COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Mendon-Upton Regional School District
BSEA # 26-10137
RULING ON THE DISTRICT’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on Mendon-Upton Regional School District’s (District) Response to Parent’s (sic) Hearing Request and Motion to Dismiss (Motion) filed with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) on March 24, 2026[1]. On March 31, 2026, Parents filed a letter in opposition to the District’s Motion (Opposition). Also on March 31, 2026, the District filed its Response to Parent’s (sic) Letter (Response). Neither party has requested a hearing on the Motion. Because neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer's understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without hearing, pursuant to Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rule VI(D). For the reasons articulated, the Motion is ALLOWED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND[2]
On March 11, 2026, Parents filed a Hearing Request on behalf of Student, who is a 9 year old third grader diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) that is supported through a 504 Plan. Among other claims, the Hearing Request alleged that the District had retaliated against the family (Retaliation Claim). Specifically, the Hearing Request alleged “[w]e feel we have been retaliated against by the district and that our children have been specifically threatened by the District, as evidenced by [a specifically identified staff member] stating ‘staff at [Student’s school] will take it out on your children if you continue to advocate for them’”.
On March 24, 2026 the District sought to dismiss the Retaliation Claim with prejudice, on the ground that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction to address any retaliation claims. The District argued that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Massachusetts Special Education laws (M.G.L. c. 71B) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), the BSEA’s only jurisdiction is with regard to “the eligibility, evaluation, placement, individualized education programs (IEP), and the provision of special education and procedural protections for students with disabilities”. Further the District denied “retaliat[ing] against parents [ ]or threaten[ing] children” and noted that “[t]he Parent (sic) has made numerous attempts to address issues similar to this through the BSEA and PRS, without success”.
On March 31, 2026, Parents filed their Opposition asserting, with respect to the Retaliation Claim[3],
“I believe the lack of communication and retaliation impacted my daughter’s ability to receive a complete extended evaluation, which resulted in a crisis situation in fall of 2025. The [specifically named staff member] told us on numerous occasions that her staff would take out their frustrations on my children[4], and I believe her. The District should be made to take appropriate action to ensure that my advocacy for my child does not preclude her from receiving a free and appropriate education, as is her right.”
Thereafter, on the same day, the District filed its Response, continuing to seek dismissal of the Retaliation Claim “with prejudice”, contending that there are no facts in the Hearing Request, “that raise a right to relief above the speculative level” to support it. Although the District acknowledges that the BSEA has jurisdiction over “retaliation claims if the alleged retaliation is connected to the provision of a [free appropriate public education] FAPE to the student”, it argues that the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over the Retaliation Claim as it is not FAPE-based. Specifically, the District submits that none of Parents’ allegations, including the claims relating to their disagreement with the results of an extended evaluation, “give rise to a FAPE claim”, particularly as Student “continues to do well in her current setting with the 504 accommodations in place”.
LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss.
Pursuant to Rule XVI(B)(1) and (4) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3)[5], Hearing Requests may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over a claim or if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief…”[6]. The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor”[7]. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level... [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the [hearing request] (even if doubtful in fact)”[8].
Motions to dismiss should be approached with caution, particularly when, as in the instant matter, the party filing the matter is pro se[9]. This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system [, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law[10]. However, even in such cases, “[w]hile ‘a trial judge is to employ less stringent standards in assessing pro se pleadings ... than would be used to judge the final product of lawyers,’ this leniency does not permit the district court to act as counsel for a party or to rewrite deficient pleadings”[11].
2. Jurisdiction of BSEA and the Notice Pleading Standard
The BSEA is not an agency of general jurisdiction. Rather, it is limited to considering “only those claims for which enabling statutes and regulations expressly grant authority”[12]. Under 20 USC §1415(b)(6), parties may file timely complaints “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child”[13]. Similarly, M.G.L. c. 71B §2A, establishing the BSEA, authorizes it to resolve special education disputes concerning,
“…(i) any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, education program or educational placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a [FAPE] to the child arising under this chapter and regulations promulgated hereunder or under the [IDEA], 20 U.S.C. [§]1400 et seq., and its regulations; or (ii) a student's rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. [§]794, and its regulations”[14].
Hearing requests filed under the IDEA need only provide fair notice to the opposing party of the nature of the dispute[15]. This is consistent with the FRCP notice pleading requirement[16]. However, “[w]hile …. detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, “… a [Parent and Student’s] obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of [their] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”[17].
3. Section 504 Retaliation Claims and the BSEA’s Jurisdiction
The BSEA and, recently, this Hearing Officer, have consistently recognized that retaliation claims brought under Section 504 that pertain to FAPE-related issues are within its jurisdiction[18]. According to the First Circuit, a party who wants to pursue such FAPE-based Section 504 retaliation claims, must “invoke due process hearing procedures of IDEA before filing her retaliation claim in federal court pursuant to [Section 504]”[19]. As the Weber Court reasoned, such claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement at the administrative level, as they are within the “zone of interest” that is protected or regulated by the IDEA[20].
The Courts apply a long-established burden-shifting framework in assessing any retaliation claim[21]. Consistent with this framework, in the first instance, for a parent to proceed with pursuing a Section 504 FAPE-based retaliation claim, the parent must “…show that (1) he or she engaged in protected conduct, (2) he or she was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action”[22].
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
After reviewing the Retaliation Claimin the light most favorable to Parents and viewing it deferentially in light of Parents’ pro se status, as I am required to do, I conclude that, as presented, it must be dismissed without prejudice.
As the District properly acknowledged in its Response, and as noted, supra, the First Circuit has clearly held that FAPE-based retaliation claims must be exhausted before the BSEA[23]. Thus, such FAPE-based retaliation claims are within the BSEA’s jurisdiction. As such, my analysis turns on whether the Retaliation Claim contains sufficient factual allegations to establish a prima facie case of FAPE-based retaliation.
I find that the information presented in the Hearing Request, even when considered in tandem with the Opposition[24], fails to meet the second and third elements required to pursue a claim of FAPE-based retaliation[25]. Specifically, although Parents have alleged that District staff threatened to retaliate against Student if Parents continued to advocate for her, there is no information presented as to when this threat was made, what, if any, specific alleged adverse action Student (or Parents) have been subjected to after this threat was made, or how this threat related to any of the other claims in the Hearing Request, that could otherwise potentially provide a causal connection between Parents’ advocacy and any potential adverse action[26].
I, therefore, find that, as currently presented, the Retaliation Claim lacks sufficient factual allegations to provide the District with fair notice as to the nature of the retaliation dispute[27]. However, since this deficiency may be cured, and if so cured, conceivably could involve a viable FAPE-based retaliation claim, dismissal with prejudice, as the District requests, is not warranted. As such, the Retaliation Claim is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
ORDER
The District’s Motion is ALLOWED in part as the Retaliation Claim is DISMISSED but DENIED insofar as the Motion seeks that such dismissal is with prejudice.The Hearing will proceed in accordance with the April 1, 2026 Ruling on all remaining claims in the Hearing Request.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Marguerite M. Mitchell
Marguerite M. Mitchell
Dated: April 14, 2026
Footnotes
[1] As noted in my April 1, 2026 Ruling on Joint Request to Postpone Hearing and to Convene Hearing Virtually (April 1, 2026 Ruling), during the initial Conference Call in this matter on March 30, 2026, the District clarified that it was only seeking a partial dismissal in the Motion, specifically dismissal of the retaliation claim, as argued in section 4 on page 3 of the Motion.
[2] The factual statements contained herein are taken as true for purposes of this Ruling only.
[3] The Opposition also included a request for sanctions, against the District’s attorney “and her associates” “to compel them to comply with confidentiality laws,” alleging that the District’s attorney “has, on numerous occasions, sent emails to the wrong person. In this case alone, documents are addressed to the wrong party and emails containing sensitive information have been sent to the wrong party.” In its Response, the District advised it will “continue to maintain confidentiality of the Student information and records”. I note that the Parties discussed these confidentiality concerns during the initial Conference Call held the day before Parents filed their Opposition. They reviewed the only email sent, to date, from the District’s attorney’s office and discussed each email address copied to it. The District acknowledged it had erroneously sent the email to the District’s former Special Education Administrator at her then-District email address, rather than to the current Special Education Administrator. However, as this error involved an email to a District email address that is no longer viable, rather than to an unrelated third party, I do not find there to have been any violation of confidentiality. Parents do not present any other evidence of alleged confidentiality breaches in this matter, beyond their unspecified claim. Thus, sanctions are not warranted, and Parents’ request is denied.
[4] Although Parents reference their “children”, I consider their arguments solely with regard to Student, as the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over allegations over more than one student at a time in any matter. Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir., 2000) (recognizing that for a party to have standing to pursue an IDEA claim “the harm asserted cannot be a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in equal measure by all or a large class of citizens”) quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 US 490, 499 (1975); see In Re: Student & Quincy & DESE, BSEA No. 2408249, 30 MSER 176 (Mitchell, 2024); In Re: Holyoke Pub. Schools and Jay, BSEA No. 1800619, 24 MSER 20 (Oliver, 2018); In Re: Springfield Pub. Schools, BSEA No. 1309716,19 MSER 294 (Oliver, 2013).
[5] As these rules/regulations are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP and MRCP, respectively), hearing officers are generally guided by federal court decisions in deciding such motions.
[6] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
[7] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[8] Iannocchino,451 Mass. at 636 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
[9] Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (allegations contained in a hearing request are to be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation [of their hearing request] is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled”); In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 2203555, 22 MSER 109, (Berman, 2022); see In Re: Easthampton Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 2203513, 28 MSER 35, (Kantor Nir, 2022).
[10] Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[11] Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 F.App'x 274, 276–77 (11th Cir. 2008) quoting Hepperle v. Johnston, 544 F.2d 201, 202 (5th Cir.1976).
[12] In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 2203555, 28 MSER 111 (Berman, 2022) citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm., 421 Mass. 570, 586 (1996) (“Any judicial review of agency action embodies the principle that an agency has no inherent authority beyond its enabling act and therefore it may do nothing that contradicts such legislation”); see 20 U.S.C. §1400 et. seq; M.G.L. 71B; 29 U.S.C. §794; In Re: Student & Quincy & DESE, BSEA No. 2408249; In Re: Holyoke and Jay, BSEA No. 1800619.
[13] See 34 CFR 300.507(a)(1).
[14] See 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a) (providing for the BSEA to hear “… any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law or the procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities”).
[15] See 20 USC 1415(7)(ii) setting forth the requirements for a due process complaint under the IDEA. The only substantive requirements consist of “a description of the nature of the problem of the child relating to such proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to such problem” and “a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available to the party at the time” (emphasis added).
[16] Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; see FRCP 8(a), “Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: … (2)a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief….”.
[17] Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, (1986); see In Re: Student & Weston Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 2602235, 31 MSER 398 (Mitchell, 2025).
[18] In Re: Dudley-Charlton Reg’l Sch. Dist., BSEA No. 2605107, 32 MSER 23 (Mitchell, 2026); see In Re: Student v. Dracut Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 2312210, 29 MSER 177 at Ftnt 77 (Kantor Nir, 2023) (dismissing only the non-FAPE-based retaliation claims); In Re: Springfield Pub. Schs., BSEA #2208440, 28 MSER 250 (Kantor Nir, 2022); In Re: Ollie v. Springfield Pub Schs., BSEA #2004776, 26 MSER 62 (Reichbach, 2020) (concluding that unless a claim of retaliation is tied to a FAPE claim, it is outside the jurisdiction of the BSEA); In Re: Oxford Pub. Schs., BSEA No. 1506886 at Ftnt 5 (Berman, 2015).
[19] Weber, 212 F.3d at 51-52 (“Weber’s claim of retaliation is literally ‘related’ to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [her] ‘child.'”); see Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000)(holding all plaintiff’s claims, including that the school “retaliated against [the student] in response to the [parents’] efforts to enforce his educational rights,” were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement because they “relate unmistakably to the evaluation and educational placement of [the student]”).
[20] Weber, 212 F.3d at 51.
[21] McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 US 792, 801-03 (1973); D.B. ex re. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir, 2012) (recognizing that the standard for analyzing Section 504 retaliation claims is the same as ADA retaliation claims) (internal citations omitted).
[22] D.B., 675 F.3d at 41.
[23] Rose, 214 F.3d at 210; Weber, 212 F.3d at 51-52.
[24] While, typically, motions to dismiss, should be analyzed only considering the initial pleadings (i.e., the Hearing Request) not subsequent information, given Parents’ pro se status, I have considered both pleadings, consistent with my obligation to assess pro se pleadings less stringently, and liberally interpret them so as to “intuit a correct cause of action even if imperfectly pled”, if possible. Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[25] See D.B., 675 F.3d at 41. I quoted verbatim all parts of Parents’ pleadings involving the Retaliation Claim.
[26] The only allegations Parents make that could conceivably be related to these elements is the Opposition’s statement that the alleged “lack of communication and retaliation” “impacted” Student’s “ability to receive a complete extended evaluation which resulted in a crisis situation in fall of 2025”. However, this statement fails to provide sufficient specificity or the necessary requisite causal connection to the alleged retaliatory “threat”. Compare D.B., 675 F.3d at 42 (recognizing retaliation may take the form of “… withholding additional services or accommodations the student otherwise would have received… [or] making the process of designing the student's curriculum unusually contentious. However, in the face of a school system's compliance with the IDEA, as in this case, a plaintiff who asserts that the content of an IEP or the conduct of an IEP process was retaliatory must show evidence of something more than a disappointing IEP or the predictable back-and-forth associated with the IEP process in order to survive summary judgment.”); Weber, 212 F.3d at 44 (FAPE-based retaliation claim alleged Parent was denied access to school records, restricted from communicating with teachers and threatened to be reported to the state child welfare agency).
[27] Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.