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FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION
Case Number:
Student’s Name:
Date of Birth:
District: Hearing Requested By: Parent
Date of Hearing: April 2, 2014
Actual Record Closed Date: April 9, 2014
Hearing Officer: Jeffrey J. Schiro, Esq.
NAMES AND TITLES OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED ON APRIL 2, 2014
Parents
District Representative, CSE — DOE
I. JURISDICTION - OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
This impartial due process proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. This hearing was requested by the parents of the student in a due process complaint dated December 12, 2013. The primary issue to be determined at this hearing are whether or not the New York City Department of Education (the “DOE”) shall be ordered to compensate the parents for transportation costs associated with the student’s receipt therapy during the 2012/13 school year (Ex. P-A).[1]
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (the “CSE”) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, at least one psychologist, and school district representatives. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR §§ 200.3, 200.4(d)(2). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415(e)-(f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.152, 300.506, 300.511; N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(h)-(l).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student.” See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(i)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)-(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1)-(2), 300.507(a)(1). An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five (5) business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(2)(A), (h)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(a)(1)-(4); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.5(j)(3)(v), (vii), (xii). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than forty-five (45) days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(2), (c), 300.515(a); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (“SRO”). See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(1); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(k).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 13, 2013, I was appointed by the DOE to hear this matter. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(3)(i). A hearing in this matter was thereafter held on April 2, 2014.[2] Appended to this decision are: a statement of appeal rights; a list of the persons in attendance at the hearings; and a list of the documents received into evidence. See 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(5)(v).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the December 12, 2013 due process complaint, the student was six
(6) years old and displayed in expressive communication. The student's eligibility for special education and related services as a student with a is not in dispute in this hearing (Exs. SD-1 at 1, P-A at 1, P-F).[3] See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(11); 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(11).
Prior to a September 2012 CSE meeting, the student’s skills were assessed with the Kahn-Lewis Phonological Assessment, the Goldman Fistoe Articulation Test, the Preschool Language Scale, and the Expressive One-Word Vocabulary Test. The student’s speech intelligibility was judged to be sixty-five percent (65%) conversationally. The student exhibited mild vowel distortions. Expressive vocabulary was at a 4.2 year old level, indicating a twenty-one percent (21%) delay. The student did not use the auxiliary verb and confused pronouns conversationally, but regularly engaged in sentence productions of five-to-six words. The student also had difficulty answering “wh” questions after listening to a short story (Ex. SD-1 at 1).
On September 6, 2012, the CSE convened and developed an individualized education services plan (“IESP”) for the student. The CSE recommended for the 2012/13 school year that the student receive individual therapy, two (2) times per week for thirty (30) minutes per session, in a separate location. Goals that were targeted that year included vocabulary expansion including: categorization skills, receptive and expressive use of common items, as well as word retrieval skills; sequencing skills, including use of time words (e.g., first, then, next); syntactic development, including verb usage; and conjugation, including the third person singular, and use of verb “to be” (Exs. SD-1 at 23, P-G).
During the 2012/13 school year, the student received her recommended speech therapy sessions , an approved provider, located at with MS CCC/SLP, who specializes in remediating oral motor/feeding delays. The student’s oral motor and were reportedly so severe, that they were not able to be addressed by the Strivright therapist who was present at the student’s non-public school (Exs. P-A at 2, P-B, P-C, P-D, P-E, PF, P-G).
The parents arranged for transportation of the student to and from the Strivright center to receive recommended therapy services (Ex. P-H). The parents’ request for direct payment by the DOE for transportation was denied, because the student’s speech/language service was arranged through a “transmittal” rather than a related service authorization or “RSA.” This hearing ensued (Ex. P-A at 1-2).
IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The DOE
There is no dispute that the student required individual speech/language therapy services last academic year (2012/13). As the DOE arranged for an approved provider to implement mandated services for the student on-site at her non-public school, it should not be required to pay for car fare to bring the student to a related service center (R. 9-11).
B. The Parent
Last year (2013/13), the DOE arranged for the student to receive recommended related services on-site at her nonpublic school via a transmittal. Given the severity of the student’s needs, the on-site provider recommended that the student receive her speech/language therapy services at a center. The DOE refused to arrange, and/or pay, for transportation of the student to and from the center because it had arranged for the student to receive therapy services on-site at her nonpublic school via a transmittal, rather than an RSA (R. 7-9; Ex. P-A at 1-2).
V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. General Legal Standards
Two purposes of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, are: (a) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B); see generally Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009); Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).[4]
A FAPE is offered to a student when: (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA; and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3155869 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013); R.E. v. New York City Dep't. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied 2013 WL 1418840 (U.S. June 10, 2013); M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 (2d Cir. 2012); Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.'" Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009). While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not," see R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91, the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA, M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003); Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007). Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies: (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE; (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student; or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); 8 NYCRR § 200.5(j)(4)(ii); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007); R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.H. v. Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3242234, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010); E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008), aff'd, 2009 WL 3326627 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009); Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 3852180 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008).
The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Grim, 346 F.3d at 379. Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement.'" See Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130); see also T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2008); Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15. The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" See Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i), 300.116(a)(2); 8 NYCRR §§ 200.1(cc), 200.6(a)(1); see also Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 4946429 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Patskin v. Board of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1);[8] NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(i); Tarlowe v. Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320(a)(2)(i), (2)(i)(A); of the services they would receive if they were enrolled in a public school. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(10), (b)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.137(a), 138(a)(2); see also Analysis of Comments & Changes to 34 C.F.R. Parts 300 & 301, 71 Fed. Reg. 156 at 46,597 (Aug. 14, 2006).
In contrast to the IDEA, New York State law provides:
[T]he committee on special education of the school district of location shall develop an individualized education service program for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an individualized education program. The committee on special education shall assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3602-c(2)(b)(1)
The IDEA authorizes the delivery of special education services to be provided to parentally placed private school students located within a district "on the premises of private, including religious, schools, to the extent consistent with law" (20 U.S.C. § 412(a)(10)(A)(i)(III). While subdivision 9 of Education Law 3602-c provides that such students "shall receive such services in regular classes of the public school and shall not be provided such services separately from pupils regularly attending the public schools," the NewYork State Court of Appeals has held that:
The statute does not limit the right and responsibility of educational authorities in the first instance to make placements appropriate to the educational needs of each child, whether the child attends public or private school. Such placements may well be in regular public school classes and programs, in the interests of mainstreaming or otherwise, but that is not a matter of statutory compulsion under section 3602-c Board of Educ. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 184 (1988).
In Wieder, the Court of Appeals further stated "[t]he paramount principle that guides State law is concern for a handicapped child's educational needs, whether in public or private school" and that such children "are to be afforded suitable educational opportunities according to their individual needs." Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d at 186. Moreover, the court concluded that school districts were not compelled to provided services exclusively at public or private school placements, and that "such a compulsion would be inconsistent with the regulatory scheme, which contemplates that the placement of children in programs will be guided generally by their individual educational needs." Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d at 187-88. Section 3602-c of the Education Law does not mandate the location where services are to be provided to a student, but a contention that such services cannot be provided at a nonpublic or parochial school is not supportable in light of Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174 (1988). See Board of Educ. v Kain, 60 A.D.3d 851, 851-52 (2009).
If special education services are to be provided to a student at a site other than the student’s non-public school, the school district in which the non-public school is located is responsible to provide the special education services, including, as applicable, arranging and providing transportation, including special transportation as appropriate, necessary for the student to receive special education services. See James P. DeLorenzo, Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007 - Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c at 15, Q & A #25 (VESID Sept. 2007).
Here, the DOE’s CSE developed an IESP for the student for the 2012/13 school year and recommended that the student receive individual , two (2) times per week for thirty (30) minutes per session, in a separate location (Ex. SD-1 at 3). The DOE arranged for a third party provider, i.e., to implement the student’s mandated services on-site at her nonpublic school.[5] Given this arrangement, described in the hearing record as a “transmittal,” I find that was the DOE’s authorized agent in implementing the student’s mandated IESP services.[6]
In the professional opinion of the Strivright providers, the student’s speech/language needs required that she receive such services at its center, rather than at her non-public school (R. 25; Ex. P-F).7 Given this recommendation and Strivright’s status an authorized agent of the DOE, I find that the DOE was required to transport the student to and from the Strivright center to receive mandated IESP services. See James P. DeLorenzo, Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007 - Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c at 15, Q & A #25 (VESID Sept. 2007). As the DOE failed to arrange for transportation of the student to and from the Strivright center to receive mandated IESP services during the 2012/13 school year, it shall be ordered to reimburse the parents, and/or direct pay, for all relevant transportation costs (Ex. P-H). See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S.[7] (1993); School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985); Mr. A. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.W. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Connors v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
or through other arrangements. See 64 Fed. Reg. 12,478 (1999); see also Application of the New York City Dep’t of Educ., Appeal No. 13-144 at 34 (SRO Oct. 22, 2014).
1. The agent holds the power to alter the legal relationship between his principal and third parties in matters within the scope of the agency. See Bickford v Menier, 107 N.Y. 490; Walsh v Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 73 N.Y. 5; Restatement, Agency 2d, § 12.
VI. ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT,
IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The parents’ claim for reimbursement, and/or direct payment, for costs of transportation of the student to and from the Strivright center to receive mandated IESP services during the 2012/13 school year is GRANTED;
and
2. Within thirty (30) days of the submission of adequate proof-of-payment or proof-of-transportation services rendered, the DOE shall reimburse the parents, and/or make direct payment, for costs of transportation of the student to and from the to receive mandated IESP services during the 2012/13 school year. Dated: April 23, 2014
Jeffrey J. Schiro, Esq. gc
JEFFREY J. SCHIRO, ESQ.
Impartial Hearing Officer JJS:gc
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
Within 35 days of the date of this decision, the parent and/or the New York City Department of Education has a right to appeal the decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department under Section 4404 of the Education Law and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
“The notice of intention to seek review shall be served upon the school district not less than 10 days before service of a copy of the petition for review upon such school district, and within 25 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. The petition for review shall be served upon the school district within 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. If the decision has been served by mail upon petitioner, the date of mailing and the four days subsequent thereto shall be excluded in computing the 25- or 35-day period.”
(8NYCRR279.2[b]) Failure to file the notice of intention to seek review is a waiver of the right to appeal this decision.
Directions and sample forms for filing an appeal are included with this decision. Directions and forms can also be found in the Office of State Review website: www.sro.nysed.gov/appeals.htm.
DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD ON APRIL 2, 2014
PARENT
A. Due Process Complaint Notice/Impartial Hearing Request, 12/12/13, 2 pgs.
B. Letter from I. (Confirmation of Rendered during November, 2012), 12/27/12,
1 pg.
C. Letter from I. (Confirmation of Rendered during December, 2012), 12/27/12,
1 pg.
D. Letter from I. Reuven (Confirmation of Rendered during January, 2013),
3/14/13, 1 pg.
E. Letter from I. Reuven (Confirmation of Rendered during February, 2013),
3/14/13, 1 pg.
F. Letter from , 3/25/14, 1 pg.
G. Report from , 3/25/14,[1] pg.
H. Proof-of-transportation services rendered, various dates, 4 pgs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Footnotes
[1] References to the hearing transcript are noted as “R.” References to exhibits admitted into evidence are noted as “Ex.”
[2] Following my appointment to this case, the DOE moved to extend the case compliance date in this matter twice in order to accommodate the availability of its hearing representative and its witnesses on the extensive issues raised in the parents’ due process complaint. In considering those requests, I weighed the cumulative impact of the relevant factors and found that the stated reasons for extension requests justified the delay in the resolution of the matter and were in accordance with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, requests for extensions of the case compliance date were granted (Exs. IHO-I, IHO-II).
[3] Speech or language impairment means a communication disorder, such as stuttering, impaired articulation, a language impairment or a voice impairment, that adversely affects a student’s educational performance. 8 NYCRR § 200.1(zz)(11).
[4] The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17.
[8] NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(iii), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(4); 8 NYCRR § 200.4(d)(2)(v). The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 404(1)(c); see also R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010). B. Dual Enrollment Services As noted earlier, a board of education must offer a FAPE to each student with a disability residing in the school district who requires special education services or programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a])(1)(A); N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 4402(2)(a), (b)(2). However, the IDEA confers no individual entitlement to special education or related services to students who are parentally placed in nonpublic schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10). Although boards of education are required by the IDEA to provide some special education services to some students enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools, no such students are individually entitled under the IDEA to any or all
[5] While a school district, or other public agency, is responsible for developing the child's IEP and must ensure that the child receives FAPE, it does not have to provide the services. The public agency responsible for the education of a child with a disability has the option of providing IEP services to the child directly, through the agency's own staff resources, or indirectly, by contracting with another public or private agency
[6] Agency is a fiduciary relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. See Smirlock Rlty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Comp., 70 A.D.2d 455 (2d Dep’t 197); Restatement, Agency 2d, §
[7] It is undisputed that the student made progress from her speech/language therapy services delivered last year (Exs. P-F, P-G).
[1] Individualized Education Services Program (IESP), 9/6/12, 7 pgs. IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER None DOCUMENTATION ENTERED INTO THE RECORD FOLLOWING THE HEARING PARENT None DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION None IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER I. Confirmation of Extension, 2/24/14, 1 pg. II. Confirmation of Extension, 3/24/14, 1 pg.