NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number:
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
District:
Hearing Requested By: Parent
Date of Hearing: July 30, 2015
August 6, 2015
Actual Record Closed Date: November 6, 2015
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey Schiro, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON JULY 30, 2015
ESQ., Attorney — Student
Parents
Student
Director, (via telephone) — Student
Impartial Hearing Representative — DOE
Teacher (via telephone) — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON AUGUST 6, 2015
ESQ., Attorney — Student
Parents
Student
(via telephone) — Student
Impartial Hearing Representative — DOE
I. JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. This hearing was requested by the attorneys for the student and the parent in a due process complaint notice dated April 17, 2015. The primary issue to be determined at this hearing is whether or not the Department of Education (the “DOE”) denied the student a free appropriate public education during the 2013/14 and 2014/15 school years (Ex. P-A).[1]
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local committee on special education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y.
Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(a)-(b); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present state complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y.
Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(a), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with state and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may appeal that decision to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(k).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 20, 2015, the DOE appointed me to serve as the IHO in this matter. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(3)(i). In a due process response dated April 29, 2015, the DOE denied each and every allegation contained in the complaint (Ex. SD-2). See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(i)(4), (5). Hearings in this matter were thereafter held on July 30, 2015 and August 6, 2015.[2] Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence.
See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the April 17, 2015 due process complaint, the student was ( ) years old and has been diagnosed with an (“ ”) and a (Exs. P-A at 1, SD-9 at 2, SD-16 at 8, SD-14 at 1, SD-18 at 2, 7). For the 2014/15 school year, the student attended the ( ) grade at the , , in (Exs. P-A at 1, SD-20). The student's current eligibility education and related services as a student with a is not in dispute in this hearing (Exs. P-A, SD-2, SD-3 at 1, SD-4 at 1).
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(11); 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(11).3
On a January 18, 2013 evaluation, the student was described as and able to . The student demonstrated and , , and . was not recommended to continue (Ex.
SD-9 at 7).
On March 12, 2013, the student participated in a psychoeducational evaluation conducted by the DOE. As assessed by the (“ ”), the student was in the range ( ) in terms of his overall ability to , and . As assessed by the , the student performed in the range ( ) on . The student also displayed delays in (
), ( ), and (Ex. SD-10 at 2-3).
On October 9, 2013, the student participated in another evaluation at the request of the parent due to continued concerns regarding and skills. The student presented with , . The student could , including and .
was not recommended to continue (Ex. SD-11 at 1-2, 6).
On December 4, 2013, the CSE convened to develop an IEP for the student through December 3, 2014. The CSE recommended that the student receive
(“ ”) services for , , and in a means a , such as , , or a , that adversely affects a student’s educational performance. 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)( ). school on a ( ) basis.[4] The CSE also recommended that the student receive ( ) , ( ) time per week for ( )
minutes per session (Exs. P-A at 2-3, SD-3 at 1, 8, 12-14).
On a December 2, 2014 teacher progress report, the student’s teacher reported that the student “
”“ ”“ ” and “
” (Ex. SD-12 at 1). In a separate report, the student’s teacher reported that the student had “ ” but noted a weakness in (Ex. SD-12 at 2). According to a December 3, 2014 student progress report from the student’s , the student was showing progress toward his IEP goals notwithstanding
“ ” at sessions earlier in the school year (Ex. SD-13).
On December 19, 2014, the CSE convened to develop an IEP for the student through December 18, 2015. The CSE recommended that the student receive services in and in a school on a ( ) basis. The CSE also recommended that the student receive ( ) , times per week for ( ) minutes per session (Exs. P-A at 3-5, SD-4 at 1, 10, 14-15,
SD-20).
In progress reports dated January 9, 2015, the student’s and teachers stated that the student was an , but needed improvement in (Ex. SD-19).
As part of a May 1, 2015 evaluation, the student was administered the (“ ”). The student’s Full Scale IQ was estimated to be in the range ( ), but among the student’s scores which ranged from
( ) to the (
). On the
(“ ”), the student’s academic achievement ranged from the range to the range, with , performance on , but performance on and . The
discrepancy between the student’s results and his results indicated a need for with and (Exs. SD-14, SD-16 at 8).
On May 19, 2015 the student was administered the (“ ") as part of a evaluation. While the student’s score measured in the range, the testing in the area of revealed
. Continued was recommended to target that area of weakness (Exs. SD-15, SD-17).
On July 14, 2015, the student participated in another evaluation. Based on clinical observation and assessment, the student demonstrated . He followed , and . He
. The student was
. He
demonstrated and
. The student was able to
. He demonstrated
. was sufficient to .
was adequate as needed to . and impacted . appeared as needed to and . School-based was not recommended (Ex. SD-18 at 7).
IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The DOE
The parent’s claims for independent and/or additional evaluations have already been resolved with the completion of an independent evaluation by Dr. , an independent evaluation, an additional evaluation, and an additional evaluation. A meeting was held on August 14, 2015 to review the results of those evaluations. The parent’s claims concerning the 2013/14 school year were resolved in a November 5, 2014 mediation agreement whereby the student was awarded hours of (“ ”) to be provided by the (“ ”).
As the DOE provided the student with a free appropriate public education for the FAPE for the 2014/15 school year, the parent’s claims for additions hours should be denied (R. 15-19, 260-265; Ex. SD-2).
B. The Parent
The DOE failed to provide the student with a free appropriate public education.
As a consequence, the student failed to make meaningful educational progress during the 2013/14 and 2014/15 school years, his and grades, respectively. Without compensatory services, the student will with a and will be (R. 20-26, 253-260).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Applicable Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (a) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v. T.A ., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); B oard of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206-07 (1982).[5]
A FAPE is offered to a student when: (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3155869 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013); R.E. v. New Y ork City D ep't.
of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied 2013 WL 1418840 (U.S. June
10, 2013); M.H. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 (2d Cir. 2012); Cerra v. Paw ling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.'" W alczak v. Florida
Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see T.P. v. M amaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009).
While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and has indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not," see R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91, the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA, M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A .C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003); Perricelli v.
Carm el Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c)
caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007); R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M .H., 685 F.3d at 245; A .H. v. Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3242234, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010); E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008), aff'd, 2009 WL 3326627 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009); Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP."
W alczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." See W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Grim, 346 F.3d at 379.
Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement.'" See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (quoting W alczak, 142 F.3d at 130); see also T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2008); Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15. The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" See M rs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); see also Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v.
A rlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); W alczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 4946429 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Patsk in v. B oard of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d
422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(i); Tarlow e v. Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320(a)(2)(i), (2)(i)(A); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(v).
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).
B. Moot Claims
It is well settled that the dispute between the parties must at all stages be "real and live," and not "academic," or it risks becoming moot. See Lillbask v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008); see also Chenier v. Richard W ., 82 N.Y.2d 830, 832 (1993); Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714 (1980). Mootness may be raised at any stage of litigation. See In re Kurtzman, 194 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1999). Administrative decisions rendered in cases that concern such issues that arise out of school years since expired may no longer appropriately address the current needs of the student. See Daniel R.R. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1989); M .S. v. New Y ork City Dept. of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280-81 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). In general, cases dealing with issues such as desired changes in IEPs, specific placements, and implementation disputes may become moot at the end of the school year because no meaningful relief can be granted. See V .M . v. No. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 2013 WL
3187069, at *13-*15 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2013); A pplication of a Student with a Disability (New York City Dep’t of Educ.), Appeal No. 12-205 at 8 (SRO July 31, 2014).
The evidence contained in the hearing record reflects that several of the parent’s claims are now moot. Following the April 17, 2015 due process complaint, the student participated in a May 1, 2015 evaluation, a May 19, 2015 evaluation, an independent evaluation completed on May 16, 2015, and an independent evaluation completed on July 14, 2015 (Exs. SD-8, SD-14, SD-15, SD-16, SD-17, SD-18). Given the completion of these evaluations, I find that the parent’s claims for additional and/or independent evaluations are now moot (Ex. P-A at 7). Likewise, as the CSE planned to review these evaluations at an August 14, 2015 meeting, I find that the parent’s claim for an Order directing the CSE to reconvene to review this diagnostic testing is also now moot (Ex. P-A at 7).
With respect to the parent’s claim that the student was denied a FAPE during the 2013/14 school year, I note that the parties signed a mediation agreement, on or about November 3, 2014, authorizing the student’s receipt of hours of as compensatory education in satisfaction of claims for the 2013/14 school year (Exs. SD-5
SD-6). Given the of the mediation agreement, and the parent’s acknowledgment at the hearing that any award of hours must be offset by the number of hours authorized in the agreement, I find that the parent’s claims concerning the 2013/14 school year are now moot.
C. 2014/15 School Year Program
As noted earlier, the IDEA directs that, in general, an impartial hearing officer’s decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(I). A school district offers a FAPE “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
The IEP must be “reasonably calculated to provide some ‘meaningful’ benefit.” M rs. B.
v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997), quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at
192.
Based on evidence contained in the hearing record, including the credible testimony of Ms. , I find that the DOE provided the student with a FAPE during the 2014/15 school year (R. 39-44). The evaluations secured by the CSE, and the progress reports authored by the student’s teachers, reflect that the student possessed weaknesses in , , and (Exs. SD-10 at 2-3, SD-12, SD-14 at 3,
SD-15 at 4, SD-16 at 8, SD-17 at 6). To address those needs, the CSE recommended specific annual goals for the student in , , and (Ex. SD-4 at 5-9). The CSE also recommended a number of program modifications to meet the student’s needs in the school setting (Ex. SD-4 at 3). Although the parent expressed concern to the CSE about the student’s performance in and (Exs. SD-3 at 14, SD-4 at 3, 15), there is no allegation or evidence that the CSE erred in recommending services and for the student, or that there was any interruption in the delivery of recommended services to the student during the 2014/15 school year (R. 253; Ex. P-A).
By December 2014, the student had earned , and needed to earn
(Ex. SD-4 at 1, SD-20). By the conclusion of the 2014/15 school year, the student’s grade, the student , including , e.g., ,
, , ,
and
(Exs. SD-18 at 2, SD-20). As per teacher reports, the student was a and was . The student and . The student and . The student also reportedly benefitted from:
, and
(Ex. SD-18 at 2). The student also :
, , ,
(Exs. SD-3 at 1, SD-4 at 1).
Alternatively, while the parent asserts that the student displayed and in school during the 2014/15 school year (R. 23), the progress reports supplied by the student’s teachers, and the student’s academic transcript, does not support that assertion (Exs. SD-12, SD-13, SD-19, SD-20). Likewise, while the parent asserts that the CSE erred in failing to provide to the student
(R. 257), the hearing record reflects that student’s needs were evaluated on January 18, 2013, October 9, 2013 and July 14, 2015, and on each occasion, was not recommended (Exs. SD-9 at 1, SD-11 at 1, SD-18 at 1).[6]
VI. ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The parent’s claim that the student was denied a free appropriate public education for the 2014/15 school year is DENIED.
Dated: November 24, 2015
JEFFREY SCHIRO, ESQ.
Impartial Hearing Officer
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period. ” (8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.
Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
PARENTS
A. Due Process Complaint Notice/Impartial Hearing Request, 4/17/15, 8 pgs.
B. NYSED Response to Complaint, 10/9/14, 4 pgs.
C. NYSED Response to Complaint, 12/17/14, 8 pgs.
D. NYSED Response to Complaint, 12/30/14, 9 pgs.
E. NYSED Response to Complaint (Corrected), 3/16/15, 8 pgs.
F. Letter to Parent from (NYSED), 2/10/15, 4 pgs.
G. [Reserved]
H. [Reserved]
I. [Reserved]
J. [Reserved]
K. Evaluation, , 1/24/15, 47 pgs.
L. , , 7/2/15, 2 pgs.
M. , , 7/16/15, 1 pg.
N. [Reserved]
O. [Reserved]
P. [Reserved]
Q. - Disclaimer, 4/30/15, 1 pg.
R. [Reserved]
S. Evaluation & Report, 6/9/15, 68 pgs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
1. [Reserved]
2. Due Process Response, 4/29/15, 3 pgs.
3. Individualized Education Program (IEP), 12/4/13, 15 pgs.
4. Individualized Education Program (IEP), 12/19/14, 17 pgs.
5. Mediation Agreement, 11/5/14, 3 pgs.
6. Authorization for Independent
( ) (Form P-4), 1/20/15, 2 pgs.
7. Letter to Parent from (Principal) - educational records, 4/30/15, 2 pgs.
8. Letter to Parent from (Principal) - IEEs, 4/30/15, 1 pg.
9. Evaluation, 1/18/13, 8 pgs.
10. Educational Evaluation Report, 3/12/13, 3 pgs.
11. Evaluation, 10/9/13, 7 pgs.
12. Teacher Progress Report, 12/2/14, 2 pgs.
13. Student Progress Report ( ), 12/3/14, 2 pgs.
14. Psychoeducational Evaluation Report, 5/1/15, 3 pgs.
15. Evaluation, 5/19/15, 5 pgs.
16. Evaluation, 5/16/15, 13 pgs.
17. Evaluation, 5/19/15, 7 pgs.
18. Evaluation, 7/14/15, 8 pgs.
19. Progress Report, 1/9/15, 3 pgs.
20. Student Report Cards, various dates, 5 pgs.
IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
I. Confirmation of Extension, 7/1/15, 1 pg.
II. Confirmation of Extension, 7/31/15, 1 pg.
III. Confirmation of Extension, 8/24/15, 1 pg.
IV. Confirmation of Extension, 9/30/15, 1 pg.
V. Confirmation of Extension, 10/30/15, 1 pg.
Footnotes
[1] References to the hearing transcript are noted as “R.” References to exhibits admitted into evidence are noted as “Ex.”
[2] Following my appointment to this case, the parties moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter several times in order to allow the parties to present their available witnesses and in order to allow for adequate time for my review of the hearing record taken on the extensive issues raised in the parents’ due process complaint. In considering those requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that the stated reasons for the extensions justified the delay in the resolution of the matter and that the reasons for the requested extensions were in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, requests for extensions of the case compliance date were granted (R. 184-185; Exs. IHO-I - IHO-V). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5).
[4] State regulations define services as the " ," and require such classrooms to be "minimally" staffed with both a teacher and a teacher. See 8 NYCRR §§ 200.6 , . Recently, the Second Circuit described services as a placement " " See M.W . v. New Y ork City D ep't of Educ., 2013 WL 3868594, at *9-*12 (2d Cir. July 29, 2013).
[5] The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.
[6] While an independent evaluator drew an opposite conclusion in an evaluation conducted on June 9, 2015 (Ex. P-S), I find that the December 2014 CSE reasonably determined that the student did not require based on the information in its possession at that time (Exs. SD-4, SD-9, SD-11, SD- 18).