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Special Education Law
DECISIONLEA ResponsibilityRIDE Case No. 19-034A

Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Cumberland School Department, In re M. Doe

May 21, 2019·Anthony F. Cottone·Cumberland·

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, Petitioner

vs.

CUMBERLAND SCHOOL DEPARTMENT, Respondent

In re M. Doe

RIDE No. 19-034A

DECISION AND ORDER

Held: DCYF’s petition for reimbursement of a portion of the cost of the educational services provided to a general education student in its care who was placed in a private residential facility by the Family Court was granted since: (1) neither the text of RIGL § 16-64-1.1(c), when read in context, nor the relevant legislative history supported Respondent’s argument that its obligation to reimburse DCYF only extends to special education students; and (2) § 16-64-1.1(d), which provides that DCYF shall bear the “entire cost” of such educational services, was not applicable since DCYF’s contract with the provider did not require the funding of either “a pre-determined number of placements” or “part of the facility’s program;” and finally, Respondent’s request for a stay of enforcement pending appeal was denied since the Respondent: (1) will not likely succeed on the merits; and (2) has wrongfully retained the use of money rightfully belonging to DCYF for long enough.

Date: May 21, 2019

On or about February 8, 2019, Petitioner, Department of Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”), filed a Request for a Residency Determination and Designation of Party Responsible for the Education of a Youth Residing in a Residential Facility (the “Petition”) requesting that the Commissioner order Respondent, Cumberland School Department (“CSD”), to reimburse it for the statutorily-mandated portion of the cost of educating a child in DCYF custody who DCYF had placed in a private residential facility that includes educational services pursuant to an order of the Family Court.

I. Jurisdiction, Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

This is yet another in a series of similar petitions filed by DCYF, and as the Commissioner has noted recently, he (and now she) has subject matter jurisdiction over such petitions, and DCYF has standing, under RIGL §§ 16-64-1.2, 16-64-1.3 and 42-72-5(24), as well as under either RIGL § 16-39-1, which covers disputes “arising under any law relating to schools or education,” or § 16-39-2, which concerns appeals from the actions of school committees. See, e.g., DCYF v. Newport School Department, RIDE No. 19-006 A (March 8, 2019). And as in prior similar proceedings, DCYF has the burden of proof,[1] and the standard of review as to the relevant legal issue is de novo.[2]

II. Facts

The following facts were deduced from testimony during evidentiary hearings before the undersigned Hearing Officer on March 26 and April 22, 2019, as well as the exhibits that were entered into evidence during the proceedings.[3] The parties were represented by counsel and testimony was offered by DCYF’s Chief Executive Legal Counsel, who was its Chief of Staff during the relevant time period.

  1. Student M. Doe was fourteen (14) years old when DCYF filed the Petition (DCYF Ex. 1). See March 26 Tr. at 4.

  2. He was at all relevant times a general education student who was not eligible for special education services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and applicable state regulations.

  3. M. Doe’s mother resided at all relevant times in Cumberland, Rhode Island. See March 26 Tr. at 4, 6-7; January 23, 2019 Affidavit of Donna Crawshaw, DCYF Social Case Worker II (the “Crawshaw Aff.”) attached to the Petition at ¶ 4.

  4. Pursuant to an October 31, 2018 order of the Family Court, a copy of which was attached to the Petition, M. Doe was placed at the Meadowridge Academy (“Meadowridge”), a private residential facility which provides educational services located in Swansea, Massachusetts that is owned by Justice Resource Institute, Inc., a Massachusetts non-profit corporation (“JRI”, and collectively with Meadowridge, “JRI Meadowridge”). See Crawshaw Aff. at ¶ 5.

  5. DCYF had a contract with JRI (the “JRI Meadowridge Contract” or, the “Contract”) pursuant to which DCYF agreed to pay a total of $565.40 per day per child placed at Meadowridge, not to exceed a combined grand total of $931,213.80. See CSD’s Ex. 2, Addendum II (Budget) at 41.[4]

  6. The Contract also provided, inter alia, that:

    1. DCYF was not “obligate[d] to pay for any minimum a pre-determined number of referrals or placements or any part of the facility’s program.” See id., Addendum I (Scope of Work) at 32;

    2. Meadowridge was “regulated by the State of Massachusetts” and was required “to comply with any and all Massachusetts licensing regulations.” See id. at 33;[5]

    3. DCYF’s “Utilization Volume” was “[n]ot to exceed 3 concurrent slots,” id., but “the point-in-time census” was “subject to change” and “may exceed three.” Id., Addendum II (Budget) at 41;

    4. JRI Meadowridge agreed that the proposed number of “slots” for their services “shall be preserved and available to [DCYF]...[and]... [i]f for some reason [JRI Meadowridge was] no longer able to provide the agreed upon number of slots, [DCYF] must be notified.” See id. at 42; and

    5. “DCYF’s direct compensation rate to [JRI Meadowridge] for services will vary based upon a statutory requirement for the contribution by the child’s/youth’s LEA... Each LEA is responsible to contribute the per pupil special education rate regardless of the youths identification as a child with a disability requiring special education services.” See id. at 41.[6]

  7. On or about October 26, 2018, DCYF provided CSD with a formal Notice of Responsibility for Child in State Care from DCYF with respect to M. Doe (attached to the Petition) which suggested that M. Doe’s mother resided in Cumberland and that CSD would be responsible for reimbursing DCYF for the cost of the educational services provided to M. Doe for a total of one hundred and twenty-eight (128) days during the period October 31, 2018 through March 8, 2019 at CSD’s special education rate. See Crashw Aff. at ¶ 5; March 14, 2019 Affidavit of Kayleigh Pratt, DCYF’s Chief Financial Officer (the “Pratt Aff.”) attached to the Petition at ¶ 6.

  8. The daily special education rate for CSD for Fiscal Year 2019, which covers the period July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019, is $123.06 per student. See March 26 Tr. at 11; October 26, 2018 Notice of Responsibility (attached to the Petition).

  9. CSD has refused to reimburse DCYF, or to pay JRI Meadowridge directly, for the educational services provided to M. Doe during Fiscal Year 2019, see Petition, ¶¶ 6-7 at 2, which, in total, amounts to some fifteen thousand seven hundred fifty one dollars and sixty-eight cents ($15,751.68). See Crashw Aff. at ¶ 5; Pratt Aff. at ¶ 6.

III. Positions of the Parties

1. CSD

CSD argued that:

  1. since it is not financially responsible when a parent places a general education student not eligible for special education services in a private residential facility for non-educational reasons, it should not be held responsible when DCYF (or in this case, the Family Court) makes a similar placement of a general education student in its care. See CSD’s May 6, 2019 Memorandum (the “CSD Mem.”) at 3-5;

  2. the Commissioner’s conclusion in Newport School Department, supra, that school departments must reimburse DCYF at a RIDE-assigned per pupil special education rate for any student committed to the care of DCYF whom DCYF places in a residential facility that provides educational services is not supported by the applicable statutes. Id. at 4;

  3. “[t]he use of the article ‘A’ to modify ‘per-pupil special education cost’ in § 16-64-1.1(c), as opposed to the use of the article ‘THE,’ has meaning. ‘THE’ is a definite article, and it connotes a specific reference, e.g., the per pupil special education cost, as in the one and only per pupil special education cost. But ‘A’ is an indefinite article, connoting a generic reference, applying only if the student in question is actually receiving special education and related services at the residential, educational placement pursuant to an applicable disability law.” Id. at 10; and

  4. even if the Commissioner’s rationale in Newport School Department, supra, was correct, DCYF nonetheless should be held responsible for “the entire cost” of the educational services provided to M. Doe at Meadowridge under RIGL § 16-64-1.1(d) (quoted at note 4, supra), which was applicable since: (a) DCYF funded a “pre-determined number of placements” or “a part of the facility’s program” under the JRI-Meadowridge Contract; (b) Meadowridge was “state licensed;” and (c) Meadowridge operated “an approved, on-grounds educational program.” See the CDS Mem. at 8, citing § 16-64-1.1(d).

Finally, CSD argued that in the event that the Commissioner ruled in favor of DCYF, enforcement should be stayed pending appeal since neither DCYF nor CSD “has a better equitable claim in favor of or against a stay in light of the fact this is a dispute about money.” Id. at 15, citing Dep’t of Corr. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 658 A.2d 509 (R.I. 1995).

2. DCYF

DCYF argued that:

  1. “RIGL §16-64-1.1(a) clearly states that Cumberland, as the city or town of residence, must ‘pay the cost of education of the child during the time the child is in foster care in the city or town.’ M. Doe is a resident of Cumberland. Therefore, the cost of M. Doe’s education is to be paid for by Cumberland. Moreover, the statute provides what Cumberland must ‘pay,’ i.e. the per pupil special education cost.” See DCYF’s May 14, 2019 Reply Memorandum (“DCYF’s Mem.”) at 3-5;

  2. “The Commissioner specifically found in Newport School Department that ‘the General Assembly’s conscious choice in 2001 to remove any reference to the general education rate more logically reflects the Legislature’s recognition that the actual cost of providing either general or special education services regularly exceeds even the higher special education per pupil rate.’” Id. at 2;

  3. “A specific finding by the Commissioner of legislative intent based on the General Assembly’s ‘conscious choice’ to delete any reference to a ‘general education’ rate should weigh more heavily than the Legislature's use of ‘a’ versus ‘the,’” id. at 3, and in any event, the Legislature’s use of “the” in lieu of “a” merely reflected the fact that “[t]here is not a single uniform per-pupil special education rate” as “[t]he rate varies by city and town.” Id. at 5; and

  4. RIGL §16-64-1.1(d) is not applicable since:

    1. “the parties clearly intended that the Contract not be construed as a contract for a ‘predetermined number of placements’ since it provided that it “does not obligate the Department to pay for any minimum pre-determined number of referrals or placements or any part of the facility’s program.’” See id. at 8, citing the Contract (CSD’s Ex. 2) Addendum I, Scope of Work at 32;

    2. “It could not be more clear that the utilization volume [referenced in the Contract] is variable (‘the point-in-time census is subject to change’) and ‘may exceed three’ slots at any given point in time.” DCYF Mem. at 8, citing April 22 Tr. at 47;

    3. Meadowridge is more than a “program,” it is “a residential treatment facility with the delivery of educational services,” DCYF Mem. at 10, and the mere placement of M. Doe at the facility does not establish that payments made to the facility by DCYF were made to any specific “program.” See id. at 10; and

    4. Meadowridge is licensed by Massachusetts, not Rhode Island, and thus was not “state licensed” under §16-64-1.1(d)(2). See id. at 10-11.

And finally, DCYF argued that CSD’s request for a stay of enforcement pending appeal should be denied since it will not likely succeed on the merits, which is the “sine qua non of the stay pending appeal standard.” See id. at 11, citing, inter alia, Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera- Monroig, 296 F. 3d 13 (1st Cir. 2002).

IV. Decision

1. The Use of an Indefinite Article in § 16-64-1.1(c)

RIGL § 16-64-1.1(c) provides, in pertinent part that:

[t]he city or town determined to be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil special education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2 shall pay its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF or to the facility providing educational services.

Id. (emphasis added).[7] CSD focuses upon the General Assembly’s use of an indefinite article – “a” – as opposed to a definite article – such as “the” – when modifying the phrase “per-pupil special education cost” in § 16-64-1.1(c). See CSD Mem. at 10. According to CSD, the use of a “word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an’” in that subsection conclusively establishes that the only time an LEA is liable to DCYF with respect to educational services provided at a private residential facility is when the foster child is receiving special education services pursuant to an IEP. See id. at 11, citing Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

However, neither the language cited by CSD, when read in context, nor the cases cited support CSD’s argument. While the D.C. Circuit did cite the general rule that “the definite article ‘the’... is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an’” in Am. Bus Ass’n, supra (while holding that the federal Department of Transportation lacked statutory authority to impose money damages on bus companies under the American with Disabilities Act, see id. at 2, 4), unlike here, the Court in Am. Bus Ass’n was construing a sentence in an Act that was otherwise silent with respect to the dispositive issue. See id. at 4.

Indeed, when the general rule was recited in the other case cited by CSD, a patent infringement case, the Court emphasized that:

‘[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘When interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature.’

Apotex Corp., supra, 316 F.3d at 1355, quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).

Thus, CSD’s textual argument would be more persuasive if the relevant statutory provisions here were, as in Am. Bus Ass’n, supra, being construed against a statutory scheme that was otherwise silent with respect to the dispositive issue. Yet, as the Commissioner made clear in Newport School Department, supra, §§ 16-64-1.1(c) and 16-64-1.2(c) must be construed in their proper context. And in Newport School Department, the Commissioner explained that:

... the General Assembly did initially recognize the distinction between general and special education rates: (1) when it amended RIGL § 42-72-5(b) in 1977 and made the special education rate applicable to ‘seriously emotionally disturbed children and children with functional developmental disabilities.’ See P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 3 (quoted at note 7, supra);[8] and (2) when it enacted § 16-64- 1.1(c) in 1998 and referenced the ‘average per pupil cost of general or special education.’ See P.L. 1998, ch. 68, § 3 (emphasis added). If the story had ended in 1998, the [Newport School Department (“NSD”)] would have had a valid argument that the rate of reimbursement might differ depending upon whether the child being placed was a general education, or special education, student.

Significantly, however, §§ 16-64-1.1, 16-64-1.2 and 16-64-1.3 were amended in 2001 so that all now refer exclusively to ‘the per-pupil special education cost,’ as quoted above. See P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 22, § 3; [additional citation omitted]. Thus while, as both parties note, the legislative history “clearly demonstrates the recognition by the Legislature of the two types of ‘cost of education’ namely ‘general’ or ‘special education’” [additional citation omitted]; [additional citation omitted], this legislative awareness, coupled with statutory amendments that remove any mention of the general education rate in §§ 16-64-1.1, 16-64-1.2 and 16-64-1.3, hardly supports the NSD’s conclusion that the general education rate is applicable here.

In fact, the General Assembly’s conscious choice in 2001 to remove any reference to the general education rate more logically reflects the Legislature’s recognition that the actual cost of providing either general or special education services regularly exceeds even the higher special education per pupil rate. And the NSD has presented no evidence to support its claim that interpreting the statute as DCYF has requested ‘would put a windfall into the hands of DCYF at the direct expense of the taxpayers of Newport.’ [citation omitted].

See id. at 10-11. Moreover, as noted by DCYF, the Legislature’s use of “the” in lieu of “a” in § 16-64-1.1(c) reflects the fact that “[t]here is not a single uniform per-pupil special education rate,” which “varies by city and town.” See DCYF Mem. at 5.

In short, CSD’s myopic focus upon the use of an indefinite article in one subsection of chapter 64 is no substitute for actually addressing the Commissioner’s rationale in Newport School Department, supra, and the relevant legislative history and statutory context, none of which support its claim that it need not reimburse DCYF for educational services provided to general education students placed by the Family Court in private residential facilities.

2. The Applicability of § 16-64-1.1(d)

Alternatively, CSD argues that under RIGL § 16-64-1.1(d) (quoted supra at note 4), DCYF must bear “the entire cost” of the educational services provided at Meadowridge. The evidence here does support the conclusion that the conditions specified in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) have been met since:

  1. CSD makes a persuasive argument that the General Assembly, which specifically contemplated the placement of children in out-of-state facilities, would have expressly stated that its use of the term “state licensed” in § 16-64-1.1(d)(2) was limited to facilities licensed by the State of Rhode Island had that been its intention. See CSD Mem. at 8;[9] and

  2. there was no dispute over the fact that Meadowridge “operate[d] an approved, on-grounds educational program” within the meaning of subsection (d)(3).

However, the plain language of § 16-64-1.1(d) makes clear that the conditions referenced in (d)(1) through (d)(3) all must be satisfied if DCYF is to be held financially responsible for the “entire cost” of a child’s education, and CSD’s argument that the condition specified in subsection (d)(1) has been satisfied is belied by the express language of the JRI Meadowridge Contract, which makes clear that it “[did] not obligate [DCYF] to pay for any minimum a predetermined number of referrals or placements or any part of the facility’s program.” See Contract (CSD’s Ex. 2), Addendum I (Scope of Work) at 32.

CSD argues that despite the contrary contractual language and the absence of any rebutting evidence, “the fact that DCYF required Meadowridge to preserve a certain number of slots is sufficient for the Commissioner to find that DCYF funded a pre-determined number of placements at Meadowridge.” See CDS Mem. at 8, n. 1. Yet, the Contract merely required that “[i]f for some reason [JRI Meadowridge was] no longer able to provide the agreed upon number of slots, [DCYF] must be notified.” See Contract Addendum II (Budget) at 42. This contractual obligation is materially different from “funding a pre-determined amount of slots,” as required if § 16-64-1.1(d)(1) were to apply.

And finally, if § 16-64-1.1(d)(1)’s requirement to “fund... part of the facility’s program” were to be construed as broadly as CSD suggests, it would apply to all of DCYF’s contracts with private residential facilities absent proof that none of the moneys provided under any contract were used to fund a part of some program run by the vendor, a nearly impossible task which would effectively render § 16-64-1.1(d)(1) illusory. Thus, CSD’s bald claim that the Contract “clearly does fund a part of Meadowridge’s program” is not persuasive, even if one were to ignore the express contractual language to the contrary. See Contract (CSD’s Ex. 2), Addendum I (Scope of Work) at 32.

3. CSD’s Request for a Stay of Enforcement

CSD has failed to meet any of the four criteria relevant to any consideration of a stay pending appeal set forth in Narragansett Electric Co. v. Harsch, 117 R.I. 940, 942, 367 A.2d 195, 197 (1976), since CSD:

  1. will not likely prevail on the merits, for the reasons set forth above;

  2. will not suffer irreparable harm as a matter of law, since the stay involves only money, i.e., the withdrawal of a limited amount of state education aid;

  3. granting a stay will likely result in substantial harm to DCYF and the state’s taxpayers, which have been forced to bear more than their legal share of the cost of the educational services provided to a foster child; and

  4. has failed to establish that allowing it to continue to ignore its legal responsibility for the education of foster children is in the public interest.

And while “the Harsch criteria are not “rigid requirements” that must be met if in the exercise of “sound discretion” it is determined that matters should be held in status quo pending review of the agency decision on its merits, see Dep’t of Corr., supra, 658 A.2d at 510, no persuasive reason has been put forth by CSD for the exercise of such discretion here.

V. Order

For all of the above reasons:

  1. DCYF’s Petition in the above matter is hereby granted;
  2. CSD shall reimburse DCYF for the cost of the educational services provided to M. Doe during one hundred and twenty-eight (128) day period from October 31, 2018 through March 8, 2019 at CSD’s special education rate, which is $123.06 per day per student, for a total of fifteen thousand, seven hundred fifty one dollars and sixty-eight cents ($15,751.68);
  3. CSD’s request for a stay of enforcement pending appeal is denied; and
  4. In the event that CSD does not within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision either: (a) reimburse DCYF as per ¶2, above; or (b) enter into a stipulation with DCYF that provides an agreed-upon reimbursement schedule, the Commissioner shall, after notice to the parties, enter an order requesting that the state’s General Treasurer withhold any unpaid balance from the state education aid to be paid to the CDS; and

Footnotes

[1] See Larue v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Dept. of Transp., 568 A.2d 755, 758-59 (R.I. 1990), citing Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (general presumption in administrative proceedings “favors the administrators” and places the burden of proof upon the party challenging the action “to produce evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.”).

[2] See, e.g., Alba v. Cranston School Committee, 90 A.3d 174, 184-85 (R.I. 2014) (quoting rule); Slattery v. School Committee of City of Cranston, 116 R.I. 252, 262, 354 A.2d 741, 747 (1976) (“one who appeals to the commissioner is entitled to ‘a de novo hearing’ and not ‘merely a review of [the] school committee action’”); School Committee of City of Pawtucket v. State Bd. of Ed., 103 R.I. 359, 364, 237 A.2d 713, 716 (1968) (commissioner’s jurisdiction “considerably broader than that of this court in reviewing an appeal” since “it is clear that § 16–39–2 and precursory legislation give the commissioner of education the right to make a de novo decision in examining and deciding the issue involved”).

[3] References to the hearing transcripts will be preceded by the abbreviation, “March 26 Tr.” or “April 22 Tr.”

[4] RIGL § 16-64-1.1(d) provides, in pertinent part, that:

[c]hildren placed by DCYF in group homes, child-caring facilities, community residences, or other residential facilities shall have the entire cost of their education paid for by DCYF if:

  1. The facility is operated by the state of Rhode Island or the facility has a contract with DCYF to fund a pre-determined number of placements or part of the facility's program;
  2. The facility is state licensed; and
  3. The facility operates an approved, on-grounds educational program, whether or not the child attends the on-grounds program.

Id.

[5] And DCYF recognized that there was no licensing function performed by the State of Rhode Island with respect to JRI Meadowridge. See April 22 Tr. at 57.

[6] According to DCYF’s Chief Executive Legal Counsel, DCYF has approximately nine (9) or (10) contracts similar to the JRI Meadowridge Contract, and presently, there is somewhere between 47 and 58 children in its care placed in out-of-state residential facilities. See April 22 Tr. at 55.

[7] And § 16-64-1.2(c) provides, in pertinent part, that when the child has neither father or mother living in the state, or when the child has been surrendered or freed for adoption (neither of which is the case here), RIDE:

shall designate the city or town to be responsible for the per-pupil special education cost of education to be paid to DCYF for children in state care . . .

Id. (emphasis added).

[8] Note 7 provided that:

[A]nd although less directly relevant, RIGL § 16-64-1.3(b) also refers exclusively to the “city or town's per pupil special education cost,” id. (emphasis added), and provides that:

[t]he city or town responsible for payment under § 16-64-1.1(c) for payment of a city or town's per pupil special education cost to DCYF for a child placed in a residential facility, group home, or other residential facility that includes the delivery of educational services shall be responsible for the free, appropriate public education, including all procedural safeguards, evaluation and instruction in accordance with regulations under chapter 24 of this title.

Id. (emphasis added). And § 42-72-5(b)(24)(v), which concerns “seriously emotionally disturbed children and children with functional developmental disabilities,” provides that:

[e]ach community, as defined in chapter 7 of title 16, shall contribute to the department, at least in accordance with rules and regulations to be adopted by the department, at least its average per-pupil cost for special education for the year in which placement commences, as its share of the cost of educational services furnished to a seriously emotionally disturbed child pursuant to this section in a residential treatment program that includes the delivery of educational services.

Id. (emphasis added).

Newport School Department, at 9-10, n.7.

[9] Indeed, DCYF’s point that § 16-64-1.1(d) “contains two references to a ‘state,’” only one of which “clearly identifies facilities ‘operated by the state of Rhode Island,’” see DCYF Mem. at 10-11, actually supports CSD’s interpretation rather than somehow mandating that the subsequent use of the term should for some unknown reason be construed as if modified by the phrase “operated by the state of Rhode Island.”

ANTHONY F. COTTONE, ESQ.,

as Hearing Officer for the Commissioner

Date: May 21, 2019

ANGELICA INFANTE-GREEN,

Commissioner