after service of the request for review is complete. The rules of procedure for appeals before a SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. A copy of the rules in Part 279 and model forms are available at the Office of State Review website (http://www.sro.nysed.gov).
Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact and Decision Case Id: 527751
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
DISTRICT
Exhibits Description Date Page(s)
1 IEP 03/02/2020 17
2 IEP Meeting Minutes 03/02/2020 5 3 Notice of IEP Meeting 02/04/2020 3 4 Assessment Planning 02/14/2020 2 5 Mandated Three Year Evaluation 02/14/2020 2 6 Clinical Research Feedback Report 05/08/2018 43 7 Speech Language Feedback Report 05/23/2019 1 8 Middle School Transcript Undated 1 9 Level I Vocational Review 03/02/2020 4 10 19-20 Fall Report Undated 11 11 19-20 Winter Report Undated 9 12 Prior Notice Package 03/26/1010 6
PARENTS
Exhibits Description Date Page(s)
A Impartial Hearing and Pendency Request 08/19/2019 6
B Ten Day Notice 06/17/19 6
C Individualized Education Program 5/30/19 15
D Wechsler 6/2018 4
E 2018-2019 Rpt. Spring 2019 0
F 2018-2019 6/2019
Fall & Spring Rpt. Cards 2
G Fall 2019 Rpt. Card Fall 2019 11
H Spring 2020 Rpt. Card Spring 2020 9
I 2019-2020
Enrollment Contract 3/26/19 7
J 2019-2020
Tuition Affidavit 12/11/19 1 K 2019-2020
Schedule Undated 1
L 2019-2020
Attendance April 2020 1
M
School Program Description Undated 3
N
Remote Learning Program 4/2020 2
O Parent 2019 Tax Return 2019 3
P Parent Proof of Payment 3/26/19 1
Q Amended Ten Day Notice 8/19/19 6
R Parent Affidavit: 5/15/20 6
S School Administrator Affidavit:
5/15/20 10
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
I Order extending the Compliance Date 01/23/2020 1
II Order extending the Compliance Date 01/23/2020 1
III Order extending the Compliance Date 01/23/2020 1
IV Order extending the Compliance Date 01/23/2020 1
V Order extending the Compliance Date 04/15/2020 1
VI Order extending the Compliance Date 04/15/2020 1
VII Order extending the Compliance Date 05/26/2020 1
VIII Interim Order - Withdrawn 5/22/20 05/04/2020 1
Footnotes
[1] Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C.§1415(f).
[3] Michael Gindy, Esq. appeared at the April 15, 2020 hearing.
[5] Other Circuit Courts have supplemented the definition. With regard to a student attending
[6] As of the date of this decision, the Second Circuit has yet to definitively comment on the