NYSED redacts decisions, and its source files vary in quality. Gaps and text errors are original to the NYSED documents.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case No. SED ID
No. Student's Name:
Parent Date of Birth:
September 18, District: Hearing
2014 Requested by: Date October 31,
2014 of Hearing: November 17,
2014 January
14, 2015
January 21,
2015
March 4, 2015 Record Close
, Date: Hearing
Esq. Officer: Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
July 28, 2014, the parent (the "Parent") (the "Student") filed a due process complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. section 1415(f) and Section 4404(1) of the New York State Education Law, against the New York City Department of Education (the "DOE"). I was appointed as impartial hearing officer ("IHO") on August 13, 2014, after the recusal of the IHO(s) previously appointed to hear this case.
The matter came on for a hearing on the Student's pendency ("stay put")
program on September 18, 2014 and for substantive hearings on October 31, 2014, November 17, 2014, January 14, 2015, and January 21, 2015. An
Interim Order on Pendency was issued on September 19, 2014 (IHO Ex. I).
Lists of the persons who appeared at the hearing and the documentary evidence submitted are appended to this Order. The compliance date for issuing a decision in this proceeding has been extended (IHO Ex. II).
BACKGROUND AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
is an year-old male student who is classified as a student with a having (DOE Ex. 1). His classification and eligibility for special education supports and services is not in dispute. This proceeding involves the parties' dispute about the Student's special education program and placement for the 2014-2015 school year. The Parent maintains that the DOE did not offer the Student a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE"). The Parent unilaterally placed the Student at (" ") and now seeks tuition reimbursement for the cost of that placement. He asserts that placement was appropriate and met the Student's special education needs, and that equitable factors support the tuition reimbursement claim. The Parent requests that the DOE be directed to reimburse him for the cost of the tuition that he paid to date, and that the DOE be directed to pay for the balance of the tuition due to by issuing payment directly to the school. The
Parent's legal and factual arguments were extensively set forth in a post-hearing brief (IHO Ex. III).
The DOE maintains that it offered the Student a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") for the 2014-2015 school year and that is not an appropriate placement for the Student. The
DOE requests that I deny the Parent's' tuition reimbursement claim. The
DOE's legal and factual arguments were extensively set forth in a post-hearing brief (IHO Ex. IV).
The DOE presented the testimony of the school psychologist who participated at the Student's January 13, 2014 Committee on Special Education ("CSE") meeting and of the Unit Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
Coordinator from the CSE's proposed public school placement. The
Parents presented the testimony of the Student's father, the Student's
, the head teacher from the Student's 2013-2014 class at , the head teacher from the Student's 2014- 2015 class at , the Program Director from , and of a who evaluated the Student in October of 2014. Both parties submitted documentary evidence in this proceeding.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The IDEA provides that children with disabilities are entitled to a Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE") (20 U.S.C. § 1400 [d][1][A].
A FAPE consists of specialized education and related services designed to meet a student's unique needs, provided in conformity with a comprehensive written IEP (34 C.F.R. § 300.13). A school district has offered a student a FAPE when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA and (b) the IEP is developed through the IDEA's procedures and is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07
[1982]).
A board of education may be required to pay for educational services obtained for a child by the child's parent, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parent were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parent's claim. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington
v. Department of Education, Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 [1985]; Florence County School District Four et al. v. Carter by Carter, 510 U.S.
7 [1993]; see also Frank G. and Dianne G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park,459 F.3d 356 [2d Cir. 2006], cert denied, Board of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. School Dist. v. Frank G.,2007 WL 2982269 [Oct. 15, 2007].
School districts have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in IDEA due process hearings, except that a parent or person in parental relationship seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement has the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement ( NYS Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c)).
Decisions of impartial hearing officers must be on substantive grounds based on a Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
determination of whether a the student received a FAPE, 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(i), except as follows:
In matters alleging a procedural violation, an impartial hearing officer may find that a student did not receive a free appropriate public education only if the procedural inadequacies impeded the student's right to a free appropriate public education, significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parent's child, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to preclude an impartial hearing officer from ordering a school district to comply with procedural requirements under this Part and Part 201 of this Title 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii).
The CSE recommended that the Student be placed in a school year : program with services,
, ,
- , and
. (DOE Ex. 1). The CSE offered the Student
placement in a class at at (DOE Ex. 3). The Parent raised numerous challenges to the DOE's program and placement recommendations.
The Parent asserts that the school location letter (DOE Ex. 3) was not timely, and that the late notice constituted a FAPE deprivation.. The
DOE asserts that the letter, which was dated June 10, 2014, was timely. Although the letter bears the date of June 10, 2014, it was not mailed until June 16, 2014 (Parent Ex. M). The Student attends school on a school year basis, and the first day of the school year was July 1, 2014. The DOE was required to provide the Student with a placement by no later than June 15, 2014. As such, it was not timely. However, under the circumstances of this case, I find that the delay in sending the placement notice (the school location letter) was de minimus and did not constitute a deprivation of the Student's right to a FAPE. .
The Parent also asserts that the CSE's failure to perform and evaluations constituted a FAPE deprivation. The DOE asserts that I cannot consider that argument because the issue was not raised in the due process complaint. Absent the parties agreement, the party requesting the due process hearing may not raise issues that were not raised in the due process complaint. As such, the DOE is correct in its assertion that the DOE's acknowledged failure to perform and evaluations cannot form the basis of a finding that it did not offer the Student a FAPE in this Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
proceeding. However, the DOE none-the-less has the burden of proving that the CSE's program and placement recommendations for the Student were reasonably calculated to enable the Student to make meaningful educational progress. If the evaluation material available to and considered by the CSE was not sufficient, the DOE may well have difficulty in meeting its burden of proof in this proceeding.
In its closing brief, the DOE cites prior IHO and SRO decisions regarding this Student (IHO Ex. IV at 16). The DOE urges me to follow the
"precedent" in this proceeding, although it acknowledges that previous IHO and SRO decisions are not actually binding legal precedent. It asserts that the precedent is that a class is appropriate for the Student. There are several problems with the DOE's argument. Each school year must be evaluated separately. An SRO decision for the 2013-2014 school year cannot form the bases of a finding that the CSE's 2014-2015 program recommendations were appropriate. Moreover, the DOE's argument goes beyond the hearing record in this case. Facts may not be raised for the first time in a closing brief. The DOE has raised the new facts and a new argument in a manner which precluded the Parent from addressing the issue. There is nothing in either the testimony or documentary evidence in this case regarding the IHO and SRO decisions cited. The only prior decision included in the hearing record is an unappealed July 2, 2013 IHO decision (Parent Ex. B) which found that the CSE's recommendations were not appropriate, that placement was appropriate, that equitable factors supported the tuition reimbursement claim, and which directed the DOE to fund the Student's unilateral placement at
(Id).
The DOE would have me "blindly follow" its characterization of the SRO's ruling in SRO Appeal Number 14-054. The DOE asserts that there
"is nothing that distinguishes this year's case from last year's" (Id). That cannot possibly be true because this year's case involves a different IEP, a new psycho-educational evaluation, a new evaluation, a new classroom observation, June 2013 and December 2013, and May 2014 Progress Reports, and possibly a new l evaluation (depending on when the 2013-2014 IEP was prepared) (DOE Exs. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8; Parent Exs. H, J, K, V, and X).
This year's case also includes testimony regarding the Student's academic performance and special education issues during the 2013-1014 school year, which would not have been
Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
factors that the CSE considered when formulating the 2013-2014 IEP (which was the subject matter of the SRO App. No. 14-054).
Based on my review of the testimony and documentary evidence presented in this proceeding, I find that the Parent is correct in his assertion that the DOE did not meet its burden of proving that it offered to provide the Student with a FAPE for the 2014-2015 school year. There is no dispute about the fact that the Student has . The Student's
, classroom teachers, and father
testified about the Student's . The Student
His testified that the Student needs a in which he
The testimony of the Parent's witnesses, and the supporting documentary evidence, consistently and convincingly supported the Parent's contention that the Student requires instruction throughout the school day and that he requires . The testimony of the DOE's two witnesses and the documentary evidence it submitted was not sufficient to support the DOE's contention that the CSE's program recommendation was reasonably calculated to address the Student's
. The information available to the CSE was provided by the Parent, the Student's teacher, and other staff. It was made patently clear to the CSE that the Student required a
.
The DOE did not cite to any report or information that supported the CSE's determination that a class could adequately address the Student's . When asked (about why the Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
CSE recommended the program and how the program would have provided meaningful educational benefit to the Student, the school psychologist who participated in the Student's IEP meeting testified about the number of peers in the classroom for the development of program would , (Tr. at 129, 131131). Although the psychologist testified about the issues addressed in the IEP (Tr. at 134-137), she did not explain about how his need for for setting. She testified that the CSE didn't recommend any because "I don't think that it would be necessary (Tr. 136). She testified that the CSE didn't recommend a because " " (Tr. at 137). The reasons and justification cited in the psychologist's testimony were not consistent with the information available to the CSE at the time of the meeting. Instead, it appears that the rationale for the CSE's program recommendation were the reasons cited in the Parent's testimony: the CSE advised him that the class is "
" "
" (Tr. 321, 322).
The psychologist's testimony did not support the contention that the program, without a , would address the Student's and allow him to make meaningful educational progress. The CSE's recommendations were not supported by the information available to the CSE, so the recommendations were not reasonably calculated to meet his needs. A reasonably calculated recommendation, by definition, needs to be based upon the evaluations and information available to the CSE at the time that it made its recommendation. Moreover, the reference to supporting have little, if anything, to do with addressing the Student's . Nor do these factors address the Student's need for instruction (when regulated) in order to make educational progress. He requires instruction because he
.
The DOE presented testimony at the hearing about the "
" at the proposed placement site. However, during the course of the testimony it became clear that the was not in place at the school until some time in September of 2014. As such, it was not in place as of the beginning of the school year (which began on July 1, 2014). Since I must look at the CSE's program and placement recommendations as of the time that the recommendations were made (and considered/rejected by the Parent), I may not consider the fact that the school created a several months later. Moreover, the IEP does not include a or the equipment contained therein. It appears that the DOE is seeking to rehabilitate a defective IEP by offering testimony about what the school would have provided had the Student enrolled in and attended the school.
The DOE's attempt to use testimony about things that the placement could have or would have done (access to a )
constituted restrospective testimony that cannot be considered in determining whether the IEP was appropriate. Retrospective testimony is "testimony that certain services not listed in the IEP would actually have been provided to the child if he or she had attended the school district's proposed placement." R.E. v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 694 F.2d
167, 185 (2d Cir. 2012). A student's "IEP must be evaluated prospectively as of the time of its drafting . . . retrospective testimony that the school district would have provided additional services beyond those listed in the IEP may not be considered in a Burlington/Carter proceeding. R.E. v. NYC Dep't of Educ., at 186 (2d Cir. 2012).
"[T]estimony regarding state-offered services may only explain or justify what is listed in the written IEP. Testimony may not support a modification that is materially different from the IEP, and thus a deficient IEP may not be effectively rehabilitated or amended after the fact through testimony regarding services that do no appear in the IEP." R.E.
v. NYC Dep't of Educ., at 185. A school district "may not introduce evidence that modifies [a] staffing ratio (such as testimony from a teacher that he would have provided extensive 1:1 instruction to the student)." R.E. v. NYC Dep't of Educ., at 186.
"In determining the adequacy of an IEP, the parties are limited to discussing the placement and services specified in the written plan and therefore reasonably known to the parties at the time of the placement decision." R.E. v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 694at 187. "Thus, it is error to find that a FAPE was provided because a specific teacher would have been assigned or because of actions that specific teacher would have taken beyond what was listed in the IEP. R.E. v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 694 F.2d 167, 187 (2d Cir. 2012).
Testimony about is precisely the type of retrospective testimony that I cannot consider in light of the R.E.
decision.
For all the foregoing reasons, I find that the DOE failed to establish that it offered the Student a FAPE for the 2014-2015 school year. The Parent has therefore met the first of the three Burlington/Carter criteria for tuition reimbursement.
The Parent has the burden of proving that the unilateral placement was appropriate. In order to meet this burden, the Parent must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the unilateral placement provides "educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the student" (Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch.
Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 [2d . Cir. 2007]. The private school placement "need not meet the [IDEA] definition of a free and appropriate public education" or "state education standards or requirements" (Frank G. v.
Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 [2d. Cir. 2006]. The private placement need not provide certified special education teachers or an IEP. Parental placements are not subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school district placement. The private school placement must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits, and must be likely to produce progress, not regression.
The standard to apply is whether "[the] unilateral private placement ... provides educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child" Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at
115):
No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents' unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child's potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction. Gagliardo. 489 F.3d at 112 (quoting Frank G , 459 F.3d at 364-65).
The DOE takes the position that placement
is not appropriate because the Student "
" (IHO Ex. IV at 24). The DOE notes that
" " " " "
" (IHO Ex. IV at 2425).. The DOE acknowledges that the Student has made gains and progress at , but asserts that the Student is capable of more and that 's model of education does not appropriately meet those needs (IHO Ex. IV at 26). The DOE's arguments are not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. The Parent has the burden of proving that program is appropriate for the Student, and I find that the Parent has, in fact, met that burden.
The testimony of the Parents' witnesses and the documentary evidence submitted overwhelming supports the Parents' contention that placement was appropriate. The testimony presented was credible and convincing. As discussed more fully above, the Student has that need to be addressed in order for him to benefit from instruction. The
Student needs
His class at has students and adults, with a for another student in the class. He receives the support that he needs , as well as the support that he requires when . His program at includes a , developed specifically for the Student by his , which . The school has and The were selected to specifically address his needs by his . School staff has been trained to properly implement his and to provide the necessary that are
As a result, the extent to which the Student's interfere with his
The Student made meaningful progress at during the prior school year, and when the Parent unilaterally placed the Student at the school for th 2014-2015 school year he had every reason to believe that would continue to meet the Student's and enable him to continue to make meaningful educational progress. The testimony about the Student's Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
progress at the school was uncontroverted (and the DOE in fact concedes that the Student made progress, see IHO Ex. IV at 26).
The DOE's contention that the Student is capable of making more progress than he has made does not warrant a finding that is not an appropriate placement for the Student. First of all, it is somewhat speculative and not supported by the evidence at the hearing.
Moreover, in order to be appropriate a parental placement (or a DOE placement, for that matter), need not maximize a Student's potential. It must, however be designed to provide the Student with a special education program that was designed to meet the Student's unique special education needs and that was reasonably calculated to enable the him to make meaningful educational progress. The testimony of the Parent's witnesses and the documentary evidence amply supports the Parent's contention that the Student's program at was designed to provide and did, in fact, provide the Student with a special education program that was designed to meet the Student's unique special education needs and was reasonably calculated to enable the him to make meaningful educational progress.
he DOE's contention that is "
" is not supported by the hearing record. The DOE's own classroom observation reflects instruction at in an apparently setting (DOE Ex. 6).The
Student was able to and was reported to have been "
" (Id at 2). The brief reference in the testimony of the DOE's psychologist about being "
" during a tour that she took at the beginning of the 2013- 2014 school year (Tr. 141) does not warrant a finding that the school was not appropriate for the Student during the 2014-2015 school year.
The psychologist did not have any knowledge about the Student's class
(Tt. 141). She also acknowledged, during cross-examination, that the DOE's classroom observation did not mention at all (Tr.
151-2).
The DOE's contention that 's model of education does not appropriately meet the Student's needs is also not supported by the hearing record. The testimony of the Parent's various witnesses (the Student's 2013-2014 classroom teacher, the Student's
2014-2015 classroom Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
teacher, the Student's , and
Program Director) make clear that the Student's program at is tailored to address the Student's unique needs and that he has been making demonstrable and meaningful progress at the school (See also DOE Exs. 4 and 7; Parent Exs. H, K, T, V, and X). In fact, the psychologist who performed the DOE's psycho-educational evaluation noted his progress and concluded that "
" (DOE Ex. 4 at 4).
Based on the foregoing, I find that the Parent has met the second of the three Burlington/Carter criteria for tuition reimbursement.
Turning to Prong Three of the Burlington/Carter analysis, I find that there is nothing in the hearing record that would preclude tuition reimbursement on equitable grounds. The DOE did not raise any Prong Three issue or challenge the tuition claim on equitable grounds in its opening statement or post-hearing brief. The Parent cooperated with the CSE, shared his concerns and information about the Student with the CSE, and did not engage in any activities that interfered with the CSE's evaluation, program development, and placement process. He visited the proposed placement, carefully considered it prior to rejecting it, and provided the DOE with prompt and appropriate written notice of his rejection of the placement. I therefore find that equitable factors support the Parent's tuition reimbursement claim. The Parent has met the third of the three Burlington/Carter criteria for tuition reimbursement.
Having met all three prongs of the Burlington/Carter analysis, the Paren its entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the Student's 2014-2015
placement at .
The Parent seeks direct tuition funding for the cost of placement, in addition to reimbursement for the amount that he has already paid to the school. annual tuition for the 2014-2015 school is (Parent Ex. U). The
Parent paid to the school when he signed the contract on June 30,2014 (Parent Ex. Z). The Parent is entitled to prompt reimbursement for that payment, as well as reimbursement for any other payments that he may have made. The Parent asserts that he does not have the financial means to Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
pay for the full cost of tuition. This assertion was not disputed by the DOE in either its opening statement or post-hearing brief. As such, the Parent's request for direct/prospective tuition funding is granted (See Mr. & Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
The Parent is entitled to immediate reimbursement in the amount of , to prompt reimbursement for any other payments made to the school, and to an order directing the DOE to remit the balance of the tuition due directly to the school.
ORDER IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that New York City Department of Education is directed to pay for the cost of the Student's 2014-2015 enrollment at in the total amount of as follows: (a)
the DOE shall issue reimbursement to the Parent in the amount of within two weeks of the date hereof, and (b) the DOE shall issue reimbursement to the Parent for any additional payments made to the school within two weeks of the submission of proof of payment; and
(c) the DOE shall remit payment for the balance of the tuition due by issuing payment directly to the school within two weeks of the submission of an affidavit setting forth the amounts paid by the Parent and the amount remaining due and owning to the school (the DOE shall be entitled to a credit for any tuition payments made pursuant to the Interim Order on Pendency issued herein).
Dated: March 5, 2015
Impartial Hearing Officer
Findings of Fact and Decision
Case No.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 2014
Esq. Attorney, Esq. Attorney — Parents
Father — Parents
Esq. Attorney — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON OCTOBER 31, 2014
Esq. Attorney, Esq. Attorney — Parents
Observer — Parents
Father — Parents
Esq. Attorney — DOE
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON NOVEMBER 17, 2014
Esq. Attorney, Esq. Attorney — Parents
Observer Observer — Parents
Father — Parents
Esq. Attorney — DOE
* School Psychologist — DOE
(By Telepone) * Unit Coordinator (By Telephone) — DOE
* Testified at Hearing — DOE
Esq. Attorney, Esq. Attorney *Father — Parents
Esq. Observer * (By Telephone) — Parents
Head Teacher (By Telephone) For the Department of Education , Esq. Attorney
Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON JANUARY
14, 2015
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON JANUARY
21, 2015
Esq. Attorney, Esq. — Parents
Attorney — Parents
Father, Esq. Observer — Parents
Project Associate Head Teacher, Ph.D.* Psychologist (By (by telephone) — Parents
Telephone) * Program Director (By Telephone) — Parents
* Head Teacher (By Telephone) — Parents
Esq. Attorney — DOE
* Testified at Hearing — DOE
Findings of Fact and Decision Case No. — DOE
DOCUMENTS ENTERED INTO THE RECORD
Department of Education Exhibit
Individualized Education Program, 1/13/14, 16 pp.
CSE Review Minutes, 1/13/14, 4 pp.
Final Notice of Recommendation, Prior Written Notice, 6/10/14, 4 pp.
Psycho-Educational Evaluation, 11/11/13, 4 pp.
Evaluation, 11/11/13, 3 pp.
Classroom Observation, 11/613, 2 pp.
Progress Report, December 2013, 11 pp.
Due Process Response, 7/29/14, 4 pp.
Parent Exhibits
A. Impartial Hearing Request, 7/28/14, 9 pp.
B. Impartial Hearing Findings of Fact and Decision, 7/2/13, 14 pp.
C. Notice of Non-Appeal, 7/31/13, 1 p.
D. Email from to IHO re scheduling subpoena hearing,
10/15/14, 5 pp.
E. Email from to IHO re scheduling subpoena hearing, 10/21,
14, 1 p.
F. Individualized Education Program (" "), 1/13/14, 20 pp.
G. MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY
H. Psychoeducational Evaluation Reported conducted by NYC DOE,
10/29/13, 5 pp.
I. MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY
J. Evaluation conducted by NYC DOE, 11/4/13, 4
pp.
K. Evaluation conducted by , Ph.D.,
2/4/13, 7 pp.
L. Email from Parent to re Evaluation, 2/5/14,
5 pp.
M. School Location Letter, Prior Written Notice and mailing envelope, 6/10/14,
postmarked 6/16/14, 7 pp.
N. Day Notice Letter, 6/17/14, 2 pp.
O. Email from to re Ten Day Notice, 6/17/14, 1 p.
P. Email from to re Ten Day Notice, 6/2014, 1 p.
Q. Certified Mail Receipt for Ten Day Notice, 6/23/14, 1 p.
R. Placement Rejection Letter, 6/30/14, 5 pp.
S. Email from to re Placement Rejection Letter,
6/30/14, 1 p.
T. Evaluation Report conducted by ,
Ph.D., October 2014, 14 pp.
U. Enrollment Contract for the 2014-2015 School
Year, 7/1/14, 6 pp.
V. Progress Report, June 2013, 12 pp.
W. MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY
X. Progress Report, May 2014, 12 pp.
Y. DOE Events Log, May 2012-June 2013, 1 p.
Z. Check fro Parent to , 6/30/14, 1 p. AA.
Subpoena to CSE , 9/2/14, 3 pp.
Findings of Fact and Decision Case No.
BB. Subpoena to , 9/2/14, 2 pp.
CC. Subpoenas signed by IHO, 10/31/14, 5 pp. DOE Events
Log for Student, 11/12/14, 3 pp.
IHO Exhibits
I. Interim Order on Pendency, 9/19/14, 3 pp.
II. Emails from IHO re Compliance Date Extensions, 9/19/14, 10/20/14, 11/17/14,
11/25/14, 12/3/14, 1/14/15, and 1/21/15, 7 pp.
III. Parent Post Hearing Letter Brief, 2/18/15, 30 pp.
IV. Closing Brief for the Department of Education, 218/15, 2 pp.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the Public School District has a right to appeal the decision to a State Review Officer (SRO) of the New York State Education Department under section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act.
If the parent plans to appeal the decision, a notice of intention to seek review shall be personally served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed so that a certified copy of the hearing record may be prepared for submission by the school district. If a school district plans to appeal the decision, the district shall file a certified copy of the hearing record together with its petition.
An appealing parties' petition for review shall be personally served upon the opposing party within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period. (8 NYCRR § 279.2(b))
The rules of procedure for proceedings before a SRO are found in Part 279 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/part279home.html.
Footnotes
[1] As of the date hereof, the cited SRO decision (Appeal No. 14-054) is not posted online at the SRO website. The DOE did not supply me and the Parent's attorney with a copy of the decision. Thus, even if it were appropriate to follow the "precedent," I would not be able to determine what that precedent actually is because I have no access to the SRO decision.