COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student & Quincy Public Schools, Norwood Public Schools, Plymouth Public Schools and Chamberlain School BSEA 2611822
RULING ON CO-GUARDIAN’S MOTION TO RECUSE HEARING OFFICER
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Co-Guardian’s (Co-Guardian or Parent[1]) Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of Hearing Officer Mitchell (Motion), filed with the BSEA on June 24, 2026. None of the school Parties (collectively, Schools) have filed a response to the Motion, and the deadline to so file pursuant to Rule VI(C) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules) has passed.
As no Party requested a hearing on the Motion, and because neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer's understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing pursuant to Hearing Rule VI(D). For the reasons articulated below, the Co-Guardian’s Motion is DENIED.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[2]:
On April 9, 2026, Co-Guardian filed a Hearing Request alleging substantive violations of Student’s right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) [3]. Student is 21 years old and has a history of psychotic symptoms, paranoia, disorganized thinking, self-dialogue, and command auditory hallucinations that tell him to engage in harm to himself and others. According to the Hearing Request, Student is currently homeless, fled from his last shelter location for safety reasons, and, as a result, struggles with maintaining activities of daily living skills with respect to hygiene, laundry, medication management and consistently attending school. The Hearing Request seeks relief to provide Student with his remaining required educational programming, transition planning, educational access, secure lodging[4], transportation, vocational supports, medication management supports, and other related supports until age 22 to enable him to attend school regularly and graduate with a high school diploma, consistent with his long-standing IEP Vision statement[5].
The hearing was initially scheduled for May 22, 2026[6]. On May 19, 2026, after two Conference Calls and the filing of two sets of status reports by all Parties (that focused on an interim agreement to address Student’s immediate educational needs), the Hearing was postponed for good cause until September 15 and 16, 2026[7].
The Parties participated in a further Conference Call on May 26, 2026. Thereafter, on May 27, 2026, a Post Conference Call Order (May Order) issued, ordering the Parties to file another status report by June 26, 2026, addressing 5 specific items, and to update the Hearing Officer about a possible Resolution Session. This Order also summarized a conceptual graduation plan that the Parties advised they had agreed to.
On June 11, 2026[8], Co-Guardian filed Parent/Legal Guardian’s Emergency Motion for a Status Conference (Emergency Motion), seeking to convene an immediate “Emergency Status Conference” to address the Quincy Public Schools (Quincy) refusal to engage in “emergency safety planning” or to provide an “emergency student safety evaluation” of Student (further described as an “emergency Behavioral Threat Assessment (BTA) and clinical Safety Risk Evaluation”). This Emergency Motion was “predicated on severe, outside-in exploitation risks targeting the student’s documented cognitive deficits in risk analysis”. Co-Guardian sought to have an immediate Team meeting to finalize an “immediate protective interim safety plan” as well as the requested testing, which she claimed Quincy had refused to do.
According to attachments to the Emergency Motion, Student’s grandfather is currently held without bail on first-degree felony charges in Texas after having been determined to be at risk for “mass-lethality/murder-suicide risk profile”, and Co-Guardian is listed as witness for the state with regard to the charges. Student’s grandfather has now “launched an active proxy campaign utilizing local associates to execute predatory monitoring at family locations” of Co-Guardian. He has explicitly targeted Student by name in “jailhouse letters”, is aware of Student’s “psychiatric diagnoses, cognitive limitations and unhoused status”, and is using all this knowledge to exploit Student.
On June 11, 2026, this Hearing Officer contacted the Parties to attempt to schedule the requested Conference Call and to encourage the Parties to participate in the requested Team meeting and not wait for the Call to do so.
On June 23, 2026, the Parties participated in a Conference Call, virtually (Virtual Conference Call). During the Virtual Conference Call, the Parties jointly requested to postpone the deadline to file the upcoming status report until July 17, 2026, and agreed to include an update on scheduling and convening a Team meeting in said report. The Parties also discussed the reason that this Team meeting had yet to be convened. Co-Guardian explained that she was still waiting to receive a large-print version of the draft IEP from Quincy that it had previously agreed to provide to accommodate her disability. Quincy did not dispute it had agreed to provide this documentation but disputed that it was a necessary pre-requisite to a Team meeting. Ultimately, the Parties developed a plan for Co-Guardian to arrange to pick up this document the following day, if it did not otherwise arrive by mail. After the Virtual Conference Call, Co-Guardian sent a follow-up email to advise that she had not received the document in the mail, and that the plan developed for her to receive it the following day would no longer work. She requested Quincy deliver the document to her at her home.
On June 24, 2026, a Post Conference Call Order (June Order) issued revising the May Order by changing the deadline of the status report to July 17, 2026, and adding an obligation to report on scheduling of a Team meeting that would, among other things, “discuss educational-related requested supports or services pertaining to an out-of-state safety threat to Student”[9]. The cover email issuing the June Order, also addressed Co-Guardian’s email the prior evening[10].
Later, on June 24, 2026, Co-Guardian filed the Motion seeking recusal due to alleged improprieties during the Virtual Conference Call. Attached to the Motion was the June Order and the cover email, although no allegations pertaining to either document were raised in the Motion itself[11].
SUMMARY OF CO-GUARDIAN’S CLAIMS
Co-Guardian claims that the Virtual Conference Call should have been a “brief administrative call” designed “strictly to brief the tribunal, organize scheduling and clarify the items to be argued at a later date”. Instead, according to the Motion, I,
demonstrated explicit subjective pre-judgment of the core issues without a factual record, failed to maintain an impartial and neutral forum, and permitted the [Schools’] legal counsel to foster a hostile environment that openly cross-examine[d] and interrogate[d] the [Co-] Guardian’s documented disabilities, weaponizes the [Co-] Guardian’s status as a crime victim, and disregards binding accommodations under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to accommodate the administrative convenience of school districts”.
Specifically, Co-Guardian claims the Hearing Officer improperly issued substantive determinations on potential amendments to the Hearing Request; “pre-judg[ed] the scope of the case before an evidentiary record could be established” by adopting the Schools’ position on various issues; wrongly suggested Co-Guardian have Student’s outside therapists attend the Team meeting; allowed the Schools to “cross-examine and interrogate” Co-Guardian about her need for a disability accommodation that had been established and agreed to in October 2024; “shifted the burden of ADA compliance onto the disabled parent” by asking if Co-Guardian could drive to pick up the large-print draft IEP (which also put Co-Guardian in an uncomfortable position of having to share or “guard” further private information); disparately provided technical assistance to the Schools by advising that the IDEA does not require provision of a draft IEP prior to a Team meeting, without regard to any ADA requirements; allowed the Schools to make statements that mischaracterized Co-Guardians actions, which amounted to “bad faith harassment”; and failed to properly intervene in the Schools’ “coordinated characterization” of their frustration with Co-Guardian.
LEGAL STANDARD
The IDEA grants parties the right to an impartial due process hearing to resolve issues related to the “identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [a student], or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child”[12]. In order to ensure such impartiality, Hearing Officers must, in addition to possessing knowledge of, and the ability to understand, act and issue decisions in accordance with special education laws, administrative hearing procedural requirements and standard legal practice, at a minimum not be “(I) an employee of the State educational agency or the local educational agency involved in the education or care of the child; or (II) a person having a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the person’s objectivity in the hearing”,[13]. If a party feels that an assigned Hearing Officer does not meet these requirements, it can request recusal of that Hearing Officer.
When recusal is sought, a Hearing Officer must, via self-examination, apply a multi-part analysis to the request, as such requests are treated “seriously in order to protect the trust and confidence of the participants in this quasi-judicial proceeding”[14]. “… [I]t is the duty of the hearing officer when evaluating such a request to fairly examine the facts alleged and h[er] own conscience, as well as to attempt to view h[er] actions from the perspective of the litigants and the public”[15]. As a matter of policy, it is of utmost importance to the due process proceedings that all participants have trust and confidence in the impartiality and professional ability of the presiding hearing officer[16]. At the same time, a countervailing policy concern exists such “that a [hearing officer] once having drawn a case should not recuse h[er]self on an unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation; were [s]he to do so, the price of maintaining the purity of appearance would be the power of litigants or third parties to exercise a negative veto over the assignment of [hearing officers]”[17].
Thus, in addressing a request for recusal, a Hearing Officer must undertake a careful, and thorough examination of her own professional qualifications to hear the type of appeal presented; consider and be alert to any objective bars that arise in the particular matter before her; consider any subjective biases or prejudgments she may have about the parties or subject matter; and anticipate how her conduct of the matter might “appear” to the parties and the public[18]. While legitimate, and in some cases compelling reasons support denial of recusal requests, such as preventing “hearing officer shopping”, promoting conservation of scarce administrative resources and ensuring efficiency of the administrative management of a proceeding, such requests must be treated carefully and examined closely to confirm if there are any factors that exist in the particular case supporting recusal[19]. However, in the absence of any such factors, the Hearing Officer should not recuse herself.
Guided by this legal authority, I turn to the instant Motion.
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARD
A. Professional Qualifications and Objective Biases
This Hearing Officer is a member of the Massachusetts Bar in good standing and has practiced as an attorney in the Commonwealth for over nineteen years, representing, at various times, parents, students, and a public school district, before accepting a position as a Hearing Officer at the BSEA in 2021. Given the Hearing Officer’s professional qualifications, which are not challenged in the Motion, recusal on this basis is not warranted[20].
Additionally, in the instant matter, there are no allegations of, nor are there any financial, familial, or personal relationships in fact that would constitute an objective bar to my continuing as the Hearing Officer here. To my knowledge, no current or previous familial, personal, financial or professional relationship exists between myself and any party, or any expected witness in this matter. Further, while I have interacted professionally with the attorneys for the Schools in the past, it has always been strictly in my capacity as a Hearing Officer or as opposing counsel.
B. Subjective Bias and “Appearance” of Partiality
Overall, Co-Guardian raises an objection to the format of the Virtual Conference Call, asserting that it should have been limited to a brief proceeding to discuss scheduling, and clarification of issues, rather than a lengthy substantive discussion as to the District’s obligations to address, evaluate and support Student’s current out-of-state safety-based concerns and the challenges the Parties have faced to convene a Team meeting. Specifically, Co-Guardian contends this Hearing Officer was subjectively biased or acted in ways that have an “appearance” of partiality by improperly pre-determining actual or potential issues; providing two objectionable substantive suggestions; and failing to intervene when the Schools’ attorneys engaged in behavior/made statements Co-Guardian believed to be inaccurate or mischaracterizations[21].
As to Co-Guardian’s overall challenge to the Virtual Conference Call, her argument fails to account for the fact that the Virtual Conference Call was scheduled at her request pursuant to her Emergency Motion. The Emergency Motion raised new out-of-state safety-based concerns for Student and specifically requested the assistance of this Hearing Officer via an “emergency status conference” to address Quincy’s refusal to engage in safety-planning, perform a requested safety-evaluation and convene a Team meeting to discuss the safety issues.
Turning next to the specific claims, I start with the allegations of improper pre-determination. I note at the outset that as a Hearing Officer, I have a duty and a responsibility to issue a “fair, independent, and impartial decision based on the issues and evidence presented at the hearing and in accordance with the law”[22] (emphasis added). While, as in the instant matter, hearing officers may and often do communicate with parties about a pending matter prior to the hearing per se, the written decision can only be based on information that is admitted into evidence during the hearing itself. As the hearing on the merits has yet to be convened in this matter, anything discussed during pre-hearing proceedings cannot be considered by me in rendering my final decision on the issues I hear. Thus, contrary to Co-Guardian’s contentions, I have not and could not have “pre-judged” the matter, or “made final substantive determinations on the merits” of potential claims.
Additionally, generally parties are only bound by the written rulings and/or orders issued by a hearing officer in any matter, not oral discussions that occur during a pre-hearing proceeding (including any telephonic or virtual conference calls). To date all issues presented in the Hearing Request remain pending, have not been subject to any dispositive ruling, and no amendments to the Hearing Request have been filed.
As evidence of improper “pre-judg[ment]” and “final substantive determinations”, Co-Guardian points to my response to her question about amending the Hearing Request by adding certain enumerated claims, specifically, my indication that certain matters may be outside the Schools’ responsibilities. However, those statements merely provided Co-Guardian with information related to the jurisdictional limits that may be implicated by her potential amendment; a form of technical assistance with respect to the boundaries of the BSEA’s jurisdiction, rather than administrative overreach, improper pre-adjudication or bias. They were not and did not amount to any binding or substantive rulings.
Disagreeing with a hearing officer's interpretation of jurisdictional scope, no matter how unsatisfactory to the party seeking recusal, is not by itself a valid basis for disqualification. Allowing recusal on that basis alone would risk encouraging improper “hearing officer shopping”. As the Supreme Court held in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994),
“judicial remarks … that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.… Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune”[23] (emphasis in original).
Co-Guardian next challenges two suggestions I made during the conference call, namely, to have Student’s outside therapists attend the Team meeting[24], and that Co-Guardian drive to Quincy to obtain the large-print draft IEP she was waiting to receive, before participating in the Team meeting. I do not find either suggestion to be improper or to warrant recusal. Notwithstanding that neither suggestion was contained in any ruling or order (including but not limited to the May Order or the June Order), and was therefore non-binding on the Parties, such suggestions also do not evidence subjective bias or could otherwise appear to a reasonable person to indicate partiality. Both suggestions were intended to and provided potential solutions for the Parties consideration, to assist with scheduling and holding a productive Team meeting, one of the fundamental procedural elements of the IDEA[25], consistent with Co-Guardian’s own request in the Emergency Motion. That Co-Guardian is unable or declines to follow either or both suggestions, does not justify my disqualification as the hearing officer in this matter.
Finally, Co-Guardian seeks recusal on the basis that I failed to intervene on her behalf or that I implicitly adopted statements and positions of the Schools with which she disagreed without regard to her accommodation needs or rights. Co-Guardian does not point to any language in any ruling or order (including the May Order and the June Order) to support this claim, nor does anything so exist. She also does not present any evidence that I actually adopted the Schools’ attorneys’ disputed characterizations, relied on them in any procedural or substantive ruling or order (including the May Order and the June Order), or modified or rejected any agreed upon disability accommodations that may exist between the parties. To the extent Co-Guardian’s objection pertains to my statement relating to the IDEA not requiring a draft IEP be provided prior to a Team meeting, this is an accurate statement of IDEA's meeting requirements. Contrary to Co-Guardian’s contentions, it did not adjudicate an ADA accommodation claim, alter any Party's rights, or excuse the District's obligations under any potential 2024 accommodation agreement that may exist. A statement that, on its face, delineates jurisdictional boundaries rather than resolving a disputed claim does not constitute evidence of subjective bias or create an appearance of partiality. Allowing each party the opportunity to share a status update and their position on the issues being discussed, advising on jurisdictional limits of authority to address parental ADA accommodations, and addressing legal requirements under the IDEA pertaining to the Team process, evidences impartiality as opposed to partiality, as well as “knowledge of, and the ability to understand, act and issue decisions in accordance with special education laws “. Further, intervention on behalf of any party in a matter is contrary to the obligations of a neutral hearing officer, so failure to do so supports my retention as the hearing officer.
As explained by the First Circuit in In Re: United States, there is a “high threshold” when considering disqualification, and such determinations must seek to promote public confidence in judicial proceedings while also preventing parties from disqualifying an impartial judge to secure a preferable one[26]. A recusal determination falls within the discretion of the hearing officer presiding over the matter and “the denial of such a motion will only be reversed upon the showing of an abuse of such discretion”[27].
Upon careful analysis of Co-Guardian’s claims, and recognizing that even when no actual partiality exists, disqualification is warranted “to avoid even the appearance of impropriety”[28], I do not find there to be justification for recusal here. Co-Guardian’s claims of impropriety reflect disagreement with discussions she requested that occurred during the Virtual Conference Call she also requested. None of the disputed statements were included in any procedural or substantive ruling or order I have issued in this matter. As Co-Guardian’s allegations do not contain any direct evidence of subjective bias or prejudgments I may have about the parties or the issues in the Hearing Request, nor do they implicate an appearance of partiality, they amount to the type of “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation” that does not justify recusal[29]. Accordingly, there is no reasonable basis for granting the request for recusal and the Motion is hereby DENIED.
ORDER
I decline to recuse myself from this matter. Co-Guardian’s Motion is DENIED.
By the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Marguerite M. Mitchell
Marguerite M. Mitchell
Date: July 17, 2026
Footnotes
[1] The Co-Guardian filing this Motion is also Student’s Mother.
[2] The factual statements set forth are taken as true for purposes of this Ruling only.
[3] Although the Hearing Request noted that Student is currently a client of and receiving DMH services, the only respondents named were the Schools. DMH is not a party to the instant matter at this time.
[4] The Hearing Request specified this is distinct from a request for residential educational programming as Student “spent approximately five years in residential facilities and declined during that time” and no longer wants to continue in such programming.
[5] Additionally, Co-Guardian requests Student receive in-home occupational therapy supports pursuant to a prior agreement to provide the same; an assistive technology evaluation with implementation of its resulting recommendations; and a “driving evaluation” with related driver education and licensure support.
[6] This date was the result of a Recalculated Notice of Hearing, as some of the schools were not initially served with the Hearing Request.
[7] For a more detailed analysis and procedural history relating to the postponement request, refer to the May 19, 2026, Ruling on School Parties’ Request to Postpone Hearing – Revised.
[8] Although dated June 10, 2026, it was received after close of business and is deemed filed June 11, 2026.
[9] Additionally, the summary of the agreed-upon conceptual graduation plan was not included as it was already summarized in the May Order. In all other respects, the June Order reiterated the May Order.
[10] Specifically, I advised: “I also reviewed your email last night [], and while hopefully your suggestion to have Quincy deliver the document to you today can work (assuming of course there is another copy of it that can be made), if Quincy cannot deliver it, I suggest you identify someone else who is available to pick up the document for you sometime this week. Alternatively, you could also let Quincy know when [Student’s] father is available to pick it up. I do not need to be copied on these emails, however, to be clear, I am expecting you to be collaborative and flexible in working with Quincy to get this document, if you want to have it before the Team meeting. Should you decide you do not need it for the Team meeting, please also advise Quincy accordingly. To confirm, as we discussed, there is nothing in the IDEA to prohibit the Team meeting from proceeding without a draft IEP, provided no one at the meeting is looking at a draft IEP. Thank you.”
[11] However, in the cover email Co-Guardian asserted that, “Furthermore, the written Post-Conference Call Order issued by Hearing Officer Mitchell this morning directly supports and validates the necessity of this motion. (emphasis in original). The legal purpose of a brief pre-hearing conference call is strictly limited to clarifying the parameters of a future hearing and organizing scheduling. However, this morning's written order—which commands action and makes definitive adjustments regarding transition goals and academic credits—serves as immediate, written documentation that the Hearing Officer impermissibly used an informal phone call to make final substantive determinations on the merits of my claims without a factual record or a full evidentiary hearing."
[12] 20 USC 1415 (b)(6) and (f)(1)(A).
[13] 20 USC 1415 (f)(3)(A); see 34 CFR 300.511(c)(1); 603 CMR 28.08(3) (“… hearings shall be conducted by impartial … hearing officers who do not have personal or professional interests that would conflict with their objectivity in the hearing … and who are employed to conduct those proceedings”).
[14] In Re: Brookline Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 2303670, 29 MSER 101 (Figueroa, 2023); see In Re: Amherst-Pelham Reg. Sch. Dist. and Wendy, BSEA No. 2206283, 28 MSER 31 (Reichbach, 2022).
[15] In re: Danvers Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 1701031, 23 MSER 5 (Oliver, 2017).
[16] In re: Danvers, BSEA No. 1701031; In Re: Ludlow Pub. Schs., Ruling on Motion for Recusal, BSEA No. 1509319, 21 MSER 135 (Scannell, 2015); see In re: Northborough-Southborough Reg. Sch. Dist., BSEA No. 2201162, 27 MSER 411 (Kantor Nir, 2021)
[17] In Re: United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981); see In re: Northborough-Southborough, BSEA No. 2201162.
[18] In Re: Ludlow quoting In Re: Brockton Public Schools and Xylon, BSEA No. 11-0374, 16 MSER 367 (Byrne, 2010); In Re: Duxbury Public Schools and Ishmael, BSEA No. 09-1986, 14 MSER 363 (Byrne, 2008); In Re: Marblehead Public Schools, BSEA No. 02-2828, 8 MSER 84 (Crane, 2002); see In Re: Brookline BSEA No. 2303670; In Re: Wendy, BSEA No. 2206283.
[19] In re: Danvers, BSEA No. 1701031.
[20] See In Re: Ludlow, BSEA No. 1509319.
[21] I include in my analysis of these claims Co-Guardian’s allegations that I allowed the Schools to “cross-examine and interrogate” her about her need for a disability accommodation that had been established and agreed to in October 2024, and that I disparately provided technical assistance to the Schools by advising that the IDEA does not require that a draft IEP be provided prior to a Team meeting, without regard to any ADA accommodations.
[22] 603 CMR 28.08(5)(c); Hearing Rule IX(B).
[23] See In Re: United States, 441 F.3d 44, 67 (1st Cir. 2006) (“a judge’s rulings and statements in the course of the proceedings before him or her rarely provide a basis for recusal …” even if erroneous); In Re: Bridget Brown Parson, No. 21-30982, 2021 WL 5094786, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2021) (unsubstantiated claims of harassment, intimidation, discrimination, violation of various rights and allegations of a “hostile environment”, did not justify recusal as “nothing in the record indicating that a reasonable person with knowledge and understanding of all the relevant facts would conclude that this Court’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned”); see also In re Pease, No. ADV 10-5011-C, 2010 WL 1849919, at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2010) (finding the recusal request to be a “trial tactic, or as a substitute for obtaining appellate review of adverse decisions”).
[24] I note that this suggestion was made in response to Co-Guardian advising that these outside therapists had recommendations and/or opinions about services and/or supports Student required to access and attend school, particularly with regard to the out-of-state safety-based concerns. Moreover, the suggestion was not specific to the therapists attending the Team meeting but also included coordinating consultation between Student’s school-based and outside counselors.
[25] 20 USC 1415 (f)(3)(A)(ii); see 34 CFR 300.322 (pertaining to parent participation in Team meetings); 34 CFR 300.511(c)(1)(i)(B); 603 CMR 28.08(3).
[26] 158 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (“A party cannot cast sinister aspersions, fail to provide a factual basis for those aspersions, and then claim that the judge must disqualify [him]self because the aspersions, ex proprio vigore, create a cloud on [his] impartiality”); see In Re: Bulger, 710 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that recusal cannot be granted on a “standard of … mere suspicion” citing In re Allied–Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir 1989).
[27] U.S. v. Bremers, 195 F.3d. 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999) appeal after remand 50 Fed.Appx. 591 (5th Cir. 2002); see In re Wilborn, 401 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) citing U.S. v. Mizell, 88 F.3d. 288, 299 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting a judge’s broad discretion when determining disqualification).
[28] Bremers, 195 F3d at 226 citing Liljeberg v. Health Svcs. Acquisition Corp., 486 US 847, 860 (1988).
[29] In Re: United States, 666 F.2d at 694; see In re: Northborough-Southborough, BSEA No. 2201162.