COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Melrose Public Schools
BSEA #2614457
Ruling on Melrose Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss
Parents in the above-referenced matter filed a Hearing Request on May 27, 2026. Parents then clarified the issues/amended the Hearing Request on June 2, 2026, and a Re-calculated Notice of Hearing was issued on June 3, 2026, scheduling the Hearing for July 8, 2026. Parents’ complaint alleges denials of FAPE and child find failures. The request seeks equitable monetary reimbursement for after-school care tuition[1] for all dates between October 2025 and June 2026 on which Student was physically excluded from the building as a result of informal administrative determinations. (Between September 4, 2025 and May 18, 2026, Student was dismissed from school eight times, twice by the school’s nurse. Four of the dismissals occurred in May of 2026. Parents seek that these dismissals/ exclusions be treated as disciplinary suspensions which triggered the District’s responsibility to conduct a Manifestation Determination Review.)
The Hearing Request also seeks reimbursement for a private neuropsychological evaluation, funding for other independent educational evaluations including a functional behavioral assessment (FBA) and compensation for private therapeutic services “to account for specific instructional hours lost during documented physical exclusions from the building” in Melrose. Lastly, Parents requested that Student’s records be corrected to reflect all informal removals as suspensions.
Melrose Public Schools (Melrose or District) filed a Response to the Hearing Request together with a Motion to Dismiss on June 8, 2026, arguing that Parent and Student never resided in Melrose, but rather Saugus, Lynnfield or Peabody during all times relevant to the period in question.
Melrose asserted that during the 2024-2025 and 2025-2026 school years, Student attended a general education, tuition-based preschool program in Melrose, the Franklin Early Childhood Center (hereafter Franklin) because it was convenient for Parent who is the Principal of an elementary school in Melrose, but lives with Student in Lynnfield, Massachusetts. On or about April of 2026, the Lynnfield Public Schools initiated the evaluation process to determine Student’s eligibility for special education services. Melrose denies any violations of the IDEA and seeks dismissal of the instant Hearing Request on the bases of residency, pursuant to MGL c. 76 §5[2] and MGL c. 71B §3[3].
The District further argued that the IDEA does not confer a right to stay-put where, as in the instant case, the student has not been found eligible to receive special education services.[4] Melrose further denies responsibility for provision of compensatory education and/ or monetary reimbursement to Parent for any “services, evaluations, or observations privately obtained by Parent”. Moreover, Melrose asserts that any claims arising prior to 2024 are barred pursuant to the IDEA two-year statute of limitations.
The Parties participated in a conference call on June 15, 2026, with the Hearing Officer during which mediation was discussed and the Motion to Dismiss referenced.
Parents did not file a written opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss, nor did they request a hearing on the motion within seven calendar days following receipt of said Motion; they also did not request an extension to file a response.[5]
On June 26, 2026, Melrose wrote to the BSEA seeking a ruling on its Motion to Dismiss and in the alternative a postponement of the Hearing.[6]
LEGAL STANDARDS
MOTION TO DISMISS
Rule XVII (A) and (B) of the BSEA Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure[7], at 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), authorize BSEA hearing officers to consider and allow a motion to dismiss for good cause, for lack of jurisdiction or when the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.[8] When deciding motions to dismiss, BSEA hearing officers are guided by the standards used by courts when deciding these types of motions.
To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[9] In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[10] If the pleadings so viewed fail to support a plausible claim for relief, the case may be dismissed.[11] To survive dismissal, accepting as true the allegations of the complaint, said “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”[12]
In the context of a BSEA hearing, after taking as true the allegations raised in the hearing request, if the hearing officer finds the party requesting the hearing can prove no set of facts entitling that party to any of the types of relief that may be granted through the BSEA (consistent with its limited grant of authority), the hearing request must be dismissed.
BSEA'S JURISDICTION
In Massachusetts the jurisdiction of the BSEA is limited to the grant of authority pursuant to 20 USC §1415(b)(6); M.G.L. c.71B §2A; 34 CFR 300.507(a)(1); 603 CMR 28.08 (3); and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Specifically, under the above-cited provisions, the BSEA may adjudicate disputes “among school districts, private schools, parents and state agencies”[13]. See G.L. c. 71B §2A and 603 CMR 28.08(3). In pertinent part, 603 CMR 28.08(3) notes that the BSEA may hear controversies involving
“… the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as set forth in 34 CFR §§104-31-104-39.” 603 CMR 28.08(3).
MANIFESTATION DETERMINATION REVIEW
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires that all eligible disabled students receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE)[14], and it further requires compliance with procedural safeguards designed to protect the rights of parents and students,[15] ensuring meaningful parental participation.[16] Massachusetts has adopted the IDEA, and specifically, the federal standards involving discipline of eligible students. (MGL c.71B and implementing regulations at 603 CMR.28 et seq.).
The specific process which school districts must follow when taking disciplinary action against an eligible student for violations of the school’s code of conduct is described at 20 USC § 1415 (k)(1)(B) and (C) which provide that:
(B) Authority. School personnel under this subsection may remove a child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct from their current placement to an appropriate interim alternative educational setting, another setting, or suspension, for not more than 10 school days (to the extent such alternatives are applied to children without disabilities).
(C) Additional Authority. If school personnel seek to order a change in placement that would exceed 10 school days and the behavior that gave rise to the violation of the school code is determined not to be a manifestation of the child's disability pursuant to subparagraph (E), the relevant disciplinary procedures applicable to children without disabilities may be applied to the child in the same manner and for the same duration in which the procedures would be applied to children without disabilities, except as provided in section 612 A1 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) although it may be provided in an interim alternative educational setting.[17]
Students who are removed from their educational school placement for more than 10 school days in a school year must be provided with educational services. 20 USC § 1415 (k)(1)(D).[18]
Following disciplinary removals amounting to 10 school days, the school district must convene a meeting to conduct a manifestation determination review (MDR)[19] inclusive of parent, a representative from the school, “and relevant members of the child's IEP Team (as determined by the parent and the [school])”[20], prior to initiating any additional disciplinary action. Moreover, pursuant to 34 CFR 300.536 (e) the MDR Team must convene within 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a student for disciplinary reasons.[21]
DISCUSSION OF FACTS[22] AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
Student, who is five years old, lives with Mother in Lynnfield. Student presents with an adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. Medical providers have identified “Rule Out” diagnoses of ADHD, Anxiety Disorder and other developmental related concerns (Autism Spectrum Disorder).
Student attended Franklin (a tuition-based general education, preschool program) in Melrose during the 2024-2025 and 2025-2026 school year, because it was convenient for Parent given her responsibilities as elementary school Principal in Melrose. At the time of his enrollment in the fall of 2024, Mother acknowledged that his tuition was for general education services only. Nevertheless, in October of 2025, Mother requested that an FBA be conducted to address Student’s dysregulation. The request was denied.
Neither parent has ever lived in Melrose. Enrollment at Franklin is open to Melrose and non-Melrose residents who are three or four years old by September 1st of the incoming school year, and who have completed the registration process.
On or about November 6, 2025, Parent requested that a formal special education evaluation be conducted through Melrose. This request was denied on the basis of residency. Mother requested a residency exemption from Melrose’s Superintendent for purposes of the evaluation. This was also denied. At that time, Mother lived in Saugus and Father lived in Peabody. Melrose informed Parents that Student’s district of residence was responsible to conduct the evaluation and noted Melrose’s willingness to facilitate the process and work with the evaluators.
Sometime on or around January of 2026, Mother informed Melrose that she had moved to Lynnfield. In April of 2026, Lynnfield Public Schools initiated the evaluation process to determine whether Student was IDEA eligible. (The evaluation was underway at the time Parents filed the instant Hearing Request.)
In May of 2026, Melrose met twice with Parents to discuss Student’s behavioral challenges in the classroom, and on May 20, 2026, Melrose informed them that Student’s enrollment at Franklin would end on May 29, 2026. Melrose explained that it could not provide the level of support Student required to be safe and successful due to lack of resources, staffing and the need to service students already on IEPs. That same day, Mother filed the instant Hearing Request arguing that Melrose was deflecting its child find obligations and had failed to provide Student behavioral supports to ensure his safety.[23] Invoking stay-put rights, Parents sought that: Melrose be prevented from terminating Student’s enrollment prior to June 17, 2026 (the end of the school year); that he remain in his Franklin placement with one-to-one paraprofessional support specifically assigned to him; that all tuition charges for the month of June be waived and that Parents be reimbursed for all the days in which Student was excluded for half or a full day during the 2025-2026 school year; that they receive full monetary reimbursement for prepaid after-care tuition fees during the month of June 2026 as well as for the days when Student was excluded from the building via dismissals; that Student be awarded compensatory education in the form of private specialized tutoring or behavioral therapy to make up the instructional hours Student lost; funding of an Independent Functional Behavioral Assessment and a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation; and that records that falsified/ omitted Student’s attendance/ dismissal data that contradicted texts and documented evaluation appointments, be corrected.
To the extent that Melrose challenges Parents’ Hearing Request on the basis of the statute of limitations, said argument is inapplicable here as Parents’ claims fall squarely within the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations. (See 20 USC §1415 (f)(3)(C) and 20 USC §1415 (b)(6)(B). While Student’s enrollment in Melrose initiated in the fall of 2024, Parents’ claims involve Melrose’s actions starting in the fall of 2025.
The District is persuasive that Student has never been a resident of Melrose and that he only participated in a tuition-based general education, preschool and after-school program in Melrose. Moreover, at the time of enrollment, Parents were aware of Student’s behavioral dysregulation, despite having acknowledged that Student’s tuition was for general education services only. As early as the fall of 2025, Parents were aware that they had a right to have either of the districts where they resided conduct an evaluation of Student, and yet, they insisted that Melrose conduct the initial evaluation.
Student’s difficulties continued during the 2025-2026 school year and each time Parents asked Melrose to perform the evaluations, Melrose declined informing Parents that said evaluation was the responsibility of the districts where Parents resided. Following Mother’s relocation to Lynnfield, she sought the evaluation from Lynnfield Public Schools.
MGL c. 76 §5 grants school age children in Massachusetts the right to attend public school in the town where they reside, and if they are minors, the district where the parents reside. MGL c. 71B §3 ascribes responsibility to the school district of residence to identify and provide special education services to eligible school-age children. Thus, the educational responsibility for Student herein was never with Melrose. At different points in time between 2024 and 2026 that responsibility rested with Saugus, Peabody or Lynnfield. See George and Irene Walker Home for Children v. Town of Franklin, 416 Mass. 291 (1993); 621 N.E. 2d 376. Parents were aware of the latter since they first requested that Melrose evaluate Student in the fall of 2025, and in April of 2026, requested that Lynnfield conduct the evaluation. Notably, they also agreed at the time of Student’s registration that Melrose would only be responsible for general education services, and not for anything having to do with special education.
Parents’ Hearing Request seeks that each of Student’s eight dismissals, including the two made by the school’s nurse, be counted as suspensions further claiming that the District failed to convene a manifestation determination review. A manifestation determination review is only mandated when ten consecutive or cumulative disciplinary exclusions occur during a school year. Melrose was under no obligation to convene a manifestation determination review, because at the time that Student’s tuition-based general education, preschool program participation terminated he had been dismissed/ excluded from the program only eight times. Therefore, the District’s responsibility to convene such review was not triggered.
At the time of registration, Parents acknowledged that Student’s tuition was for general education services/after school care only, thus waiving any potential Melrose responsibility for offering special education services. As such, and most importantly given that Melrose was not Student’s district of residence, Parents would not be entitled to orders requiring that Melrose assign a one-to-one paraprofessional support, offer compensatory education in the form of private specialized tutoring or behavioral therapy, or fund an independent Functional Behavioral Assessment or neuropsychological evaluation.[24]
The remainder of Parents’ requests regarding record corrections, preventing Melrose from terminating Student’s enrollment, monetary reimbursement for tuition and prepaid after-care fees during the month of June 2026 and during other building exclusions, involve general education determinations over which the BSEA lacks jurisdictional authority.
Lastly, Parents did not respond or oppose Melrose’s Motion to Dismiss within the seven calendar days following receipt of the Motion or at any time thereafter, never requested nor were they granted an extension of time to respond to the Motion and did not in any manner disagree or dispute the District’s factual assertions or reasoning.
Taking as true the allegations in Parents’ complaints, and drawing all inferences in Parents’ favor as I am required to do in the context of a Motion to Dismiss, I find that the pleadings so viewed fail to support a plausible claim for relief.[25] Melrose is persuasive that Parents’ Hearing Request failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
As such, Melrose’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this matter is DISMISSED with Prejudice as to Melrose.
So Ordered by the Hearing Officer,
Rosa I. Figueroa
Rosa I. Figueroa
Dated: July 2, 2026
Footnotes
[1] Although Parents’ Hearing Request mentions seeking this type of relief, no further information regarding what this specifically entails is provided.
[2] School age children in Massachusetts have a right to attend public schools in the town where they reside.
[3] MGL c. 71B §3 ascribes responsibility to identify eligible children to the school district where the student resides.
[4] 603 CMR 28.08.
[5] See Rule VI.C. of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals.
[6] Attached was an Out of District Registration Form signed by Mother on January 27, 2024, where it is noted that Parent “understands that the tuition for my child while enrolled in the Melrose Public Schools Early Childhood Center, will cover his/ her general education. If at any time it is determined that my child needs special education services this will not be provided. I take responsibility to seek services from my town or from a private source. I understand that when my child is age eligible for kindergarten, he/ she will not be able to participate in Melrose Public Schools Kindergarten Programs”.
[7] 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[8] These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.
[9] Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[10] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[11] Tomaselli v. Beaulieu, No. 08-CV-10666-PBS, 2010WL2105347, at 3* (D. Mass. May 7, 2010); Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc. 572 F. 3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967(2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (discussing the plausibility standard).
[12] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[13] 603 CMR 28.08(3).
[14] 20 USC §1400 (D)(1)(A).
[15] 20 USC §1415 (f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 CFR 300.513 (a)(2).
[16] See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050 (1982).
[17] See 34 CFR 300.530 et seq.
[18] See 34 CFR 300.530(b)(2) and (d)(1)-(5).
[19] 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(E) and 34 CFR 300.530(e).
[20] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)(1).
[21] At the MDR meeting, the participants must review “all relevant information in the student's file, including the child's IEP, any teacher observations, and any relevant information provided by the parents”, consistent with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)(1), to ascertain: (1) “if the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to, the child's disability” or (2) “if the conduct in question was the direct result of the local education agency's failure to implement the IEP.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i)(I)–(II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)(1)(i)–(ii). The answer to those questions determines the manner in which a student may be disciplined and the Team’s additional responsibilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C); 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(F)(i) and (ii); and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F)(iii); See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(c) and 34 CFR § 300.530(g).
[22] The facts herein are taken from the Parties’ pleadings and are considered to be true for purposes of this Motion only.
[23] During this time Parents received assistance from a special education advocate, David Magee.
[24] Funding of independent evaluations is triggered after a district conducts its evaluation.
[25] Tomaselli v. Beaulieu, No. 08-CV-10666-PBS, 2010WL2105347, at 3* (D. Mass. May 7, 2010); Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc. 572 F. 3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967(2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (discussing the plausibility standard).