STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES
Petitioner
v.
SOUTH KINGSTOWN SCHOOL DEPARTMENT
Respondent
(In Re: A. Doe)
Case No. 19-029P
Decision
Held: DCYF did not give the South Kingstown School Department accurate and timely notice of Doe’s mother’s alleged place of residence and failed to establish that her last known Rhode Island residence was in South Kingstown. DCYF’s request to hold the school district financially and educationally responsible for the child’s residential placement at St. Mary’s Home for Children is denied.
Date: December 09, 2020
Introduction
This matter concerns a request by the Department of Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”) for a residency determination under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.1(c) for the purpose of assigning financial and educational responsibility for a child placed in a residential treatment facility.[1]
Background
By Family Court order dated May 22, 2015, A. Doe was removed from the home of her mother and committed to the care of Petitioner. Doe was 14 years old at the time. Reunification efforts followed but the last time Doe lived with her mother was August 22, 2016. Doe was deemed eligible for special education services in September 2015 and since then has had individualized education programs. Doe’s DCYF social case worker testified that Doe’s mother’s “parental rights [are] still intact.”[2]
According to Petitioner’s information system,[3] “the last known address” for Doe’s mother is 8 North Road in Wakefield.[4] Doe’s case worker testified that in January 2018 she believed Doe’s mother lived “[a[t the North Road address in Wakefield.”[5] However, the case worker further testified that on March 19, 2018, after speaking to Doe’s mother and being contacted by an organization providing services to the homeless, she created an Intrastate Identification Card for Doe showing her mother’s address as 44 Kersey Road in Wakefield. The case worker also testified, on cross-examination, that as of May 23, 2018, Doe’s mother had been evicted from her Kersey Road apartment. She testified that she currently had “no idea” where Doe’s mother lived.[6] There is no evidence in the record that Doe’s mother ever resided in the town of South Kingstown prior to living at 8 North Road or that Doe was ever enrolled in the South Kingstown public school system.
By letter dated November 2, 2018, Petitioner sent Respondent a “Notice of Responsibility For A Child In State Care.” The Notice stated that Doe is in Petitioner’s care and “is being reviewed for placement at a residential treatment facility that includes the delivery of educational services.”[7] Listing Doe’s mother’s address as “8 North Road, Wakefield, Rhode Island,” the Notice deemed Doe to be “a resident of the Town of South Kingstown for purposes of determining LEA responsibility,” and that South Kingstown would be responsible for its annual per-pupil special education cost of $102,897 if the placement were effectuated. Respondent declined responsibility.
Doe was accepted at St. Mary’s Home for Children in North Providence. Following a November 13, 2018 Family Court wayward/delinquent hearing, Doe was ordered to remain and cooperate with the placement at St. Mary’s. The residential placement commenced on November 20, 2018.
Petitioner filed its request for reimbursement in this matter on February 1, 2019. The first fact alleged in the request is “Upon information and belief, the foster child’s custodial parent, [name], lives at 8 North Road, Wakefield, RI” [footnote: “See RICHIST record attached; See Affidavit of [social case worker] attached”].[8] Petitioner did not amend its request with regard to this allegation before or during the March 20, 2019 hearing. Further hearing was available to either party, but the parties decided during a March 27, 2019 telephone conference to admit additional exhibits, close the record and submit memoranda following receipt of the hearing transcript. The record indicates that Doe’s placement at St. Mary’s continued as of the date of hearing and that Petitioner’s claim against Respondent was ongoing as of that date.
Positions of the Parties
Petitioner: The testimony and documentary evidence in this case proves that Doe’s mother’s last known address is 44 Kersey Road in Wakefield. While Petitioner “acknowledges the importance of accurate parental address histories,”[9] any errors made in the residential information provided to Respondent “are not material and South Kingstown has not demonstrated any reliance or prejudice as a result of those errors.”[10] Referencing the erroneous RICHIST record showing Doe’s mother’s address at 8 North Road, Petitioner states:
... South Kingstown denied responsibility for Doe based on the fact that she was not enrolled in the district and the district did not know the family or the student. There was no evidence that South Kingstown relied on the RICHIST record to its detriment or even saw the document prior to the hearing.[11]
While Petitioner bears the burden of proving Doe’s mother’s last Rhode Island residence under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.2(c), it need prove only the last “known” residence, not the last actual residence. Petitioner met its burden. Respondent offered no evidence. Therefore,
The Commissioner must designate South Kingstown as Doe’s city or town of residence pursuant to RIGL §16-64-1.1(c). This designation constitutes ‘prima facie evidence’ of [the mother’s] residence pursuant to RIGL §16-64-1.1(d). Alternatively, DCYF produced Doe’s Interstate ID Card... which by statute, RIGL §42-72.4-1(b), also constitutes ‘prima facie evidence’ of [Doe’s mothers] residence in the district. (emphasis in original).[12]
Petitioner concludes its argument by asserting that after the Commissioner makes her designation of residence pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.1(d), the burden of proof in a residency determination proceeding shifts to Respondent to rebut the “prima facie evidence” that 44 Kersey Road in Wakefield is Doe’s mother’s last known Rhode Island residence. Respondent did not present a “last known Rhode Island residence” for Doe’s mother.
Respondent: Petitioner sought to prove a South Kingstown residency “through purported ‘business records’ and other ‘evidence’ that contains not only numerous inaccuracies, but simply incorrect information with respect to the main point of contention in the hearing, the parent’s address.”[13] Petitioner never provided Respondent with an accurate and timely address, and its notice of responsibility and petition to the Commissioner are based on an inaccurate allegation: that Doe’s mother resides at 8 North Road in Wakefield. Petitioner’s RICHIST records were shown to be inaccurate and unreliable and therefore are not trustworthy “business records” entitled to any weight. Petitioner has no first-hand knowledge of residences at 8 North Road or 44 Kersey Road and it has absolutely no idea where Doe’s mother currently resides. Its inaccurate and second-hand evidence failed to meet its burden of proof in this matter.
Discussion
The record in this case shows that, before contacting Respondent about Doe’s placement at St. Mary’s, Petitioner:
- Had information that Doe’s mother had moved from 8 North Road in Wakefield to 44 Kersey Road in Wakefield;
- Had created an Interstate Identification Card for Doe’s mother with an address of 44 Kersey Road;
- Had information that Doe’s mother had been evicted from 44 Kersey Road; and
- Had no information about Doe’s mother’s subsequent whereabouts.
And yet, despite these facts, Petitioner:
- On November 2, 2018 sent Respondent a “Notice of Responsibility For A Child In State Care” listing Doe’s mother’s address as “8 North Road, Wakefield, Rhode Island;”
- Three months later, filed the instant request for a residency determination alleging that Doe’s mother, “[u]pon information and belief... lives at 8 North Road, Wakefield, RI” and attached a RICHIST record and affidavit from Doe’s case worker stating the same;
- Did not amend the residence allegation in its request in the seven weeks that preceded the hearing;
- Did not amend the residence allegation at the outset or at any other time during the hearing;
- Did not present evidence of the Kersey Road eviction during its case-in-chief at the hearing; and
- Did not take the position at the hearing that 44 Kersey Road was Doe’s mother’s “last Rhode Island residence.”
In light of the above, we deny Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for the following reasons, each of which is, in and of itself, grounds for denial.
First, Doe’s mother did not live at 8 North Road in Wakefield when Petitioner informed Respondent that such residence was the basis for its responsibility for Doe. Petitioner’s Notice of Responsibility was not a “notice” at all when it provided inaccurate residential information. As is the case here, it is not uncommon for a DCYF-placed child to have never been enrolled in the LEA which DCYF claims is responsible under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.2. It is the residence of the parent at the time of (and during the subsequent course of) the residential placement that determines responsibility under the statute, a residence which often is established some time after the child enters Petitioner’s care. In the absence of previous contact with the parent, the LEA is totally dependent upon the residential information it receives from Petitioner in order to determine whether it has educational and financial responsibility for the child.[14] Because the financial stakes can be high in these cases ($102,897 annually for Respondent), the information about the parent’s residence needs to be accurate and up-to-date. Respondent received neither. Its opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s Notice of Responsibility was severely compromised by the information Petitioner provided. Moreover, Petitioner repeated its erroneous statement of Doe’s mother’s residence in its request herein and at no point in the hearing process sought to amend this most essential factual allegation.[15] It was not until Petitioner’s case-in-chief at the hearing that Respondent received an updated address for Doe’s mother. This was not the result of newly-discovered or previously-unavailable evidence, yet it concerns the most important fact in the case. Respondent’s contention that it was never given an accurate and timely address for Doe’s mother is well taken, and we find that Petitioner’s “notice” to Respondent deprived it of a fundamentally fair process in this matter.
Second, Petitioner, in its post-hearing memorandum, invokes R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.2(c) to establish Respondent’s responsibility in this matter. That statute provides, in relevant part, that:
The department of elementary and secondary education shall designate the city or town to be responsible for the per-pupil special education cost of education to be paid to DCYF for children in state care who have neither a father, mother, nor guardian living in the state or whose residence can be determined in the state or who have been surrendered for adoption or who have been freed for adoption by a court of competent jurisdiction using the following criteria: (1) last known Rhode Island residence of the child's father, mother, or guardian prior to moving from the state, dying, surrendering the child for adoption or having parental rights terminated...
If Petitioner were relying on a “last known Rhode Island residence” of Doe’s mother at 44 Kersey Road in Wakefield, it needed to timely inform Respondent of such. Instead, Petitioner informed Respondent of an 8 North Road residence in November 2018, alleged the same address in its February 2019 request herein, introduced the 44 Kersey Road residence at the March 2019 hearing, and then claimed that address as a “last known Rhode Island residence” in its post-hearing brief.[16] As discussed above, this is not a fair process. Rhode Island’s Administrative Procedures Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §42-35-1 et seq. demands that “all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing after reasonable notice.”[17] The notice Petitioner belatedly provided to the Respondent during the course of the hearing was not reasonable.
Third, not only did Petitioner need to give Respondent reasonable notice of the actual basis of its claim, it needed to prove its claim. The evidence in this record does not establish that 44 Kersey Road was Doe’s mother’s “last known Rhode Island residence... prior to moving from the state, dying, surrendering the child for adoption or having parental rights terminated.” At the hearing, Respondent’s counsel asked Doe’s case worker where Doe’s mother currently resides. The case worker answered “I have no idea.”[18] She was then asked if Doe’s mother lives in Rhode Island. She replied “As of May 23, 2018, she was evicted from [44 Kersey Road]. From that point on, I have no idea.”[19] There is no evidence of any attempt by Petitioner to verify the 44 Kersey Road residence, ascertain Doe’s mother’s subsequent whereabouts or determine whether she currently resides in Rhode Island.[20] Thus, with regard to §16-64-1.2(c), the evidence fails to demonstrate that Doe does not have “a father, mother, nor guardian living in the state or whose residence can be determined in the state...” Petitioner has “no idea” where Doe’s mother lives. It therefore cannot say the Doe does not have “a father, mother, nor guardian living in the state.” Nor did Petitioner show that Doe does not have “a father, mother, nor guardian... whose residence can be determined in the state.” It did not make any effort to determine, post-eviction from 44 Kersey Road, where Doe’s mother is living, particularly whether she is living in Rhode Island. In order to conclude that a particular residence is a parent or guardian’s “last known Rhode Island residence,” a party must show the basis of that conclusion. It must produce evidence of its efforts to find a later residence and the result of those efforts. DCYF cannot simply declare that the last address in RICHIST is the parent’s “last known Rhode Island residence.” It must demonstrate the effort it undertook to determine a subsequent residence for the parent. If credible evidence of an unsuccessful attempt to find a subsequent residence is provided, then DCYF may claim that the parent’s residence cannot be determined to be in the state and that the last address in RICHIST, provided it has an accurate basis in fact, is the parent’s “last known Rhode Island residence.” Thus, even if the notice deficiencies discussed above did not exist, Petitioner has not provided sufficient proof that South Kingstown is the “last known Rhode Island residence” for Doe’s mother or even that §16-64-1.2(c) is applicable to the facts of this case.[21]
Conclusion
Petitioner did not give Respondent accurate and timely notice of Doe’s mother’s alleged place of residence, and failed to establish that Doe’s mother’s current residence could not be determined or that her last known Rhode Island residence was in South Kingstown. Petitioner’s request to hold Respondent financially and educationally responsible for Doe’s residential placement at St. Mary’s Home for Children is denied.[22]
Footnotes
[1] A hearing in this matter was conducted on March 20, 2019.
[2] Transcript, p. 39.
[3] The system is known as “Rhode Island’s Children Information System,” or “RICHIST.” According to Petitioner’s website, RICHIST “is the required method of documenting the Department’s work.” See http://www.dcyf.ri.gov/policyregs/rhode_island_children_s_information_system__richist_.htm#
[4] Tr., p. 49.
[5] Tr., p. 52.
[6] Tr., p. 65. Neither Doe’s case worker nor any other DCYF employee ever visited 8 North Road or 44 Kersey Avenue.
[7] Petitioner Exhibit 15.
[8] Petitioner Exhibit 1.
[9] Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law, p. 8.
[10] Id., p. 7.
[11] Id., p. 7.
[12] Id., p. 9.
[13] Respondent’s Memorandum of Law, p. 2.
[14] Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, Respondent’s claim that it did not know the family or the student exacerbated the problem of Petitioner’s inaccuracies because Respondent did not have any information of its own about Doe’s mother’s residential history.
[15] Petitioner alleged a residence of 8 North Road “based upon information and belief.” The testimony of Doe’s case worker clearly shows that she had “information and belief” that Doe’s mother subsequently moved to 44 Kersey Road. Also, the significance of Petitioner’s assertion that Respondent did not see the erroneous RICHIST record prior to the hearing is hard to fathom when Petitioner used the same erroneous address in the RICHIST record in its Notice of Responsibility and request for a residency determination. Inconsistent residential addresses for the student’s parent in RICHIST was a factor in the Superior Court’s decision in Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education and the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (In Re: P. Doe), C.A. No. PC-2019- 5968, February 11, 2020, reversing Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Newport Public Schools (In re P. Doe), Case No. 19-005A, April 26, 2019. See also, Decision and Order Following Remand, Case No. 19-005A, August 18, 2020.
[16] In fact, the only mention of Doe’s mother’s “last known address” at the hearing occurred in one question to Doe’s caseworker about 8 North Road being the last entry in the RICHIST mother’s address history.
[17] R. I. Gen. Laws §42-35-9(a).
[18] Tr., p. 65.
[19] Tr., p. 66.
[20] In spite of evidence that Doe’s mother retained her parental rights.
[21] Nor does Petitioner’s attempt to use the Interstate Identification Card establish Respondent’s responsibility. R.I. Gen. Laws §42-35-72.4(b) states as follows:
It is the duty of the director to update the intra-state education identification card for each child in order to provide current information regarding the residence of the parent or guardian and evidence of immunization as provided in § 16-38-2 on an annual basis prior to and each time the child transfers to another school district. This card shall provide that each city or town be required to immediately enroll the child in its school system and for purposes of determining the school district financially responsible for the child's education in accordance with § 16-64-1.1, the parent's residence designated on the intra-state education identification card shall constitute prima facie evidence of the parent's residence in that district.
The Card was created in March 2018. It was overlooked when Petitioner sent its Notice of Responsibility to Respondent. It was overlooked again when Petitioner filed its request herein for a residency determination. It first came to light during the hearing, but was not presented for the express purpose of establishing a prima facie case. In Petitioner’s post-hearing memorandum, however, it transformed into an alternative ground for finding Respondent responsible. We find that the Card was not used in the way intended by the statute, i.e., “to provide current information regarding residence of the parent...” or in accordance with fundamental principles of fair procedure, i.e., reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing. This Card cannot supersede the inaccuracies and omissions which took place in Petitioner’s pursuit of this claim.
[22] If Doe’s placement remains ongoing as of the date of this decision, DCYF is hereby ordered to contact the Office of Student, Community and Academic Supports at the Department of Education for purposes of assigning educational responsibility for Doe’s placement.
/s/ Paul E. Pontarelli
Paul E. Pontarelli
Hearing Officer
Approved:
Angélica Infante-Green
Commissioner
Date: December 09, 2020