COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In re: Blake[1] v. Wachusett Regional School District & BSEA #2613049
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
RULING ON MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Motion filed on May 14, 2026, by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE or the Department) to dismiss the Hearing Request filed by Parents on behalf of Blake. On the same date, Parents filed their Motion to Quash in Opposition to Department’s Motion to Dismiss (Opposition). As neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, I am issuing this Ruling on the Department’s Motion to Dismiss (Motion) without a hearing, pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules).
For the reasons set forth below, DESE’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 5, 2026, Parents filed a Hearing Request against Wachusett Regional School District (Wachusett or the District) and DESE. Parents allege that the District violated Child Find and evaluation obligations, failed to properly determine eligibility and provide an Individualized Education Program (IEP), systematically disregarded Independent Educational Evaluations (IEEs), failed to address and remedy disability-based bullying, and interfered with parental participation through procedural violations. Parents further allege that the Department failed to exercise oversight by “failing to intervene despite notice through PRS complaints and documented violations. . . allowing Wachusett’s noncompliance to persist unchecked.”
According to Parents, Blake is a fourteen-year-old student with speech, language, and learning disabilities, currently attending school within the Dudley-Charlton Regional School District, but previously attending a school within Wachusett. Parents contend that despite clear evidence and substantial documentation of these disabilities, the District failed to identify, evaluate, and appropriately serve Blake, forcing Parents to obtain private evaluations and services. Specifically, Parents assert that the District’s actions and inactions include: (1) violating obligations under Child Find, resulting in “years of delayed eligibility and services;” (2) failing to properly determine eligibility and develop IEPs by minimizing Blake’s needs, thus denying him a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE); (3) consistently disregarding IEEs that contained findings of dyslexia, language impairment, and related needs; (4) failing to address and remedy disability-based bullying that interfered directly with Blake’s access to education; and (5) undermining Parents’ rights to participate meaningfully in Blake’s education through procedural violations. In their final claim, (6), Parents allege that the Department has failed to exercise oversight over the District, declining to intervene despite being put on notice of the District’s violations. As a remedy, Parents request that Blake be identified as eligible for special education and related services under the categories of Specific Learning Disability (dyslexia) and Communication Disorder; that an appropriate IEP be developed for Blake;[2] that Wachusett provide compensatory education for period of denial of FAPE; that Wachusett be ordered to undergo district-wide corrective action and training; and that DESE monitor to ensure Wachusett’s compliance.
The Hearing in the underlying matter is scheduled for June 9, 2026.
On May 14, 2026, Wachusett filed its Response and a Sufficiency Challenge to the Hearing Request. On May 19, 2026, the undersigned Hearing Officer denied the District’s Sufficiency Challenge.
DESE filed the instant Motion on May 14, 2026, asserting that Parents’ Hearing Request fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that the BSEA does not have jurisdiction over Parents’ claims against the Department. On the same date, Parents filed their Opposition.
II. DISCUSSION
Whether Parents’ claims survive a Motion to Dismiss turns on both the procedural standards for such a motion and the substantive standards governing their claims.
A. Standard for Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVIIB of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This rule is analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, what is required to survive a motion to dismiss “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[3] Moreover, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[4] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[5] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . .”[6]
B. BSEA Jurisdiction
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides parents with a formal due process complaint process with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[7] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency before which any impartial due process hearing regarding these issues takes place. The BSEA is an agency of limited jurisdiction; it has jurisdiction over requests for hearing filed by:
a parent or school district . . . on any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 . . . .[8]
As BSEA Hearing Officers have recognized, “individual claims must be dismissed . . . if they do not arise under federal or state special education statutes, or applicable portions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Unlike a court with general jurisdiction, the BSEA may consider only those claims for which enabling statutes and regulations expressly grant authority.”[9]
It is within this legal framework that I now examine the allegations in this case.
C. Application of Legal Standards Requires Dismissal of All Claims Against DESE
The Department asserts that all claims set forth in Parents’ Hearing Request should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. As DESE divides its arguments into two sections, I do the same.
1. Claim 6, Parents’ Claim that the Department Failed to Exercise Oversight Over the District, is Not Within the Jurisdiction of the BSEA and Fails to State a Claim upon Which Relief May be Based.
Parents contend that DESE failed to intervene despite the Department being on notice of the District’s violations through Problem Resolution System (PRS) complaints as well as other documentation. Although Parents concede that Wachusett has primary responsibility over such violations, they assert that DESE secondarily failed to exercise oversight pertaining to the alleged violations, thus allowing the District’s noncompliance to continue.
In its Motion, DESE argues that Parents cannot assert such a claim against the Department because the IDEA does not provide an individual right to enforce a State’s supervisory responsibilities over special education.[10] The Department cites to a ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissing claims against a state agency, as the IDEA does not “authorize[] claims against a state agency rooted in the State’s general supervisory role under the IDEA.”[11] Additionally, DESE cites to a 2023 Ruling where the BSEA considered this question and ruled the same way, concluding that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities because Section 1415 of the IDEA does not authorize a private right of action for violations of Section 1412.[12]
In their Opposition, Parents assert that the Department’s reliance on 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) is incorrect, as this is not a case of general failure to supervise but rather one of direct notice of specific allegations. Specifically, Parents contend the Department had direct notice involving “failure to appropriately identify and evaluate [Blake]; failure to consider independent evaluations; bullying and disability-based harassment; predetermination and denial of parental participation; ongoing deprivation of [a] FAPE.” To this point, Parents argue that the Department’s reliance on case law is similarly misplaced, as in the instant matter, DESE was on actual notice and knowingly ignored a school district’s violations. Additionally, Parents assert that the IDEA bestows responsibility upon the State Educational Agency (“SEA”), which is DESE; and that the relief they seek is connected directly to Blake’s educational rights, over which the BSEA has authority, and specifically relates to the Department regarding monitoring remedies.
To evaluate DESE’s Motion as to this claim, I must take as true Parents’ factual allegations, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom in Parents’ favor, and I must find that they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.[13] As such, I take as true Parents’ allegations that they alerted the Department to Wachusett’s violations of Blake’s right to a FAPE and that DESE failed to act in accordance with its supervisory responsibility for school districts’ provision of special education services to eligible students.
These facts, however, taken as true, do not suggest an entitlement to relief for which the BSEA may find DESE liable,[14] because the responsibility for developing and implementing IEPs “is placed upon local school districts and not the state,”[15] and because there is no private right of action for violations of the DESE’s supervisory responsibilities under the IDEA.[16] For these reasons, to the extent Parents wish to pursue claims against the Department for its failure to supervise Wachusett, such claims do not arise under federal or state special education statutes within the BSEA's jurisdiction.[17]
2. Claims 1 Through 5, Alleging Actions and Inactions by Wachusett, Fail to State a Claim Against the Department
The remainder of Parents’ claims assert that the District: (1) violated its Child Find obligations; (2) failed to properly determine eligibility and develop IEPs; (3) consistently disregarded IEEs; (4) failed to address and remedy disability-based bullying; and (5) undermined Parents’ rights to participate meaningfully in Blake’s education.
In its Motion, the Department contends that this portion of the Hearing Request does not identify any action or inaction taken by the Department and, as such, each of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 fails to state a claim for relief against DESE.[18] To the extent Parents imply that DESE may be held liable on these claims based on the Department’s supervisory responsibility, DESE asserts that they should be dismissed for the reasons applicable to Claim 6. Additionally, the Department is not mentioned in Claims 1, 2, 3, or 5. The Department is referenced only in Claim 4 with regard to a PRS decision on bullying.
In their Opposition, Parents assert that Claims 1 through 5 are not meant to be read in isolation from Claim 6. They argue that all Claims are interconnected and point to the Motion in which DESE concedes that PRS confirmed bullying allegations, demonstrating the entanglement between Claims 4 and 6 and actual notice of violations by the District. Additionally, Parents contend that the Department’s position undermines the IDEA, as allowing the Motion would essentially permit SEAs to receive notice of violations, fail to address such violations, and then deny responsibility once challenged.
The Department is correct that Claims 1 through 5 do not allege any action or inaction by DESE. As such, even taking as true Parents’ factual allegations and any inferences that may be drawn therefrom, as I must,[19] this factual content does not allow for a “reasonable inference that the [Department] is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[20] Each of Claims 1 through 5 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against DESE.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon reviewing DESE’s Motion to Dismiss and Parents’ Opposition thereto, I find that Claims 1 through 5 fail to state a claim against the Department, and that Claim 6 is not within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.
ORDER
The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED, with prejudice, as to all of Parents’ claims in their Hearing Request.
By the Hearing Officer: [21]
/s/ Amy Reichbach
Amy M. Reichbach
Dated: May 26, 2026
Footnotes
[1] “Blake” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in the documents available to the public.
[2] Given that Blake no longer attends a school within the Wachusett Regional School District, and the school district in which Blake is currently enrolled is not a party to this matter, it is unclear how such remedy would be ordered, if found appropriate.
[3] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[4] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
[5] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[6] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)’”).
[7] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
[8] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a). Sections 3(c) and 3(d) of 603 CMR 28.08 contain certain exceptions that do not apply here.
[9] In Re: Parent and Student v. Springfield Public Schools (Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss), BSEA # 2309351 (Mitchell, 2023) [hereinafter Springfield Ruling] (citing In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools, BSEA # 2203555 and # 2210887 (Berman, 2022) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted)); see In Re: Hank and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss) BSEA # 2607508 (Reichbach, 2026); In Re: Frank and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss) BSEA # 260587 (Reichbach, 2026).
[10] Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11), to maintain eligibility for federal funding under the IDEA Part B, a State must provide assurances that it has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that the State meets certain conditions. Specifically, the State educational agency is responsible for general supervision, which involves, in pertinent part, ensuring that the requirements of the relevant subchapter are met and that all educational programs for children with disabilities in the State, including those administered by local educational agencies, “(I) are under the general supervision of individuals in the State who are responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities; and (II) meet the educational standards of the State educational agency.”
[11] Larach-Cohen v. Porter, 2021 WL 1203686 (S.D.N.Y. 3/30/31) at \*3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. New York, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (State agency may not be sued as a defendant to an IDEA action brought pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(a)).
[12] Springfield Ruling at n.58.
[13] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iannoccino, 451 Mass. at 636; Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[14] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
[15] B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
[16] See, e.g., Larach-Cohen at \*3 (collecting cases supporting proposition that IDEA did not create a private right of action to remedy violations of section 1412); B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600-601 (collecting cases supporting proposition that state agencies may not be sued as defendants to an IDEA action based on their supervisory responsibilities); Springfield Ruling at n.58 (dismissing claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities, and collecting cases supporting proposition that no private right of action exists for violations of Section 1412 of the IDEA).
[17] See In Re: Hank; In Re: Frank; Springfield Ruling.
[18] See In Re: Student v. Longmeadow Public Schools (BSEA # 2510207) (October 31, 2025) (Kantor Nir, 2025) (asserting that “hearing officers [at the BSEA] have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” and “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”) (citing Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008)).
[19] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[20] Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
[21] The undersigned Hearing Officer is grateful for the diligent assistance of legal intern Olivia Syat in the preparation of this Ruling.