STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, Petitioner
v.
SMITHFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT, Respondent
In Re: R. Doe
RIDE No. 19-008K
DECISION
Held: The Smithfield School Department was not permitted to introduce evidence of undue hardship arising from the projected payment of statutorily-required reimbursement to DCYF because the Commissioner lacked authority to entertain this equitable defense in a proceeding brought to collect monies owed to DCYF for the educational costs of a student in DCYF custody placed at a residential facility. However, Smithfield's argument with respect to the extreme hardship a judgment in excess of $178,000 will have on the district's financial situation this year, coupled with DCYF's delay in asserting this claim against the school district, should be taken into account in determining the length of time Smithfield should have to pay this obligation to DCYF. For this reason, the Commissioner declines to order the General Treasurer to deduct the amount owed from Smithfield's state education aid at this time. The parties are to confer to agree upon a payment schedule for the payment of reimbursement required to be paid to DCYF under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.1(c).
Date: December 30, 2019
Travel of the Case:
The Department of Children, Youth and Families ("DCYF") filed a "Request For An Order For Residency Determination And Designation Of Party Responsible For The Education Of A Youth Residing In A Residential Facility" (the "Request") with the Commissioner on January 15, 2019. The Request indicated that R. Doe had entered DCYF custody on December 2, 2010, that she had been placed in a residential facility on September 9, 2016 and that she currently resided there. The Request indicated that both of R. Doe's parents had moved out of state in 2014 and that just prior to their move to the state of New York, they had both resided together for a brief period of time in Smithfield, Rhode Island. Therefore, the Smithfield School Department ("Smithfield") had been named as the responsible LEA for R. Doe, but yet a Notice of Responsibility, sent to its Director of Special Education on September 21, 2016 had been declined.
The matter was assigned for hearing and testimony and documentary evidence were submitted at hearings convened on April 2, 2019 and June 25, 2019. Closing memoranda were submitted on October 21, 2019 and November 7, 2019 at which time the record closed.
Jurisdiction to hear this dispute arises under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-6 (school residency)[1] and R.I. Gen. Laws §16-39-1 (the Commissioner's general jurisdiction over disputes "arising under any law relating to schools or education").
ISSUE:
Is Smithfield's assertion that undue hardship will result if it is required to pay the full amount of reimbursement currently owed to DCYF a potential equitable defense to payment, such that evidence of undue hardship should be taken in this case?
Findings of Relevant Facts:
R. Doe has been in the care and custody of DCYF since she was four (4) years old. The Rhode Island Family Court placed her in "temporary" state custody on December 2, 2010. DCYF Ex. 1. Doe is also a student with a disability, eligible for services under state law and the IDEA. DCYF Ex. 13 and 15. Tr. Vol. I, p. 87.
At the time of hearing in April of 2019, Doe had been in a residential placement at the Mauran Unit of St. Mary's Home for Children since September 19, 2016. DCYF Ex. 12. Other than for brief periods of time in which she was hospitalized, Doe resided at the Mauran Unit from September 19, 2016 until her placement in a specialized foster home in Woonsocket, Rhode Island on February 15, 2019. DCYF Ex. 12 and 16; Tr. Vol. II, p. 14.
Doe's mother and father resided together in Smithfield, Rhode Island for a brief period of time prior to moving to the state of New York. Doe's mother[2] lived in Smithfield from June 9, 2014 to September 30, 2014; her father lived in Smithfield from June 9, 2014 to October 14, 2014. DCYF Ex. 10 and 11.
R. Doe has never lived in Smithfield and was at no point in her life enrolled as a student in the Smithfield school system. Smithfield Ex. 1; DCYF Ex. 12.
Based on the residence of Doe's mother in Smithfield prior to leaving the state in 2014, DCYF sent a "Notice of Responsibility For A Child In State Care" to Eileen Crudele, the Director of Special Education of Smithfield, on September 21, 2016. Ms. Crudele declined acceptance of financial and educational responsibility for Doe in writing, on behalf of Smithfield, on September 27, 2016. Ms. Crudele testified as to the reasons she declined to accept responsibility for Doe. She checked Smithfield's data base to see if Doe had ever been enrolled as a student in Smithfield and determined that she had not ever been a student in the district. She also attempted to verify the mother's residence and determined that Doe's mother was not living at the address provided by DCYF on the Notice of Responsibility. Tr.Vol. II, pp. 22-26.[3]
DCYF filed a Request for determination of a responsible LEA for Doe on January 15, 2019.
Positions of the Parties:
Smithfield School Department:
Smithfield recognizes that it is not entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law, but submits that a judgment in excess of $178, 000 will have dire consequences this year for the children enrolled in Smithfield schools. Counsel for the district submits that the hearing officer should have allowed Smithfield the opportunity to establish facts in support of its "equitable defense" of extreme hardship. An offer of proof was made at the time the hearing officer sustained DCYF's objection to the introduction of evidence relating to the dire state of school funding in Smithfield, to wit: the fact that Smithfield had sustained a 1.4 million dollar cut in state education aid in the current fiscal year at a time when enrollment in the Smithfield school system is increasing.
Smithfield contends that the Commissioner is charged with assisting local districts to achieve "maximum efficiency and economy" as set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws §16-60-6(5) and as a public officer must act as a fiduciary. To effectuate these ends, the Commissioner is statutorily authorized to "examine and decide" any matter of dispute...arising under any law relating to schools or education..." Armed with such broad authority, Smithfield submits that the Commissioner exercises "equitable authority in the field of education," when adjudicating disputes, citing Northeast Cent. Sch. Dist. V. Sobol, 79 NY 2d 598, 609, 595 N. E. 2d 339, 346, 584 N.Y.S. 2d 525, 532 (1992) a case issued from the Court of Appeal of New York. Counsel notes that Rhode Island's Commissioner exercised equitable authority in a case arising under the same statute at issue here. In Harmony Hill Sch. & DCYF v. Foster Sch. Comm., No 005-13 (R.I. Comm'r of Educ. Feb. 27, 2013) the Commissioner rejected DCYF's strict statutory arguments when doing so would financially devastate a small local educational agency.
In this case, the hearing officer should reconsider her ruling declining to hear any evidence on the devastating impact that this judgment, in excess of $178,000, would have on a small district like Smithfield. The consequences of enabling DCYF to "balance its budget" this year will be extremely dire for Smithfield children in a fiscal year in which state aid has been cut and student enrollment is rising. Since she has the authority, the Commissioner should permit the creation of a record in this case that will support an equitable defense to payment for the education of a child who never attended, or was even enrolled, in Smithfield's school system because her parents briefly resided in the district back in 2014. Under circumstances that Smithfield stands ready to prove, the Commissioner cannot permit DCYF to collect statutory reimbursement for this child in state custody.
DCYF:
Counsel for DCYF sums up Smithfield's argument as nothing more than "argumentum ad misericordiam" a "logically fallacious style of argument" based on appeal to the Commissioner's sympathy. This argument is not relevant to the facts in this record. DCYF points out that when Smithfield was notified that it had been identified as the responsible LEA for this student on September 21, 2016, Smithfield made a decision to refuse to accept responsibility based on the residency of the custodial parent- a fact it now admits. At the conclusion of the hearing there was no dispute that both Doe's mother and father lived in Smithfield prior to moving out of state. This fact places financial and educational responsibility squarely upon Smithfield per R.I. Gen. Laws §16-64-1.2 (c). Faced with a clear statutory responsibility to provide reimbursement for Doe's educational expenses during the time she was placed at St. Mary's Home, Smithfield now characterizes this clearly-supported statutory claim as affording DCYF "ready access to other people's money". Rather than recognizing that state law requires that reimbursement must be made to DCYF (and that payment is long-overdue), Smithfield attempts to string together facts in support of an argument playing upon sympathy for its financial plight. What Smithfield fails to mention is that Smithfield, like all other school districts in Rhode Island, receives educational funding for children placed by DCYF in residential facilities and therefore received state aid to support Doe's educational costs. If there is a financial drain from Smithfield's school resources this year, it will be one of Smithfield's own making.
Smithfield cites a case from New York, Northeast Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Sobol, supra, for the proposition that the Commissioner can ignore the dictates of Chapter 64 of Title 16. The case cited by DCYF holds only that the New York Commissioner was authorized to reimburse parents for special education retroactively as part of the school district's obligation to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to a child. The Court of Appeal in the case cited approved the Commissioner's fashioning of a remedy for a student's denial of FAPE as authorized under both state (of New York) and federal law, not in violation of such laws. Similarly, Smithfield's reliance on Harmony Hill Sch. & DCYF v. Foster Sch. Comm., supra, is misplaced. In Harmony Hill the Commissioner did not relieve the Foster school district from its statutory obligation to make reimbursement to DCYF, but merely recognized that over a lengthy period of time RIDE had permitted payment of a state average per pupil cost instead of Foster's "average" based on the small number of special education students in the district. It is disingenuous for Smithfield to suggest in its memorandum that the Commissioner's decision in Harmony Hill was based on the financial impact such payment would have upon the town of Foster.
DCYF argues that while the Commissioner is authorized by state law to adjudicate educational disputes, in doing so she is not authorized to ignore the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws §§16-64-1.1, 16-64-1.2 and 16-64-1.3. In fact, the Commissioner is charged with requiring the observance of all laws relating to education (R.I. Gen. Laws §16-60-6 (9) (vii) not the avoidance of statutory responsibilities. More general statutory statements that the Commissioner should "assist local districts to achieve maximum efficiency" (R.I. Gen. Laws §16-60-6 (5) cannot and should not be interpreted as conveying authority to ignore provisions of other statutes that clearly, by unambiguous language, require districts to reimburse DCYF for costs incurred in educating children in state care such as Doe. If the Commissioner were to permit the presentation of an "equitable defense" to preclude Smithfield's payment of these monies, she would be acting ultra vires and her action would be invalid, subject to reversal by a court.
DECISION
As Smithfield recognizes in its memorandum, it is not entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Enforcement of the provisions placed in statute by the Rhode Island General Assembly require that the Commissioner rule that Smithfield is indebted to DCYF in the amount of $178,640.68.[4] The reimbursement provisions found in Title 16 Chapter 64 evidence a clear legislative intent that Rhode Island districts are to reimburse DCYF for a portion of the educational costs incurred in educating children in state care under the circumstances here.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the parents of R. Doe both had a last-known Rhode Island address in the town of Smithfield. Smithfield's assertion that DCYF is taking unwarranted steps to "balance its budget" ignores the fact that the law requires this state agency to obtain the reimbursement it seeks from Smithfield, as well as other school districts that have been parties in numerous cases of this type recently brought before the Commissioner.
Smithfield's argument that proof of extreme hardship wrought by payment of a debt of this magnitude during this fiscal year[5] is an equitable defense to DCYF's claim is rejected. This is not to say that the Commissioner is barred from ever considering equity and equitable principles in adjudicating disputes under R.I. Gen. Laws §16-39-1. However, arguments based in equity cannot be used to circumvent the very education law that that the Commissioner is statutorily-bound to enforce.[6] Even though the equitable defense of "extreme" or "undue"
hardship is not a defense that can be used to preclude payment of this indebtedness, principles of equity and the specific factual circumstances of the Smithfield School Department during the current fiscal year could be relevant to the terms and conditions under which this debt is to be paid by Smithfield. Therefore, based on the argument advanced at the time of hearing and the offer of proof of counsel for the district, the Commissioner declines to order the General Treasurer to deduct the entire amount owed to DCYF from Smithfield's state education aid at this time. The parties are directed to confer to agree upon a payment schedule that will take into account the facts referenced in counsel's offer of proof, i.e. the 1.4 million dollar reduction in state aid this fiscal year and the increase in enrollment that Smithfield experienced. The parties should also take into account the delay from September of 2016 to January of 2019 in DCYF's filing of its Request for reimbursement with the Commissioner.
If the parties cannot agree upon a payment schedule, the hearing will be reconvened to take evidence of facts that may be relevant to equitable considerations of undue hardship raised by Smithfield in this case.
DCYF has proven that Smithfield owes the sum of $178,640.68 as reimbursement for the cost of educating Doe during the time she was placed at the Mauran Unit of St. Mary's Home for Children.
Footnotes
[1] Initially, counsel for Smithfield raised several discrete issues constituting potential defenses to reimbursement to DCYF, including the assertion that Doe's father may have resided in another Rhode Island town or city (not Smithfield) after his move to the state of New York in 2014.
[2] Counsel for both parties apparently viewed the sequence in the timing of termination of parental rights in 2015 as significant in making Doe's father the parent whose "last known Rhode Island residence" was determinative of the responsible LEA. We do not share in this interpretation of the statute, such that in another case (not this one) in which the parents live in different communities prior to moving out of state, the residence of the second parent to leave the state would be the pertinent fact, notwithstanding when there may have been a subsequent termination of parental rights, surrendering of the child for adoption, or death.
[3] On cross-examination, Ms. Crudele indicated that she later became aware that Doe's mother had moved to the state of New York and, being unaware that parental rights had been terminated, she suggested to Doe's educational advocate that Doe's supervision should be assumed by the state child welfare agency in New York and responsibility for Doe's education assumed by the school district in which her mother currently lived. DCYF Ex. 17; Tr. Vol. II, pp.53-54.
[4] The parties discussed potential minor revisions to this amount at the June 25, 2019 hearing.
[5] The proof that was rejected when DCYF's objection to its introduction was sustained.
[6] The single case cited from the New York Court of Appeal does not support Smithfield's legal argument. The Commissioner's ruling in Harmony Hill Sch. & DCYF v. Foster Sch. Comm., supra, involved recognition of a different and long-standing calculation of statutory reimbursement to DCYF by the Foster School Department, based on a prior determination by RIDE that Foster's low population of special education students did not produce a true "average" per pupil cost for this district. Foster's financial condition had no bearing on the Commissioner's ruling in this case.
For the Commissioner,
Kathleen S. Murray,
Hearing Officer
Angélica Infante-Green,
Commissioner of Education
Date: December 30, 2019