STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
Petitioner
v.
SMITHFIELD SCHOOL COMMITTEE,
Respondent
(IN RE: A. DOE)
Case No. 19-033
DECISION AND ORDER
Held: Petitioner’s request for certain statutorily-mandated costs related to its placement of a child in a residential treatment facility and the related hearing before RIDE provide neither the proper context nor the appropriate forum to adjudicate alleged violations of a student’s right to a free, appropriate, public education (a “FAPE”) under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), as such claims should be investigated by RIDE’s Office of Student, Community and Academic Supports and decided either pursuant to IDEA-mandated due process procedures, or by the Family Court. Moreover, since such FAPE-related allegations are not a defense to an action for the statutorily-mandated costs related to a residential placement, Respondent must pay its per-pupil special education rate to Petitioner for the two years of Student A. Doe’s attendance at the treatment facility.
Dated: December 10, 2020
I. Introduction
This matter concerns a request by the Petitioner, Department of Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”), for a residency determination under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-64-1.1(c) for the purpose of assigning financial and educational responsibility for a child, Student A. Doe (“Doe”), who was placed in a residential facility by DCYF with the approval of the Family Court.
RIDE Hearing Officer Paul Pontarelli was appointed by the Commissioner to hear the matter and after doing so, he submitted a draft decision for the Commissioner’s consideration, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “Draft Decision”). Although the Commissioner accepts the Hearing Officer’s findings of fact and ultimate conclusion as to the liability of Respondent, Smithfield School Committee (the “School Committee”), the Commissioner took issue with certain other legal conclusions, and thus is issuing the following in lieu of the Draft Decision.[1]
The Commissioner recognizes that alleged violations of a student’s right to a free, appropriate, public education (a “FAPE”) under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”): (1) are not a defense to claims by DCYF for statutorily-mandated costs related to a residential placement, such as the claim brought here; and (2) should not be adjudicated in that context, but rather should be investigated by RIDE’s Office of Student, Community and Academic Supports (“OSCAS”), and decided either pursuant to IDEA-mandated due process procedures, or by the Family Court. At the same time, the Commissioner concludes that:
(1) the Hearing Officer’s legal conclusion contained in his Draft Decision that “the requirements of IDEA [the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act], particularly § 34 CFR 300.116, do not apply to Petitioner’s decision to place Doe at Hillcrest [Educational Center (“Hillcrest”)],” see Draft Decision at 4 (¶ 1 of the Discussion section), is legally incorrect or, at best, overly broad and/or potentially misleading; and
(2) the Hearing Officer’s ostensible findings with respect to at least one FAPE-related claim, i.e., his apparent finding that Doe’s placement at Hillcrest was not a violation of her right under the IDEA to receive educational services in the least restrictive environment (the “LRE”), see id. at 4, coupled with the Hearing Officer’s referral of certain other FAPE-related issues to OSCAS – such as the child’s access to a school psychologist and her right to receive Extended School Year (“ESY”) services, see id. at 5 – rendered the Draft Decision as a whole inconsistent and misleading.
II. Background
It is undisputed that Doe, a foster child in Petitioner’s care, has at all relevant times been deemed to be a resident of the town of Smithfield. She is a child with a disability and has had an individualized education program (“IEP”).
On June 7, 2018, Doe’s IEP team met to conduct an annual review of her IEP. Doe’s DCYF social worker and her mother attended the IEP team meeting. The IEP developed for Doe provided for a placement in a “[s]pecial education residential school in a separate public or nonpublic facility.”[2] The IEP included direct counseling from a school psychologist for 15 minutes per month “to address behavior and emotional regulation.”[3] The IEP also stated that Doe did not require extended school year services (“ESY”).
On June 11, 2018, the Family Court gave Petitioner the “discretion to place [Doe] at Hillcrest Educational Center.”[4] No representative from the Smithfield School Department attended the Family Court hearing. Doe was placed at Hillcrest for “high end residential treatment.”[5] The sixteen-year-old Doe arrived at Hillcrest on June 26, 2018. On the same date, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent’s special education director requesting that Respondent assume responsibility for its per-pupil special education cost for Doe’s placement in a residential treatment facility. After a series of communications, the director informed Petitioner that:
Smithfield believes that [Doe’s] placement at Hillcrest is not the Least Restrictive Environment. Smithfield is able to provide [Doe] with a free appropriate education within the district and would request that a review of her placement be conducted. Because of the district’s concerns with placement, Smithfield is rejecting responsibility for educational payment.[6]
On October 24, 2018, the head of the special education department at Smithfield High School and the school psychologist visited Hillcrest to observe Doe. The information obtained from the observation was shared at a November 28, 2018 IEP team meeting for Doe at Smithfield High School. Doe, her Hillcrest regular education teacher, special education teacher, clinician and case manager participated in the meeting by conference call. Doe’s DCYF social worker was aware of the meeting but did not participate. The meeting resulted in a much different IEP for Doe, providing for education in a regular education class with related services and supplementary aids and supports. The IEP includes 45 minutes per week of both individual and group counseling from a school psychologist. The IEP does not provide for ESY services. The IEP lists Doe’s “Home School” as “Smithfield Public Schools” and her “Current School” as “Smithfield Pupil Services School.”[7]
Respondent and Hillcrest had further conversations following the November 28, 2018 IEP meeting. The subjects of these conversations included the need for a school psychologist, the least restrictive environment (“LRE”) for Doe and ESY services. Hillcrest does not have a school psychologist on staff.
Petitioner has paid the cost of Doe’s educational services at Hillcrest since June 26, 2018 without any contribution from a Rhode Island city or town. Doe remains at Hillcrest to this date.
III. Positions of the Parties
Respondent: The Commissioner should reconsider the argument of various Rhode Island school districts that the “funding mechanism” set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-64-1.1(c) is preempted by the IEP and LRE requirements of the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Respondent does not ask the Commissioner to ignore a Family Court placement order but simply asserts that the Commissioner cannot make it pay Hillcrest because she cannot disregard the IDEA’s LRE requirement, the provision in Doe’s IEP that she receive counseling from a school psychologist, and the IEP’s statement that she does not require ESY services. Rhode Island law does not give DCYF or the Commissioner the authority to violate IDEA, which grants every child with a disability the right to receive a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). In addition, IDEA prohibits states from using “funding mechanisms” which result in placements that violate the LRE requirement.[8] Respondent emphasizes that Doe’s IEP from Smithfield was developed by a team of qualified professionals and complied with LRE by placing her in a public school setting, not a residential placement. The Family Court did not have the benefit of input from Doe’s school district. Finally, IDEA “mandates that A. Doe be educated in a public school setting which Smithfield has designated as Smithfield High School;”[9] Doe’s IEP “should and does meet her needs, and it must be implemented as a matter of federal and state law even if it is inconvenient for DCYF and [Hillcrest]”;[10] and “all Smithfield had to do was make the necessary arrangements for A. Doe to attend a Smithfield public school which Smithfield was more than ready to do.”[11]
Petitioner: Respondent is advancing a thoroughly discredited defense in this matter. The Commissioner has flatly rejected a school district’s reliance on special education laws to avoid financial responsibility for a DCYF non-educational placement of a child in a residential facility.[12] This precedent is binding. It is the Family Court which is statutorily authorized to make placement decisions for children in DCYF care, and it does so based on information that the law has deemed confidential and in proceedings closed to the public. School districts do not have any legal standing in these proceedings. The cases from other states cited by Respondent involve residential placements made by local education agencies and/or different statutory schemes. Doe’s placement at Hillcrest was made pursuant to Rhode Island child welfare laws and was subject to the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Family Court. It was a child welfare, not educational, placement. Doe’s residency is not in dispute and any questions Respondent has about FAPE must be raised with the Family Court or the Department of Education’s Office of Student, Community and Academic Supports (“OSCAS”). Respondent’s arguments with respect to Doe’s psychological services and ESY services do not raise issues within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction in this matter, which applies to financial and educational responsibility for Doe. Because R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-64-1.1(c) requires Respondent to pay DCYF its “per-pupil special education cost,” which has been set at a daily rate by the Commissioner, Respondent is responsible for its daily per-pupil special education cost for the period of time Doe is placed at Hillcrest.
IV. Discussion
As the Commissioner has made clear on several occasions, liability for reimbursement with respect to a residential placement approved by the Family Court and compliance with the IDEA are separate and distinct matters, and alleged violations of a student’s right to a FAPE under the IDEA are not a defense to statutorily-mandated costs related to a placement at a residential treatment center under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-64-1.1(c), which makes clear that:
[c]hildren placed by DCYF in a residential-treatment program, group home, or other residential facility, whether or not located in the state of Rhode Island, which includes the delivery of educational services provided by that facility (excluding facilities where students are taught on grounds for periods of time by teaching staff provided by the school district in which the facility is located), shall have the cost of their education paid for as provided for in subsection (d) and § 16-64-1.2. The city or town determined to be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil special education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2 shall pay its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF or to the facility providing educational services.
Id.[13]
This is not to suggest that the IDEA is inapplicable, merely that a DCYF collection action for a past placement is not the proper context, and the related evidentiary hearing before RIDE is not the proper forum, to decide such issues. After all, due process hearings under the IDEA must be conducted by impartial and independent hearing officers who cannot be employed by RIDE or the local educational agency involved in the education or care of the child. See 200 R.I. Admin. Code 20-30-6.8.1(L).[14] Thus, whether Doe’s placement at Hillcrest violated her right to an education in the LRE, and/or whether she was entitled to and/or received counseling by a school psychologist and/or ESY services, should be investigated by OSCAS and decided pursuant to the procedures mandated under the IDEA, or alternatively, by the Family Court.
As for the assessment of the statutory per-pupil special education cost for “summer” days, we note that the per-pupil cost is calculated in the first instance as an annual amount. It represents a local education agency’s average yearly expenditure on a special education student. It is a function of costs over time. Looking at the facts of this case, Doe is completing her second full year at Hillcrest. Petitioner has paid the cost of Doe’s education for the entire time. Respondent, at this point, needs to make its statutory “contribution”[15] to the cost of Doe’s education by reimbursing Petitioner in the amount of two years of its applicable per-pupil special education cost.
V. Order
For all the above reasons:
- Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of Respondent’s per-pupil special education rate from June 26, 2018 to the present is hereby granted;
- Respondent is ordered to pay DCYF forthwith, or alternatively, pursuant to an agreed-upon payment plan; and
- The Commissioner will retain jurisdiction to ensure prompt implementation of the remedy ordered herein.
Footnotes
[1] Although the Commissioner is required to give deference to a hearing officer's findings that rely upon determinations of witness credibility, if the findings of the hearing officer did not rely upon determinations of credibility, the Commissioner’s review is de novo. See, e.g., Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 206-07 (R.I. 1993).
[2] Petitioner Exhibit 2.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. Hillcrest operates a residential facility in Pittsfield, Massachusetts which includes the delivery of educational services.
[5] Id.
[6] Respondent Exhibit 2.
[7] Respondent Exhibit 1.
[8] 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(b)(i).
[9] Respondent’s Memorandum of Law, p. 10. Respondent further asserts that Rhode Island regulations require the same, and it cites several state appellate court decisions to support the proposition that, as a matter of law, a juvenile court is not a substitute for an IEP team.
[10] Id., p. 15.
[11] Id.
[12] Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District v. Rhode Island Department of Education, 009-14, July 7, 2014; Department of Youth, Children and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, In Re: Student T.P., 021-15, December 15, 2015
[13] See, e.g., Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee and North Providence School Committee (In Re: Student N.M.), RIDE Case No. 015-16, June 22, 2016, pp. 13-14, citing Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District v. Rhode Island Department of Education, 009-14, July 7, 2014 and Department of Youth, Children and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, In Re: Student T.P., 021-15, December 15, 2015.
[14] Incorporating by reference 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(c)(1)(i).
[15] See Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Burrillville School Department (In Re: Student S. Doe), RIDE Case No. 19-051K, February 12, 2020, p. 6.
Date: December 10, 2020
Angélica Infante-Green
Commissioner
EXHIBIT A
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES
Petitioner
v.
SMITHFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT
Respondent
(IN RE: A. DOE)
Case No. 19-033P
Decision and Order
Held: Smithfield must pay its per-pupil special education rate to DCYF for the entire two years of the student’s non-educational placement at an out-of-state residential treatment facility where it is not feasible to implement the educational placement in the individualized education program Smithfield developed for the student.
Date:
Introduction
This matter concerns a petition by the Department of Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”) for a residency determination under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-64-1(c) for the purpose of assigning financial and educational responsibility for a child placed in a residential facility.
Background
It is undisputed that at all relevant times, A. Doe, a foster child in Petitioner’s care, has been deemed to be a resident of the town of Smithfield. She is a child with a disability and has had an individualized education program (“IEP”).
On June 7, 2018, Doe’s IEP team met to conduct an annual review of her IEP. Doe’s DCYF social worker and her mother attended the IEP team meeting. The IEP developed for Doe provided for a placement in a “[s]pecial education residential school in a separate public or non-public facility.”[16] The IEP included direct counseling from a school psychologist for 15 minutes per month “to address behavior and emotional regulation.”[17] The IEP also stated that Doe did not require extended school year services (“ESY”).
On June 11, 2018, the Family Court gave Petitioner the “discretion to place [Doe] at Hillcrest Educational Center.”[18] No representative from the Smithfield School Department attended the Family Court hearing. Doe was placed at Hillcrest for “high end residential treatment.”[19] The sixteen-year-old Doe arrived at Hillcrest on June 26, 2018. On the same date, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent’s special education director requesting that Respondent assume responsibility for its per-pupil special education cost for Doe’s placement in a residential treatment facility. After a series of communications, the director informed Petitioner that:
Smithfield believes that [Doe’s] placement at Hillcrest is not the Least Restrictive Environment. Smithfield is able to provide [Doe] with a free appropriate education within the district and would request that a review of her placement be conducted. Because of the district’s concerns with placement, Smithfield is rejecting responsibility for educational payment.[20]
On October 24, 2018, the head of the special education department at Smithfield High School and the school psychologist visited Hillcrest to observe Doe. The information obtained from the observation was shared at a November 28, 2018 IEP team meeting for Doe at Smithfield High School. Doe, her Hillcrest regular education teacher, special education teacher, clinician and case manager participated in the meeting by conference call. Doe’s DCYF social worker was aware of the meeting but did not participate. The meeting resulted in a much different IEP for Doe, providing for education in a regular education class with related services and supplementary aids and supports. The IEP includes 45 minutes per week of both individual and group counseling from a school psychologist. The IEP does not provide for ESY services. The IEP lists Doe’s “Home School” as “Smithfield Public Schools” and her “Current School” as “Smithfield Pupil Services School.”[21]
Respondent and Hillcrest had further conversations following the November 28, 2018 IEP meeting. The subjects of these conversations included the need for a school psychologist, the least restrictive environment (“LRE”) for Doe and ESY services. Hillcrest does not have a school psychologist on staff.
Petitioner has paid the cost of Doe’s educational services at Hillcrest since June 26, 2018 without any contribution from a Rhode Island city or town. Doe remains at Hillcrest to this date.
Positions of the Parties
Respondent: The recently-appointed Commissioner should reconsider the argument of various Rhode Island school districts that the “funding mechanism” set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.1(c) is pre-empted by the IEP and LRE requirements of the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Respondent does not ask the Commissioner to ignore a Family Court placement order but simply asserts that the Commissioner cannot make it pay Hillcrest because she cannot disregard the IDEA’s LRE requirement, the provision in Doe’s IEP that she receive counseling from a school psychologist, and the IEP’s statement that she does not require ESY services. Rhode Island law does not give DCYF or the Commissioner the authority to violate IDEA, which grants every child with a disability the right to receive a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). In addition, IDEA prohibits states from using “funding mechanisms” which result in placements that violate the LRE requirement.[22] Respondent emphasizes that Doe’s IEP from Smithfield was developed by a team of qualified professionals and complied with LRE by placing her in a public school setting, not a residential placement. The Family Court did not have the benefit of input from Doe’s school district. Finally, IDEA “mandates that A. Doe be educated in a public school setting which Smithfield has designated as Smithfield High School;”[23] Doe’s IEP “should and does meet her needs, and it must be implemented as a matter of federal and state law even if it is inconvenient for DCYF and [Hillcrest],”[24] and “all Smithfield had to do was make the necessary arrangements for A. Doe to attend a Smithfield public school which Smithfield was more than ready to do.”[25]
Petitioner: Respondent is advancing a thoroughly discredited defense in this matter. The Commissioner has flatly rejected a school district’s reliance on special education laws to avoid financial responsibility for a DCYF non-educational placement of a child in a residential facility.[26] This precedent is binding. It is the Family Court which is statutorily authorized to make placement decisions for children in DCYF care, and it does so based on information that the law has deemed confidential and in proceedings closed to the public. School districts do not have any legal standing in these proceedings. The cases from other states cited by Respondent involve residential placements made by local education agencies and/or different statutory schemes. Doe’s placement at Hillcrest was made pursuant to Rhode Island child welfare laws and was subject to the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Family Court. It was a child welfare, not educational, placement. Doe’s residency is not in dispute and any questions Respondent has about FAPE must be raised with the Family Court or the Department of Education’s Office of Student, Community and Academic Supports (“OSCAS”). Respondent’s arguments with respect to Doe’s psychological services and ESY services do not raise issues within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction in this matter, which applies to financial and educational responsibility for Doe. Because R.I. Gen. Laws §1664-1.1(c) requires Respondent to pay DCYF its “per-pupil special education cost,” which has been set at a daily rate by the Commissioner, Respondent is responsible for its daily per-pupil special education cost for the period of time Doe is placed at Hillcrest.
Discussion
Petitioner did not place Doe at Hillcrest for educational reasons. It was a child-welfare placement. Therefore, the requirements of IDEA, particularly § 34 CFR 300.116, do not apply to Petitioner’s decision to place Doe at Hillcrest.[27] Nor is R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.1(c) pre-empted by IDEA, a federal educational statute, when reimbursement is sought with regard to a non-educational residential placement. Once Doe moved to her residential placement at Hillcrest, however, the requirements of IDEA applied to her educational program there.
Ordinarily, liability for reimbursement and compliance with IDEA are separate and distinct matters.[28] Here, however, Respondent denies financial responsibility for Doe because of the nature of the educational services Doe receives at Hillcrest. It asserts that the IEP it wrote for Doe mandates that she receive her education at Smithfield High School, and that this IEP “must be implemented as a matter of federal and state law even if it is inconvenient for DCYF and [Hillcrest]” and that “all Smithfield had to do was make the necessary arrangements for A. Doe to attend a Smithfield public school which Smithfield was more than ready to do.”
Respondent did not, however, produce any evidence of the arrangements needed to be made to overcome this “inconvenience” or demonstrate that it would even be feasible for Doe to attend Smithfield High School while residing at the Hillcrest Educational Center in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. This lack of evidence becomes completely understandable when official notice is taken of the 127-mile/two-hour-and-fifteen-minute drive from Hillcrest to Smithfield High School.[29] We need not say any more about Doe’s “IEP-placement mandate.”[30]
The evidence does show that Respondent raises a legitimate question about the related service in Doe’s IEP for counseling by a school psychologist. While the Commissioner has previously held that this type of question is not a defense to liability under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-641.1(c),[31] we will refer the question to OSCAS for investigation.[32] Doe is entitled to receive such related services as are necessary for her receipt of FAPE and OSCAS must ensure that additional steps are taken, if necessary, to secure the services of a school psychologist.
With regard to Respondent's final arguments regarding ESY services, it is not entirely clear from the evidence that Doe received education services at Hillcrest in the summer. This question also may be referred to OSCAS. As for the assessment of the statutory per-pupil special education cost for “summer” days, we note that the per-pupil cost is calculated in the first instance as an annual amount. It represents a local education agency’s average yearly expenditure on a special education student. It is a function of costs over time. Looking at the facts of this case, Doe is completing her second full year at Hillcrest. Petitioner has paid the cost of Doe’s education for the entire time. Respondent, at this point, needs to make its statutory “contribution”[33] to the cost of Doe’s education by reimbursing Petitioner in the amount of two years of its applicable per-pupil special education cost. Perhaps different facts would yield a different result,[34] but the facts here require full statutory payment.
Conclusion
Petitioner has established that Respondent is financially and educationally responsible for Student A. Doe. Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of Respondent’s per-pupil special education rate from June 26, 2018 to the present is granted. Petitioner shall present Respondent with documentation of the current amount owed, and Respondent is ordered to pay DCYF forthwith. In lieu of full payment at this time, the parties may agree upon a reimbursement schedule. The Commissioner will retain jurisdiction of this case to ensure prompt implementation of the remedy ordered herein. A hearing to address any remedial issues is hereby scheduled for August 26, 2020 at 2:00 p.m.
Footnotes to Exhibit A
[16] Petitioner Exhibit 2.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. Hillcrest operates a residential facility in Pittsfield, Massachusetts which includes the delivery of educational services.
[19] Id.
[20] Respondent Exhibit 2.
[21] Respondent Exhibit 1.
[22] 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(b)(i).
[23] Respondent’s Memorandum of Law, p. 10. Respondent further asserts that Rhode Island regulations require the same, and it cites several state appellate court decisions to support the proposition that, as a matter of law, a juvenile court is not a substitute for an IEP team.
[24] Id., p. 15.
[25] Id.
[26] Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District v. Rhode Island Department of Education, 009-14, July 7, 2014; Department of Youth, Children and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, In Re: Student T.P., 021-15, December 15, 2015
[27] Section 34 CFR 300.116, entitled “Placements” and incorporated by reference in Rhode Island Regulation 200-RICR-30- 6.5.2(F), sets forth requirements “[i]n determining the educational placement of a child with a disability . . .”
[28] See Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee and North Providence School Committee (In Re: Student N.M.), RIDE Case No. 015-16, June 22, 2016, pp. 13-14, citing Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District v. Rhode Island Department of Education, 009-14, July 7, 2014 and Department of Youth, Children and Families v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, In Re: Student T.P., 021-15, December 15, 2015.
[29] Google Maps Driving Directions: https://www.bing.com/maps?q=google+maps+driving+directions&form=PRDLR1&src=IE11TR&pc=DCTE
[30] We have assumed for the purposes of Respondent’s argument that Doe is allowed to leave the Hillcrest property.
[31] See footnote 28.
[32] See In Re: Residency of Student C.M. Doe, RIDE Case No. 023-13, September 27, 2013, p. 10.
[33] See Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Burrillville School Department (In Re: Student S. Doe), RIDE Case No. 19-051K, February 12, 2020, p. 6.
[34] Id., pp. 5-6.
/s/ Paul E. Pontarelli
Hearing Officer
Approved:
Angélica Infante-Green
Commissioner
Date: