COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Pioneer Valley Chinese Immersion Charter School, Springfield Public Schools & Student
BSEA#s 2601931, 2614195
RULING ON MULTIPLE MOTIONS
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on multiple motions filed by the Parties between July 20, 2026 and August 3, 2026. The factual background and procedural history of this matter are extensive and have been described in detail in multiple previous Rulings. I need not repeat them here, except to address the factual and procedural history relevant to this Ruling. Specifically, on August 9, 2025, Pioneer Valley Chinese Immersion Charter School (PVCICS) filed a Hearing Request with the BSEA (BSEA #2601931)[1].
Following a Team meeting on March 10, 2026, on March 13, 2026, PVCICS issued Prior Written Notice to Parents stating, in part, that because the Team was “considering an initial placement out-of-district,” the Team concluded its meeting prior to making a placement decision and invited Springfield Public Schools (Springfield), Student’s school of residence (SDOR), to join the next Team meeting.
On April 10, 2026, the Team reconvened with Springfield in attendance. On the same date, PVCICS issued a Prior Written Notice to Parents indicating, in part, that, at said Team meeting, Springfield reported that it was able to deliver the programming proposed by the IEP; that there is an in-district therapeutic public day program with extended school year services within Springfield to support Student; and that pursuant to 603 CMR 28.10(d) and the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) Technical Advisory 2014-5, PVCICS proposed a therapeutic public day program with extended school year services within Springfield (Springfield’s Public Day Elementary Program or PDES). The placement page issued with the proposed IEP indicated that a public separate day school was proposed.
On May 6, 2026, PVCICS filed the School District’s Motion to Amend Hearing Request to Join The Springfield Public Schools, and for Substitute Consent to Conduct Home Assessment and Extended Evaluation at In-District Program[2].
On May 21, 2026, Parents filed their own Hearing Request against PVCICS asserting procedural violations with respect to proposing and conducting evaluations, substantive FAPE issues, and allegations that PVCICS failed to implement services. Parents’ Hearing Request was assigned BSEA Matter No. 2614195.
On June 1, 2026, a Ruling was issued on PVCICS’s Motion to Amend Hearing Request to Join The Springfield Public Schools, and for Substitute Consent to Conduct Home Assessment and Extended Evaluation at In-District Program. Said Ruling allowed the Motion to Amend and Request for Joinder of Springfield,,[3] and all pending claims and issues in BSEA No. 2601931 and Parents’ Hearing Request (BSEA No. 2614195) were consolidated. Springfield was also joined as a necessary party.
On June 23, 2026, an Order was issued in response to email communications between the parties and specific queries by Parents’ Counsel regarding the inconsistency between the April 2026 placement page (indicating a proposal for an out-of-district program) and PVCICS’s Motion to Amend (referring to the proposed program as an in-district program). Said Order invited the parties to participate in an evidentiary hearing via a virtual platform on July 30, 2026, limited to the issue of whether PVCICS proposed an “out-of-district placement” or an “in-District” placement when it proposed Springfield’s PDES. Via email dated July 6, 2026, Parents’ Counsel inquired whether PVCICS would bear the burden of proof on said issue.
On July 7, 2026, due to the unavailability of Parents’ Counsel on July 30, I issued an Order inviting the parties to submit, in lieu of an evidentiary hearing on July 30, 2026, “legal briefs on the following issues: 1) whether PVCICS proposed an ‘out-of-district placement’ or an ‘in-District’ placement when it proposed Springfield’s [PDES]; and 2) whether Parents, PVCICS, or Springfield bear the burden of proof relative to issue #1.”
On or about July 20, 2026, via email, Counsel for Parents clarified that she was still seeking an evidentiary hearing on whether PVCICS proposed an ‘out-of-district placement’ or an ‘in-District’ placement when it proposed Springfield’s PDES.
Also on July 20, 2026, Parents filed Parents’ Brief on the Limited Issue of PVCICS’s Filed Claim that Springfield is an “In-District” Program (hereinafter, Parents’ Motion Relative to Issue of Burden)[4] in which they argued that PVCICS bears the burden of persuasion on whether PVCICS proposed an ‘out-of-district placement’ or an ‘in-District’ placement when it proposed Springfield’s PDES, because PVCICS is the party that initiated the due process hearing and affirmatively alleged that Springfield’s proposed program is an in-district placement.[5]
On July 21[6], 2026, PVCICS and Springfield (together, the Schools) filed a Joint Memorandum on the Burden of Persuasion with Regards to the Pre-Hearing Analysis on the Legal Categorization of Springfield Public Schools’ Public Day Elementary School (hereinafter, Schools’ Joint Response Relative to Issue of Burden) arguing that Parents bear the burden of persuasion because they are the party challenging the proposed placement at PDES and seeking public funding for a private day school. The Schools contended that the Team had already determined Student requires a more restrictive placement and that Parents agree with that determination but dispute the specific public program selected.[7]
On the same day, Springfield filed Springfield Public Schools’ Stipulation, stipulating that
“Springfield Public Schools houses [PDES] on its campus, within the continuum of services provided for its students. PDES educates children only with disabilities in a separate setting who, like [Student], require a more restrictive setting than a substantially separate program. Therefore, there is enough evidence to support that PDES meets the programmatic threshold to qualify as an ‘out of district placement’ limited to this unique set of facts in this particular case.
Notwithstanding the above, Springfield maintains its position and states that the PVCICS team in conjunction with the SDOR (i) properly considered PDES as the [least restrictive environment (LRE)] option for [Student], and (ii) properly considered the plain meaning of the words ‘in district’, within the hierarchal analysis required for placement determination within the plain meaning of the text, and within its programmatic responsibility pursuant to 603 CMR 28.10.[8] To that end, Springfield maintains the position, shared with PVCICS, that PDES can provide [Student] a FAPE in the LRE; and therefore, the team need not consider additional, more restrictive placements, and calls upon Parent to disprove same at Hearing.”
According to Springfield, because there was “no further issue concerning the classification of the PDES[,] the parties [could] now move forward with the hearing on whether an extended evaluation at PDES and/or permanent placement of [Student] at PDES can provide [him] with a FAPE.”
On July 27, 2026, Springfield filed Request for Pre-Hearing Ruling That Springfield Public Day School Is an Out-of-District Placement and Cancellation of Evidentiary Hearing (hereinafter, Springfield’s Motion for Pre-Hearing Ruling), requesting a pre-hearing ruling that the proposed placement at Springfield’s PDES is an out-of-district public day placement and asking that the evidentiary hearing on that issue, for which the parties had yet to identify a mutually agreeable date and time, be canceled. Springfield asserted that although it initially characterized PDES as an in-district program after being joined pursuant to 603 CMR 28.10, further analysis and input from Parents led it to conclude that PDES constitutes an out-of-district placement because it is more restrictive than a substantially separate program, as it only serves students with disabilities. Springfield noted that it had already stipulated to this position and argued that any prior characterization of PDES by PVCICS as an in-district program is legally irrelevant because PVCICS neither operates nor controls the program and is no longer asserting that PDES is an in-district placement. According to Springfield, there is no remaining factual or legal dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing on the classification of the program, rendering such a hearing cumulative, unnecessary, and an inefficient use of public resources. Springfield hence requested that the Hearing Officer rule that PDES is an out-of-district placement and cancel the evidentiary hearing on that issue.
On July 31, 2026, PVCICS filed School District’s Clarification of Amended Hearing Request (PVCICS Clarification), stating that it was not seeking to clarify (not amend[9]) the nature of Student’s proposed placement. PVCICS asserted that, on April 10, 2026, PVCICS and Springfield jointly proposed PDES. PVCICS acknowledged that, under 603 CMR 28.02(6)(a)(1), PDES is definitionally an out-of-district public day program, but it had previously referred to PDES as "in-district" only in the descriptive sense that the program is operated, funded, administered, and located within Springfield. According to PVCICS, the terms "in-district" and "out-of-district" describe different aspects of the program and neither alter its status as a public day school nor the relief sought. PVCICS further represented that neither of the Schools had proposed, or intended to propose, a private day school placement.
Also on July 31, 2026, PVCICS filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact concerning the proposed placement at the PDES program; that PDES is properly characterized as an out-of-district placement as a matter of law; and that PVCICS and Springfield are entitled to judgment as a matter of law concerning the interlocutory issue of the proper legal characterization of the proposed placement at the PDES program as an out-of-district placement. PVCICS further indicated that PVCICS and Springfield have already asserted and have stipulated that PDES is properly characterized as an out-of-district placement as a matter of law.
On August 3, 2026, Parents filed Parents Consolidated Responses and Limited Objections to Springfield’s July 21 “Stipulation”, and Springfield’s July 27 Request for Ruling, and Springfield & PVCICS’s July 21 Joint Memorandum, and PVCICS’s July 31 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and PVCICS’s July 31 “Clarification”; and Motion to Strike or, Alternatively, to Disregard and Limit (hereinafter, Parents’ Objections), arguing that, although they do not oppose a narrow legal determination that Springfield’s PDES falls within the regulatory definition of an out-of-district program, because it serves only students with disabilities in a separate educational setting, such a determination should not be construed as resolving the broader disputes in this matter. According to Parents, PVCICS and Springfield repeatedly represented PDES as an "in-district" placement, relied upon that characterization to bypass the regulatory process applicable to out-of-district placements, and thereby denied Parents meaningful participation in the placement decision. Parents further contended that Springfield's July 21, 2026 Stipulation is not a binding stipulation because it was executed only by Springfield and that PVCICS's "Clarification" improperly attempts to retroactively reinterpret rather than formally amend its prior pleadings, and that neither filing may be used to alter the operative issues, expand the scope of the hearing, or shift the burden of proof. Parents requested that any ruling be limited to the legal classification of PDES, while preserving for hearing the remaining disputed issues concerning notice, Team process, procedural compliance, the adequacy of the proposed placement, the appropriateness of any extended evaluation, and the parties' respective burdens of proof.
Also on August 3, 2026, PVCICS filed a Supplement to Partial Summary Judgment Motion, arguing that there is no longer any dispute over whether the PDES program is an out-of-district placement. According to PVCICS, as Parents have stated that they do not oppose the legal conclusion that a program located outside the general education environment and serving only students with disabilities meets the regulatory definition of an out-of-district program, Parents have acknowledged that PDES is an out-of-district placement, resolving the issue by agreement and eliminating the need for further legal analysis or an evidentiary hearing on that question.[10] PVCICS therefore renewed its request for partial summary judgment formally classifying the proposed PDES placement as an out-of-district placement because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding its legal status.
LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS:
I. Parents’ Motion Relative to Issue of Burden, Springfield’s Motion for Pre-Hearing Ruling, PVCICS's Clarification of Amended Hearing Request, and Parents’ Objections
1. Legal Standard:
Massachusetts law provides for hearings to resolve disputes involving any matter concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities.[11] It is well established that matters that come before the BSEA must involve a live or current dispute between the Parties.[12]
2. Application of Legal Standard:
Because Springfield, the school district that owns and operates the Springfield PDES, has stipulated that, under the unique facts of this case, PDES qualifies as an out-of-district public day placement because it serves only students with disabilities in a setting more restrictive than a substantially separate program, and PVCICS no longer contends that PDES is an in-district placement, there is no longer a live dispute or an actual controversy between the parties regarding the legal classification of PDES. Accordingly, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing solely to determine whether PDES is properly classified as an out-of-district placement. Although Parents argue that PVCICS previously characterized PDES as an in-district placement in its pleadings, there is no practical relief that could result from conducting an evidentiary hearing solely to determine whether PDES is an out-of-district placement when Springfield has already stipulated that it is[13]. Not only does the BSEA lack the authority to address issues for which there is no longer disagreement, but an evidentiary hearing devoted solely to this issue would expend unnecessary public and private resources without advancing resolution of the substantive issues remaining in the instant consolidated matter.
In addition, accepting Springfield's stipulation solely for purposes of resolving the legal classification of PDES neither resolves nor forecloses Parents’ other claims, such as whether PVCICS or Springfield previously characterized PDES as an in-district placement, whether that characterization, if it so occurred, affected the Team process, whether the procedural requirements governing out-of-district placements were followed, whether any procedural violations denied Parents meaningful participation or resulted in a denial of FAPE to Student, any issue concerning the parties' respective burdens of proof as to the remaining substantive claims, the propriety of any proposed extended evaluation and whether PDES is an appropriate placement for Student. These claims remain disputed issues for hearing on the merits.
Likewise, I do not construe PVCICS's clarification as retroactively amending its pleadings or altering the historical facts underlying Parents' claims; Parents remain free to argue that PVCICS's prior characterization of PDES was legally or procedurally improper.[14]
II. PVCICS’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
1. Legal Standard:
Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[15] In determining whether to grant summary judgment, BSEA hearing officers are often guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."[16] A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if a fact that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit” is disputed such that “a reasonable [fact-finder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”[17] “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”[18]
The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[19]
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[20] To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” in its favor that the fact finder could decide for it.[21] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.”[22] The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”[23]
2. Application of Legal Standard:
PVCICS asks for judgment that PDES is an out-of-district placement. The parties now agree that, for purposes of this proceeding, PDES is properly characterized as an out-of-district public day placement. That agreement resolves the factual question PVCICS presents, but it does not resolve any claim before me.
The claims remaining for hearing concern, in part, (1) whether PVCICS previously mischaracterized PDES; (2) whether PVCICS complied with applicable procedural requirements; (3) whether PVCICS denied Parents meaningful participation in the Team process; and (4) whether PVCICS denied Student a free appropriate public education. None of these claims turns on how PDES is characterized now. In other words, the parties' present agreement says nothing about whether the District's prior characterization was accurate, whether the District discharged its procedural obligations at the relevant times, or what effect any such failure had on Parents' participation or on Student's programming. Those questions present disputed issues of fact and law that must be resolved at hearing on a developed record.
Because the current characterization of PDES is not outcome-determinative as to any remaining “claim or defense” for hearing, it is not a "material fact" within the meaning of the summary judgment standard. As the facts “material” to the hearing claims and defenses remain disputed, PVCICS is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Motion must thus be denied.
That said, there is no reason to relitigate a matter on which the parties agree. In the interest of narrowing the issues and conserving hearing time, I will treat the characterization of PDES as an out-of-district public day placement as established for purposes of this proceeding.
ORDER:
Parents' Motion Relative to Issue of Burden is DENIED, as moot. Because there is no longer a live dispute requiring adjudication as to whether PDES is an in-district or out-of-district placement, no determination is necessary regarding which party would bear the burden of persuasion on that issue.
Springfield Public Schools' Request for Pre-Hearing Ruling That Springfield Public Day Elementary School Is an Out-of-District Placement and Cancellation of Evidentiary Hearing is ALLOWED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The request to cancel the separate evidentiary hearing limited to the legal classification of PDES is ALLOWED, as no such hearing is necessary. To the extent that Springfield seeks a separate pre-hearing ruling declaring PDES to be an out-of-district placement, that request is DENIED because there is no longer a live controversy regarding that legal classification.
PVCICS's Clarification of Amended Hearing Request is ALLOWED to the extent that it is treated as a representation of PVCICS's current litigation position and not as an amendment to its prior pleadings or a determination of any historical facts. Nothing in this Ruling limits Parents' ability to argue at hearing that PVCICS previously characterized PDES as an in-district placement or that such characterization had legal or procedural significance.
PVCICS's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as supplemented on August 3, 2026, is DENIED. For the purpose of this matter, it is deemed established that PDES is properly characterized as an out-of-district public day placement. No party need present evidence on that point.
Parents' Consolidated Responses and Limited Objections, including the Motion to Strike or, Alternatively, to Disregard and Limit, are ALLOWED, in part, and DENIED, in part. To the extent that Parents requested that any ruling be limited solely to the legal classification of PDES and not be construed as resolving or limiting their claims regarding prior representations, procedural compliance, meaningful parental participation, the appropriateness of the proposed placement or extended evaluation, FAPE, or the parties' respective burdens on the remaining claims, that request is ALLOWED. To the extent that Parents seek to strike Springfield's Stipulation, PVCICS's Clarification, or other filings, that request is DENIED, as I have not relied on those filings to alter the issues for hearing or to amend the pleadings.
The hearing in these consolidated matters shall proceed on all remaining disputed factual and legal issues, including, but not limited to, the parties' claims regarding procedural compliance, the Team process, meaningful parental participation, FAPE, the appropriateness of the proposed placement and/or extended evaluation, and all other issues preserved by prior rulings.
So Ordered by the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: August 7, 2026
Footnotes
[1] In November 2025 PVCICS requested and was allowed to amend its Hearing Request to add issues related to certain Physician’s Affirmations of Need for Temporary Home or Hospital Education for Medically Necessary Reasons.
[2] In its pleading, PVCICS referred to Springfield’s therapeutic day program as an “in-district” program (i.e., an in-district program within Springfield).
[3] Only the request for amendment and joinder of Springfield was addressed in that Ruling as it was determined that PVCICS’s request for substitute consent with respect to a proposed home assessment and an extended evaluation would be decided following an evidentiary hearing.
[4] In a separate email on the same day, Parents’ Counsel submitted six exhibits in support of her Brief.
[5] Relying on Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), Parents contended that the party seeking relief bears the burden of persuasion. They characterized PVCICS's assertion that Springfield's program is an "in-district" placement as a claim for which PVCICS must prove the factual and legal basis.
[6] Counsel for Springfield clarified that due to technical difficulties on July 21, 2026, the pleading was not sent to the Hearing Officer and Parents’ Counsel by the close of business day July 20, 2026.
[7] The Schools relied on Schaffer and D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2012) in asserting that Parents must prove that Springfield's proposed program cannot provide Student with a FAPE and that Springfield's program should not be treated as an appropriate in-district placement.
[8] The Schools relied on Technical Assistance Advisory SPED 2014-5: Charter School Responsibilities for Students with Disabilities Who May Need an Out-of-District Program - Special Education in their argument.
[9] PVCICS specified that a clarification was distinct from a request to amend, contending that the clarification did not constitute a substantive change to the issues or requested relief in the pending proceedings.
[10] Although Parents objected to several broader legal arguments they believe were embedded in PVCICS's prior filings, PVCICS did not address those arguments individually and did not concede any of Parents' factual or legal assertions.
[11] See 603 CMR §28.08(3). A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as set forth in 34 CFR §§104.31-104.39. See id.
[12] See In Re: Student v. Bay Path Reg'l Vocational Tech. High Sch., BSEA # 18-05746 (Figueroa, 2018).
[13] Nor do I find persuasive Parents' argument that Springfield's stipulation is ineffective because it was signed only by Springfield. As the district that owns and operates PDES, Springfield is uniquely positioned to identify the nature of its own program.
[14] I also note that Springfield's stipulation regarding the legal classification of PDES resolves only that narrow issue. It does not eliminate Springfield's continuing role in this matter. Springfield remains Student's school district of residence, operates the proposed program, maintains that PDES can provide Student with a FAPE, and may bear responsibility for implementing any placement ultimately ordered. See 603 CMR 28.10(6)(a)(3) (“If the placement Team, in accordance with the procedures of 603 CMR 28.06(2)(e), determines that the student requires an out-of-district program to provide the services identified on the student's IEP, then the placement proposed to the parent shall be an out-of-district day or residential school, depending on the needs of the student. Upon parental acceptance of the proposed IEP and proposed placement, programmatic and financial responsibility shall return to the school district where the student resides. The school district where the student resides shall implement the placement determination of the Team consistent with the requirements of 603 CMR 28.06(3)”). Accordingly, while the controversy regarding the legal classification of PDES is moot, Springfield remains a properly joined party to these proceedings.
[15] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).
[16] Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
[17] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
[18] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
[19] See id. at 252; see also In Re: Westwood Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol County Agricultural Sch., BSEA No. 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006).
[20] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
[21] Id. at 249.
[22] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).
[23] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).