COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
BSEA # 2608620
RULING ON DEPARTMENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING REQUEST
AND DEPARTMENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED HEARING REQUEST
On January 14, 2026, Parents filed a Hearing Request against the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (the Department or DESE)[1] (BSEA # 2607507). The matter was dismissed with prejudice in my Ruling on The Department's Motion to Dismiss on January 21, 2026 (the First Ruling). On January 23, 2026, Parents again filed a Hearing Request against DESE (BSEA # 2608048) asserting the identical claims which were dismissed in the First Ruling. The matter was dismissed with prejudice in my Ruling on The Department's Motion to Dismiss on February 3, 2026 (the Second Ruling). On the same day, Parents filed a Hearing Request (BSEA # 2608620) asserting the identical claims which were dismissed in the First Ruling and in the Second Ruling.
On February 11, 2026, DESE filed Department's Motion to Dismiss, asking the BSEA to dismiss the Hearing Request in BSEA # 2608620 in its entirety and issue an order limiting future filings by the Parents presenting claims regarding the Student identical to claims that the BSEA has already dismissed.
On February 12[2], 2026, Parents filed an Amendment, seeking to amend the initial Hearing Request filed on February 3, 2026 by adding a claim.. Specifically, Parents asserted that DESE's own guidance defines true inclusion as structured, evidence-based practice, requiring implementation of Universal Design for Learning (UDL), Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), and Social-Emotional Learning (SEL), and, although Student's current placement is labeled "inclusion," it does not implement these frameworks. Rather, Student receives standard general education instruction with accommodations added only after failure, no tiered PBIS system, and no embedded SEL instruction, and he experiences reactive discipline for disability-related behaviors in a setting without structured supports. Parents asserted that mislabeling an unsupported general education placement as "inclusion" is discriminatory because it denies Student meaningful access to curriculum, equal access to program benefits in violation of §504, and reasonable modifications pursuant to ADA Title II. Moreover, Parents argued that disability inclusion under IDEA is not a DEI initiative but a statutory civil rights mandate. Districts may not weaken UDL, PBIS, or SEL by recharacterizing them as DEI-related. Doing so would result in a discriminatory impact on students with disabilities. Parents requested findings that Student's current "inclusion" setting is discriminatory as implemented, that inclusion without evidence-based supports violates IDEA and §504, and that Student needs either a properly supported inclusive placement or a more intensive specialized setting, as well as compensatory education. They also requested findings that IDEA-based inclusion is legally distinct from DEI policy and cannot be reduced based on federal DEI directives. The Motion to Amend was allowed on February 12, 2026, and the BSEA issued an Amended Notice of Hearing scheduling the hearing for March 19, 2026.
On February 23, 2026, DESE filed the Department's Motion To Dismiss Amended Hearing Request, seeking dismissal of the claims in both the Amended Hearing Request and the original Hearing Request because all of the claims are based on the Department's supervisory responsibilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"), and the IDEA does not provide a private right of action for enforcement of a State's supervisory responsibilities. According to DESE, the original and Amended Hearing Requests should , therefore, be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be based and because the BSEA lacks jurisdiction over such claims.
Also on February 23, 2026, Parents filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that DESE mischaracterizes their claim as a broad challenge to the State's general supervisory role. Instead, Parents assert that DESE's statewide "Inclusive Practice" framework is being applied in a way that denies Student a FAPE, making DESE a necessary party to provide meaningful relief. Because DESE developed and promotes the framework on which districts rely for placement decisions, DESE's actions and omissions directly contribute to the alleged deprivation. This case differs from prior dismissed matters because it identifies specific state-issued guidance and alleges concrete, systemic misapplication affecting Student's placement. It also implicates Section 504 as it disproportionately impacts students with disabilities by masking service reductions under the label of inclusion or creating barriers to individualized supports. Dismissing the case would effectively shield statewide policies from review and leave families without meaningful remedies whenever districts rely on state-promoted frameworks. Moreover, Parents oppose DESE's request to restrict future filings, asserting that they have a statutory right to pursue due process and that no basis exists for limiting that right.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVI(A) and (B) of the Hearing Rules and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist "factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief."[3] The hearing officer must take as true "the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor."[4] These "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."[5]
Jurisdiction of the BSEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child."[6] In Massachusetts, a parent or a school district, "may request mediation and/or a hearing at any time on any matter[7] concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities."[8] Nevertheless, it is well established that matters that come before the BSEA must involve a live or current dispute between the Parties.[9] In addition, the BSEA "can only grant relief that is authorized by these statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services."[10]
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The purpose of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to "prevent plaintiffs from splitting their claims by providing a strong incentive for them to plead all factually related allegations and attendant legal theories for recovery the first time they bring suit."[11] These doctrines "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication."[12] Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from re-litigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.[13] The three elements of res judicata are (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) "sufficient identicality" between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and (3) "sufficient identicality" between the parties in the two suits.[14] Moreover, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, once an issue of fact or law necessary to a judgment has been decided, that decision may preclude re-litigating the issue in an appeal on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.[15] A final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding, not appealed from and as to which the appeal period has expired, precludes re-litigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.[16] Hence, these doctrines both apply to a BSEA Hearing Officer's decision regarding the merits of a special education dispute.
A "dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not considered to be 'on the merits,' and therefore is without res judicata effect."[17] Nevertheless, the First Circuit has found that "dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction precludes re[-]litigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdictional question."[18] Thus, where the BSEA has determined that it lacks the legal authority to adjudicate a particular claim, that determination is binding on the parties and cannot be reargued in subsequent filings before the BSEA.
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
For the same reasons articulated in my January 21, 2026 Ruling on the Department's Motion to Dismiss Hearing Request in BSEA # 2607507 and my February 3, 2026 Ruling on the Department's Motion to Dismiss Hearing Request in BSEA # 2608048 involving the same parties, and because 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(1)(B) requires that a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (which includes a ruling dismissing a matter with prejudice) is a final agency action subject to no further agency review, Parents' February 3, 2026 initial Hearing Request must be dismissed.
Moreover, Parents' Amended Hearing Request must also be dismissed. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) provides that, as a condition of federal funding under IDEA Part B, the State educational agency (SEA) is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of IDEA Part B are met; and "that all educational programs for children with disabilities in the State ... are under the general supervision of individuals in the State who are responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities; and meet the educational standards of the [SEA] ...." As held by numerous BSEA Decisions, the IDEA does not create a private right of action that permits a parent to enforce a State's supervisory responsibilities over special education.[19] This conclusion stands; the IDEA does not "authorize[] claims against a state agency rooted in the State's general supervisory role under the IDEA."[20]
Here, Parents attempt to reframe their claim as a direct denial of FAPE attributable to DESE's "Inclusive Practice" framework. Parents do not allege that DESE exercised individualized decision-making authority over Student but rather that DESE's statewide guidance influenced local district decisions. However, IDEA assigns primary responsibility for delivering FAPE to local educational agencies, while assigning states a monitoring and compliance role. Parents' theory improperly merges these separate functions and seeks to impose liability where the statute provides none.
Parents' Section 504 argument is equally unpersuasive. It is framed in broad, speculative terms and fails to assert specific factual allegations showing discriminatory conduct by DESE toward Student. Because the Amended Hearing Request seeks relief grounded in DESE's supervisory role, Parent's February 12, 2026, Amended Hearing Request must be dismissed.
DESE has also requested that, in light of Parents' filing of the instant Hearing Request after the BSEA dismissed three earlier identical hearing requests in BSEA Nos. 2605857, 2607507, and 2608048, the BSEA exercise its inherent authority over the conduct of due process proceedings by issuing an order limiting future filings by the Parents presenting identical claims regarding this Student. According to DESE, imposing a sanction will relieve both the Department and the BSEA of the need to expend resources responding to repeated, identical filings. In support of its request, DESE cites to State Realty Co. of Boston v. MacNeil, 341 Mass. 123, 124 (1960), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a court of equity has "ample power" to issue an injunction "aimed at putting a stop to harassing, vexatious, and repetitious litigation," and thus holding that the lower court properly entered an order enjoining a party from further litigating a matter that had already been the subject of "nearly a score of reported decisions in this court and in Federal courts." DESE further notes that in Ruling on Taunton's Motion to Dismiss, dated January 5, 2015, in Nelson and Taunton Public Schools (BSEA No. 10-8142) Hearing Officer Rosa Figueroa found that, in connection with "redundant," "frivolous", and "defamatory" claims filed by a non-attorney advocate, a reasonable sanction was to strike "the offending submissions from consideration for any purpose in the BSEA proceeding at hand" pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(c) which authorizes a hearing officer to strike "any insufficient allegation or defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter."
DESE also cited to 603 CMR 28.08(5)(c) (BSEA hearing officers are authorized "to take such . . . steps as are appropriate to assure the orderly presentation of evidence and protection of the parties' rights at the hearing") and BSEA Hearing Rule IX(B) (providing that hearing officers are empowered to "[c]ensure, reprimand, or otherwise ensure that all participants conduct themselves in an appropriate manner" and, after consultation with the parties and consideration of proposed evidence, may "place reasonable limits on the presentation of evidence to prevent undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence") in support of its request for sanctions.
I humbly decline to extend to myself the "ample power" discussed in State Realty Co. of Boston v. MacNeil and afforded to judges, and I further find this matter distinguishable from Nelson and Taunton Public Schools. In Nelson, the issue concerned the submission of documents by an advocate after the due process hearing had already begun. In contrast, the present matter concerns the filing of a Hearing Request, a substantive right expressly granted to parents under IDEA.[21] Specifically, I decline to place any limitations on the threshold right of parents to file a Hearing Request under IDEA.
That said, if Parents are dissatisfied with my Ruling herein with respect to the DESE's Motion to Dismiss the February 3, 2026 Hearing Request and the February 12, 2026 Amended Hearing Request, they are advised to exercise their right to appeal this ruling to the state superior court or to the federal district court,[22] rather than refile identical hearing requests going forward, as they have previously done.
ORDER
The Department's February 11, 2026, Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED as to its Motion to Dismiss but DENIED as to its request for sanctions. The Department's February 23, 2026, Motion To Dismiss Amended Hearing Request is also ALLOWED. The initial Hearing Request filed on February 3, 2026, and the Amended Hearing Request filed on February 12, 2026, are dismissed with prejudice.
So Ordered,
/s/ Alina Kantor NirAlina Kantor Nir
Date: February 23, 2026
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
Footnotes
[1] Parents did not name Dudley-Charlton Regional School District as a party in the matter.
[2] Parents filed the Amendment after business hours on February 11, 2026. As such, it is deemed to have been filed on February 12, 2026.
[3] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[4] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[5] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[6] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[7] Limited exceptions exist that are not here applicable.
[8] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[9] See In Re: Student v. Bay Path Reg'l Vocational Tech. High Sch., BSEA #1805746 (Figueroa, 2018).
[10] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA #1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[11] See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.2d 727, 736 (3rd Cir. 2009).
[12] Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
[13] Id.
[14] Id.; see In Re Sonus Networks, Inc., Shareholder Derivative Litig., 499 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007); Kobrin v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005).
[15] See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
[16] See Diaz v. City of Somerville, 59 F.4th 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2023); see also See Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 844 ("final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding ... precludes re[-]litigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction").
[17] Muniz Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc., 229 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2000).
[18] Id. at 14-15.
[19] See In Re: Hank and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling On Massachusetts Department Of Elementary And Secondary Education's Motion To Dismiss), BSEA #26-07508 (Reichbach, 2026) (referencing other BSEA decisions).
[20] Larach-Cohen v. Porter, 2021 WL 1203686 (S.D.N.Y. 3/30/31) at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. New York, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (State agency may not be sued as a defendant to an IDEA action brought pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(a)). See also In Re: Student v. the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Ruling on DESE's Motion to Dismiss), BSEA # 2607507 (Kantor Nir, 2026) (concluding that the IDEA does not confer an individual right to enforce a State's supervisory responsibilities over special education); In Re: Student & Franklin Public Schools & Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services (Ruling on Parents' Motion to Join DESE), BSEA # 2500429 (Mitchell, 2025) ("As I have previously recognized, however, no private right of action for DESE's violations of Section 1412 of the IDEA exists in Section 1415 of the IDEA").
[21] See 34 CFR 300.507 (a).
[22] See 20 U.S.C. s. 1415(i)(2)(B).