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FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case No. 174230
Student’s
Name:
Date of Birth:
District:
Hearing Parent
Requested By:
Dates Of July 27, 2018 (Pre Hearing) Hearings:
August 8, 2018 November 30, 2018 March 27, 2019 May 3, 2019 May 17, 2019
Record Closed 06/21/19
Date:
Hearing Jeffrey Silverson, Esq. Officer: Officer's Findings of Fact and Decision
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
July 27, 2018
FOR PRE HEARING CONFERENCE
For the Student:
For the Department of Education:
Esq., Attorney (by phone) NONE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
August 8, 2018
For the Student:
For the Department of Education:
Esq., Attorney, District Representative
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
November 30, 2018
For the Student:
For the Department of Education:
Esq., Attorney, Dist. Rep. (by phone)
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
March 27, 2019
For the Student:
For the Department of Education:
Esq., Attorney, District Representative
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
= May 3, 2019
For the Student:
For the Department of Education:
Esq., Attorney, District Representative
BCBA (by phone)
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED
May 17, 2019
For the Student:
For the Department of Education:
Esq., Attorney, District Representative
parent
|. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 29, 2018, a due process complaint (“DPC”) was filed on behalf of (“ ”"“ "and “Student”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA), 20 U.S.C.§1415(f). Three days later on July , 2018, I was appointed as the Impartial Hearing Officer regarding the matter.
The Parent (“ ”) is represented by , Esq. from the , and the Department of Education is[1] represented by ' District Representative. On July 17, 2018, the remainder of the mandatory resolution period (8 NYCRR §200.5(j)(2)) was waived by the parties. A telephonic pre-hearing conference pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (I.D.E.I.A.) was then scheduled via telephone on July 27, 2018. Unfortunately, no one appeared for the DOE.
At the request of the parent, a hearing was conducted on July 18, 2016 to determine whether placement at a District non-public school ( “NPS’), in addition to a SETSS program, various services - both at home and in school - plus special education transportation were warranted. (N.Y. Educ. Law 4404[4]; 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §200.5[j][2]. On August 28, 2018, I issued an interim order on pendency? and granted the above requests called for by the Student's parent. The parent is now seeking a final order from me that in addition to an extension of the pendency entitlement would include new demands. See Exhibit A-8-9
After a brief hearing was held on November 30, 2018 regarding the full 2018-2019 SY, | scheduled further hearing dates for March 27, 2019, May 3, 2019 and May 17, 2019 to decide the matters raised in the due process complaint. 20 U.S.C. §1415 (f). By the time of the date of this Finding of Fact and Decision, ten (10) extensions to the case timeline had been issued in accordance with the Commissioner's Regulations at 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §200.5(j)(5)(ii) and 34 C.F.R.§300.515(c). See Exhibits I-X.
Upon submission of a written closing statement by the parent’, the record was closed on June 21, 2019. Appended to this decision are lists of the persons in attendance at the hearings, documents received in evidence, and a statement regarding the right to appeal. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
ll. PRELIMINARY FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the time of hearing, was ( ) years old.[4] He has been placed by the DOE in a state-approved non-public school,[5] © Within his latest IEP® from June 15, 2016, he was classified as autistic. Exhibit 1-1 Tr. 42-43, 71 In a Psychoeducational Evaluation Report, he was diagnosed with “Severe Symptoms of Autism Spectrum Disorder.” (emphasis added) Exhibit 4-2 The aforementioned IEP recommended a SETSS program and various services (See Exhibit 1-29), which were granted by me within an interim order on pendency. An educational Progress Report released that same month from | said that “requires an intensive ABA treatment plan due to his attending and learning difficulties.” Exhibit 3-1
In a neuropsychological evaluation conducted approximately two years earlier, when was years old, his verbal and nonverbal reasoning were described as “very low.” However, the examiner, a licensed psychologist, cautioned that since it was unclear whether fully understood the directions of the tasks called for in the test, the resultant scores should be viewed with caution. Exhibit 2-8 Her report noted “documented diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder, mood disorder, oral apraxia, and reactive airway disease,” in addition to “global
3 The statement is The DOE chose not to submit one. “ He has since turned years old. See Exhibit A . See Exhibit A at 76; D at 1; Tr. 67-69 ° Prior to that, he had been placed by the DOE in a public school. Tr. 75:14-17, 68; Exhibit B at 3. .... Public school's not appropriate to meet his needs. They sent him to an NPS school.” Tr. 75:2-11 ® individualized education program. developmental delays.” Exhibit 2-1, 2-12 She added that has “severe” impairment in functioning in all areas of living, and requires “very substantial” support at this time. Exhibit 2-12 One of her recommendations was for an increase in SETSS and an emphasis for him to be able to transition into adult life. Exhibit 2-14
lll. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The DOE
The DOE prepared neither a prior written notice nor an answer to the DPC. It did not make an appearance at the prehearing conference. At hearing, its representative rested after stating that her office would not be presenting a case. Tr.25 Then, she neither cross-examined either of the two parent witnesses who testified at hearing, nor presented an argument on behalf of her office. In other words, she neither denied nor defended against the allegations contained within the parent’s DPC. Taken as a whole, | can only conclude that the DOE — albeit indirectly admits to not providing the Student with a FAPE for the 2018-2019 SY.
The Parent
While choosing not to open on the record, I note that via DPC, the parent asserted that the DOE had not provided a FAPE for her son, nor an adequate evaluation, legally appropriate IEP and placement, or follow requisite procedural requirements of the IDEA. She also alleged that the DOE Section violated 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972. The parent then demanded — in essence - that the temporary entitlement to pendency services ordered by this IHO in his Interim Order on Pendency be extended to include the entire 2018-2019 SY, in addition to further requests that will be considered infra.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Legal Framework and Standard
As noted above, I find that the DOE has admitted that it did not, in effect, provide a FAPE for the Student. Thus, my task will be to decide whether or not, the parental demand for a continuation of the temporary entitlement to pendency services for the entire at-issue SY, in addition to further requests would provide an appropriate education. As a prequel to that discussion, I believe that a look at pertinent law will provide a necessary backdrop and jumping off point for my upcoming review of the record. | begin with two seminal Supreme Court decisions.
The underlying intention of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA)[7] (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) is to provide children with disabilities a FAPE. A foundational Supreme Court decision, Rowley, in defining what it meant, held that the IDEA does not require states to “maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided non-handicapped children.” It does set a floor, however, and holds that a State furnishes a FAPE “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Board of Education v. Rowley 458 US 176, 203 [1982]. Additionally, and importantly, Rowley set forth procedural requirements that Districts must meet to abide by federal law.[8]
A couple of years ago, in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 - the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision - while resolving a split within the Circuit Courts - revisited and reshaped its early substantive standard enunciated within Rowley. Without reversing its initial delineation of what constitutes an appropriate offering by a school district to a child within a general education environment receiving special education services, and without clarifying what constitutes a “meaningful benefit”, it addressed the appropriate treatment of a child within a special education setting, and added that while an IEP need not provide a maximal benefit to the child, it must offer more than a de minimus one. Specifically: "To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F. id., at 999. In other words, the Court emphasized progress for the individual child given his or her unique needs. “After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement.” (citations omitted) /d. Furthermore, “[t]he adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created." Thus the Court - as in its earlier Rowley decision — once again leads us to an individualized fact intensive inquiry, albeit from a different perspective, which is a focus by IEP teams on the individual child and whether appropriate progress is being made in light of that child’s unique, and often evolving circumstances.[9]°
A threshold tool in providing a FAPE is a written, individualized education program (IEP) that is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child. Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphasized the importance of the IEP by stating that the "centerpiece" of the IDEA's education delivery system is the IEP. Murphy v. Arlington Central School District Board of Education 297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). See Endrew F., 137 S.Ct., at 994 (2017)(quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988)).
With respect to procedural matters, more than two decades after Rowley, the Supreme Court placed the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing upon the party seeking relief. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 US 49, 53 (2005). Then, a couple of years later, the New York State Legislature reversed that obligation, and placed the burden of production and persuasion upon the school district, except as regards the portion of a case dealing with a unilateral private placement by parents, where they were tasked with the burden to demonstrate the appropriateness of their private placement. (See Educ. Law §4404[1][c]); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) and C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't. of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2014))
To reiterate what has been stated above, the parent has contended that a FAPE has been denied to her son, and that to achieve one the DOE should be ordered to continue the program at , in addition to the services ordered by me within my interim order on pendency, which had been encapsulated within the June 15, 2016 IEP (See Exhibit 1), and had previously been ordered by another IHO within a Finding of Fact & Decision. As noted above, the DPC includes further requests, which are supplemental to those enumerated within my aforementioned order. See Exhibit A-9 However, since there is no reimbursement demand for a private, unilateral placement, the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion remain with the DOE. See Educ. Law § 4404/1][c]. see also, e.g., M.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 356, 368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Sullivan, D.J.) (“Because Plaintiffs are merely seeking to maintain the related services they are currently receiving at DOE's expense pursuant to the IDEIA's pendency provisions, the Burlington—Carter test does not apply.”).'[10] Nevertheless,
'0 In similar cases, where the parent seeks alternative services in a public program, the SRO has placed the burden of proof on the DOE to prove the requested services are not appropriate/necessary for the child. See SRO No. 12-006, at 8 (“the district presented no evidence on this issue. Accordingly, I find that the district did not establish that the student did not require aide services during APE and, in the absence of any evidence in the hearing record that the student did not require them, I will order the district to provide the student with such support ... unless the parties otherwise agree.”) (emphasis added); SRO No. 11-
053 (reversing because the “parent did not unilaterally place the student in a private school there was no basis for [IHO] to require the parent to prove that the services she sought were appropriate for the student...Once [IHO] determined that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE, [IHO] should have next determined the appropriate remedy”)citations omitted). though the Parent did not bear the burden of proof, her counsel went forward and created a record that assisted me in making a finding in this matter, which is in his client’s behalf. Though, after reviewing the record, which does not include anything in contradiction from the DOE for me to weigh in the balance, I note that my finding and subsequent order below would have been the same, no matter who bore the burden of proof
The DOE failed to offer an appropriate program to A board of education must offer a FAPE to each student with a disability residing in its school district that requires special education services or programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 4402(2)(a), (b)(2). Section 300.342 (a) of the IDEA states that at the beginning of each school year, each public agency shall have an IEP for each child with a disability within its jurisdiction. (20 U.S.C. 1414(d) (2) (A))). Yet, evidence at hearing has clearly demonstrated that no IEP had been created to commence at the beginning of the 2018-2019 SY, much less at any later time during that year. I find that such an omission impeded the student's right to a FAPE and caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii).. Accordingly, I find that a FAPE has not been provided to by the DOE.
To argue what, in effect, she believed would comprise a FAPE, the parent presented evidence — both testimonial and evidentiary - to demonstrate her position that her son required not only a continuation of his pendency program ordered by me on August 28" of last year, but additional services. I will be ordering most of that request below. After examining the core of the latter, based on both documentary and testimonial evidence (see below for the latter), I find that requires a full and comprehensive ABA program administered by a credentialed ABA provider. As testified: [My son has] been utilizing ABA since he is 14 months old, so it is the only effective practice that has worked for him.” Tr. 72 I will now discuss some of her testimony at greater length, together with that of , a NYS licensed behavior analyst who holds a certification from the Behavior Analyst Certification Board as a certified BCBA". Parent Witness Testimony
Hearing testimony opened with . She described applied behavior analysis (“ABA”) as a science that studies how environment influences behaviors. Tr. 37 She works as a liaison between the home and , and also provides coverage for direct service, in tandem with two other individuals. She said that engages in self-stimulatory behaviors, such as being aggressive towards others. “[He will] bang his head into walls, into floors, he'll throw himself into furniture, he will punch other people in the face, he will punch his own head and face until he leaves bruises. He usually has black and blues all over his face from punching himself in the face.” If he only does this three times a week, she considers it to be "a good week.” Tr. 68-69 Furthermore, he has low frustration tolerance, and is in need of restraint, or what is known as SCIP", which requires training to use. ‘s mother added that SCIP training is imperative because [her son] is dangerous to himself and to others.” Tr. 85 It is imperative for it to be provided to both staff in school and at home, and also to her husband and herself, because it is “dangerous” for her son to be restrained by people who do not know what they are doing. Tr. 83
In a similar vein of caution, it was ‘Ss understanding that while has one-on-one ABA instruction at , tis administered by untrained paraprofessionals. She added that it is important for — to have ABA delivered to him consistently and within differing areas of his
"| A Board Certified Behavior Analyst Tr. 37
'2 Strategies for Crisis Intervention and Prevention. Tr. 78 life, from school to home, and into the community. He needs to “generalize” what he has learned, so it will be recognized by him and utilized in all three of those places. Moreover, a guiding hand will help to assure accurate data collection. stressed a need for an independent functional behavioral assessment (“FBA”) to understand the cause of her son’s behavior at home and in school, and a follow-up functional behavioral assessment"? to address them. She argued that if had the capability to produce one, it would have done so by now, since he obviously needed such a plan. further criticized the School for not having a certified teacherin ‘’sclassroom. Tr. 89 In sum, I found testimony by both witnesses to be credible.
V. Conclusion
I find the DOE responsible for not providing the Student with a FAPE for the 2018-2019 SY. Indeed, evidence has demonstrated that it has acted inappropriately even beyond the school year in question, by neither having evaluated nor developed an IEP for him in almost 3 years. Tr. 72-73; See Exhibits A and B. A failure to provide such a threshold element of a FAPE is wrong, and leads this hearing officer to find at the outset that any consideration of the equities favors the parent. Indeed, in the instant matter, | can certainly find no equitable bar whatsoever to granting most of the many parent requests written in her DPC. As mentioned earlier, though, the within matter is not at root a Burlington—Carter tuition reimbursement case. Instead, it centers on whether the CSE recommended an appropriate program for It clearly did not. Consequently, I will order below that the District take action to remedy its formidable disregard for responsibilities imposed on it pursuant to the IDEIA, which are to offer specialized education and related services designed to meet this student’s unique needs, provided
'3 Tr. 86 in conformity with an IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13. Noting that the DOE has neither objected orally nor in writing to what I find to be appropriate, I will grant most of the parent requests.
Vi. Other Issues
I have considered all other requests and claims by the parties, such as assistive technology, and find them to be without merit or insufficiently asserted. See S.G. v. Haverstraw-Stony Point Cent. Schl. Dist., 2013 WL 118479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) citing Singleton v. City of Newburgh, 1 F.Supp.2d 306, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), claim abandoned where alleged in the complaint but not raised elsewhere in the record. Finally, I have considered the Parent's 504 claim and believe it to be subsumed within the IDEIA claims at hearing, and rectified by virtue of the IDEIA remedies, which are enumerated below.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF
FACT, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The New York City Department of Education is directed to provide the following items enumerated in significant part within Exhibit B-3-4: a) Placement at the following NPS school: for the 2018-2019 SY; b) Full-time crisis management paraprofessional; c) Transportation paraprofessional both to and from (See Tr. 11); d) Special education transportation; e) 15 hours per week of home-based ABA/SETSS; f) Counseling Services, two times per week for 60 minutes per session on an after school-basis; g) OT four times per week for 30 minutes per session on an after-school basis; h) PT two times per week for 30 minutes per session on an after-school basis; |) Speech and Language Therapy (“SLT”) eight times per week for 30 minutes per session on an after-school basis; j) After-school SETSS, OT, PT, SLT, Occupational Therapy as 12-month 52 week services; k) Twelve-month 46 week school year for ; paraprofessionals and special education transportation; l) An enhanced rate for the provision of ABA SETSS and Counseling at a maximum of $150 per hour retroactive to the date of the DPC. (See Tr. 24); m) RSAs_ and/or direct funding through the IHO implementation office for the home-based related services of, OT at the rate of $85 for 30 minutes, PT at the rate of $85 for 30 minutes and SLT, at the rate of $85 for 30 minutes. n) The service providers and paraprofessionals, both in and out of school, are to be identified by the family (and must, where applicable, be appropriately licensed), and may be provided by the’ student's non-public school or independently of it, irrespective of where the services are delivered; the district is accountable for their cost, whether billed by the school or by the provider directly, at the family’s option. Additionally, the DOE shall provide: o) An independent FBA and BIP conducted and prepared by a licensed LBA or BCBA provider selected by the Parent, at a reasonable market rate; p) Additional relief in the form of DOE authorization for funding for SCIP (Strategies for Crisis Intervention and Prevention) training to both staff in school and at home, and also to and her husband on a date/time selected by the Parent within 30-days of this Order; q) Within 30 days of this Order the DOE shall convene a CSE and develop a legally valid IEP that incorporates the services enumerated above, and determines the Student's need for additional evaluations. With regard to the creation of the IEP, | Order the district to provide a copy of this decision to any and all persons participating on its behalf in any and all reviews of ‘s educational program and/or placement, including any such meetings conducted during the current school year for the purpose of defining and recommending programs, related services and placement for the upcoming 2019-2020 school year.
The Parent's Claims for compensatory education and transitional services are hereby dismissed without prejudice.
Dated: July 2, 2019
Jeffrey Silverson, Esq.
Impartial Hearing Officer
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period.” (8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.
Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENT
A Due Process Complaint, 06/29/18, ten pages
B FOFD, 06/21/18, six pages
C IEP Provider certifications, unidentified date, three pages
D Parent affidavit, 5/13/18, one page
E Provider affidavit, 6/19/18, one page
F Report from, 06/24/18, two pages
G Alternate Section of IEP, Undated, four pages
4
Physical Therapy Report, 8/6/2018, two pages
Occupational Therapy Progress Report, 06/01/18, one page
Draft IEP, Undated, ten pages —n©-R& IEP with Annual Goals, Undated, five pages
Emails between Parent &
10/09/2018, five pages , 4/16, 3/29, 1/04//2019, 11/09,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
IEP, 6/15/16, 37 pages
Neuropsychological evaluation, 7/5/14, 15 pages oFNWaBD
Educational progress report, 6/20/16, 13 pages
Educational progress report, 6/20/16, 13 pages
Central response for consideration of a State-approved nonpublic school, 7/28/16, one page
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
| Order: Compliance Date Extension, 08/28/18, 1 page ll Order: Compliance Date Extension, 09/26/18, 1 page Ill Order: Compliance Date Extension,10/30/18, 1 page
IV Order: Compliance Date Extension,11/29/18, 1 page
V Order: Compliance Date Extension,12/27/18, 1 page
VI Order: Compliance Date Extension, 01/26/19, 1 page
Vil Order: Compliance Date Extension, 02/27/19, 1 page
VIIl Order: Compliance Date Extension, 04/12/19,1 page
IX Order: Compliance Date Extension, 05/17/19, 1 page
X Order: Compliance Date Extension, 06/07/19, 1 page
X| Parent's Proposed FOFD/Closing Mem. 6/18/2019 36 pages
The Parent requested acceptable amendments to the Interim Order on Pendency, via email on September 27, 2018 and at the hearing on March 27, 2019. See Tr. 24.
Footnotes
[1] appeared for the DOE at the November 30, 2018 hearing date.
[4] He has since turned years old. See Exhibit A . See Exhibit A at ¶6; D at 1; Tr. 67–69
[5] Prior to that, he had been placed by the DOE in a public school. Tr. 75:14-17, 68; Exhibit B at 3. … Public school's not appropriate to meet his needs. They sent him to an NPS school.” Tr. 75:2-11
[7] Although the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (I.D.E.A.) was amended in 2004 in the |.D.E.1.A., the cases cited herein remain authoritative.
[8] Congress later reduced the role that such procedural violations may play in entitling a parent to receive reimbursement for a unilateral placement by adding three requirements for such a violation to be considered a denial of FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.§ 1415 (f)(3)(E)(ii)
[9] As of the date of this decision, the Second Circuit has yet to definitively comment on the Supreme Court ruling. “Because we conclude that the School District failed to provide T.C. with a free and appropriate public education under the existing precedent in this circuit, we need not decide whether Endrew F. raised the bar for a free and appropriate public education or left Second Circuit precedent intact (the Supreme Court's decision certainly did not reduce the force of the requirement).” J.C. v KatonahLewisboro Sch. Dist., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8171 [2d Cir May 9, 2017, No. 16-1838].
[10] In similar cases, where the parent seeks alternative services in a public program, the SRO has placed the burden of proof on the DOE to prove the requested services are not appropriate/necessary for the child. See SRO No. 12-006, at 8 (“the district presented no evidence on this issue. Accordingly, I find that the district did not establish that the student did not require aide services during APE and, in the absence of any evidence in the hearing record that the student did not require them, I will order the district to provide the student with such support ... unless the parties otherwise agree.”) (emphasis added); SRO No. 11- 053 (reversing because the “parent did not unilaterally place the student in a private school there was no basis for [IHO] to require the parent to prove that the services she sought were appropriate for the student...Once [IHO] determined that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE, [IHO] should have next determined the appropriate remedy”)citations omitted). though the Parent did not bear the burden of proof, her counsel went forward and created a record that assisted me in making a finding in this matter, which is in his client’s behalf. Though, after reviewing