COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In re: Hank[1] and the Massachusetts
BSEA # 26-07508
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
RULING ON MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Motion filed on January 26, 2026, by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE or the Department) to Dismiss the Hearing Request filed by Parents on behalf of Hank (Motion). On the same date, Parents filed their Motion to Quash. As neither party has requested a Hearing on the Motion, and as neither testimony nor oral argument would advance my understanding of the issues involved, I am issuing this Ruling without a hearing, pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules).
For the reasons set forth below, DESE’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 14, 2026, Parents filed a Hearing Request against DESE “for its knowing failure to fulfill its non-delegable obligation as the State Educational Agency (‘SEA’) to ensure the provision of a Free Appropriate Public Education (‘FAPE’) to [Hank], a young student with documented disabilities.”
According to Parents, Hank is an elementary-age student with “high-average cognitive ability and significant, documented disabilities affecting access to the curriculum.” Said disabilities include a Specific Learning Disability; a speech sound/motor-speech impairment, comprising symptoms “entirely consistent with dysarthria or a motor-speech disorder;” and “dysgraphia (completely ignored by the district),” all of which adversely impact his decoding, phonological processing, spelling, and written expression. Parents contend that the Dudley-Charlton Regional School District (Dudley-Charlton or the District)[2] has acknowledged Hank’s “speech-sound errors and abnormal oral-motor patterns,” but has denied direct speech-language services, finding incorrectly that speech does not interfere with Hank’s access to the curriculum. Parents assert, further, that DESE “chooses to allow their districts to launch this sort of assault on student rights.” Specifically, Parents assert that: (A) the District has ignored a known speech disability, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); and (B) DESE affirmatively abdicated its duties and colluded with Dudley-Charlton because the Department had actual and constructive notice of these violations,[3] yet the Department failed to require corrective action, failed to mandate proper speech evaluation for motor-speech impairment, and failed to enforce compliance with the IDEA’s child-find and FAPE mandates.[4] According to Parents, DESE’s failure to take such actions constitutes a violation of the Department’s non-delegable duty to ensure that local Districts comply with the IDEA, as DESE permitted Dudley-Charlton to ignore a known speech disability, deny necessary related services, and implement an IEP that is not reasonably calculated to enable Hank’s progress.[5] Parents assert that Hank has suffered compensable harm as a “direct result of DESE’s failure to act,”[6] because the District denied Hank a FAPE.[7] Parents request, as a remedy, that the BSEA find that DESE has failed to meet its “SEA obligations under IDEA;” declare that Hank was denied a FAPE; order an immediate independent speech-language evaluation, by a clinician experienced in motor-speech disorders, at public expense; order compensatory education, including speech-language therapy and literacy remediation; and order prospective relief requiring DESE oversight “to ensure compliant IEP development and implementation.”
The Hearing is scheduled for February 18, 2026.
In the instant Motion, DESE asserts that Parents’ Hearing Request fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, further, that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over the claims. According to the Department, Claim A is against Dudley-Charlton, which is not a party to this dispute. DESE contends that the remainder of the Hearing Request must be dismissed because the IDEA does not provide a private right of action against the Department based on its supervisory authority.
In their Motion to Quash, which will be referred to as their Opposition, Parents contend that DESE’s characterization of their Hearing Request as “a generalized attempt to enforce abstract supervisory duties under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) . . . is inaccurate and incomplete.” Rather, they argue, they are alleging “that DESE had actual and constructive notice of a specific denial of a FAPE affecting a named student, involving a known speech-language disability, and failed to take any corrective or remedial action, resulting in ongoing educational harm.” According to Parents, the Department may be found liable for failing to act when it has been given notice of a systemic or student-specific denial. Moreover, only DESE can provide the relief they seek: prospective oversight, corrective action, and systemic safeguards to prevent recurrence. Parents state that Claim A provides necessary factual context for Claims B through E, and that dismissal of the former does not require dismissal of the latter. Finally, Parents assert that dismissal of their Hearing Request at this stage would be premature and contrary to the IDEA’s remedial purpose, as “[w]hether DESE in fact had sufficient notice, what authority it exercised or failed to exercise, and whether its inaction caused harm are fact-intensive questions that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.”
DISCUSSION
Whether Parents’ claims survive a Motion to Dismiss turns on both the procedural standards for such a motion and the substantive standards governing their claims.
Standard for Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss a Hearing Request
Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVIIB of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This rule is analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, what is required to survive a motion to dismiss “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[8] Moreover, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[9] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[10] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . .”[11]
BSEA Jurisdiction
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides parents with a formal due process complaint process with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[12] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency before which any impartial due process hearing regarding these issues takes place. The BSEA is an agency of limited jurisdiction; it has jurisdiction over requests for hearing filed by:
a parent or school district . . . on any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 . . . .[13]
As BSEA Hearing Officers have recognized, “individual claims must be dismissed . . . if they do not arise under federal or state special education statutes, or applicable portions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Unlike a court with general jurisdiction, the BSEA may consider only those claims for which enabling statutes and regulations expressly grant authority.”[14]
It is within this legal framework that I now examine the allegations in this case.
DESE’s Responsibilities Under the IDEA
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) provides that, as a condition of federal funding under IDEA Part B, the State educational agency (SEA) is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of IDEA Part B are met; and “that all educational programs for children with disabilities in the State … are under the general supervision of individuals in the State who are responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities; and meet the educational standards of the [SEA] …”
In two recent Rulings, I reviewed case law and previous BSEA rulings regarding a SEA’s responsibilities pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) and concluded that the IDEA does not create a private right of action that permits a parent to enforce a State’s supervisory responsibilities over special education.[15] That conclusion stands; the IDEA does not “authorize[] claims against a state agency rooted in the State’s general supervisory role under the IDEA.”[16]
Application of Legal Standards Permits Dismissal of All Claims Raised in Parents’ Hearing Request
Claim A, Alleging Actions and Inactions by Dudley-Charlton, Fails to State a Claim Against the Department
Claim A alleges that the District ignored a known speech disability, despite identification by evaluators of deficits “directly impacting literacy acquisition,” and concerns raised by parents and advocate that these deficits require direct speech-language intervention, not merely consultation. According to Parents, this amounts to “a categorical refusal to evaluate and serve an identified area of need, in violation of the IDEA.”
Taking these factual allegations as true and any inferences that may be drawn therefrom, as I must, for the purposes of the instant Motion, I assume that Dudley-Charlton denied Hank a FAPE.[17] This factual content, however, does not allow for a “reasonable inference that the [Department] is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[18] Thus, as Claim A fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against DESE, it is DISMISSED with prejudice.[19]
The Remaining Claims (Claims B through E), Are Not Within the Jurisdiction of the BSEA
In Claims B through E, Parents allege that the Department had actual and constructive notice of the violations outlined in Claim A but failed to take corrective action, resulting in compensable educational harm.[20]
To evaluate DESE’s Motion as to claims B through E, I must take as true Parents’ factual allegations, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom in Parents’ favor, and I must find that they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.[21] As such, I take as true Parents’ allegations that they alerted the Department to Dudley-Charlton’s violations of Hank’s right to a FAPE and that DESE failed to “enforce [Dudley-Charlton’s] compliance” with the IDEA, such that Hank suffered educational harm.
These facts, however, taken as true, do not suggest an entitlement to relief for which the BSEA may find DESE liable,[22] because the responsibility for evaluating a student and for developing and implementing IEPs “is placed upon local school districts and not the state,”[23] and because there is no private right of action for violations of the DESE’s supervisory responsibilities (including enforcing a school district’s compliance) under the IDEA.[24] For these reasons, Claims B through E do not arise under federal or state special education statutes that are within the jurisdiction of the BSEA and, therefore, are DISMISSED with prejudice.[25]
CONCLUSION
Upon reviewing DESE’s Motion and Parents’ Opposition thereto, I find that Claim A fails to state a claim against the Department, and that the remainder of Parents’ Hearing Request is not within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.
ORDER
The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s Motion is hereby ALLOWED, with prejudice, as to all of Parents’ claims. The matter is dismissed with prejudice.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Amy Reichbach
Amy M. Reichbach
Dated: February 10, 2026
Footnotes
[1] “Hank” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in the documents available to the public.
[2] The District was not included as a party to the Hearing Request.
[3] Specifically, Parents allege that the Department had notice that Dudley-Charlton was violating Hank’s right to a FAPE through parent communications, the content of Hank’s IEP itself, the District’s express rejection of direct speech-language services despite evidence, and DESE’s oversight and monitoring responsibilities.
[4] Parents detail Claims A and B in the “Factual Background” section of their Hearing Request.
[5] DESE characterizes this allegation, which Parents include in the “Legal Violations” section of their Hearing Request, as Claim C.
[6] DESE characterizes this allegation, which Parents include in the “Legal Violations” section of their Hearing Request, as Claim E.
[7] DESE characterizes this allegation, which Parents include in the “Legal Violations” section of their Hearing Request, as Claim D.
[8] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[9] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
[10] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[11] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)’”).
[12] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
[13] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a). Sections 3(c) and 3(d) of 603 CMR 28.08 contain certain exceptions that do not apply here.
[14] In Re: Parent and Student v. Springfield Public Schools et al. (Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss), BSEA #2309351 (Mitchell, 2023) [hereinafter Springfield Ruling] (citing In Re: Student v. Springfield Public Schools, BSEA #2203555 and 2210887 (Berman, 2022) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted)); see In Re: Frank v. Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling on DESE’s Motion to Dismiss; Ruling on DESE’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Hearing Request), BSEA #2605857 (Reichbach, 2026) [hereinafter Frank Rulings].
[15] Frank Rulings.
[16] Larach-Cohen v. Porter, 2021 WL 1203686 (S.D.N.Y. 3/30/31) at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. New York, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (State agency may not be sued as a defendant to an IDEA action brought pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(a)). See also In Re: Student v. the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling on DESE’s Motion to Dismiss), BSEA #2607507 (Kantor Nir, 2026) [hereinafter Kantor Nir Ruling] (concluding that the IDEA does not confer an individual right to enforce a State’s supervisory responsibilities over special education); In Re: Student & Franklin Public Schools & Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services (Ruling on Parents’ Motion to Join DESE), BSEA #2500429 (Mitchell, 2025) (“As I have previously recognized, however, no private right of action for DESE’s violations of Section 1412 of the IDEA exists in Section 1415 of the IDEA”).
[17] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[18] Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
[19] See 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). To the extent Claim A was meant to include, indirectly, a claim against DESE based on its supervisory responsibility, such claim is not within the jurisdiction of the BSEA for the reasons discussed in Section II(D)(ii), below.
[20] Parents contend that in failing to mandate that the District evaluate Hank properly for motor-speech impairment, the Department abdicated its duty to “enforce compliance with IDEA’s child-find and FAPE mandates.”
[21] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iannocchino, 451 Mass. at 636; Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[22] See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
[23] B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
[24] See, e.g., Larach-Cohen at *3 (collecting cases supporting proposition that IDEA did not create a private right of action to remedy violations of section 1412); B.J.S., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 600-601 (collecting cases supporting proposition that state agencies may not be sued as defendants to an IDEA action based on their supervisory responsibilities); Springfield Ruling at n. 58 (dismissing claims alleging violations of DESE’s general supervision responsibilities, and collecting cases supporting proposition that no private right of action exists for violations of Section 1412 of the IDEA).
[25] See Frank Rulings; Kantor Nir Ruling; Springfield Ruling.