COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In re: Mary[1] v. Lowell Public Schools BSEA #2612372
RULING ON LOWELL PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Partial Motion to Dismiss (Partial Motion) filed by Lowell Public Schools (Lowell or the District) on May 8, 2026. Parent filed a Hearing Request on behalf of Mary on April 20, 2026, alleging violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and other federal and state laws. Neither party requested a hearing on the Partial Motion, and as formal oral argument would not advance my understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing, pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules).
For the reasons set forth below, Lowell’s Partial Motion is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 20, 2026, Parent filed a document entitled Master Legal Packet [hereinafter, Hearing Request] with the BSEA[2] against Lowell and multiple other parties alleging violations of various federal and state statutes, District policies, and the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). Parent alleges, among other things, that despite having notice of Mary’s Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Lowell failed to evaluate Mary appropriately and delayed implementation of disability-related supports. Parent also contends that the District failed to implement Section 504 accommodations properly, subjected Mary to disciplinary consequences for behavior related to her disability, and denied her equal access to educational programs and services. Parent further asserts that Lowell personnel engaged in disability-based discrimination, retaliation, and conduct that created a hostile educational environment. In addition, Parent challenges the adequacy of the District's internal investigation process, the conduct of District counsel in responding to a Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) Problem Resolution System (PRS) complaint, and the adequacy of the PRS investigation itself. Parent seeks relief under Section 504, the ADA, the IDEA, and other federal and state laws. Specifically, Parent sets forth multiple claims, each with subsections, labeled as follows:
A. Federal Violations – Section 504
B. Federal Violations – ADA Title II
C. Federal Violations – IDEA
D. Massachusetts State Law Violations
E. Civil Rights Violations
F. District Policy Violations
G. Attorney Conduct Violations – MRPC
H. State Agency Misconduct – PRS/DESE
I. DCF-Related Retaliation and Misconduct
The matter was initially scheduled for Hearing on May 26, 2026, but a Recalculated Notice of Hearing later issued because Lowell had not received the Hearing Request, and the Hearing was rescheduled to June 2, 2026.
On April 30, 2026, Lowell filed a Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Hearing Request, which was denied on May 1, 2026.
On May 8, 2026, Lowell filed the instant Partial Motion, asserting that numerous allegations contained in Parent’s Hearing Request are beyond the jurisdiction of the BSEA and/or fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted. Lowell submitted exhibits in support of its Partial Motion. However, because a motion to dismiss tests only the sufficiency of the allegations in the Hearing Request, I do not consider those exhibits in the instant Ruling.[3]
Specifically, Lowell contends that the following categories of Parent's allegations either are beyond the BSEA’s jurisdiction or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:
1. Allegations regarding a purported conflict of interest in the District’s internal investigation process (F-3, F-4);[4]
2. Allegations asserting violations of the MRPC by District counsel (F-5, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4);
3. Allegations regarding the adequacy of DESE’s PRS investigation (H);
4. Allegations involving retaliation relating to a warning letter issued to Parent (A-4, B-3);
5. Allegations asserting a hostile educational environment based on disability-based discrimination, including under the ADA and G.L. c. 76, § 5 (A-5, B-1, D-2);
6. Allegations asserting violations of procedural safeguards (C-2), including those related to school discipline (D-4, F-1, F-2);
7. Allegations regarding failure to record disciplinary actions and report significant patterns to DESE, as required by DESE (D-6); and
8. Allegations asserting violation of equal protection (E).
Lowell argues that the allegations identified in Categories 1 through 5, 7, and 8, above, fall outside the BSEA's jurisdiction because they do not concern Mary's eligibility, evaluation, placement, procedural protections, or access to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Lowell further contends that the allegations identified in Category 6 are unfounded and fail to plausibly establish an entitlement to relief.
On May 18, 2026, the parties jointly requested that the Hearing be postponed for ten weeks to permit the District to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of Mary and to continue exploring resolution. The request was allowed for good cause, and the Hearing was rescheduled for August 19 and 20, 2026.
II. DISCUSSION
Whether Parent’s claims survive Lowell’s Partial Motion turns on both the procedural standards governing such motions and the substantive standards governing the BSEA’s jurisdiction.
A. Standard for Ruling on Motion to Dismiss a Hearing Request Filed Pro Se
Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVI(B) of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This rule is analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, what is required to survive a motion to dismiss “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[5] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[6] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . .”[7]
Courts have held that complaints filed by pro se parties should be construed liberally.[8] According to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]he policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled."[9] This principle aligns with the First Circuit's recognition that "[o]ur judicial system zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf," while acknowledging that pro se litigants remain subject to applicable procedural and substantive requirements.[10]
B. BSEA Jurisdiction and Exhaustion
The IDEA provides parents with a formal due process complaint procedure with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[11] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency responsible for conducting impartial due process hearings concerning such matters. As an agency of limited jurisdiction, the BSEA has jurisdiction over hearing requests filed by:
a parent or school district . . . on any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities. A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 . . .[12]
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that plaintiffs need not file claims before agencies such as the BSEA in order to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA when seeking relief that is not available under the IDEA.[13] Where the essence of a claim involves the denial of FAPE, however, that claim is IDEA-based and must be brought before the BSEA rather than directly to court.[14] This ensures that the BSEA is able to “develop a factual record [and] apply its expertise.”[15] A claim is not IDEA-based, and therefore not properly before the BSEA, where a student solely seeks money damages for tort-like damages not subsumed in a federal claim, or where there are no factual assertions to indicate that a dispute exists concerning the individual student’s eligibility under the IDEA or Section 504 or the discharge of a school district’s procedural and substantive responsibilities under these statutes.[16]
It is within this legal framework that I now examine the allegations in this case.
C. Application of Legal Standards
Lowell focuses its requests for dismissal on eight categories of allegations made by Parent. I consider each in turn.
i. Conflict of Interest
Parent alleges that the involvement of a particular individual in the District’s internal investigation created a conflict of interest and, further, that Lowell failed to properly respond to Parent’s complaints regarding the investigator. Lowell argues that these allegations, which relate to internal personnel and administrative matters, fall outside the jurisdiction of the BSEA.
To the extent Parent seeks review of the District’s decision to assign a particular employee to investigate her complaint, Parent is not alleging a violation of the IDEA, Section 504, or state special education laws, nor does her claim concern Mary’s access to a FAPE. Parent does not allege that the assignment of the investigator affected Mary’s educational program, eligibility, evaluation, placement, procedural protections, or receipt of services. Even construing Parent’s claim liberally, as I must do,[17] I cannot conclude that this claim asserts a denial of Mary’s rights under the IDEA or Section 504.[18] Thus, Parent’s allegations regarding conflict of interest do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief that may be awarded by the BSEA.[19] Accordingly, Parent’s conflict-of-interest allegations are dismissed with prejudice.
ii. Professional Conduct
Parent alleges that the attorneys representing the District violated the MRPC in connection with Lowell’s response to her PRS complaint. Lowell contends that such allegations are beyond the BSEA's jurisdiction.
As the BSEA's jurisdiction is limited to disputes concerning a student's eligibility, evaluation, placement, procedural protections, and access to a FAPE under the IDEA and Section 504, claims falling outside those areas are not properly before the BSEA.[20] The BSEA does not possess authority to adjudicate alleged violations of the MRPC, or to impose attorney discipline.[21]
Even construing Parent’s Hearing Request liberally,[22] I find that Parent does not plausibly allege that the purported ethical violations themselves deprived Mary of a FAPE or otherwise constitute violations of the IDEA or Section 504.[23] Accordingly, Parent’s allegations regarding violations of the MRPC are dismissed with prejudice.
iii. PRS Investigation
Parent alleges that a DESE/PRS Education Specialist failed to conduct a thorough investigation of her complaint. Lowell argues that allegations regarding the adequacy of a PRS investigation are beyond the BSEA's jurisdiction because the PRS process and the BSEA’s due process system are separate administrative mechanisms.
The BSEA is not the appropriate forum for reviewing the conduct or conclusions of a PRS investigation.[24] Construing Parent’s allegations liberally, I find no plausible basis upon which these allegations may be understood as independently asserting a violation of Mary’s rights under the IDEA or Section 504.[25] Accordingly, Parent’s allegations concerning the adequacy of the PRS investigation are beyond the jurisdiction of the BSEA and are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
iv. Retaliation
Parent alleges that Lowell personnel retaliated against her by issuing a warning letter following interactions with District staff and threatened to file a 51A report with the Department of Children and Families (DCF) alleging sexual abuse against her family. Lowell argues that the warning letter was issued in response to Parent’s conduct toward school personnel and does not implicate Mary’s educational rights under the IDEA or Section 504.
Taking Parent’s allegations as true, I find that the issuance of a warning letter to Parent, standing alone, does not concern Mary’s eligibility, evaluation, placement, procedural protections, or access to a FAPE.[26] Nor has Parent plausibly alleged that the warning letter itself deprived Student of educational services or otherwise interfered with Student’s rights under IDEA or Section 504.[27]
Accordingly, Parent’s retaliation allegations relating to the warning letter issued to her do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief within the jurisdiction of the BSEA and must be dismissed with prejudice.[28]
v. Hostile Environment and Discrimination
Parent alleges that Mary was subject to disability-based discrimination and a hostile educational environment. Specifically, Parent asserts that Mary was disciplined differently from nondisabled peers; that the District failed to respond appropriately to disability-related behaviors; and that these actions interfered with Mary’s educational access and rights under Section 504. Parent also contends that Lowell’s actions violated the ADA, because Mary was excluded from educational programming or activities in the general education setting. Lowell argues that these allegations are unfounded and do not provide a basis for relief within the BSEA's jurisdiction.
At this early stage of the case, I must accept Parent’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in her favor.[29] Construing Parent’s Hearing Request liberally, I find that at least some of her allegations regarding disability-based discrimination may reasonably be understood as asserting violations of Mary’s right to a FAPE. As such, Parent has plausibly alleged an entitlement to relief within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.[30] Accordingly, Lowell’s Partial Motion is denied with respect to Parent’s allegations that Lowell’s disability-based discrimination impacted Mary’s right to a FAPE, and allowed as to allegations arising under the ADA or other statutes.[31]
vi. Procedural Safeguards
Parent asserts that Lowell failed to provide appropriate procedural safeguards in connection with Mary’s disability-related needs, disciplinary matters, and Section 504 protections. Lowell argues that these allegations should be dismissed because the District complied with its obligations and provided the procedural protections required by law.
Unlike the allegations discussed above, claims concerning procedural safeguards afforded to students with disabilities fall directly within the jurisdiction of the BSEA.[32] Whether Lowell ultimately complied with its procedural obligations is a factual question that cannot be appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss.[33]
Taking Parent’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Parent’s favor, as I must at this stage of the proceedings, I find that Parent has plausibly alleged procedural violations affecting Mary’s rights under Section 504 and/or the IDEA.[34] To the extent Parent alleges failure to follow proper disciplinary procedures flowing from other independent sources such as Lowell’s student handbook, however, such allegations are not within the BSEA’s jurisdiction.[35] Accordingly, Lowell’s Partial Motion is denied with respect to Parent’s claims that the District failed to follow procedural safeguards arising under Section 504 and/or the IDEA, impacting Mary’s access to a FAPE, and allowed with prejudice as to other claims regarding failure to follow proper disciplinary procedures.
vii. Recording of disciplinary actions and reporting of significant patterns to DESE, as required by DESE
Parent alleges that Lowell failed to comply with DESE oversight and reporting requirements, including the obligation to maintain accurate records of disciplinary actions. This claim does not, however, allege any violation of the IDEA or Section 504, nor does it draw a connection between such failure and Mary’s right to a FAPE. As such, even if Parent’s allegations are true, they do not comprise a claim within the BSEA’s jurisdiction.[36]
viii. Equal protection
Parent alleges that Lowell deprived Mary of her constitutional rights under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly violating her rights to due process and equal protection. Lowell argues that these claims should be dismissed, as Student does not have an IEP and the District did not violate any procedural protections related to school discipline.
As recognized by Hearing Officer Alina Kantor Nir in a separate BSEA matter, claims stating violations of constitutional rights “must be dismissed with prejudice as the BSEA lacks specific statutory authority over, or expertise and experience in, adjudicating constitutional claims.”[37]
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Upon reviewing Parent’s Hearing Request and Lowell Public Schools’ Partial Motion, I find that Parent’s claims regarding conflicts of interest in the District’s internal investigation process (F-3, F-4), violations of the MRPC by District counsel (F-5, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4), the adequacy of the DESE PRS investigation (H), retaliation relating to a warning letter issued to Parent (A-4, B-3), failure to record and report disciplinary actions (D-6), violation of equal protection (E), hostile educational environment under the ADA and G.L. c. 76, § 5 (B-1, D-2), and district disciplinary policy violations (F-1, F-2) do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief under the IDEA, Section 504, or other statutes within the jurisdiction of the BSEA. Lowell’s Partial Motion is ALLOWED as to these claims, each of which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
However, construing Parent’s Hearing Request liberally, as I must, I find that the remainder of the claims challenged by Lowell in its Partial Motion to Dismiss (specifically, A-5, C-2, and D-4) may reasonably be understood to assert a denial of Mary’s rights under Section 504 and/or a denial of a FAPE. Taken as true, these claims plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Lowell’s Partial Motion is DENIED as to Claims A-5, alleging disability-based discrimination in violation of Section 504, and C-2 and D-4, alleging violations of procedural safeguards, including those related to school discipline.
The Hearing shall proceed on August 19 and 20, 2026, on Parent’s surviving claims.
By the Hearing Officer:[38]
/s/ Amy Reichbach
Date: July 6, 2026
Footnotes
[1] “Mary” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in the documents available to the public.
[2] The title page of the Master Legal Packet stated that, in addition to the BSEA, the document was being filed simultaneously with the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE), and the Problem Resolution System (PRS).
[3] See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“If, on any motion asserting the defense numbered (6), to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56”); see also Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, *3 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Ordinarily, of course, any consideration of documents not attached to the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, is forbidden, unless the proceeding is properly converted into one for summary judgment”); Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000) (in evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts ordinarily consider only the allegations of the complaint, though may also consider documents properly incorporated therein).
[4] As Section III of Parent’s Master Legal Packet is labeled “Comprehensive Violations Catalog” and divided into sections A through I, each further divided into subsections, for ease of reference I use those same subsections here, as did Lowell in its Partial Motion.
[5] Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[6] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[7] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
[8] See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (noting that allegations contained in pro se pleadings are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing that courts should construe pro se pleadings liberally); In re: Student & Haverhill Public Schools (Ruling on Haverhill Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss), BSEA # 2301105 (Mitchell, 2022) (applying these principles to Hearing Request filed by a pro se parent).
[9] Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[10] Id.; see Instituto de Educ. Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
[11] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
[12] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a). Sections 3(c) and 3(d) of 603 CMR 28.08 contain exceptions to the BSEA's jurisdiction that are not applicable here.
[13] See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 169 (2017).
[14] See id. at 168-170; Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2002); Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000); In Re: Stewart v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District (Ruling on Acton-Boxborough Regional School District's Partial Motion to Dismiss and Parent's Motion to Join the Town of Acton), BSEA # 2101061 (Reichbach, 2021).
[15] Frazier, 276 F.3d at 60; see id. at 61; see also Fry, 580 U.S. at 168 (noting that hearing officers have expertise in addressing FAPE-related claims); In Re: Georgetown Public Schools (Motion to Dismiss of the Georgetown Public Schools), BSEA # 1405352 (Berman, 2014) (recognizing that FAPE-related claims asserted under non-IDEA laws may be subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement if the BSEA can “provide some meaningful relief or a superior record on which the court could make its determination” (internal citation omitted)).
[16] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168; see also In Re: Stewart (noting that the existence of an IEP does not alter the character of a parent’s claim, such that “a school’s conduct toward a student or an event that took place at school is not dispositive in determining whether the underlying claim concerns the denial of FAPE. Because the only relief the BSEA can grant is relief for the denial of a FAPE, I must dismiss any claims that do not concern the denial of a FAPE, regardless of where they transpired and whom they involved” (internal citations omitted)); In re: XiLi & The Guild School, BSEA # 1803736 (Byrne, 2018) ("Where a party requesting a BSEA hearing does not assert a substantive or procedural violation of a special education statute, and/or does not request relief authorized under any of these statutes, the BSEA lacks jurisdiction").
[17] See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520; Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[18] See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a); Fry, 580 U.S. at 171.
[19] See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.
[20] See In Re: Georgetown Public Schools (explaining that the BSEA's jurisdiction is limited to disputes concerning special education and Section 504 rights and that the BSEA may grant only relief authorized by those statutes and regulations).
[21] See G.L. c. 71B, § 2A(a); 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a); see also S.J.C. Rule 4:01 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court retains exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over any lawyer admitted to or engaging in the practice of law in the Commonwealth).
[22] See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520; Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[23] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168-170; Frazier, 276 F.3d at 59.
[24] See 603 CMR 28.08 (2) (“Findings and orders issued by the Department on complaints and the Department's processing of a complaint are not reviewable by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals”); see also In Re: Student v. Medford Public Schools, BSEA # 200251 (Figueroa, 2020) (recognizing that the PRS complaint process and BSEA due process proceedings are separate administrative mechanisms).
[25] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168-170; Frazier, 276 F.3d at 59.
[26] See 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[27] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168-170; Frazier, 276 F.3d at 59.
[28] See In Re: Student v. Dracut Public Schools, BSEA # 2302425 (Kantor Nir, 2023) (retaliation claim not relating to the student's evaluation or provision of special education services dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
[29] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407; Golchin, 460 Mass. at 223.
[30] See G.L. c. 71B, § 2A(a); 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a); Fry, 580 U.S. at 168-70; Georgetown Public Schools.
[31] To the extent Parent’s disability-based discrimination claims arise under the ADA and/or G.L. c. 76 § 5, however, those claims are dismissed. See Dracut Public Schools (“in contrast to Section 504, there is no express grant of jurisdiction to a BSEA Hearing Officer to address ADA claims” (internal citation omitted)).
[32] See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1998); see also Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist. 267 F.3d 877, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Procedural compliance is essential to ensuring that every eligible child receives a FAPE”).
[33] See In Re: Melrose Public Schools (Ruling on Melrose Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss), BSEA # 2205685 (Kantor Nir, 2022).
[34] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168; Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 891-92 (9th Cir. 2001). To the extent Parent alleges violations of procedural protections relating to school discipline, the BSEA has explicit jurisdiction. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k); G.L. c. 71, § 37H; BSEA Hearing Rule II(C); see also A.V. ex rel. Concepcion Varela v. Panama-Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 3255076, at *6 (E.D. Cal 2016) (denying dismissal of claim alleging failure to conduct a legally compliant Manifestation Determination Review (MDR) under Section 504).
[35] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168; In Re: Stewart (noting that not every claim involving a student who is on an IEP necessarily involves the denial of a FAPE).
[36] See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168; Frazier, 276 F.3d at 59.
[37] In Re: Dracut Public Schools.
[38] The undersigned Hearing Officer is grateful for the diligent assistance of legal intern Erika Gleason in the preparation of this Ruling.