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David and Jennifer P v. Allegheny Intermedia, et al.

January 12, 2007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID AND JENNIFER

eet” PARDINI, No. 2:03-cv-0725 Plaintiffs, Judge Thomas J. Hardiman VS. Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay

ALLEGHENY INTERMEDIATE UNIT, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal

From and Objections to Memorandum Order of August 18, 2006

(Memorandum) entered by United States Magistrate Judge Amy

Reynolds Hay. In her Memorandum, Magistrate Judge Hay denied

Plaintiffs' motion to exclude from evidence an Individualized

Family Services Plan (IFSP) and held that Plaintiffs are not

entitled to attorney's fees because David Pardini, Esq. brought

this case on behalf of himself, his wife Jennifer, and their

Gaughter Georgia. Magistrate Judge Hay's Memorandum is thorough,

concise, and the Court agrees with its analysis and conclusions.

This brief Memorandum Opinion is intended, out of deference to

the Court of Appeals, to frame the issue in general terms to

assist the appellate review that inevitably will follow. Poke eee et ON pred ab eyo fa ey foyer RNa eww tf a Nasiionant Sf Ehlee ATPtd Ory? Darn 8 NE not 4A ad pet) ." a) copes td expe wevlews roe he PEP Re ASH ARLTee eke ER LS seeds PPAR AA Rees oye: AS a aha a bPe" CARRAR edi A fe go A Me

First, it must be noted that the Court of Appeals, in

reversing this Court,’ held that "the stay-put provision of the

IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §1415(j), required Georgia to continue to receive

conductive education until the dispute over its appropriateness

for inclusion in her IEP was resolved." Pardini v. Allegheny

Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2005). Although

the Court of Appeals was not presented with the question of

Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorneys' fees, it stated ina

footnote: "We do not think that Mr. Pardini is precluded from

recovering reasonable attorneys' fees otherwise provided for

under the IDEA merely because he is seeking reimbursement for his

own expenses while representing his daughter. In Zucker v.

Westinghouse, 374 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004) we recognized

that, absent an expression of congressional intent to the

contrary, a plaintiff's entitlement to attorneys' fees is not

eliminated merely because he/she was pro se counsel." Pardini,

420 F.3d at 184 n.4.

As Magistrate Judge Hay noted, however, the Court of Appeals

in Woodside v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 248 F.3d 129 (3d

Cir. 2001), held "that an attorney-parent cannot receive attorney

fees for work representing his minor child in proceedings under

* This case was originally assigned to, and decided by, the Honorable Arthur J. Schwab. Upon remand from the Court of Appeals, Judge Schwab recused himself on October 11, 2006 and the case was reassigned on October 16, 2006 to the undersigned.

2 the IDEA." Id. at 131. In his objections now pending, attorney

Pardini correctly notes that in Woodside the attorney/father

sought fees for representing his minor child in administrative

proceedings whereas here Pardini seeks fees earned as the

prevailing party in federal court. At the same time, however,

the attorney in Woodside also sought fees for the federal court

action and the holding quoted above is not limited to recovery of

fees for legal work at administrative proceedings.

In light of the foregoing, it is understandable that Pardini

would assert his entitlement to attorney's fees and that the

Allegheny Intermediate Unit would deny any obligation to pay

those fees. The Court of Appeals undoubtedly will have the

opportunity to answer this question definitively in this case.

Based on the equivocal controlling law, however, this Court finds

that the Third Circuit's opinion in Woodside -- wherein the issue

of attorneys' fees was squarely joined -- controls the decision

here. Conversely, the dicta in Pardini -- which do not reference

the Third Circuit's prior decision in Woodside -- is not

controlling. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is not

unmindful of its obligation to adhere faithfully to decisions of

the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, the question presented

appears to present a Hobson's choice in this regard, which is the

principal reason for this supplemental explication of the Court’s

agreement with Magistrate Judge Hay's well-reasoned opinion. - aw Ay age 55 — ~ or So Ta PN eR Oe a

ae Loe? PPbaat RoeAeAL RD ob AAPOR UPRARL RP ATL ~PORVEPPS AAS amirpnant @f Mion APTOS Dann A mat A New CARDS an A ¥ Nef Gan PoUWas } SNR eee SERee et TEaS eeSees EEE PRG HX, BrgeeeteP Le RFS POPRRS A ore de AP LAY a A edi ice TAMA, 22. 03F At 8 ah is pets

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ADOPTS the

Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Hay as supplemented

herein as the Opinion of the Court and AFFIRMS the Memorandum

Order of August 18, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

s Vorclo FlU.a men Thomas M. Hardiman United States District Judge

Dated: January 12, 2007

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